Sargent v. Long et al
Filing
56
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER.. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants motion for summary judgment (Doc. 39) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 28) is DISMISSED with prejudice.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction is DENIED as moot. (Doc. 55.). Signed by Magistrate Judge Nannette A. Baker on 12/9/20. (MRS)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
VINCENT E. SARGENT,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVE LONG, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:17-CV-12 NAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Vincent E. Sargent (“Plaintiff” or “Sargent”) filed this suit alleging that
Defendants (all current or former employees of the Missouri Department of Corrections) violated
his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act by discriminating against him based on his religion. This matter is
before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction. (Docs. 39, 55.) The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of
the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 13.) For
the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and deny
as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO/Preliminary Injunction.
I.
Procedural Background
Sargent, an incarcerated person proceeding pro se, filed this action on January 17, 2017.
In his Second Amended Complaint 1, he asserts that his First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights
and rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc, were violated by the Defendants regarding the type of meals served to Muslim
1
Plaintiff titled his Second Amended Complaint the “Third Amended Complaint.” In the order of June 22, 2018, the
Court directed that Plaintiff’s document be amended by interlineation as the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 27.)
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prisoners during their holy month of Ramadan, the ban of religious oils, and the limitations
placed on wearing of kufi headgear in prison. Defendants seek dismissal of the four claims
contained in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. In Count I, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants
Thomas Shanefelter, Douglas Worsham, Robin Norris violated his First Amendment rights to
freely practice his religion, his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and to be free
from discrimination, and his rights under the RLUIPA regarding sack lunches provided during
Ramadan. Counts II and III assert that Defendants Doug Worsham, Steve Johnson, Steve Long,
and Dave Domire violated his First Amendment rights to freely practice his religion, his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and to be free from discrimination, and his
rights under the RLUIPA, because they do not allow Muslim inmates to receive donations or
purchase religious oils. Finally, Count IV asserts that Defendants Dwayne Kempker, William
Stange, and Brandi Meredith violated his First Amendment rights and his Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection and to be free from discrimination because they do not
allow Sargent to wear a kufi as daily headgear.
Sargent requested that the Court order Defendants 2 to (1) accommodate fasting Muslim
prisoners with halal 3 meals for the evening meals during Ramadan, (2) commemorate one
Muslim holiday meal just as Christian holidays are commemorated, (3) allow Muslim prisoners
to purchase two ounces of religious oil donations from valid vendors or Islamic Centers,
(4) allow Muslim prisoners to wear kufis “like any other headgear,” and (5) Defendants
compensate Sargent $1,000.00 for his expenditures in prosecution of the action, and (6) costs be
assessed to Defendants.
2
Ten Defendants remain in this case. In addition to the nine Defendants identified in Counts I through IV, Sargent
brought suit against Defendant Joseph Campbell. Although Campbell is not specifically identified in Sargent’s
claims, he has moved for summary judgment with the other nine Defendants.
3
Halal is a term used to designate food that is prepared in a manner consistent with Islamic law. See
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/halal (last visited December 7, 2020).
2
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Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 39.) Sargent filed a Response in Opposition. (Doc. 48.)
Defendants filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 52.) Sargent then filed a Motion for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction. (Doc. 55.) Defendants have not filed a response, and the time to do so has passed.
II.
Standard of Review
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense on which
summary judgment is sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civil P. 56(a). Federal courts must adhere to the
axiom that “in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). “A
dispute is not ‘genuine’ unless the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Herring v. Can. Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir.
2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A party resisting summary judgment has the burden
to designate the specific facts that create a triable controversy. See Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004). Self-serving, conclusory statements without support
are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2
F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1993). At the summary judgment stage, the Court is not to weigh the
evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but rather only determine if there is a genuine issue
for trial. See Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
III.
Factual Background
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The Court finds that the following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Sargent,
are material and undisputed for purposes of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 4
A.
Plaintiff’s Religious Beliefs
Sargent, also known as Shahid Wali Muhammad, is an incarcerated person confined at
the Southeast Correctional Center. He currently practices the Islam faith and is a member of the
Al-Islam Muslim religious group. Ramadan is a twenty-nine or thirty day period of praying and
fasting observed once a year by Al-Islam and Nation of Islam Muslims. The start of Ramadan
changes every year, moving backwards on the calendar ten days every year according to the
Islamic lunar calendar. During Ramadan, Al-Islam and Nation of Islam Muslims fast from dawn
to sunset. The first day of Ramadan begins after dawn. When Ramadan occurs during warmer
months, the time period for sunset occurs later. Muslim inmates do not eat pork.
B.
Religious Programming Advisory Council
The Religious Programming Advisory Council (RPAC) is a volunteer group representing
various religions and spiritualities accommodated by the Department of Corrections (DOC) for
inmates confined by DOC and meets twice yearly. Defendant Douglas Worsham is the
Supervisor of Religious/Spiritual Programming with the DOC. His duties include meeting with
the RPAC twice per year to address religious issues. Dr. A. Rashed Nizam is a member of the
RPCA and serves as the community representative for the Muslim Islamic faith.
C.
Provision of Meals During Ramadan
The DOC makes a certified religious diet available to inmates upon approval of the DOC
Chaplain. The certified religious diet contains no meat, but does contain protein. It is food in its
4
The facts listed are undisputed by the parties or supported by appropriate citations to the record as required by
Local Rule 4.01(E). The Court has not included conclusory factual or legal statements or opinions in this fact
section. See Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653 F.3d 745, 751-52 (8th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff needed to explain the legal
significance of her factual allegations beyond mere conclusory statements importing the appropriate terms of art).
4
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natural state or processed food that has been certified by an approved rabbinical authority.
Inmates designating Al-Islam as their religious preference are eligible to receive foods from the
certified religious diet. The meal plan offered to all general population inmates three times a day
has a vegetarian option. Halal food items are not served to any inmates, including inmates in
general population at Southeast Correctional Center. Halal food items are available for purchase
in the prison canteen there.
The DOC instituted the practice of providing sack meals to any inmates observing
Ramadan to be eaten after sundown. The sack meals provided for later consumption, and at a
minimum, have nutritional value equal to meals provided to all general population inmates
during the evening meal. The sack meals provided to all inmates observing Ramadan consist of a
double entre portion, a vegetable portion, a fruit portion, a desert, and a drink. The most recent
model menu of breakfast and dinner for inmates observing Ramadan during the thirty day period
in 2018 shows they were provided a daily average of approximately 1857 to 2135 calories daily.
The DOC typically follows this model menu during Ramadan. According to USDA nutrition
dietary guidelines, males who were 60 years of age or younger who are either sedentary or
moderately active should consume a minimum of 2200 to 2400 calories per day. The minimum
caloric recommendation for males over 60 is between 2000 and 2400 calories per day.
D.
Bottled Fragrance Oils
The Islamic faith directs that Muslims be clean and odor-free while praying together.
Bottled fragrance oils used by Muslims were previously sold in the prison canteens. The DOC
found that the fragrance oil bottles were being used by some offenders to store unauthorized
substances. Unauthorized substances in the prison pose a security concern for both staff and
offenders. To address this security concern, the bottled fragrance oils have since been removed
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for sale from all DOC canteens. 5 As of March 1, 2019, the DOC has made available for purchase
inexpensive personal cleansing wipes as an alternative to bottled fragrance oils. Inmates who
practice the Wiccan religion are allowed to obtain as a group three plastic vials containing one
ounce of oil each for use in their religious ceremonies. The plastic vials are kept in the chaplain’s
office when not being used in the Wiccan religious ceremony. The Wiccans place a few drops of
oil in a bowl of water during their religious ceremonial expression. The use of the oil in any
other way, including personal application, is prohibited. The Wiccans as a group are allowed to
have no more than three vials for their use at any one time. No oils are allowed for personal use
by any Wiccans and cannot be placed on the inmate’s personal property list.
E.
Kufi Headgear
The DOC allows inmates to wear religious apparel in their cells and during religious
services. Kufis are worn on the head and are considered to be religious apparel. Unless
participating in a religious activity or required for work, inmates at Southeast Correctional
Center are prohibited from wearing headgear of any type indoors. State-issued caps in limited
colors with no writing are sold in the prison canteen.
IV.
Discussion
A.
Dismissal of Defendants Long, Dormire, Kempker, and Norris
First, Defendants Steve Long, Dave Dormire, Dwayne Kempker, and Robin Norris seek
dismissal of the claims against them. Sargent’s Second Amended Complaint seeks prospective
5
On December 21, 2018, the DOC’s Deputy Division Director of Adult Institutions stated that bottled fragrance oils
were removed for sale from all DOC prison canteens. (Doc. 41-1, Affidavit of Michelle Kasak.) However, it appears
the DOC’s formal discontinuation of the sale of fragrance oils took place after Defendants filed their summary
judgment motion. Sargent filed his Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment and supporting materials on
February 28, 2019. (Docs. 48, 49.) On March 1, 2019, the DOC issued a memorandum to all offenders stating that
the sale of fragrance (prayer) oils has been discontinued, and offenders will have until September 1, 2019 to use the
oils they currently have in their possession. (Doc. 53-12, Memorandum to All Offenders.)
6
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injunctive relief against them. Long, Dormire, Kempker, and Norris no longer work for the
DOC. Sargent admits that these defendants are no longer employed with the DOC.
Prospective injunctive relief is only available against state officials. Randolph v Rogers,
253 F.3d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Prospective
injunctive relief is no longer available against these Defendants, because they are no longer
employed by the DOC. The actions required by an injunction would be impossible for these
defendants to execute. Randolph, 253 F.3d at 346. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion to
dismiss the claims of injunctive and declaratory relief against these defendants from this action.
Because other Defendants are named in the claims, prospective and injunctive relief are available
against the remaining Defendants. The Court notes that Sargent’s Second Amended Complaint
alleges the same conduct in Claims 2 and 3. Claim 2 is asserted against Defendants Worsham
and Johnson and Claim 3 is asserted against Defendants Long and Dormire. Therefore, Sargent’s
claims in Claim 3 remain pending, because it is essentially the same conduct alleged in Claim 2
against Defendants Worsham and Johnson.
B.
First Amendment and RLUIPA Claims
Sargent’s Second Amended Complaint alleges violations of his First Amendment rights
(Claims 1 through 4 relating to the issues of sack meals, religious oils, and kufi headgear) and of
his statutory rights under RLUIPA (Claims 1 through 3 relating to sack meals and religious oils).
1. Legal Standards
“[C]onvicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their
conviction and confinement in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). “Inmates
clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law
shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “Because prisoners
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retain these rights, ‘when a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional
guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.” Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 36, 405-406 (1974)).
These First Amendment rights are limited, however, by considerations unique to the demands of
the penal system. Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 2008). In balancing the
constitutional rights of the prisoner with the valid objectives of the penal system, courts typically
defer to prison authorities “who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the
particular institution under examination.” O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
RLUIPA establishes a statutory free exercise claim “encompassing a higher standard of review
than that which applies to constitutional free exercise claims.” Murphy v. Missouri Department
of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2004).
To establish violations of the First Amendment and RLUIPA, a prisoner must
demonstrate that the prison policies at issue substantially burden his ability to practice his
religion. See Gladson v. Iowa Dep't of Corrs., 551 F.3d 825, 833 (8th Cir. 2009). A substantial
burden exists if the prison policy significantly inhibits or constrains religious conduct,
meaningfully curtails an inmate's ability to express adherence to his faith, or denies an inmate
reasonable opportunities to engage in fundamental religious activities. See Van Wyhe v. Reisch,
581 F.3d 639, 656 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation omitted). “Courts have generally found
that no ‘substantial burden’ exists if the regulation merely makes the practice of a religious belief
more expensive.” Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008).
If the prisoner fails to put forth sufficient evidence that his ability to practice his religion
has been substantially burdened, then the court need not apply the rational basis test to the Free
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Exercise claim and the strict scrutiny test to the RLUIPA claim.” 6 See Gladson, 551 F.3d at 831.
Once it is determined that a regulation imposes a substantial burden on a prisoner, the review of
that burden under the Free Exercise Clause differs from the RLUIPA. Patel, 515 F.3d at 813.
a. Free Exercise Clause
Under the Free Exercise Clause, if the Court finds that that the regulation creates a
substantial burden on the inmate’s constitutional rights, then the Court analyzes whether the
regulation “is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Murphy, 372 F.3d at 982
(citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). A court must examine the four Turner factors to determine
whether the prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests: (1)
whether there is a valid, rational connection between the challenged regulation and the
government interest put forth to justify it; (2) the continued availability of other means for
prisoners to exercise the right at issue; (3) the effect that accommodation of the right would have
on other prisoners, on prison staff, and on prison resources; and (4) the existence of ready
alternatives to the challenged regulation. Goff v. Graves, 362 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2004).
Great deference is given to the judgment of prison officials, “particularly with respect to
decisions that implicate institutional security.” Goff, 362 F.3d at 549.
b. RLUIPA
Under the RLUIPA:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution … even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person – (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
6
A prison policy that satisfies the RLUIPA's strict scrutiny test necessarily satisfies the rational basis test applied for
First Amendment purposes. See Gladson, 551 F.3d at 831 (under First Amendment, government must show that
prison policy is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective).
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the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a). Once a plaintiff makes a showing of substantial burden, the burden
shifts to the government to demonstrate that the prison policy is the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling government interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)(1)–(2); Van Wyhe,
581 F.3d at 648–49.
Under RLUIPA, religious exercise “includes any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-5. The concept of
religious exercise is to be “construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the
maximum extent permitted by the [RLUIPA] and the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).
The statutory language also acknowledges that RLUIPA “may require a government to incur
expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c). “[A] prisoner’s request for an accommodation must be sincerely based on
a religious belief and not some other motivation.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360-61 (2015).
“RLUIPA’s substantial burden inquiry asks whether the government has substantially burdened
religious exercise, … not whether the RLUIPA claimant is able to engage in other forms of
exercise.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 361-62. “RLUIPA does not ‘elevate accommodation of religious
observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and security.’” Fegans, 537 F.3d at 902
(citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005)).
2. Meals for Muslim Inmates During Ramadan
Sargent’s Complaint alleges Defendants violated his rights by providing cold sack meals
during Ramadan. This claim is asserted against Defendants Shanefelter, Worsham, and Norris.
Sargent argues that the sack meals punish the inmates who fast for Ramadan and
discourages Muslim inmates from their religious duty to fast. In his deposition, Sargent states
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that he should not be “forced to eat a cold meal.” He also states, “Just because I am Muslim
doesn’t mean I shouldn’t be able to receive a hot meal.” He asserts that the DOC should provide
fasting Muslim inmates with a microwaveable Halal meal and a hot meal like the other inmates.
Sargent’s deposition testimony confirms that hot meals during Ramadan are not required as a
religious practice, but a preference. Sargent also confirms that he can and has purchased
microwaveable food through the canteen to supplement the cold sack meal provided by the
DOC. He asserts that he should not have to purchase hot meals and that the DOC should provide
hot meals. Sargent confirms that there is nothing in the meals provided that is contrary to the
tenets of his faith. Finally, Sargent states that the fasting inmates are not given three meals a day
like the rest of the general population and the evening meal does not provide enough nutrition to
make up for the missed meal.
The DOC asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Sargent’s First Amendment
claim. In support of their motion, Michele Kasaki, Deputy Division Director of Adult Institutions
for the DOC, averred in an affidavit the following. DOC dining room staff typically work no
later than 7:00 p.m. on any day. During Ramadan, it would be extremely burdensome financially
to provide adequate staff to work after regular hours to allow Muslim inmates to eat meals in the
dining room. Inadequate staffing poses a security risk to the safety of both staff and inmates in
the correctional facilities. Therefore, the DOC provides cold sack meals to offenders observing
Ramadan so they can eat after sundown. Further, the DOC asserts that the USDA recommends
2200 to 2400 calories per day for sedentary or moderately active males who are 60 years old are
younger and between 2000 and 2400 calories per day for males over the age of 60. The daily
average caloric intake offered to inmates during Ramadan in 2018 was 1857 to 2135 calories per
day.
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Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that Sargent has not established a
substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion. Sargent admits that the consumption of
hot meals during Ramadan is not a central tenet of his faith. Although Sargent states that the cold
meal and lack of fulfillment can deter someone from fasting, he admits that he personally has not
been deterred him from fasting and he adds to his meals from the canteen, including
microwaveable and halal items from the canteen. The variable difference in caloric intake of
between 143 and 343 calories is not significant enough to create a substantial burden when
Sargent has testified in his deposition that he has been able to supplement his evening meal with
hot food and additional calories. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has held that the failure to provide
halal meals does not substantially burden an inmate’s ability to practice his religion. See, e.g.,
Pratt v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 267 F. App'x 482 (8th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff did not show defendants
placed a substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion by failing to provide him with
halal meat); Patel, 515 F.3d at 810-812 & n.8 (prison’s meal plan regulations did not
substantially burden Muslim inmate’s free exercise rights where inmate had access to only
vegetarian entrees, and some of those entrees he had to pay for himself). Sargent has not shown
that providing sack meals during Ramadan for consumption after sundown significantly inhibits,
meaningfully curtails, or denies Sargent a reasonable opportunity to practice his religion.
Because Sargent has not put forth sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude his
ability to practice his religion has been substantially burdened, Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on this claim.
3. Oil Purchases or Donations
In Claims 2 and 3, Sargent alleges Defendants violated his rights by refusing to allow him
to receive oil donations or to purchase religious oils from a valid Islamic or Islamic center, and
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Defendants violated his rights by directing the DOC to discontinue the sale of fragrance oils in
the inmate canteen. Claim 2 is asserted against Defendants Worsham and Johnson. Claim 3 is
asserted against Defendants Long and Domire.
Defendants argue that the discontinuation of the sale of bottled fragrance oil does not
violate the religious tenets of Islam because there is no requirement that Muslims apply fragrance
oils to their bodies. Sargent responds that he uses prayer oils in his religious services, and his
rights are being infringed upon by not being allowed to purchase religious oils from a verified
Islamic vendor or from the canteen. Defendants reply that the DOC now makes disposable
personal cleansing wipes available for cleansing to satisfy religious practices.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that there are disputed facts as to whether the use of
oils is required by Sargent’s religious beliefs. The RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to
include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 20000cc-5(7). Despite Defendants’ contention that there is no
requirement that Muslims use fragrance oils, Plaintiffs’ evidence reflects that Defendant Kemper
acknowledges that oils “are suitable for use for Islamic religious purposes.” (Doc. 48-2 at 17,
February 10, 2015 Grievance Appeal Response.) Whether or not the use of oils is required by
Sargent’s religious beliefs is a factual determination, which should not be quickly dismissed on
summary judgment. See Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988. For purposes of summary judgment, it is
appropriate to assume that Sargent’s belief that use of oils is required for his communal worship
is an exercise of religion under the RLUIPA.
Even with this assumption, Sargent must still show that Defendants have substantially
burdened his religious exercise by no longer selling oils or allowing outside vendors to donate or
sell oils to offenders. Several courts have found that prison regulations imposing similar
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prohibitions on possession of worship materials does not constitute a substantial burden on the
practice of religion where an inmate has not established that such a burden exists. See, e.g.,
Hodgson v. Fabian, 378 Fed.Appx. 592, 593 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We agree with the district court
that Hodgson did not establish that either his ability to keep prayer oils in his cell or a delay in
receiving his religious mail substantially burdened his religion.”); Willard v. Hobbs, 2009 WL
2497637, at *10 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 12, 2009) (plaintiff failed to show denial of essential oils
created a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion under the First Amendment or
RLUIPA).
However, the Court need not resolve whether Sargent’s failure to present evidence
concerning the alleged substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion entitles
Defendants to summary judgment. Even if the Court assumes the denial of access to oils imposes
a substantial burden, Defendants have presented undisputed evidence showing that their decision
to make inexpensive disposable towelettes available for purchase as an alternative to selling
bottled fragrance oils is the least restrictive means to further a compelling interest under the
RLUIPA. While this test imposes a high burden on prison officials, this court must accord “a
significant degree of deference to the expertise of prison officials in evaluating whether they met
that burden.” Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554 (8th Cir. 1996). Defendants provided
evidence of safety and security concerns supporting this decision. Some offenders were using the
bottles to hide contraband, and unauthorized substances entering the prison is a security concern
for the safety of the staff and offenders. The discontinuation of selling bottled fragrance oil and
the prohibition of donated or outside-purchased oils serve the compelling government interest of
enhancing prison security through minimizing contraband. See Singson v. Norris, 553 F.3d 660,
662–63 (8th Cir. 2009) (“safety and security are compelling government interests”); Fegans, 537
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F.3d at 903 (in absence of substantial evidence indicating officials have exaggerated response to
prison security considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment).
In his opposition, Sargent does not comment on the proposal of inexpensive disposable
towelettes as an alternative, nor does he offer his own alternative means to exercising his religion
that addresses the DOC’s security concerns. Instead he argues that Defendants’ concerns
regarding the oils being infused with narcotics is not well-founded, pointing to what appears to
be a memo produced by the DOC. The memo reflects that drug testing of the oils sold in the
canteen can produce false positives for amphetamines, and that it would be very unusual for
amphetamines to be found in the oils that were sealed in the manufacturer-supplied containers.
(Doc. 48-2 at 26-28.) While this evidence arguably minimizes a concern regarding the infusion
of amphetamines in the oils, the tests were conducted on sealed bottles from the manufacturer
that were for sale in the canteen. Sargent does not address the concerns regarding receipt of oil
bottles from outside vendors or concealment of non-amphetamine contraband within the oil
bottles. He provides no evidence to establish less restrictive alternatives that serve Defendants’
security interests.
On the other hand, Defendants’ alternative means of making personal cleansing wipes
available for purchase in the canteen, in addition to soap and deodorant already available, allows
for Sargent and any inmate who uses cleansing products “as part of a particular faith practice
and/or other personal cleansing needs” to be clean and odor-free while in prayer. (Doc. 41-3,
Affidavit of Douglas Worsham; Doc. 53-11, Supplemental Affidavit of Douglas Worsham; Doc.
53-12, March 1, 2019 Memorandum to All Offenders Re: Discontinuation of Fragrance (Prayer)
Oils.) Given the alternative means of disposable towelettes to allow Sargent to be clean and odor
free for communal prayer and the lack of evidence regarding less restrictive means of furthering
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the DOC’s security and safety interests, the Court finds that there are no disputed facts with
respect to Sargent’s RLUIPA claims based on the unavailability of oils. Because summary
judgment in favor of Defendants is warranted under the more stringent requirements of the
RLUIPA, the Court finds that Defendants also have a legitimate penological interest in
protecting the safety and security of staff and inmates by prohibiting access to oils, and that
Sargent has failed to create a disputed fact issue as to whether Defendants violated his First
Amendment rights.
4. Kufi Headgear
Claim 4 is asserted against Defendants Kemper, Stange, and Meredith. Sargent offers no
evidence that being allowed to wear a kufi only during religious activities or in his cell, as
opposed to wearing it all the time, substantially burdens his religious exercise. See Rogers v.
Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1216 (8th Cir. 1982) (“We find that no constitutional right of the prisoners
was violated by the prohibition on wearing prayer caps and robes outside religious services.”);
see also Junaid v. Kempker, No. 4:04CV57 CDP, 2009 WL 881311, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 27,
2009) (only allowing kufi during religious activities did not impose a substantial burden under
RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause); Jihad v. Fabian, 2011 WL 1641885, at *17 (D. Minn.
Feb. 17, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1641767 (D. Minn. May 2,
2011) (no substantial burden from policy prohibiting plaintiff from wearing a kufi or displaying
an Islamic medallion while outside his cell). Accordingly, this Court finds that because Sargent
has not put forth sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude that his ability to
practice his religion has been substantially burdened, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Sargent’s First Amendment claim regarding kufi headgear.
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Lastly, although Defendants do not directly address Sargent’s Establishment Clause
claim, his Second Amended Complaint and summary judgment opposition both make reference
to the Establishment Clause as a basis for Claim 4 regarding the DOC’s limitations on wearing
kufi headgear. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits any “law respecting
an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. The test for an Establishment Clause claim
is set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), which provides that the government
action does not violate the Establishment Clause if it has a secular purpose, does not have a
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not result in excessive entanglement
with religion. Id. at 612–13. Here, the DOC’s purpose in limiting the use of any headgear (not
just kufi headgear) indoors unless participating in a religious activity or required for work is to
provide a safe environment for offenders and staff. Sargent has presented no evidence to suggest
the DOC exclusively promotes or favors any particular religion in its headgear policy. The
primary effect of this policy is not to inhibit Sargent’s religion, but to protect the inmates and
staff. Accordingly, to the extent Sargent intends to bring this First Amendment claim based on
the Establishment Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause, Defendants are still entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. See Murphy, 372 F.3d at 985; Izquierdo v. Crawford, No.
1:05CV192 CDP, 2007 WL 2873210, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2007) (“Defendants are also
entitled to summary judgment on this claim because the uncontradicted evidence shows that the
defendants’ actions had a secular purpose and did not advance or inhibit religion.”).
For the reasons discussed in this section, the Court concludes that Defendants have
demonstrated there is no genuine dispute of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Sargent’s claims that Defendants violated his rights under the RLUIPA, the
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Free Exercise Clause, and/or the Establishment Clause. For the same reasons, Defendants’
motion for summary judgment on these points will be granted.
C.
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims
Sargent’s Second Amended Complaint alleges violations of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in each of his four claims. The Equal Protection Clause requires
that the government “treat similarly situated people alike.” Murphy, 372 F.3d at 984 (internal
citations omitted)). To establish an equal protection claim, Sargent must show that he is treated
differently from similarly-situated inmates and that the different treatment is based upon a
suspect classification or a fundamental right. See Patel v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 515
F.3d 807, 816 (8th Cir. 2008). Religion is a suspect classification, and therefore, Sargent must
show that the decision of the Defendants was motivated by intentional discrimination and
furthered no legitimate penological interest. See id. at 816–17; see also Rouse v. Benson, 193
F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 1999). The Court will address each claim of an equal protection violation
in turn.
1. Meal for Muslim Inmates During Ramadan
In Claim 1, Sargent alleges he is denied the same meal that is served to the general prison
population for the evening meal during the month of Ramadan, and that Jewish inmates are
accommodated with kosher meals.
To the extent Sargent’s equal protection claim is based on the allegation that he is not
receiving the same meal as the general prison population, this claim fails because Sargent has not
shown that the general prison population is a similarly situated group, or that the prison meal
policies were applied unequally. There is no evidence that Sargent is unable to receive the meals
that the general prison population receives during Ramadan. On the contrary, the purpose of
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providing sack meals during Ramadan is to accommodate Muslim inmates who need to eat later
than the general prison population because they elect to fast as part of their religion.
Sargent also argues that he is treated differently than Jewish inmates, who are
accommodated with kosher meals and a kosher canteen list, while Sargent does not get halal
meals. Even assuming Sargent has been treated differently than similarly situated inmates,
Sargent “must show that the decision to serve kosher entrees but not halal entrees was motivated
by intentional or purposeful discrimination.” See Patel, 515 F.3d at 816. Sargent has not
presented any evidence suggesting Defendants or the DOC had a discriminatory purpose.
Defendants presented competent evidence to show that the DOC provided sack meals
specifically to accommodate inmates with diet restrictions based on religion. The canteen has
available halal items for purchase, and Sargent purchases and consumes the halal items as part of
his diet. Prior to serving sack meals during Ramadan, Defendant Worsham spoke with the
Director of the Leadership Development Center which is part of the Islamic Society of North
America regarding the requirements of the Muslim faith. Defendants have shown that the DOC
is making an effort to address issues relating to all religions, including the Islamic faith. Sargent
cannot establish a discriminatory purpose in providing him sack meals for his evening
consumption during Ramadan and/or failure to provide halal meals. Because Sargent has not
presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a factual dispute concerning the issue of whether
the food policy was motivated by discriminatory intent, his equal protection claim lacks merit as
a matter of law.
2. Oil Purchases or Donations
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In Claims 2 and 3, Sargent alleges Catholics and Wiccans are allowed to receive and
purchase religious oils but Muslims are denied the same treatment. 7 Sargent appears to be
claiming that Muslims have been treated differently than Catholics and/or Wiccans because
Wiccans are allowed to purchase religious oils and Sargent cannot. In support of this claim,
Sargent submits DOC requisition forms that reflect canteen purchases made in 2015 for “Chapel
Allotment-Wicca.” (Doc. 48-2 at 13-16.) The materials purchased include fragrance oils. Sargent
also submits a February 10, 2015 grievance appeal response from Defendant Kemper. Defendant
Kemper rejected Sargent’s request to receive oil from outside vendors and donations, explaining
that that in 2015 oils were available for purchase in the canteen and therefore could not be
purchased from outside vendors, regardless of religion. (Doc. 48-2 at 17.) Sargent also submits
the Affidavit of Wyman Hussey. (Doc. 48-1.) Mr. Hussey identifies himself as a faith facilitator
for inmates that practice the Wiccan faith and states Wiccans are allowed to order religious oils.
Sargent argues this evidence makes which make it “clear that the [M]uslims were treated
different in their request for religious oils.”
In their reply, Defendants have submitted competence evidence demonstrating that the
sale of bottled fragrance oils has been discontinued due to safety and security concerns. Wiccans
are still allowed to have a maximum of three one-ounce vials of oil in the chaplain’s office and
may use the oil by putting a few drops in a bowl of water to create a fragrant worship
environment. However, as of September 1, 2019, no inmate may have bottled fragrance oils as
part of their personal property. Moreover, no inmate may use fragrance oils for application on
their person. These policies apply to all inmates, including Muslims and Wiccans. As a result,
7
Claim 3 references a right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, although the allegations therein
do not state an equal protection claim. Further, as discussed above, the Claim 3 Defendants, Long and Dormire, are
no longer DOC employees such that prospective injunctive relief is no longer available against these Defendants.
Nevertheless, because Claims 2 and 3 contain similar allegations, and Claim 2 includes references to other religious
groups’ use of oils, the Court construes Claim 3 to include the allegations contained in Claim 2 with respect to other
religious groups and includes Claim 3 in its equal protection analysis.
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Sargent cannot show that he has been treated differently from similarly situated prisoners
because of his religion.
Even if Sargent could show that Muslims and Wiccans were similar groups that were
treated dissimilarly, Sargent has not alleged or provided evidence to support that any alleged
disparate treatment was motivated by intentional discrimination. Further, as explained above,
Defendants have a legitimate penological interest in protecting the safety and security of staff
and inmates by prohibiting access to oils. Thus, Sargent’s Equal Protection Claim on this basis
fails. See Patel, 515 F.3d at 816-817; Izquierdo, No. 1:05CV192 CDP, 2007 WL 2873210, at *8
(defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Equal Protection claim where the dissimilar
treatment is rationally related to legitimate penological interests).
3. Kufi Headgear
In Claim 4, Sargent alleges that the DOC’s headgear policy constitutes discrimination
against kufi headgear, “a hat that [he is] allowed to own and freely possess, but can only wear
during prayer.” In his opposition to summary judgment, Sargent claims the limitations on
wearing kufis is a violation of his Equal Protection rights, and Defendants’ safety and security
interests are a “blanket defense for challenges to prison policies or actions.” Sargent’s
unsupported legal conclusions do not suffice to establish a disputed fact to overcome summary
judgment. Sargent argues the headgear policies have never been regularly applied, but he does
not identify any group that receives different treatment. “To survive summary judgment,
[Sargent] must identify the characteristics of the class he claims to be similarly situated to and
present some evidence that other groups within the class were not also restricted in similar
ways.” Murphy, 372 F.3d at 984. Sargent has failed to do so. Because there is no evidence to
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support the claim that the headgear restrictions were applied unequally, summary judgment is
appropriate on this claim. See id.
For the reasons discussed in this section, the Court finds that there is no genuine fact
dispute regarding whether Defendants violated Sargent’s equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims,
and their motion for summary judgment on these points will be granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 39)
is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 28) is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction is DENIED as moot. (Doc. 55.)
A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is entered the same
date.
NANNETTE A. BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 9th day of December, 2020.
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