Aleksiejczyk v. Berryhill

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The Court finds the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and, therefore, the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. A separate Judgment will accompany this Order. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 3/18/2019. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
JOHN J. ALEKSIEJCZYK,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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Case No. l:17-CV-00166 JAR

. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER.
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner of
Social Security's final decision denying John Joseph Aleksiejczyk's ("Aleksiejczyk")
application for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.

I.

Background

Aleksiejczyk applied for supplemental security income benefits on October 24, 2013,
alleging disability as of March 1, 2004, due to mood disorder, anxiety disorder, personality
disorder, and poly substance abuse. After his application was denied at the initial administrative
level, he requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Following a hearing on
November 9, 2015, the ALJ issu~d a written decision on June 29, 2016, denying his application.
Aleksiejczyk's request for review by the Appeals Council was denied. Thus, the decision of the
ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107
(2000).

II.

Facts

The Court's review of this record shows that the Statement of Faqts is accurate and
complete, however, the materiality and relevancy of numerous facts is disputed, as Aleksiejczyk
was incarcerated at the time the indicated medical treatment was provided. 1 (Doc. No. 24-1).
The Court otherwise· adopts Aleksiejczyk's Statement of Facts, and specific facts will be
discussed as part of the analysis. (Doc. No. 17 at 1-3).

III.

Standards

The court's role on judicial review is to determine whether the ALJ's findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Johnson v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 991, 992
(8th Cir. 2009). "Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." Id. (citations omitted). The court may not reverse merely because
substantial evidence exists in the record that would support a contrary outcome or because the
court would have decided the case differently. See Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022
(8th Cir. 2002).
To determine whether the ALJ's final decision is supported by substantial evidence, the
court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and to consider:
(1) The findings of credibility made by the ALJ;
(2) The education, background, work history, and age of the claimant;
(3) The medical evidence given by the claimant's treating physicians;
(4) The subjective complaints of pain and description of the claimant's physical activity
and impairment;
(5) The corroboration by third parties of the claimant's physical impairment;
(6) The testimony of vocational experts based upon prior hypothetical questions which
fairly set forth the claimant's physical impairment; and
1

SSI applicants are ineligible for benefits for any month throughout which the applicant is a resident of a
public institution, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.201, 416.211. 2

(7) The testimony of consulting physicians.
Brand v. Sec'y of Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 1980).
The Social Security Act defines as disabled a person who is "unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
impairment must be "of such severity that [the claimant] is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person
is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a), 404.1520(a). "If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any
step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not
disabled." Goff v. Barnhart, 421 FJd 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart,
390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)).
First, the claimant must not be engaged in "substantial gainful activity" ("SGA''). 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a), 404.1520(a). Second, the claimant must have a "severe impairment,"
defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits
[claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c),
404.1520(c). "The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the
claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal

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impact on [his or] her ability to work." Page v. Astrue,' 484 FJd 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Caviness v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2001)).

If the_ claimant has a severe impairment, the ALJ must determine at step three whether any
of the claimant's impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the Regulations. 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1520(d). If the claimant has one of, or the medical equivalent of, these
impairments, then the claimant is per se disabled without consideration of the claimant's age,
education, or work history. Id.
Disability claims based on mental disorders are evaluated in essentially the same manner
as claims based on physical impairments. If the mental impairment is severe, the ALJ must
determine whether it meets or equals any of the Listings. The Listings of mental impairments
consist of three sets of "criteria"- the paragraph A criteria (a set of medical findings), paragraph
B criteria (a set of impairment-related functional limitations), and paragrap_h C criteria
(additional functional criteria applicable to certain Listings). The paragraph A criteria
substantiate medically the presence of a particular mental disorder. The paragraphs B and C
criteria describe the impairment-related functional limitations that are incompatible with the
ability to perform SGA: There are four areas in which the ALJ rates the degree of functional
limitation: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or
pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation (the "paragraph B criteria"). 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a(c)(3). A claimant can satisfy the paragraph C criteria by showing: (1) extended
episodes of decompensation; (2) a "residual disease process that has resulted in such marginal
adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands or change in the environment would
be predicted to cause the individual to decompensate," or (3) a "[c]urrent history of 1 or more
years' inability to function outside a highly supportive living arrangement." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

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Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00(C). The paragraph C criteria are assessed only if the paragraph B
criteria are not satisfied. If the claimant satisfies the A and B, or A and C criteria, he will be
considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00(A); see also 20 C.F.R.
404.1520a (detailing evaluation of mental impairments).

If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a Listing, the ALJ must determine
the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §
12.00; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). RFC is an assessment of the claimant's ability to perform
sustained work-related physical and mental activities in light of his impairments. SSR 96-8p.
The relevant mental work activities include understanding, remembering, and carrying out
instructions; responding appropriately to supervision and co-workers; and handling work
pressures in a work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c).
At step four, the ALJ must determine whether, given his RFC, the claimant can return to
his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(±), 416.920(a)(4)(iv),
416.920(±); McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605,611 (8th Cir. 2011). If the claimant can still perform
past relevant work, he will not be found to be disabled; if not, the ALJ proceeds to step five to
determine whether the claimant is able to perform any other work in the national economy in
light of his age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant
cannot make an adjustment to other work, then he will be found to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
416.920(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
Through step four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove he is disabled.
Brantley, 2013 WL 4007441, at *3 (citation omitted). At step five, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to establish that the claimant maintains the RFC to perform a significant number
of jobs within the national economy. Id. "The ultimate burden of persuasion to prove disability,

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however, remains with the claimant." Meyerpeter v. Astrue, 902 F. Supp.2d 1219, 1229 (E.D.
Mo. 2012) (citations omitted).

IV.

Decision of the ALJ

The ALJ found Aleksiejczyk had the severe impairments of mood disorder, anxiety
disorder, personality disorder, and polysubstance abuse, but that no impairment or combination
of impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 29-30). In making this finding, the ALJ found
Aleksiejczyk's impairments did not satisfy the criteria of either paragraph B or paragraph C. (Tr.
30). Specifically, Aleksiejczyk has only moderate restriction in activities of daily living, no more
than moderate difficulties with social functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace, and no
extended episodes of decompensation. (Tr. 30-31). The ALJ further noted that no treating,
reviewing or examining medical source had opined that Aleksiejczyk's mental symptoms are so
severe as to satisfy the paragraph C criteria. (Id.).
After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Aleksiej czyk had the
residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with
the following nonexertional limitations: he can perform simple, routine tasks and make simple
work-related decisions; he should not have interaction with the public; he may have only
occasional interaction with coworkers; he should only occasionally engage in decision-making;
and he should only have occasional changes in the work setting. (Tr. 32). The ALJ found
Aleksiejczyk capable of performing work that exists in the national economy

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,

which do not

require the performance of work-related activities precluded by his RFC. (Tr. 38). Thus, the ALJ
found Aleksiejczyk was not disabled as defined by the Act. (Id.)

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Aleksiejczyk has no past relevant work. (Tr. 37).
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V.

Discussion

In his appeal of the Commissioner's decision, Aleksiejczyk argues that the ALJ
improperly evaluated the medical opinion evidence. (Doc. No. 17 at 27-31). Specifically,
Aleksiejczyk argues the ALJ improperly assigned "little weight" to the opinion of consulting
physician Dr. James Critchlow. (Doc. No. 17 at 29). In determining whether the ALJ properly
considered the medical opinion evidence, the court's role is limited to reviewing whether
substantial evidence supports this determination, and not deciding whether the evidence supports
the claimant's view of the evidence. See Brown v. Astrue, 611 F.3d 941, 951 (8th Cir. 2010);
Brown v. Colvin, No. 4:13CV01693 SPM, 2014 WL 2894937, at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 26, 2014).
When evaluating the opinion of a non-examining or consultative source, the ALJ must
· evaluate the degree to which the opinion considers all of the pertinent evidence, including
opinions of treating and other examining sources. Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 967 (8th
Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), 416.927(d)(3). The opinions of non-examining or
consultative sources do not, by themselves, constitute substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, Vossen v. Astrue, 612 FJd 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010); Wildman, 596 F.3d at 967, but
may properly be considered along with the other evidence of record. See Casey v. Astrue, 503
F.3d 687, 694 (8th Cir. 2007) ("The ALJ did not err in considering the opinion of [the State
agency medical consultant] along with the medical evidence as a whole."). Upon review of the
record, the Court finds the ALJ provided good reasons for the weight given to the opinion of Dr.
Critchlow.
Dr. Critchlow conducted a physical consultative examination of Aleksiejczyk op.
December 21, 2015 and February 1, 2016. During the December 21, 2015 examination, Dr.
Critchlow found Aleksiejczyk had difficulty understanding questions. (Tr. 734). His affect was

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bland, his speech very slow, with slow movements, attributed as side effects from medications.
(Id.) Despite noting that Aleksiejczyk was "not being treated by a psychiatrist" at the time of the
examination, Dr. Critchlow opined that he was permanently disabled due to psychiatric problems
and side effects from medication. @.) During the February 1, 2016 examination, Aleksiejczyk
presented in a meek manner, speaking slowly, and lacking eye contact. (Tr. 802). Aleksiejczyk
reported having anger issues, and expressed feelings of paranoia and volatility towards others.
(Id.) Dr. Critchlow opined that Aleksiejczyk would find great difficulty in being hired or
participating in the workplace. (Id.)
The ALJ gave "little weight" to Dr. Critchlow's opinion because it was inconsistent with
the overall medical record and because his opinion appeared largely based on Aleksiejczyk's
subjective allegations. (Tr. 36). See Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The
opinion of a consulting physician, who examines a claimant once, or not at all, generally receives
very little weight."); see also Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012)
(concluding the ALJ properly discounted a doctor's report, in part, because it "cited only
limitations based on [the claimant's] subjective complaints, not his own objective findings").
First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Critchlow performed physical, not mental, examinations of
Aleksiejczyk. Second, Dr. Critchlow provided only conclusory opinions on Aleksiejczyk's
disability, as opposed to an actual diagnosis or specific functional opinion. Moreover, the finding
of disability is reserved to the Commissioner and is never entitled to controlling weight or
special significance. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927; SSR 96-5p.
The ALJ also found Dr. Critchlow's opinions inconsistent with the opinion of evaluating
psychologist Dr. Paul Rexroat. Dr. Rexroat examined Aleksiejczyk on December 9, 2015.
During this mental status examination, Dr. Rexroat diagnosed Aleksiejczyk with depression,

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bipolar disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, cannabis use, and opioid and alcohol use in some
degree of remission. (Tr. 726). Aleksiejczyk exhibited signs of slight anxiety, tension and
moderately restricted range of emotional response with a flat affect. (Tr. 724). He also displayed
a normal energy level, alertness and cooperation. (Id.) Dr. Rexroat concluded that Aleksiej czyk
had mild restrictions in daily living activities and moderate limitations in social functioning,
concentration and memory functioning. (Tr. 726). The ALJ gave "great weight" to Dr. Rexroat's
opinion, finding it well reasoned and consistent with the medical evidence of record as well as
with the totality of the credible evidence. (Tr. 36). Because Aleksiejczyk alleged disability
involves a mental impairment, it was reasonable for the ALJ to give greater weight to Dr.
Rexroat' s opinion because he was the examining psychologist. Generally more weight is given to
the opinion of a specialist on matters related to their area of specialty. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(5); Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 2014).
The ALJ also properly gave "great weight" to the opinions of the State Agency examiners
(Tr. 90-98) that Aleksiejczyk is able to meet the basic mental demands of competitive work on a
sustained basis despite the limitations resulting from his impairment. (Tr. 36-37). Toland v.
Colvin, 761 F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir. 2014) (State agency medical consultants are highly qualified
experts in Social Security disability evaluation; therefore, ALJs must consider their findings as
opinion evidence); Brandes v. Colvin, No. 4:15-CV-01737-NCC, 2017 WL 168457, at *8 (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 17, 2017) (same). See also Kamann v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 945, 951 (8th Cir. 2013) (State
agency psychologist's opinion supported the ALJ's finding that claimant could work despite his
mental impairments); Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 694 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding the ALJ did
not err in considering State agency psychologist's opinion along with the medical evidence as a
whole).

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It is the duty of the Commissioner to resolve conflicts in the medical opinion evidence,
Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th Cir. 2012), and, wheri assessing a claimant's RFC,
an ALJ need not credit the entirety of a medical opinion or directly correlate a medical opinion to
the RFC. Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 927 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the ALJ must determine
a claimant's RFC based on her review of the record as a whole. Here, the ALJ evaluated all of
the medical opinion evidence of record and adequately explained his reasons for the weight
given this evidence. For the reasons set out above, substantial evidence on the record as whole
supports the ALJ's evaluation of the medical opinion evidence.

V.

Conclusion

The Court finds the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as
a whole, and, therefore, the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and

Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. A separate Judgment will accompany this
Order.
Dated this 18th day of March, 2019.

JOH
OSS
UNITDSTATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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