Vaughn v. Stange

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 1 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Filing fee $ 5.) filed by Petitioner Darnell Vaughn: The Court denies Petitioner Darnell Vaughn's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. Doc. 1. The Court dismisses Vaughn's 1 petition with prejudice. The Court does not issue a certificate of appealability. Signed by District Judge Stephen R. Clark on 11/19/2021. (CMH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
DARNELL VAUGHN,
Petitioner,
v.
BILL STANGE,
Respondent.

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Case No. 1:21-cv-00068-SRC

Memorandum and Order
Darnell Vaughn called his mother early in the morning and, wearing a bulletproof vest
and carrying two guns, soon met with her and other family members. Doc. 9-8 at p. 3. Vaughn
told his family members that he “kill[ed] the girls” and “hit somebody with a gun” after his mind
“snapped.” Id. Late that same day police discovered the bodies of Claudia Williams and
Tasheera Johnson. Id. at p. 4. Both women died of gunshot wounds to the head. Doc. 9-1 at pp.
434, 438. The next day, Vaughn’s mother helped him get away to Minnesota; but after her arrest
several days later for hindering prosecution, Vaughn surrendered to the police. Doc. 9-8 at pp.
3–4.
A state-court jury found Vaughn guilty of one count of first-degree murder, one count of
second-degree murder, and two related counts of armed criminal action. Doc. 9-2 at pp. 84–87.
The state court sentenced Vaughn to life without parole for first-degree murder, one life sentence
for second-degree murder, and two fifteen-year sentences for armed criminal action. Id. at pp.
92–95. Vaughn appealed his conviction to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Doc.
9-8. Vaughn remains incarcerated. Doc. 1. Vaughn now petitions this Court under 28 U.S.C. §

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2254 for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging various errors by the state trial court. Id. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court denies Vaughn’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
I.

Facts and Background
The Missouri Court of Appeals described the pertinent facts as follows:
On August 29, 2012, Defendant was in possession of his girlfriend Claudia
Williams's ("Williams") vehicle. At approximately 6 P.M. that evening, Williams,
Earlene Hurd ("Hurd"), and Hurd's nine-year-old daughter began driving around
north St. Louis City, searching for Williams's vehicle. On multiple occasions
during the search, Williams used Hurd's phone to call Defendant. In one such
phone call, wherein Defendant was placed on speaker phone, Hurd overheard
Defendant warn Williams to "stay out of those dark alleys."
At approximately 10 P.M., Williams and Hurd successfully located the vehicle.
However, Defendant was in possession of her keys. When Defendant failed to meet
Williams to furnish the keys, Williams and Hurd requested assistance from and
awaited [sic] for the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, without response.
Eventually, around midnight, Hurd, Williams, and Hurd's daughter retreated to
Williams's residence in St. Louis County.
Upon arriving at Williams's residence, Tasheera Johnson ("Johnson") (collectively,
Johnson and Williams will be referred to as "Victims") asked Hurd to chauffeur her
to retrieve her daughter. Hurd consented and subsequently returned both Johnson
and her daughter to Williams's residence. Before Hurd's final departure from
Williams's residence, Williams informed Hurd that Defendant had confirmed, via
text message, that he would return Williams's vehicle the follow [sic] morning.
In the very early morning hours of August 30, 2012, Defendant placed several
phone calls to his mother, Lois Adams ("Adams"). During each phone
conversation, Defendant "kept talking about [his] children." In his final phone call,
Defendant revealed to Adams that he "killed them." Adams believed "them"
referred to Defendant's children.
Soon thereafter, Defendant, Adams, Defendant's sister, and Defendant's father,
convened at the residence of Defendant's sister. Defendant was irritable, was in
possession of two guns, and was wearing a bulletproof vest. At trial, Adams
testified that Defendant "was ready to die at that time" and was prepared to "have a
shootout with the police[.]" During this gathering, Defendant was discussing
"killing the girls" and had referenced Williams in this regard. Defendant relayed
that he had "hit somebody with a gun" after his mind "snapped." Defendant
also mentioned that a child was left behind.
Defendant, Adams, Defendant's sister, and Defendant's father subsequently
relocated to a nearby motel room, where they remained for a few hours. Adams

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then transported Defendant to Melva Hodge's ("Hodge") residence in Belleville,
Illinois. While lingering at Hodge's residence, Defendant divulged that the impetus
for the turmoil he was now experiencing was the fact that two women were "talking
about him" and "messing with him." On August 31, 2012, Adams arranged passage
for Defendant to be transported to Minnesota.
At approximately 8 P.M. on August 30, 2012, Williams's vehicle was found
abandoned (with the keys in the ignition) on Chouteau Island in Madison County,
Illinois. Defendant's fingerprints were found within Williams's vehicle.
On August 31, 2012, law enforcement was summoned to Williams's residence,
wherein the bodies of Williams and Johnson were discovered. Defendant's
fingerprints or DNA evidence was discovered on the following items located within
Williams's residence: (1) a box of firearm ammunition; (2) a baseball cap; (3) a
wave cap; and (4) a cigarette butt left on the bedroom floor.
On September 7, 2012, Defendant surrendered himself to law enforcement after
Adams was arrested and charged for hindering prosecution. Defendant was
charged with two counts of first-degree murder, in violation of Section 565.020,5
and two counts of armed criminal action, in violation of Section 571.015. During
trial, Defendant elected not to testify on his own behalf.
At the close of trial, the jury was instructed on both first- and second-degree murder
(Section 565.021) for each concomitant homicides [sic]. However, the trial court
denied Defendant's requests to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter for both
counts of first-degree murder. The jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty
of second-degree murder in regards to Williams, first-degree murder in regards to
Johnson, and both counts of armed criminal action. Defendant was sentenced to
consecutive life sentences.
Doc. 9-8 at pp. 2–4. Vaughn appealed his convictions to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which
affirmed. Doc. 9-8; State v. Vaughn, 523 S.W.3d 610 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (mem.). Vaughn
did not appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri. Doc. 1 at p. 2. Vaughn filed a Missouri Rule
29.15 post-conviction relief motion, which the motion court denied after an evidentiary hearing.
Doc. 9-12 at pp. 137–152. He appealed this decision, and the Missouri Court of Appeals
affirmed the motion court’s denial of post-conviction relief on the merits. Doc. 9-18; Vaughn v.
State, 605 S.W.3d 617 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (mem.). Vaughn now seeks habeas corpus relief in
this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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II.

Standard
“A state prisoner who believes that he is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254[.]” Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2005), as amended (June
21, 2005). Federal habeas review exists only “as ‘a guard against extreme malfunctions in the
state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.’”
Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 315 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011)). Accordingly, “[i]n the habeas setting, a federal court is bound by the
AEDPA [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] to exercise only limited and
deferential review of underlying state court decisions.” Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th
Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). For a federal court to grant an application for a writ of
habeas corpus brought by a person in custody by order of a state court, the petitioner must show
that the state court’s adjudication on the merits:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed
correct unless the petitioner successfully rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. Id. at § 2254(e)(1).
A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly-established Supreme Court precedent “if
the state court either ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme
Court] cases’ or ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of
[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.’” Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–406 (2000)).
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An unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent occurs where the
state court identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that principle
to the facts of the case. Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). Finally, a state court
decision may be considered an unreasonable determination of the facts “only if it is shown that
the state court’s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Id.
III.

Discussion
Vaughn asserts five grounds for relief in his habeas petition. Doc. 1-1. One, Vaughn

claims that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as to
the second-degree murder charge. Id. at p. 1. Two, Vaughn claims that the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as to the first-degree murder charge. Id.
at p. 1. Three, Vaughn claims his trial counsel ineffectively failed to investigate and call
potential alibi witness Lee. Id. at p. 2. Four, Vaughn claims that his trial counsel ineffectively
failed to raise a speedy trial claim. Id. at pp. 2–4. Five, Vaughn claims that trial counsel
ineffectively failed to object to Exhibit 107 based on failure to lay a proper foundation. Id. at pp.
4–5.
A.

Grounds one and two

Vaughn challenges the trial court’s decision not to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter on both murder counts. Id. at p. 1. Vaughn argued on direct appeal that the trial
court’s decision violated his due process right to a fair trial and his statutory right to a lesserincluded instruction. Doc. 9-4 at pp. 13–31; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 556.046. The Missouri Court of
Appeals denied his claim, explaining that voluntary manslaughter is not a “nested” lesserincluded offense to murder, and because Vaughn did not place into evidence a basis for acquittal
on the murder charges and a basis for conviction on a voluntary manslaughter charge, the trial

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court properly denied his request for the voluntary manslaughter instruction. Doc. 9-8 at pp. 5–
14; see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 556.046.3. As a threshold matter, the Court finds that the Missouri
Court of Appeals adjudicated Vaughn’s claim “on the merits” within the meaning of § 2254(d).
See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301 (2013).
Because the Court of Appeals adjudicated his claim on the merits, Vaughn cannot obtain
habeas relief under § 2254(a) unless the decision was either “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1), or “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding” under § 2254(d)(2). Vaughn argues that the Court of Appeals “made an objectively
unreasonable determination of the facts” under § 2254(d)(2) because “there was a basis in the
evidence for an acquittal of the higher offense and a conviction only of the lesser.” Doc. 1-1 at
p. 1. The Court disagrees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision not to instruct the jury on
voluntary manslaughter because Vaughn “failed to meet his burden of injecting evidence that he
acted under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause.” Doc. 9-8 at p. 13.
Vaughn argues that the court’s determination was unreasonable and points to the testimony of
witness Melva Hodges, who testified that Vaughn “snapped,” and that Vaughn told her that “they
just kept on talking crazy to him,” that “she was talking real bad to him.” Doc. 9-5 at pp. 15–16.
But the Court of Appeals noted this evidence and still found it “insufficient, as a matter of law, to
obligate the trial court to instruct upon voluntary manslaughter.” Doc. 9-8 at p. 12; see State v.
Redmond, 937 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Mo. 1996) (“Words alone, no matter how opprobrious or
insulting, are not sufficient to show adequate provocation.”).

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The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are “presumptively correct” and they also
“enjoy support in the record.” See Ryan, 387 F.3d at 790. Nothing in Vaughn’s petition or the
state-court records suggests that the Court of Appeals’ ruling was “based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.” See § 2254(d)(2). Furthermore, to the extent Vaughn asks the Court
to re-examine the Court of Appeals’ interpretation and application of state law, this Court refuses
to do so because “the failure to give a lesser included offense instruction in a noncapital case
rarely, if ever, presents a constitutional question[,]” Pitts v. Lockhart, 911 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir.
1990), and “[a] federal court may not re-examine a state court’s interpretation and application of
state law.” Schleeper v. Groose, 36 F.3d 735, 737 (8th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the Court
denies the first and second grounds in Vaughn’s petition for habeas relief.
B.

Ground three

Vaughn claims his trial counsel ineffectively failed to investigate and call potential alibi
witness Flora Lee. Doc. 1-1 at p. 2. After he argued this point in the state post-conviction
review court, the Missouri Court of Appeals denied his claim, explaining that Vaughn had not
shown that his “trial counsel knew or should have known about Lee.” Doc. 9-18 at pp. 7–8. The
Court of Appeals also deferred to the motion court’s decision not to credit Vaughn’s testimony
that he did not have the chance to tell his trial counsel about Lee because counsel would not give
him their undivided attention. Id. at p. 8. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that the motion
court did not clearly err in finding that Lee’s testimony would not have provided a viable
defense. Id. As a threshold matter, the Court finds that the Missouri Court of Appeals
adjudicated Vaughn’s claim “on the merits” within the meaning of § 2254(d). See Johnson, 568
U.S. at 301.

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Because the Court of Appeals adjudicated his claim on the merits, Vaughn cannot obtain
habeas relief under § 2254(a) unless the decision was either “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1), or “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding” under § 2254(d)(2). To grant relief under § 2254, the Court must conclude that the
state court unreasonably applied the Strickland test or that, in reaching its conclusions regarding
the performance of Vaughn’s attorney, it made unreasonable factual conclusions. Gabaree v.
Steele, 792 F.3d 991, 998 (8th Cir. 2015). Strickland requires Vaughn to show that his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s conclusion that Vaughn’s trial counsel
was not deficient with respect to Lee as a potential alibi witness because, as Vaughn testified in
the motion court, he did not tell his trial counsel about Lee before the day of trial, and, as
Vaughn’s trial counsel testified, had Vaughn told him about Lee, he would have contacted her.
Doc. 9-11 at pp. 94, 109. The Court of Appeals held that “[t]rial counsel cannot be unreasonable
for failing to investigate and call a witness ‘he did not know and [Vaughn] did not tell him
about.” Doc. 9-18 at p. 8 (quoting Jones v. State, 519 S.W.3d 879, 885 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)).
While Vaughn contended that his trial counsel ineffectively relied solely on him to
disclose potential witnesses and further argued that trial counsel did not give him the opportunity
to disclose Lee as a potential witness, the Court of Appeals rejected these claims. The Court of
Appeals concluded first that “counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on . . .
information supplied by the defendant,” id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691), and second,

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that it defers to the motion court’s finding that Vaughn’s testimony that he did not have the
chance to tell his lawyers about Lee was not credible. Id.
Finally, the Court of Appeals found that the motion court did not err when it found that
Lee’s testimony, even if brought at trial, would not have provided him with a viable defense. Id.
Lee could only account for Vaughn’s whereabouts until about 6:00 a.m. on the morning of the
murders, but the evidence at trial showed that the victims were shot at an address approximately
15 minutes away around 6:30 a.m. Id. at p. 9. “Lee’s testimony ‘would not have so far removed
[Vaughn] from the scene of the crime at the relevant time to render it impossible that he is the
guilty party.” Id. (quoting Helmig v. State, 42 S.W.3d 658, 670 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001).
The Court of Appeals’ application of Strickland was reasonable because Vaughn testified
that he did not tell his lawyer about Lee until trial and did not specify what additional steps he
believed his lawyer should have taken to identify Lee as a potential witness. The factual findings
of the Court of Appeals, moreover, are “presumptively correct” and they also “enjoy support in
the record.” See Ryan, 387 F.3d at 790. Nothing in Vaughn’s petition or the state-court records
suggests that the Court of Appeals’ ruling was “based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts,” including the motion court and Court of Appeals’ determination that Lee’s testimony
would not have provided a viable defense even if Vaughn’s attorney had called her. See §
2254(d)(2). Accordingly, the Court denies the third ground in Vaughn’s petition for habeas
relief.
C.

Ground four

Vaughn claims his trial and appellate counsel ineffectively failed to raise a speedy trial
claim. Doc. 1-1 at pp. 2–4. After he argued this point in the state post-conviction review court,
the Missouri Court of Appeals denied his claim, applying the Barker factors and finding that no

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speedy trial violation occurred. Doc. 9-18 at pp. 10–14; see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972). The Court of Appeals found that although the first factor, length of the delay, weighed in
Vaughn’s favor, the other three factors, reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of his right to
a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant, weighed in favor of the state. Doc. 9-18 at p. 11.
Thus, the court concluded no speedy trial violation occurred and that Vaughn’s trial and
appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise a non-meritorious claim. Id. at p. 14.
As a threshold matter, the Court finds that the Missouri Court of Appeals adjudicated Vaughn’s
claim “on the merits” within the meaning of § 2254(d). See Johnson, 568 U.S. at 301.
Because the Court of Appeals adjudicated his claim on the merits, Vaughn cannot obtain
habeas relief under § 2254(a) unless the decision was either “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1), or “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding” under § 2254(d)(2). To grant relief under § 2254, the Court must conclude that the
state court unreasonably applied the Strickland test or that, in reaching its conclusions regarding
the performance of Vaughn’s attorney, it made unreasonable factual conclusions. Gabaree v.
Steele, 792 F.3d 991, 998 (8th Cir. 2015). Strickland requires Vaughn to show that his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s conclusion that Vaughn’s trial and
appellate counsel were not deficient for failing to raise a speedy trial claim because no speedy
trial violation occurred. The Court of Appeals found no speedy trial violation because, while the
length of the delay, about forty months, was presumptively prejudicial, the remaining three
factors weigh against Vaughn. Doc. 9-18 at p. 11. The court attributed the continuances to

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Vaughn, the trial court, and, on one occasion to obtain additional evidence, the state. Id. at p. 12.
Because the court found that no evidence supported a finding that the state attempted to hamper
the defense through continuances, the court concluded that the second factor weighed only
slightly against the state and heavily against Vaughn. Id. at p. 13. Considering the third factor,
whether and how Vaughn asserted his right to a speedy trial, the court found that, while Vaughn
early on requested a speedy trial, Vaughn went on to request, consent to, and fail to object to
multiple continuances throughout 2014 and 2015. Id. And finally, the court found little
prejudice to Vaughn due to the delays because, though he was incarcerated pending trial, the
delays did not impair his defense in any way. Id. at p. 14.
The Court of Appeals’ application of Strickland was reasonable because it found no
speedy trial violation after weighing the factors set out in Barker. The factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, moreover, are “presumptively correct” and they also “enjoy support in the
record.” See Ryan, 387 F.3d at 790. Nothing in Vaughn’s petition or the state-court records
suggests that the Court of Appeals’ ruling was “based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts,” including the motion court and Court of Appeals’ determination that no speedy trial act
violation occurred. See § 2254(d)(2). Furthermore, to the extent Vaughn asks the Court to reexamine the Court of Appeals’ interpretation and application of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 545.780, this
Court refuses to do so because “[a] federal court may not re-examine a state court’s
interpretation and application of state law.” Schleeper, 36 F.3d at 737. Accordingly, the Court
denies the fourth ground in Vaughn’s petition for habeas relief.
D.

Ground five

Vaughn claims his trial counsel ineffectively failed to object at trial to the introduction of
Exhibit 107, a DVD of Melva Hodges’ interrogation by police, because the state had not

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properly laid the foundation. Doc. 1-1 at pp. 4–5. After he argued this point in the state postconviction review court, the Missouri Court of Appeals denied his claim because the state had, in
fact, properly laid the foundation. Doc. 9-18 at pp. 15–16. The Court of Appeals noted that “[i]f
a witness claims not to remember if a prior statement was or was not made, a proper foundation
has been laid to admit the prior inconsistent statement.” Id. at p. 16 (quoting State v. Reed, 282
S.W.3d 835, 838 (Mo. 2009)). Since Hodges testified at trial that she could not remember what
she told police, it was enough, per the Court of Appeals, “that the State questioned Hodges
directly about the statement she made to police and the substance of those questions matched the
inconsistent statements offered by the State.” Id. As a threshold matter, the Court finds that the
Missouri Court of Appeals adjudicated Vaughn’s claim “on the merits” within the meaning of §
2254(d). See Johnson, 568 U.S. at 301.
Because the Court of Appeals adjudicated his claim on the merits, Vaughn cannot obtain
habeas relief under § 2254(a) unless the decision was either “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1), or “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding” under § 2254(d)(2). To grant relief under § 2254, the Court must conclude that the
state court unreasonably applied the Strickland test or that, in reaching its conclusions regarding
the performance of Vaughn’s attorney, it made unreasonable factual conclusions. Gabaree v.
Steele, 792 F.3d 991, 998 (8th Cir. 2015). Strickland requires Vaughn to show that his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s conclusion that Vaughn’s trial counsel
was not deficient for failing to object to the state’s introduction of Exhibit 107 because the

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objection would have been overruled. Doc. 9-18 at p. 16. The Court of Appeals’ application of
Strickland was reasonable because it found that the state properly laid the foundation to Exhibit
107. First, the Court takes “no issue with the Missouri court’s application and interpretation of
its evidentiary rules. Skillicorn v. Luebbers, 475 F.3d 965, 974 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Schleeper,
36 F.3d at 737). The court concluded that the state properly laid the foundation to Exhibit 107;
therefore, trial counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to object. The factual findings of
the Court of Appeals, moreover, are “presumptively correct” and they also “enjoy support in the
record.” See Ryan, 387 F.3d at 790. Nothing in Vaughn’s petition or the state-court records
suggests that the Court of Appeals’ ruling was “based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts,” including the motion court and Court of Appeals’ determination that the state properly
laid the foundation to Exhibit 107. See § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, the Court denies the fifth
ground in Vaughn’s petition for habeas relief.
IV.

Certificate of Appealability
The Court finds Vaughn has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right, as is required before a certificate of appealability can issue. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c); see also Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a “substantial
showing” is a showing the “issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve
the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings”). Therefore, the Court does not
issue a certificate of appealability as to any claims raised in Vaughn’s § 2254 petition.

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V.

Conclusion
The Court denies Petitioner Darnell Vaughn’s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ

of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. Doc. 1. The Court dismisses Vaughn’s [1]
petition with prejudice. The Court does not issue a certificate of appealability.

So Ordered this 19th day of November 2021.

STEPHEN R. CLARK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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