Woolverton v. City of Wardell et al
Filing
90
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 76 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Casey Redden, Defendant Chris Rudd motion is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Abbie Crites-Leoni on 5/28/20. (MRS)
Case: 1:17-cv-00170-ACL Doc. #: 90 Filed: 05/28/20 Page: 1 of 17 PageID #: 1052
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
LEE WOOLVERTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF WARDELL, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:17 CV 170 ACL
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lee Woolverton filed this action against Defendants City of Wardell, Casey
Redden, Chris Rudd, Deputy Edward Holloway, Sheriff Tommy Greenwell, and Western Surety
Company, 1 alleging violations of his constitutional rights resulting from an April 2016 traffic
stop. Presently pending before the Court is Defendants Christopher Rudd and Casey Redden’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 76.) The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Background
In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts an excessive force claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Rudd and Redden in their official and individual capacities.
Rudd and Redden were police officers employed by the City of Wardell, Missouri, during the
relevant time. Redden stopped the automobile Woolverton was driving on April 11, 2016, in the
City of Wardell, for allegedly having loud music playing and a license plate light out. Defendant
Redden then contacted Defendant Rudd to assist Redden with the stop. The Pemiscot County
Sheriff’s dispatch told Redden that Woolverton had a warrant out for his arrest from the City of
1
Defendants City of Wardell, Western Surety Company, Deputy Edward Holloway, and Sheriff
Tommy Greenwell have been dismissed from this action. The only remaining Defendants are
Officers Chris Rudd and Casey Redden.
1
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Malden for failure to appear. Woolverton alleges that Defendants Rudd and Redden used
excessive force when one or both: (1) slammed his head into a police vehicle; (2) took him to the
ground while his hands were cuffed behind his back, causing his leg to break; (3) roughly hauled
him about, knowing his leg was broken; and (4) roughly hauled him into the police vehicle
instead of calling an ambulance. Woolverton claims that he suffered serious and continuing
injuries as a result of the Defendants’ actions.
Defendants Rudd and Redden filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 41.) In an Order dated May 14, 2018, the Court granted the Motion
as to Woolverton’s official capacity claims against Rudd and Redden, but denied it in all other
respects. (Doc. 51.)
Rudd and Redden filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on February 20, 2020.
They argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Woolverton’s excessive force claim
because the force exerted on Woolverton was objectively reasonable given the circumstances,
and because Woolverton failed to demonstrate that the takedown maneuver employed was a
violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Woolverton responds that Defendants are
not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendants assaulted him when he was not combative
and did not resist arrest. He argues that, due to the parties’ differing stories, summary judgment
is not appropriate.
Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court may grant a motion for
summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden is on the moving party.
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City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988).
After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show
that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact is not the “mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties.” State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 358 F.3d 982, 985
(8th Cir. 2004). “Instead, the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.”
Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations
omitted). A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is
sufficient evidence in his favor to allow a jury to return a verdict for him. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “If ‘opposing parties tell two different stories,’ the court must
review the record, determine which facts are material and genuinely disputed, and then view
those facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party – as long as those facts are not ‘so
blatantly contradicted by the record . . . that no reasonable jury could believe’ them.” Reed v.
City of St. Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007)). Self-serving, conclusory statements without support are not sufficient to defeat
summary judgment. Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir.
1993).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of any inferences that
logically can be drawn from those facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Woods v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005). The Court may not “weigh the evidence in the
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summary judgment record, decide credibility questions, or determine the truth of any factual
issue.” Kampouris v. St. Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2000). The court is
required, however, to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Robert
Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976).
Facts 2
Viewed in the light most favorable to Woolverton, the record establishes the following
facts. On April 11, 2016, at approximately 10:10 p.m., Redden stopped Woolverton on the side
of the road at the intersection of Railroad Street and Broad Street as Woolverton was leaving a
bar. Redden states that he stopped Woolverton because he was playing loud music and because
his license plate light was not working. 3 Woolverton provided Redden with a copy of his ID.
While running a check on Woolverton’s ID, Redden discovered that Woolverton had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest through the City of Malden for contempt of court (failure to
appear). (Do. 77-2 at p. 65.) Redden requested backup assistance from Rudd approximately
three minutes later, at 10:13 p.m.
The parties’ stories diverge significantly at this point. Redden states that Woolverton
became irate about the stop, and began “cursing and threatening” Redden. Redden asked
Woolverton to exit his vehicle when he learned about the warrant. Redden attempted to perform
a pat-down of Woolverton, but he was unable to complete one as Woolverton became further
agitated and continued to jerk, twist, and turn during the pat-down process. Redden proceeded to
2
The facts are taken from Defendants’ Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (Doc. 77-1)
and Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Uncontroverted Facts (Doc. 79).
3
Woolverton denies that he was playing loud music and that his license plate light was out. He
claims that Redden never told him why he stopped him, although he believes Redden was
“showing off” for a woman who was in the passenger seat of his patrol vehicle. Redden admits
he had a female passenger.
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put Woolverton in handcuffs and place him in his patrol vehicle. He stated that he noticed on
multiple occasions during the stop that Woolverton’s pupils were very small, which he
considered a sign that Woolverton may be on narcotics. Shortly thereafter, Rudd arrived on the
scene and Redden requested that Rudd perform a pat-down on Woolverton for the officers’
safety, given that Redden had been unable to complete one.
Rudd got Woolverton out of Redden’s patrol vehicle, noting that Woolverton was irate
and began cursing at Rudd. Rudd continually asked Woolverton to be still and cooperate during
the pat-down process, but Woolverton continued to jerk, twist, and turn, while cursing at Rudd.
During this interaction, Rudd noticed what appeared to be a gun in Woolverton’s back pocket.
Woolverton then made several attempts to kick backwards or “horse kick” at Rudd. This action
prompted Rudd to put his arm in between Woolverton’s arms and back and take him to the
ground by placing one leg in front of Woolverton’s legs.
Prior to Rudd’s attempted pat-down, Redden used his K-9 to evaluate Woolverton’s
vehicle. The K-9 alerted at one spot on Woolverton’s vehicle, indicating that the vehicle may
have drug paraphernalia inside. 4 Deputy Holloway arrived at the scene while Rudd attempted to
complete a search of Woolverton. Holloway and Redden heard a “commotion” and cursing,
which prompted them to rush to Rudd’s aid to see if he needed assistance. While coming around
the curve of the vehicle, Redden saw Woolverton attempt to horse kick Rudd. Once on the
ground, Redden held Woolverton’s upper body to prevent Woolverton from moving so that Rudd
could remove the item out of Woolverton’s back pocket. Rudd and Redden completed the patdown and found the following items on Woolverton: a deer bone they state resembled the handle
4
It is undisputed that no contraband was found during the search of Woolverton’s vehicle..
(Doc. 83-1 at p. 6.)
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of a gun from inside Woolverton’s back pocket, multi-tool plyers, a pocketknife, a metal punch,
and two unspent rifle casings. Woolverton began to complain of right leg pain and indicated that
he thought his leg was broken. Rudd and Redden assisted Woolverton into their patrol vehicle
by getting on each side of him and offering support as he got into the vehicle. They claim that
they offered to call an ambulance for Woolverton, but Woolverton refused one. Rudd and
Redden transported Woolverton to Pemiscot Memorial Hospital in Hayti, Missouri, where
Woolverton received medical treatment for his injuries.
Woolverton claims that he was not irate or threatening during the arrest, and did not resist
the officers in any way. He denies that his pupils were small, and states that he had not used
drugs within twenty-four hours of the incident. According to Woolverton, Redden called
Woolverton vulgar names while he was handcuffed in the patrol vehicle and told him that he was
going to “kick his ass.” Rudd made similar remarks. When Rudd arrived, the officers instructed
Woolverton to get out of the police vehicle and open the trunk of his truck. Woolverton
complied and then stood by the police vehicle while the officers searched his truck. After the
officers completed the search, Rudd came up from behind Woolverton and slammed his head
into the vehicle while he was handcuffed. Woolverton “held his ground” by using the weight of
his legs to prevent Rudd from pushing him forward and slamming him against the vehicle a
second time. Woolverton did not try to horse kick Rudd. Woolverton was then taken to the
ground face down by Rudd and Redden while his hands were cuffed behind his back. Redden
placed a “scissor lock” on Woolverton’s legs, which worked as a fulcrum and caused his leg to
snap when he was taken to the ground into a ditch. Woolverton immediately complained that his
leg was broken. Defendants roughly hauled him into the patrol vehicle and transported him to
Pemiscot Memorial Hospital. They did not offer to call an ambulance. X-rays revealed an
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interarticular comminuted fracture and comminuted proximal fibular fracture. Woolverton was
transferred by ambulance to Barnes Jewish Hospital in St. Louis, where he ultimately underwent
two surgeries. He also suffered facial abrasions, which Woolverton attributes to Rudd slamming
his face into the vehicle.
Discussion
An official sued in his individual capacity is entitled to summary judgment based on
qualified immunity unless (1) the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, establishes a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was
clearly established at the time so that a reasonable officer would have understood that his
conduct violated that right. Capps v. Olson, 780 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
The court must follow a two-step inquiry in a qualified immunity analysis: “(1) whether
the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2)
whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.”
Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009). A right is clearly established
if its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). The relevant question is
whether a reasonable officer would have fair warning that his conduct was unlawful. Brown,
574 F.3d at 499; see also Buckley v. Ray, 848 F.3d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 2017); Blazek v. City of
Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2014).
The Court may address the questions in either order, but a § 1983 plaintiff can defeat a
claim of qualified immunity only if the answer to both questions is yes. Boude v. City of
Raymore, 855 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). “If either
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question is answered in the negative, the public official is entitled to qualified immunity.”
Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoted case omitted). Thus, to avoid
summary judgment, Woolverton must produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Waite violated a clearly established constitutional right. De La Rosa
v. White, 852 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2017).
A.
Violation of a Constitutional Right
As previously stated, Woolverton alleges Rudd and Redden used excessive force in four
separate instances during his arrest: (1) in slamming his head into a police vehicle; (2) in taking
him to the ground while his hands were cuffed behind his back, causing his leg to break; (3) in
roughly hauling him about, knowing his leg was broken; and (4) in roughly hauling him into the
police vehicle instead of calling an ambulance.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendants only argue they are entitled to
qualified immunity as to the takedown maneuver. Specifically, Defendants argue that
“Defendants’ actions did not constitute excessive force as the maneuver of taking Woolverton to
the ground was reasonable given the situation.” (Doc. 77 at p. 5.) Defendants do briefly address
Woolverton’s other alleged incidents of excessive force within their argument. They contend
that neither Rudd nor Redden slammed Woolverton’s head into the police vehicle, and that the
facial abrasions Woolverton suffered occurred during the “scuffle” that ensued when Redden
utilized the takedown maneuver. Id. at p. 7. Defendants further state that, after employing the
takedown maneuver, they “assisted Woolverton into their patrol vehicle and drove Woolverton
to the hospital as he had refused an ambulance.” Id. at p. 9. Because Defendants’ Motion only
claims entitlement to qualified immunity as to the takedown maneuver, Defendants are not
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entitled to summary judgment with regard to the other alleged incidents of excessive force. The
Court’s analysis will, therefore, focus on the performance of the takedown maneuver.
Claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force in the course of an arrest
or other “seizure” are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its “reasonableness standard.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-96 (1989). The question the Court must ask is whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s actions were “objectively reasonable.” Cook
v. City of Bella Villa, 582 F.3d 840, 849 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
In determining whether the force used was reasonable, relevant circumstances include the
severity of the crime, the danger the suspect poses to the officer or others, and whether the
suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee. Id. The degree of injury suffered, to the
extent “it tends to show the amount and type of force used,” is also relevant to our excessive
force inquiry. Chambers, 641 F.3d at 906. And while “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may
later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers violates the Fourth Amendment,”
Cook, 582 F.3d at 849, “force is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants who do not flee
or actively resist arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of the officers or the public,”
Brown, 574 F.3d at 499. Ultimately, the reasonableness of the force applied must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene “rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Id. at 496. Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is generally a question of
fact for the jury. Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1989); Patzner v. Burkett, 779
F.2d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir. 1985).
Defendants argue that their use of force was objectively reasonable in light of a tense,
rapidly evolving situation. They contend that, given Woolverton’s “active and rapidly escalating
resistance, Rudd was entitled to use a lawful takedown maneuver, to control Woolverton and
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Redden was authorized to hold Woolverton on the ground so that Rudd could remove what was
believed to be a gun from Woolverton’s back pocket.” (Doc. 77 at p. 9.) They urge the Court to
consider the following facts as warranting the takedown maneuver: the incident occurred on the
side of the road at night near Woolverton’s vehicle; Redden’s drug detecting K-9 had indicated
that there may be paraphernalia in Woolverton’s vehicle; Woolverton’s pupils were small;
Woolverton protested verbally and cursed; and Woolverton physically resisted when he
attempted to horse kick Rudd during a pat-down.
Defendants rely primarily on Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002, 1011 (8th Cir.
2017), which found an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by executing a takedown of
a nonviolent misdemeanant when dash camera video footage revealed the officer twice ordered
the suspect to place his hands behind his back, but the suspect continued walking away. The
Court concluded that a reasonable officer would interpret the subject’s behavior as
“noncompliant,” and reasoned that he “at least appeared to be resisting” when he continued to
walk away, so the officer was “entitled to use the force necessary to effect the arrest.” Id.
Woolverton argues that Ehlers is distinguishable, in that dash camera video showed that
Ehlers ignored the officer’s commands and continued to walk away. See id. at 1007. The
undersigned agrees. There was no dispute in Ehlers that the plaintiff was noncompliant as the
camera footage confirmed it. Additionally, Ehlers was not restrained and, instead, was walking
away from the officers when the takedown maneuver was executed. Under those circumstances,
fraught with danger and unpredictability, a reasonable officer would be entitled to use force to
effect the arrest.
In the instant case, however, the parties agree on very few facts surrounding the alleged
excessive force incident. Specifically, the parties dispute the following facts: whether
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Woolverton’s pupils were small; whether Woolverton protested verbally; whether Woolverton
jerked, twisted, and turned during the pat-down process; whether it appeared as though
Woolverton had a gun in his pocket; whether Redden participated in the takedown maneuver;
and whether Woolverton attempted to horse kick Rudd during a pat-down.
Defendants support their account of the incident with their own deposition testimony.
(Docs. 77-2, 77-5.) Defendants have also submitted the deposition testimony of Deputy
Holloway, who testified that Woolverton was laying in the ditch with his hands cuffed behind his
back when he arrived at the scene. (Doc. 77-6 at p. 15-16.) He testified that Woolverton was
“cussing everybody” and Redden and Rudd were “yelling at the guy telling him to stop.” Id. at
16. Holloway stated that he did not see Woolverton try to kick anyone; rather, he described
Woolverton as “loud and obnoxious.” Id. at 23. He testified that Woolverton complained that
his leg hurt, and Redden and Rudd picked him up and helped him into the vehicle. Id. at 20-21.
Woolverton has set forth his own deposition testimony supporting his account of the
incident. (Doc. 78-4.) He testified that Rudd came up from behind him and started slamming his
head against the patrol vehicle. Id. at p. 18. Woolverton stated that he “held his ground” by
using the weight of his legs to prevent Rudd from pushing his torso forward anymore. Id. at 19.
Next, Woolverton testified that he “looked to the side, and [saw] Officer Redden slide in with a
scissor move around my legs.” Id. He described the “scissor move” as follows:
With my handcuffs and [I] have my hands in the cuff. I see Casey Redden
coming in here and slide with his leg and lock my legs in, and as soon as that
happened, Rudd pushed me over and my leg broke on the way down.
Id. at 20. Woolverton started “hollering my leg is broke.” Id. He testified that
Defendants next took the following actions:
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And they start dragging me around and telling me my leg is not broke, and my leg
is dangling. I’m in intense pain at that time, and I am just saying my leg is broke,
and they keep saying, no, it’s not broke.
And then all I remember is them tussling me and pulling me around and then
finally trying to get me up in the SUV or back in the SUV.
Id. Woolverton testified that Redden was calling him names the entire time, and that
Woolverton “at any time hadn’t made any violent or any kind of move toward the officer.” Id. at
21.
In the context of summary judgment and qualified immunity for excessive force, “[o]nce
the predicate facts are established, the reasonableness of [an officer's] conduct under the
circumstances is a question of law.” Malone v. Hinman, 847 F.3d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 2017)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 2001)). If
genuine disputes of material fact underlie either prong of the qualified immunity inquiry, the
district court may not resolve the disputes of fact and qualified immunity must be denied. See
Wealot v. Brooks, 865 F.3d 1119, 1125 (8th Cir. 2017) (noting courts may not resolve genuine
issues of material facts under either prong and determining the plaintiff had identified two
genuine disputes as to whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable); see also Raines
v. Counseling Assocs., Inc., 883 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 2018) (dismissing appeal of denial
of qualified immunity for lack of jurisdiction and explaining a key factual issue underlying the
reasonableness of the officers’ actions, whether the suspect advanced on an officer prior to being
shot, was both material and disputed).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Woolverton, the Court cannot
conclude that Defendants’ use of force was objectively reasonable as a matter of law. It is
undisputed that Woolverton was an unarmed arrestee for a nonviolent crime, whose hands were
cuffed behind his back when Defendants employed a takedown maneuver that fractured his leg.
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Woolverton testified that he did not threaten Defendants, he neither used nor was in possession
of drugs that night, he did not physically resist during the pat-down, and did not otherwise
behave aggressively toward Defendants during the incident. He admitted that he “might have”
cursed when Rudd and Redden threatened to “whoop” him, but denied employing any physical
resistance. (Doc. 77-4 at p. 67.)
Woolverton’s testimony creates a material factual issue as to whether the amount and
degree of force used by Defendants surpassed what was objectively necessary in the situation at
hand. Even assuming Woolverton was argumentative and cursed at Defendants during the
incident, “verbal abuse alone does not justify the use of any force.” Bauer v. Norris, 713 F.2d
408, 413 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Van Raden v. Larsen, No. 13-2283 (DWF/LIB), 2015 WL
853592, at *7 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2015) (finding fact issues as to the reasonableness of the use of
a taser where plaintiff, although resisting being removed from his home and verbally expressing
his anger and frustration, was not violent towards the officers or attempting to flee, and did not
have a weapon). In assessing whether the force used during the takedown maneuver was
objectively reasonable, the Court has also considered the severity of Woolverton’s injury. See
Rohrbough v. Hall, 586 F.3d 582, 586 (8th Cir. 2009) (although not dispositive, the severity of
the injuries she sustained is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of the force
used). It is undisputed that Woolverton sustained a severe fracture of his leg that required
transportation by ambulance to St. Louis and multiple surgeries. (Doc. 83-1 at p. 3.)
The facts of the instant case are similar to those in Montoya. In Montoya, two officers
responded to a domestic dispute between the plaintiff and her ex-boyfriend at the ex-boyfriend’s
home. 669 F.3d at 869. Upon their arrival to the residence, the officers witnessed the plaintiff
and her ex-boyfriend arguing outside. Id. The ex-boyfriend stood between the two officers,
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while the plaintiff stood opposite of them, approximately ten to fifteen feet away. Id. The
officers stated that the plaintiff had taken a step forward and raised her fist, but, according to the
plaintiff’s account, she was merely using her hands to express herself. Id. One of the officers
grabbed the plaintiff’s left arm, put it behind her back, and handcuffed her left wrist; and the
second officer attempted to get the plaintiff’s right arm behind her. Id. The first officer then
performed a takedown of the plaintiff, causing her to fall to the ground face first. Id. The officer
fell on top of the plaintiff. Id. The takedown fractured the plaintiff’s knee. Id. at 870.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the officer’s takedown of the plaintiff was
not objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 871. First, the Court noted that the
plaintiff posed no threat to the safety of the officers or others, as she was “standing ten to fifteen
feet away from [the ex-boyfriend] when she raised her hands above her head in frustration. She
assert[ed] she did not intend to hit [the ex-boyfriend], and [he] testified he did not feel threatened
by her actions.” Id. Second, the plaintiff “was not actively resisting arrest, and [she] was not
attempting to flee.” Id. Third, the plaintiff’s “actions amounted to a violation of a law restricting
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor.” Id. Fourth, “although not dispositive, the severity of the
injuries she sustained[—a broken leg—was] a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness
of the force used.” Id. at 872 (citation omitted). The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district
court that the “fact Montoya sustained a broken leg is simply an ‘unfortunate’ and ‘unintended’
consequence of what the court described as objectively reasonable use of force by Officer
Hooper.” Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the officer used excessive force against Montoya. Id.
Just as in Montoya, the officers and Woolverton presented differing factual accounts,
creating genuine issues of material fact. If Woolverton’s account is believed, Woolverton was
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nonviolent, was not threatening anyone, was not actively resisting arrest, and was not attempting
to flee, when the officers took him to the ground while his hands were cuffed behind his back
with such force as to fracture his leg. Even assuming it was reasonable for the officers to believe
the objects Woolverton had in his pocket resembled a gun, there was no need to employ force if
Woolverton was compliant with his hands cuffed behind his back. “While a jury may credit [the
officers’] characterization of the incident and disbelieve [Woolverton] at trial, it is not our
function to remove the credibility assessment from the jury.” Id.
Thus, Woolverton has presented sufficient facts, when viewed in the light most favorable
to him, to show Redden and Rudd violated a constitutional right.
B.
Clearly Established
Defendants argue that, even if the force utilized by Defendants during the takedown
maneuver constituted excessive force, Woolverton has failed to establish that such conduct
violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right and that such a right existed at the
time of the incident. Defendants contend that it has not been clearly established that “use of a
takedown maneuver is in and of itself unconstitutional, especially when resisting arrest or
actively resisting cooperating with an officer during a pat-down.” (Doc. 77 at p. 16.)
“The right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established right under the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person.” Copeland v. Locke, 613
F.3d 875, 881 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Eighth
Circuit, however, has also explained that “‘the right the official is alleged to have violated must
have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
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what he is doing violates that right.’” Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 864 (8th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
Assuming again that Woolverton’s story is true, the Court finds that the contours of the
right at issue were sufficiently clear to inform a reasonable officer in the Defendants’ position
that it was unlawful to employ a takedown maneuver on a motorist suspected of a nonviolent,
minor crime, who was not threatening anyone, was not actively resisting arrest, was not
attempting to flee, and was restrained with handcuffs. See Montoya, 669 F.3d at 872-73 (clearly
established it was unlawful for officer “to perform a ‘leg sweep’ and throw to the ground a
nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant who was not threatening anyone, was not actively resisting
arrest, and was not attempting to flee”); Blazek, 761 F.3d at 925 (internal citation omitted) (“It
was clearly established in 2009 that when a person is subdued and restrained with handcuffs, a
‘gratuitous and completely unnecessary act of violence’ is unreasonable and violates the Fourth
Amendment.”); Brown, 574 F.3d at 499 (“[I]t is clearly established that force is least justified
against nonviolent misdemeanants who do not flee or actively resist arrest and pose little or no
threat to the security of the officers or the public.”).
Because fact issues remain regarding whether Defendants violated Woolverton’s clearly
established rights in employing the takedown maneuver, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment will be denied. See, e.g., McDowell v. Blankenship, No. 4:08–CV–602 (SNLJ), 2012
WL 3095520, at *8 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2012) (denying summary judgment on an excessive use
of force claim due to dispute about whether the plaintiff resisted arrest); Blair v. Brown, No.
4:10–CV–1973 (JCH), 2011 WL 6715888, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2011) (denying summary
judgment on excessive use of force claim because the parties “have drastically different accounts
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of Plaintiff’s arrest”); Kukla v. Hulm, 310 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming the denial
of summary judgment due to a genuine issue of whether force used was excessive).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants Christopher Rudd and Casey Redden’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76) is denied.
s/Abbie Crites-Leoni
ABBIE CRITES-LEONI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 28th day of May, 2020.
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