Irving v. Wells et al

Filing 84

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 83 MOTION to Continue Rule 56 (f) Continuance filed by Plaintiff William E. Irving, 49 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Danielle Wells, Defendant Lorene Armstrong, Defendant Travis Wilhite, Defendant Alex Clinton; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 49] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for Rule 56(f) continuance [Doc. # 83] is denied. A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Bodenhausen on 12/16/19. (CMH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
WILLIAM E. IRVING,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
DANIELLE WELLS, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 1:18 CV 47 (JMB)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff,
who proceeds pro se, has filed a motion for continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f), Fed.R.Civ.P. The
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The events giving rise to this dispute occurred in January and February 2018 while plaintiff
was an inmate at the Southeast Correctional Center (SECC).

He alleges that defendant

Correctional Officer Danielle Wells conspired with prisoners and gang members who threatened
plaintiff’s life. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Functional Unit Manager Lorene Armstrong
recommended against plaintiff’s request for protective custody and that defendants Shift Captains
Travis Wilhite and Alex Clinton attempted to move him to a housing unit where he would be
assaulted. Plaintiff filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief and $300 in compensatory damages and $300 in punitive damages from each defendant. 1
Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff suffered no physical injury and

1

Plaintiff’s claims against seven other defendants were dismissed following review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). [Doc.
# 12].

thus is not entitled to damages. They further argue that his claim for injunctive relief became moot
when he was transferred to SCCC and that his request for declaratory judgment should be denied.
I.

Background

Plaintiff alleges that in January and early February 2018, he submitted complaints “in
relation to” defendant Wells and gang members in Housing Unit 5 who were threatening him.
Amended Complaint § VI(a) [Doc. # 6]. On February 5, 2018, he was again threatened and
“declared protective custody.

Id. § VI(b); Lorene Armstrong Affidavit ¶ 6(a) [Doc. # 51-12].

On February 8, 2018, plaintiff appeared for an initial classification hearing, chaired by defendant
Armstrong. Classification Hearing Form dated Feb. 8, 2018 [Doc. # 51-4]. According to the
hearing form, which he signed, plaintiff stated that he did not need protective custody but needed
to move from Housing Unit 5 before he got into a fight over “a game [his] celly was trying to run
with an Officer.” Armstrong Aff. ¶ 6(b). Plaintiff also signed a waiver form, stating that he did
not believe he needed protective custody, was not aware of any enemies among the inmates, and
did not believe he was in danger. The form was witnessed by defendant Armstrong. Protective
Custody Needs Assess/Waiver Form dated Feb. 9, 2018 [Doc. # 51-3].
Plaintiff testified at deposition that he was released to the general population on February
15, 2018. Plaintiff Deposition at 58 [Doc. # 51-1]. That same day, he had several encounters with
groups of prisoners who threatened him. Amended Complaint §§ VI(e)-(h). In his first encounter,
he was told that defendant Wells said that plaintiff had “ratted on them” and caused their cells to
be searched. Plaintiff’s Dep. at 20. Later in the day, he was threatened with stabbing unless he
transferred out of the housing unit. He declared protective custody and was moved to Temporary
Administrative Segregation.

Id. at 22.

On February 21, 2018, plaintiff was assigned to

administrative segregation, where he was placed in a single-man cell. Classification Hearing Form

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dated Feb. 21, 2018 [Doc. # 51-5]; Armstrong Aff. ¶ 6(c); Plaintiff’s Dep. at 74. His protective
custody status was continued on March 16, 2018, April 11, 2018, May 9, 2018, and June 6, 2018.
Classification Hearing Forms [Docs. ## 51-6 through 51-9]. At the hearing on June 6, 2018, SECC
staff recommended that plaintiff be transferred to another facility due to the presence of “unwaived
enemies” at SECC. Classification Hearing Form dated June 6, 2018. He remained on protective
custody status until he was transferred to South Central Correctional Center on October 2, 2018.
Plaintiff’s Dep. at 23. He was never assaulted or physically injured while at SECC. Id. at 43.
II.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under Rule
56, a party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue
exists as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A dispute
is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party,” and a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Once the moving party discharges this burden, the non-moving party must set forth specific
facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the “mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247. The non-moving party
may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Id. at 256. “Factual disputes that
are irrelevant or unnecessary” will not preclude summary judgment. Id. at 248. The Court must
construe all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, must refrain from
making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence, and must draw all legitimate
inferences in favor of the non-movant. Id. at 255.

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Plaintiff here did not file a response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
statement of uncontroverted material facts. In this district, the movant’s facts are deemed admitted
if not specifically controverted by the party opposing the motion. E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(E).
Nonetheless, where a plaintiff fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, the Court should
not treat this nonresponse as sufficient to dispose of the motion. Roland v. Wallace, No.
1:14CV166 ACL, 2017 WL 1196426, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2017) (citing Lowry v.
Powerscreen USB, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 (E.D. Mo. 1999)). “Courts should proceed to
examine those portions of the record properly before them and decide for themselves whether the
motion is well taken.” Id. “In so ruling, even on an unopposed motion for summary judgment,
the court should review the facts in a light most favorable to the party who would be opposing the
motion.” Id.
III.

Discussion
A.

Plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) Motion

Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on May 3, 2019. Plaintiff filed
several motions to compel defendants to provide him with access to his legal documents that he
contended he needed in order to prepare his response. Counsel for defendants informed the Court
that plaintiff had been provided the opportunity to review his documents and, on July 8, 2019,
plaintiff’s motions were denied as moot. Plaintiff was thereafter given several extensions of time
to file his response to defendants’ summary judgment motion. Finally, on September 30, 2019,
the Court gave plaintiff one final extension of time until November 1, 2019.
On December 2, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion for continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f), in
which he asserts that he is unable to respond to defendants’ summary judgment motion without
further discovery, specifically “I.R.R,/Grievance complaints,” “misconduct reports against

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defendants,” and “assaultive histories of” other inmates who issued threats to him. Plaintiff signed
the motion under penalty of perjury on November 25, 2019.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), (formerly Rule 56(f)), a party opposing summary judgment
may seek additional discovery by “show[ing] by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons,
it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). In order to obtain
additional discovery under Rule 56(d), the nonmovant must file an affidavit explaining “(1) what
facts are sought and how they are to be obtained; (2) how these facts are reasonably expected to
raise a genuine issue of material fact; (3) what efforts the affiant has made to obtain them; and (4)
why the affiant’s efforts were unsuccessful.” Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir.
2018). “It is not enough to present a list of facts sought to be discovered. The nonmovant must
‘articulate how those facts [a]re relevant to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine
issue of fact.’” In re Mirapex Prod. Liab. Litig., 912 F.3d 1129, 1135 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ray
v. American Airlines, Inc., 609 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff fails to satisfy the second requirement. As is discussed below, defendants seek
summary judgment based on plaintiff’s failure to show that he sustained an injury, as required to
obtain compensatory damages under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Plaintiff fails to
address in his Rule 56(d) motion how the discovery he requests is reasonably expected to raise a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to this central issue and will be denied. 2 To the extent
that plaintiff’s motion addresses issues arising from conditions at SCCC, such claims are beyond
the scope of this lawsuit.

2

The motion is also untimely in that plaintiff filed it well after the November 1, 2019, deadline for filing his opposition.

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B.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The PLRA mandates that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined
in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e). “[W]e read section 1997e(e) as limiting recovery for mental or emotional injury in all
federal actions brought by prisoners.” McAdoo v. Martin, 899 F.3d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 2018)
(alteration in original; citations omitted). In order to recover “more than nominal damages under
the statute, a prisoner must allege or prove more than mental or emotional injury. We interpret the
PLRA to require more than a de minimis physical injury.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff
acknowledges that he did not sustain any injury arising from the alleged conduct and so defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on any claim for compensatory damages. See Howard v.
Unknown Named CEO, No. 4:19-CV-2241-JMB, 2019 WL 4722947, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26,
2019) (dismissing complaint seeking damages only for mental or emotional suffering).
Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, which are not
barred by the PLRA. Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004). A factfinder may
assess punitive damages in a § 1983 action when a “defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated
by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of others.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Plaintiff has
failed to present any evidence that would support a claim of evil motive or intent and his request
for punitive damages will be denied. Furthermore, plaintiff’s request for an injunction and order
to transfer became moot on October 2, 2018, when he was transferred to SCCC. In addition, the
Court declines to grant plaintiff’s request for a declaration that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995) (Declaratory

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Judgment Act is “an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute
right upon the litigant.”) (citation omitted). Finally, the PLRA would not bar a claim for nominal
damages. See Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994, 1010 (8th Cir. 2011) (nominal damages may be
available “to vindicate constitutional rights whose deprivation has not caused an actual, provable
injury”). Defendants argue that they are nonetheless entitled to summary judgment because
plaintiff did not make a claim for nominal damages in his complaint. In addition, despite having
several months in which to do so, plaintiff has chosen not to respond to defendants’ summary
judgment motion. The Court declines to address a claim that plaintiff has neither pleaded nor
attempted to support in the face of defendants’ motion.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 49]
is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for Rule 56(f) continuance [Doc. #
83] is denied.
A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be entered.

/s/ John M. Bodenhausen
JOHN M. BODENHAUSEN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 16th day of December, 2019.

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