Johnson v. Satterfield et al

Filing 5

OPINION MEMORANDUM re: 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) filed by Plaintiff Benny Johnson. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion seeking leave to commence this action without prepaying fees or co sts [ECF No. 2] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order, Plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $37.58. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United Sta tes District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original proceeding. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's claims of u nlawful conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs are SEVERED AND DISMISSED without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all remaining federal claims in this action are DISMISSED with out prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any state law claims brought by plaintiff in this action are DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. (Initial Partial Filing Fee due by 12/13/2024.) Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 11/22/2024. (CMH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
BENNY JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOE Z. SATTERFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:24-CV-00194 SPM

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Benny Johnson, an inmate at
Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Center (ERDCC), for leave to commence this civil
action without prepaying fees or costs. [ECF No. 2] The Court will grant the motion and assess an
initial partial filing fee of $37.58. Furthermore, after reviewing the pleadings in this matter, the
Court will dismiss this action for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison
account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account,
or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. After
payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20
percent of the preceding month’s income credited to his account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court
each time the amount in the account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

A review of plaintiff’s account from the relevant six-month period indicates an average
monthly deposit of $187.91 and an average monthly balance of $155.71. Plaintiff has insufficient
funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of
$37.58, which is 20 percent of plaintiff’s average monthly deposit.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An
action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial
experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded
facts but need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” the court
should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone
v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even self-represented complaints must

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allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d
1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged,
Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
State Court Background
A review of Missouri Case.net 1 indicates that on July 6, 2017, plaintiff was charged by
criminal complaint with felony driving while intoxicated, three counts of involuntary manslaughter
in the first degree and felony leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident. See State v. Johnson,
No. 17DU-CR00941 (35th Jud. Cir., Dunklin County Court). 2
The probable cause statement completed by Trooper T. Watson, with the Missouri State
Highway Patrol, on July 5, 2017, stated as follows:
On July 4, 2017, at 2217 hours, I arrived on the scene of a motor vehicle crash on
Route MM, north of Dunklin County Road 102. When I arrived, I observed a black
Chrysler Town and Country van on the northbound shoulder and a white 2015
Chevrolet Cruz sitting on the same shoulder behind it. Both vehicles were damaged.
Another vehicle involved that left the scene of the crash was a black 2010 GMC
Sierra. The GMC was located approximately a quarter of a mile north of the crash
scene and was stuck in a muddy field. The driver of the GMC Sierra was Benny
Johnson, who was traveling north, struck the Chevrolet Cruz, and killed one of its
occupants, J.S.V. DOB 07/04/2015. Johnson continued north and struck and killed
2 pedestrians T.D.S. DOB 12/13/1984 and P.S.S. DOB 03/28/2007. The Chrysler
Van was struck by debris set in motion by Johnson’s vehicle. Johnson continued
driving north, traveled around a right hand curve and as he began traveling around
a left hand curve, he traveled off the right side of the roadway, into an open field
and became stuck in the mud. Johnson was detained and brought back to the scene
by a Dunklin County Deputy.

Plaintiff’s underlying state court cases were reviewed on Case.net, Missouri’s online case management
system. The Court takes judicial notice of these public state records. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991
(8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that district court may take judicial notice of public state records); and Stutzka
v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts “may take judicial notice of
judicial opinions and public records”).

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Plaintiff was arrested on July 5, 2017, at Dexter Hospital. No bond was allowed.

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I made contact with Johnson and could smell a strong odor of intoxicants coming
from him. Johnson’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy and his speech was slurred. I
asked Johnson if he would take a portable breath test and he refused. I submitted
Johnson to field sobriety tests. The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test revealed a lack
of smooth pursuit, an onset prior to 45 degrees and distinct nystagmus at maximum
deviation in both eyes. Johnson’s eyes also revealed vertical nystagmus. During the
One-Leg-Stand test, Johnson swayed while balancing, using his arms for balance,
hopped and put his right foot down. Johnson could not maintain a heel to toe stance
while listening to the instruction to the Walk and Turn test. During the test, Johnson
stopped while walking to steady himself did not touch heel to toe, lost his balance
while walking, and used his arms for balance. Johnson stated he obtained a college
bachelor’s degree, but could not recite the alphabet correctly. Johnson also could
not count backwards from 99 to 77 correctly. Johnson was obviously intoxicated. I
arrested Johnson for Driving While Intoxicated and read him the Missouri Implied
Consent law, which he stated he understood but refused to give a blood sample.
An Information was filed on July 11, 2017, charging plaintiff with the same charge as that
in the criminal complaint. See State v. Johnson, No. 17DU-CR00941-01 (35th Jud. Cir., Dunklin
County Court). Plaintiff was also charged as a habitual offender.
The matter was transferred to Stoddard County on or about April 19, 2019. See State v.
Johnson, No. 17DU-CR00941-04 (35th Jud. Cir., Stoddard County Court). A Substitute
Information was filed on October 8, 2021, by prosecutor Nicholas Jain, charging plaintiff with
three counts of felony driving while intoxicated and causing the death of another, leaving the scene
of an accident and causing physical injury to another and leaving the scene of an accident and
causing property damage exceeding $1,000. Id. Plaintiff was represented by attorney John
McMullan.
After a three-day jury trial on the matter in front of Judge Joe Satterfield, from October 18,
2021, through October 20, 2021, plaintiff was found guilty on all charges and he was sentenced
on December 15, 2021, to a total term of imprisonment of thirty-eight (38) years in the Missouri
Department of Corrections. See State v. Johnson, No. 17DU-CR00941-04 (35th Jud. Cir., Stoddard
County Court).

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Plaintiff appealed his conviction to the Missouri Court of Appeals, and the sentence was
affirmed on August 4, 2023. See State v. Johnson, No. SD37373 (Mo.Ct.App. 2023). Plaintiff filed
a post-conviction motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to Missouri Rule 29.15 on May 12,
2023. See Johnson v. State, No. 22SD-CC00020 (35th Jud. Cir., Dunklin County Court). The matter
is currently under advisement.
The Complaint
Plaintiff Benny Johnson, an inmate at ERDCC, is a self-represented litigant who brings
this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against twenty-four (24) defendants: (1) Joe
Satterfield (Judge); (2) Robert Mayer (Judge); (3) John Speilman (Judge); (4) Nicholas Jail
(Prosecutor); (5) Russell Oliver (Prosecutor); (6) Tim Pulley (Police Officer); (7) Jeremy Jones
(Criminalist); (8) Todd Watson (Police Officer); (9) Aaron Grainger (Police Officer); (10) Josh
Roberts (City of Bernie Police Officer); (11) John McMullan (Plaintiff’s Criminal Attorney); (12)
James Smith 3; (13) Justin Claibourn (Prosecution Witness); (14) Nicole Green (Dunklin County
Jail Administrator); (15) Ashley Graham (Nurse, Dunklin County Jail); (16) Dewayne Rhody
(Medical Lab Technician); (17) Kelli Asher (Juror); (18) June Robinson (Prosecution Witness);
(19) Tayhlar Santana (Prosecution Witness); (20) Brant Bristow (Prosecution Witness); (21) Jesse
Curtis (Prosecution Witness); (22) Brian Wicker (Tow Truck Driver); (23) Bob Holder (Sheriff,
Dunklin County); and (24) Carl Heifner (Sheriff, Stoddard County). [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff is
pursuing claims for “corruption” and “cruel and unusual punishment,” as well as alleged violations

Plaintiff states that defendant James Smith is with the Missouri Courts Commission on Retirement,
Discipline and Removal.

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of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 4 Id. Plaintiff is additionally pursuing claims under
the Missouri State Constitution.
Plaintiff’s claims in this action are conclusory and lack factual support. Additionally, he
has attempted to assert multiple claims against multiple defendants in direct contravention of the
Federal joinder rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 and 20. Nevertheless, the Court will do its best to
recount plaintiff’s claims for relief in this matter.
Plaintiff allegations in his complaint appear to relate to four issues: (1) purported civil
rights violations relating to his arrest in July of 2017; (2) purported civil rights violations relating
to his criminal prosecution in Dunklin and Stoddard County Courts between July of 2017 and
October 2021; (3) claimed civil rights violations relating to his incarceration in both the Dunklin
County and the Stoddard County Jails; (4) and purported allegations of deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs during his incarceration at both the Dunklin County and Stoddard
County Jails.
A. Allegations Relating to Plaintiff’s Arrest in July of 2017
Plaintiff states that at the scene of the accident in July of 2017, he was questioned prior to
receiving his Miranda rights, by Missouri State Police Trooper Todd Watson and Officer Josh
Roberts from the City of Bernie, Missouri. 5 Plaintiff complains that Officer Roberts acted outside
his jurisdiction, while Trooper Watson disoriented him by moving him from vehicle to vehicle
after the accident prior to both questioning him and then performing a field sobriety test on him.

Plaintiff additionally claims that he is pursuing violations of his First and Sixth Amendment rights.
However, he has not provided indications of what those claims are in his complaint.

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Plaintiff admits that Judge Satterfield reviewed this issue in his criminal action, as well as whether he
had been legally under arrest prior to speaking to officers at the scene of the accident.

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Plaintiff states that “all this movement without regard to my injuries or how much more damage
he could have caused with all this movement” violated his Constitutional rights.
Plaintiff states that even though he was purportedly arrested at the scene of the accident,
he was again arrested by an unnamed person at the hospital where he was taken for treatment and
bloodwork. He claims he was physically and verbally abused by an unnamed Missouri State Police
Trooper at the hospital when he was placed in handcuffs. He was allegedly “yanked around
extremely hard, nearly causing [him] to fall.” 6 Plaintiff believes that this unnamed officer was
prejudiced against him, and he purportedly told plaintiff that he hoped he never saw a free day
again. Plaintiff claims that this “abusive Trooper” transported him from the hospital to the
“Dunklin/Stoddard County line” and to the custody of Trooper Watson who then took him to the
Dunklin County Jail. Plaintiff complains that Trooper Watson questioned him during the drive to
the Jail. Plaintiff claims Trooper Watson took him to the booking area at Dunklin County Jail and
again read him his rights. Plaintiff complains that Trooper Watson tried to make it seem like he
was first arrested at the scene of the accident, then at the hospital, but he was really arrested at the
Dunklin County Jail. As noted above, this matter was determined during plaintiff’s criminal action.
Plaintiff states that unnamed persons allowed Dexter City Police officers into the
emergency room after the accident, even though Dexter City Police officers were not involved
with his criminal investigation. Plaintiff believes that this was a violation of his HIPAA rights. 7
Plaintiff states that an unnamed accident investigator took pictures of his arms after the
accident without getting a warrant. He asserts that this investigator also asked him if he had

To the extent plaintiff believes he was subject to excessive force, he would need to bring a separate
lawsuit against a named defendant. The Court will not address the supposed excessive force allegations in
the present lawsuit given that plaintiff has not identified a proper defendant in this matter.

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Courts have repeatedly held that an allegation violation of HIPAA does not create a private right of
action. See Adams v. Eureka Fire Prot. Dist., 352 F.App’x 137, 138-39 (8th Cir. 2009).

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anything in his pockets, and when plaintiff took his truck keys out of his pockets, the investigator
took the keys prior to reading him his rights.
Plaintiff complains that City of Bernie Police Officer, Josh Roberts, let Brant Bristow leave
the scene of the accident and “swap vehicles.” Plaintiff believes Mr. Bristow should not have been
able to leave the scene. Plaintiff has not indicated the relevance of this issue.
Plaintiff objects to an unnamed officer with the Missouri State Police who allegedly
released his truck to the insurance company before his attorney, John McMullan, could review it.
He asserts that as a result, Brian Wicker, a tow truck driver, disconnected the battery on the truck
which allegedly reset the computer. This caused data that was used at trial to be, according to
plaintiff, “questionable.” Plaintiff also objects to the data used from the truck because he states
that his truck keys were taken by the police without his consent. 8
B. Allegations Relating to Plaintiff’s Criminal Prosecution in Dunklin and Stoddard
County Courts Between July of 2017 and October 2021
Plaintiff disagrees with several pretrial decisions made by Judges Joe Satterfield, Robert
Mayer and John Speilman in his criminal action. 9 He states that his initial appearance was in front
of Judge Speilman, who bound his case over in front of Judge Mayer. Plaintiff requested a change
of venue in his criminal action to Butler County, Missouri, and Judge Mayer denied the motion.
Instead, the matter was moved to Stoddard County, Missouri, but not until April of 2019. Plaintiff

Evidentiary matters would have been reviewed during plaintiff’s criminal action. As plaintiff was
convicted and sentenced in his criminal case, he cannot now attack that conviction unless it has been
expunged. See discussion of Heck v. Humphrey, infra.

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Plaintiff claims he wrote a letter to the Missouri Courts Commission on Retirement, Discipline and
Removal relative to all the judges involved in his criminal case on June 23, 2021. James Smith, an
individual at that office, wrote back to plaintiff on July 8, 2021, but only relative to his complaint against
Judge Satterfield. Smith told plaintiff there was no legal basis to proceed on his complaint. Plaintiff wrote
to Smith to ask if his complaint was shared with Judge Satterfield. Smith responded that “any
correspondence about [his] complaint were private and denied to [him].” Plaintiff has not indicated what
type of civil violation he believes Smith is liable for.

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objects to the change of venue, as well as the change of judge which occurred at the time. His case
was then assigned to Judge Joe Satterfield, who plaintiff claims was a friend of Judge Mayer.
Plaintiff states that prior to the case being transferred to Stoddard County, his attorney,
John McMullan, and the Prosecutor Unknown McCormick, reached of plea deal of ten (10) years
imprisonment. However, Judge Mayer declined to approve the deal, stating that he wanted the
incoming prosecutor, Nicholas Jain, to hear and try plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff believes that Judge
Mayer and Nicholas Jain have a corrupt relationship. He points to the fact that Judge Mayer and
Prosecutor Jain have adjacent offices in the Dunklin County Courthouse as evidence of this
relationship.
Plaintiff also claims to have additional evidence of “corruption,” including the fact that
Prosecutor Nicholas Jain wanted to enhance the charges against him, so Judge Mayer sent
plaintiff’s case back to Judge Speilman. Plaintiff believes that because Judge Speilman issued the
warrant for the blood draw in his initial case, as well as the warrant for his arrest, he should have
had to recuse himself from presiding over the motion to enhance the charges.
Plaintiff complains that Judge Satterfield showed bias by denying almost all his pretrial
motions. He also asserts that he showed bias by allowing Stoddard County Prosecutor Russell
Oliver, who was not prosecuting the case against plaintiff, to sit in the courtroom during plaintiff’s
trial. Plaintiff states that Oliver sat in a witness box next to Judge Satterfield. Plaintiff also believes
Oliver consulted with Prosecutor Jain during plaintiff’s trial. Furthermore, plaintiff accuses Oliver,
Jain and Judge Satterfield of loading the jury pool with persons that had previously been on juries
who had found criminals guilty and/or who had children who went to school with Trooper Tim
Pulley’s children. Plaintiff does not indicate how Tim Pulley is connected to his case. He has not
indicated that Pulley was at the scene of the accident or that Pulley was involved in his arrest.

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Plaintiff argues that Judge Satterfield acted in a corrupt manner when he called plaintiff’s
sister and brother-in-law into his office prior to the trial and told them what they were able to
testify to on the stand. He claims that they were threatened with jail time if they said something
either Judge Satterfield or Prosecutor Jain disagreed with, and his sister was never able to testify.
Plaintiff asserts that his attorney, John McMullan, failed to object to Judge Satterfield’s
inappropriate conduct.
Plaintiff believes that Judge Satterfield and Prosecutor Jain had too close a working
relationship. He complains that Prosecutor Jain was allowed to use leading questions with his
witnesses while plaintiff’s witnesses were not allowed the use of leading questions. Plaintiff also
complains that Prosecutor Jain enhanced the Victim Impact Statements to influence the jury.
Plaintiff also asserts that Judge Satterfield allowed the prosecution witnesses to change their stories
from the testimony given in their depositions. Plaintiff has not provided examples of this in his
complaint. His allegations are entirely conclusory.
Plaintiff accuses Trooper Tim Pulley of having an improper conversation with one of the
jurors in his criminal trial, Kelli Asher. He says that Judge Satterfield denied his requests for a
mistrial. Plaintiff does not indicate what he believes Pulley was discussing with Kelli Asher.
Plaintiff accuses Pulley of having free reign during trial, stating that Judge Satterfield allowed him
to speak directly to jurors when he was on the stand during trial. Plaintiff fails to state what Pulley
testified to at trial. Plaintiff accuses a victim’s family member in this case, Justin Claibourn, of
speaking to jurors about how much he loved his ex-wife. Plaintiff states that Claibourn should
have known that this practice was forbidden during a trial.
Plaintiff asserts that during his trial, Judge Mayer was present at the Stoddard County
Courthouse and seen coming out of the jury room while jurors were present. He also claims that

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Judge Mayer was seen going back and forth to Judge Satterfield’s office during trial breaks.
Plaintiff believes Judge Mayer should have been kept from speaking to Judge Satterfield about his
trial.
Plaintiff states that Prosecutor Jain asked Judge Satterfield for time to investigate whether
plaintiff had prior DUIs before he was sentenced. This allegedly caused a delay in sentencing of
two months. He further objects to Judge Satterfield’s remarks at sentencing stating that plaintiff
had shown no remorse for the families of those he had killed.
Plaintiff alleges that Prosecutor Nicholas Jain was somehow biased and corrupt because at
the same time as he was prosecuting him in his criminal case, Jain was defending himself on a
Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) charge. Plaintiff believes Jain should not have been able to
prosecute him while undergoing his own criminal proceeding.
Plaintiff accuses medical lab technician Dewayne Rhody of improperly testifying at trial
to topics outside of his personal knowledge. He claims that he should not have testified that he
drew both of plaintiff’s blood samples because a female staff member at the hospital drew
plaintiff’s first blood sample. Similarly, plaintiff claims that Jeremy Jones, the crime lab
supervisor, should not have been able to say with certainty at trial that the blood samples were his.
Plaintiff makes a plethora of complaints about his own attorney, John McMullan. He
asserts that he wanted his attorney to motion for speedy trial, but he failed to do so. He states that
McMullan failed to object at trial because he was afraid of harassment, was afraid of looking bad,
did not believe plaintiff was paying him enough money, and thought plaintiff was guilty. Plaintiff
also complains that he wanted to terminate McMullan’s appointment but was told he would not be
given appointed counsel if he did so. Plaintiff alleges that McMullan failed to timely depose
witnesses, and as a result, they changed their stories after speaking to Prosecutor Jain and

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investigators who worked for the prosecutor. Plaintiff also objects to McMullan’s failure to
confront Judges Satterfield and Mayer with plaintiff’s complaint to the Missouri Courts
Commission on Retirement, Discipline and Removal.
C. Allegations Relating to Alleged Civil Rights Violations at the Dunklin County and the
Stoddard County Jails
Plaintiff claims that when he was first incarcerated at Dunklin County Jail in July of 2017,
he worked in the kitchen. He complains that he was made to work approximately sixteen (16) hour
days without pay. He has failed to indicate, however, what exactly he did at the Dunklin County
Jail, or how long he worked in the kitchen at the Jail. Plaintiff has also failed to indicate if he
volunteered for the job in the kitchen, or if he received special treatment because of working at the
Jail.
Plaintiff alleges that he was held with another inmate for several months in a one-man cell
at the Dunklin County Jail. He complains that he had to sleep on a mat on the floor next to the
toilet, even when his cellmate urinated on the floor next to him. He claims that when he asked for
cleaning supplies to clean the floor, he was not provided the supplies right away. Plaintiff does not
indicate how long it took to receive the cleaning supplies. However, from the facts in the complaint
it appears that he received the supplies the next day.
Plaintiff also complains that he and other inmates suffered from spider bites at both the
Dunklin County Jail and the Stoddard County Jail. 10 He asserts that the Stoddard County Jail was
so crowded that often five inmates were in a two-man cell together. Additionally, there were not
enough showers at Stoddard County Jail for everyone to use, so usually inmates were only allowed
to shower approximately every four days. He asserts that showers at Stoddard County Jail had
It is unclear from plaintiff’s complaint plaintiff’s dates of incarceration at the Dunklin County Jail
and/or the Stoddard County Jail.
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mold on the ceiling. Furthermore, at Dunklin County Jail, the shower curtains and ceilings were
rarely cleaned, and some walls had mold on them. Plaintiff complains that he was held in a cell at
Stoddard County Jail for forty-eight (48) hours that utilized a hole in the floor for a toilet.
Plaintiff also states that inmates at the Dunklin County Jail were charged for toiletries once
per week. However, on occasion, cell searches occurred at the Jail and extra toiletries were taken
from the cells and sold to other inmates at the Jail. The amounts paid for toiletries were not
refunded to the inmates’ accounts. He asserts that Stoddard County Jail did not provide inmates
with any hygiene products, so if an inmate had no money in his account, he could not utilize
cleaning products.
Plaintiff asserts that nurse Ashley Graham, the nurse in Dunklin County, stole commissary
items from his cell on the date of one of the cell searches, including items such as bags of chips,
peanut butter snack crackers and cookies. His requests for reimbursement were denied. Plaintiff
claims that Graham, as well as janitor Orville Sipes, made comments about his criminal case at
Dunklin County Jail in front of other inmates.
Plaintiff objects to inmate phone calls and visiting rooms being recorded at the Dunklin
County and Stoddard County Jails. He believes that this allows judges and prosecutors access to
inmate conversations.
D. Plaintiff’s Allegations of Deliberate Indifference to his Serious Medical Needs at both
Dunklin County and Stoddard County Jails
Plaintiff makes the general allegation that he was denied proper medical treatment when
he was incarcerated at Dunklin County Jail. However, plaintiff has failed to identify what his
serious medical needs were during his time at both Jails.

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He claims that when he arrived at the Dunklin County Jail, he had wounds on his arms that
were “subject to bleeding,” which appear to relate to having IVs removed at the hospital in July of
2017. He states that he was denied “clean bandages” for the wounds by nurse Ashley Graham.
He states that on an unnamed occasion, Graham failed to provide him a comparable
medication at Dunklin County Jail when a medication he was taking was “pulled from the market.”
Instead, he was given an over-the-counter medication. And on another occasion, when he fell at
the Dunklin County Jail on a puddle of water and allegedly hurt his shoulder, Graham placed him
under observation for twenty-four (24) hours to see if he was faking his injury before transferring
him to the Emergency Room in Hayti, Missouri. Plaintiff complains that he was billed by the
hospital for his treatment, and that he was also billed by Dunklin County Jail for medical care
when he saw the doctor at the Jail for treatment.
On an unidentified date, plaintiff claims he got sick at the Dunklin County Jail with a fever
and chills. He claims an unnamed guard told him she spoke to a physician on the phone and came
back with an antibiotic for him to take. A few days later, plaintiff developed a rash on his hands
and feet, and the same guard again allegedly spoke to a physician and told plaintiff to take
Benadryl. Plaintiff states that he is unsure if he was being treated by an actual physician or simply
nurse Ashley Graham or a guard at the Dunklin County Jail.
Plaintiff states that he once filled out a medical request for an unnamed medical issue while
he was at the Dunklin County Jail, but it was almost three months until he was seen by a doctor.
Plaintiff fails to detail what his medical need was when he filled out the medical request.
Plaintiff complains that his sister had to both purchase and drive his psoriasis medication
to both the Dunklin County Jail and the Stoddard Count Jail. He also complains that he was made
to pay for his medications that he took while he was incarcerated at both Jails.

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E. Plaintiff Fails to Make Allegations Against the Remaining Defendants
Plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts alleging civil rights violations against the following
defendants: (1) Aaron Grainger; (2) James Smith; (3) Justin Claibourn; (4) Nicole Green; (5) Kelli
Asher; (6) June Robinson; (7) Tayhlar Santana; (8) Brant Bristow; (9) Jesse Curtis; (10) Brian
Wicker; (11) Bob Holder; and (12) Carl Heifner.
Several of the aforementioned defendants – Grainger, Smith, Green, Robinson, Curtis,
Holder and Heifner - have no allegations made against them in plaintiff’s complaint. Whereas
other defendants – Claibourn, Asher, Santana, Bristow and Wicker – were not acting as state actors
as described by plaintiff, in the events in the complaint and as such, cannot be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
For relief in this action, plaintiff seeks damages.
Severance of Plaintiff’s Purported Unlawful Conditions of
Confinement Claims and Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs Claims
As set forth above, plaintiff alleges an abundance of claims in this lawsuit, most of which
are unrelated. “Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, ... [in part]
to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees - for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to
3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the
required fees.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Complaints with unrelated
claims brought by prisoner plaintiffs against different defendants should be rejected, either by
severing the action into separate lawsuits or by dismissing improperly joined defendants. Id.; see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 844-45 (3rd Cir. 2006); Elmore v.
Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000); Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848
F.2d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 1988).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 permits severance of claims if they are improperly
joined. The rule states, in pertinent part, that on motion or sua sponte, “the court may at any time,
on just terms ... sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Severance is appropriate when
the claims are “discrete and separate,” each capable of resolution without dependence or effect on
the other. See Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of Ind., Inc., 451 F.3d 424, 442 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted).
When determining whether to sever claims pursuant to Rule 21, district courts often
consider (1) whether the issues sought to be severed are significantly different from one another
and would require distinct evidentiary proof; (2) whether severance would promote judicial
economy; and (3) whether either party will be unduly prejudiced by severance or its absence. See
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Shapiro, 190 F.R.D. 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (citation
omitted).
Plaintiff’s allegations relating to his purported unlawful conditions of confinement claims
at both the Dunklin and Stoddard County Jails, as well as his deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs claims at the Jails are not based on the same transactions or occurrences as the rest
of the claims in this lawsuit. For this reason, the Court will sever and dismiss these claims, without
prejudice. If plaintiff wishes to file new actions concerning those claims he may do so. However,
plaintiff must remember that his claims relating to Dunklin County Jail are separate and distinct
from those relating to Stoddard County Jail. Moreover, his deliberate indifference to medical care
claims are also separate and distinct from his conditions of confinement claims, as they relate to
different defendants and different dates. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 and 20. Accordingly, these claims
would need to be filed in separate lawsuits.

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Discussion
A review of plaintiff’s allegations indicates that his remaining claims against defendants
are subject to dismissal. Plaintiff’s claims relating to events which occurred prior to October 17,
2019, are time-barred, and the Court need not address those claims as a result. Plaintiff’s resultant
claims, which are brought against defendants in their official capacities only, fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Additionally, to the extent plaintiff is attacking his state court
criminal conviction, his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), as
there is no indication that his conviction has been overturned.
To the extent plaintiff is asserting claims for relief against the judges who presided over
his criminal case, as well as prosecutor Nicholas Jain and/or Prosecutor Russell Oliver, those
claims are barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiff’s claims against his defense
counsel, John McMullan are also subject to dismissal.
A. Plaintiff’s Allegations Relating to Events Which Occurred Prior to October 17, 2019,
Are Time-Barred
While there is no statute of limitations contained within 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme
Court “has held that § 1983 claims accruing within a particular state should be governed by that
state’s statute of limitations governing personal-injury claims.” Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198,
1205 (8th Cir. 2011). See also Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 934 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2019)
(determining that statute of limitations for § 1983 case arising in Minnesota “comes from the
state’s personal injury statute”). Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983
actions. Sulik v. Taney Cty., Mo., 393 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2005). While the statute of limitations
is an affirmative defense, a district court may properly dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 when it is apparent the statute of limitations has expired. Myers v. Vogal,
960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff did not sign and date the instant complaint, nor did he indicate when he placed the
complaint in the prison mail system at ERDCC. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
signed and dated October 17, 2024, and the Court received plaintiff’s complaint on that date.
Accordingly, any claims brought by plaintiff arising five (5) years prior to this date, or before
October 17, 2019, are time-barred.
Because plaintiff has failed to articulate in his complaint when the majority of his claims
arose, the Court cannot state with certainty which of the claims are time-barred. However, it is
clear that many of the claims in this action arose prior to October 17, 2019, or five years prior to
the filing of the present lawsuit. For example, the claims relating to plaintiff’s arrest arose in July
of 2017, as did many of his state pretrial criminal matters, which occurred prior to October of
2019. These claims are subject to dismissal as time-barred.
B. Plaintiff’s Claims Attacking his Criminal Conviction Are Barred by Heck v.
Humphrey
The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner may not recover damages in a § 1983 suit
where the judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions, sentences, or
continued imprisonment unless the convictions or sentences have been reversed, expunged, or
called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Schafer v.
Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997)
(applying rule in § 1983 suit seeking declaratory relief).
To the extent that plaintiff seeks a ruling that his state court sentence is invalid, and he
should be released, such a § 1983 claim is not cognizable here. Plaintiff seems to be asserting that
the allegedly unconstitutional acts of several of the defendants led to his conviction. Plaintiff does
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not aver, nor does it appear, that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, or called
into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the Court concludes that
plaintiff’s claims attacking his criminal conviction are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
C. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants in their Official Capacities Are Subject to
Dismissal
Even if most of plaintiff’s claims were not time-barred, they would be subject to dismissal.
For example, many of plaintiff’s claims are against county or municipal employees. Because
plaintiff failed to specify the capacity in which he sues the county or municipal employees, the
Court interprets the complaint as including only official capacity claims against those defendants.
See Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995) (“If a plaintiff’s
complaint is silent about the capacity in which [he] is suing the defendant, [courts] interpret the
complaint as including only official-capacity claims.”).
A suit brought against a government official in his or her official capacity pursuant to §
1983 is not a suit against the official, but rather a suit against the official’s office. Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, an official-capacity suit generally
represents a “way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). In other words, the real party in interest in an officialcapacity suit is not the named official, but the governmental entity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25
(1991). In this case, plaintiff brings claims against Dunklin County employees as well as Stoddard
County employees. As such, plaintiff’s official capacity claims against these defendants must be
treated as claims against the governmental entities that employ them, Dunklin County and
Stoddard County. 11
Plaintiff also brings claims against employees of the State of Missouri. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “Section 1983 provides for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation,
under color of law, of another’s civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008).

11

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In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), the Supreme Court
held that a municipality or local governing body can be directly liable under § 1983. Such liability
may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an
unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines,
883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018); see also Marsh v. Phelps Cnty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir.
2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a
theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”).
Plaintiff fails to make any assertions against either Dunklin County or Stoddard County in
his complaint, and no allegations that could be construed as Monell claims. There are no claims of
a constitutional violation by either Dunklin County or Stoddard County resulting from any policy,
custom, or deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–92
(describing a municipal liability claim). Merely listing a defendant’s name in a case caption is
insufficient to support a claim against the defendant. Krych v. Hvass, 83 F. App’x 854, 855 (8th
Cir. 2003) (citing Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (noting that
court properly dismissed pro se complaint that was silent as to defendant except for his name
appearing in the caption)). As such, plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against defendant police
officers fail to state a claim for relief and must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to pursue claims against either the Dunklin
County Jail and/or the Stoddard County Jail, such claims are also subject to dismissal. Municipal
departments like jails, sheriff’s offices and police departments are not legal entities that can be
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against these entities.
However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”
Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Thus, plaintiff’s claims against the State employees are subject to dismissal.

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D. Plaintiff’s Failure to Make Allegations Against Several of the Defendants is Fatal to
His Claims for Relief Against these Defendants.
Liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is personal. See Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641,
646 (8th Cir. 2017). In other words, “[g]overnment officials are personally liable only for their own
misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). As such, § 1983 liability
“requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v.
Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208
(8th Cir. 1990)). See also Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff’s
excessive bail claims because none of the defendants set plaintiff’s bail, and therefore, “there can
be no causal connection between any action on the part of the defendants and any alleged
deprivation” of plaintiff’s rights); and Love v. Schoffman, 142 Fed. Appx. 278, 279 (8th Cir. 2003)
(affirming pre-service dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because the complaint, among other
infirmities, “did not specify which of the many named defendants was responsible for each of the
alleged harms”). To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the defendant to the
challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2019).
As noted above, plaintiff fails to make specific allegations against several defendants in
this action including: Grainger, Smith, Green, Robinson, Curtis, Holder and Heifner. Similarly,
other defendants – Claibourn, Asher, Santana, Bristow and Wicker – were not acting as state actors
as described by plaintiff in the events in the complaint, and as such, cannot be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

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E. Plaintiff’s Allegations Against Judges Satterfield, Mayer and Speilman, as well as
Prosecutors Nicholas Jain and Russell Oliver, Fail to State a Claim.
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations against Judges Satterfield, Mayer and Speilman for
allegedly acting biased and corrupt, are subject to dismissal, as judges are entitled to judicial
immunity.
Judicial immunity provides judges with immunity from suit, allowing them to exercise the
authority with which they are vested, and to act upon their own convictions. See Hamilton v. City
of Hayti, Missouri, 948 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2020). “Like other forms of official immunity,
judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.”
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of
acting maliciously or corruptly. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). See also Woodworth v.
Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating that “judicial immunity is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice”). Moreover, “a judge will not be deprived of his immunity
because the action he took was in error or was in excess of his authority.” Justice Network, Inc. v.
Craighead Cty., 931 F.3d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 2019). As such, plaintiff’s allegations against Judges
Satterfield, Mayer and Speilman are subject to dismissal.
Similarly, plaintiff’s allegations against Prosecutor Nicholas Jain and Prosecutor Russell
Oliver are also subject to dismissal. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil rights claims
based on actions taken within the scope of their duties in initiating a criminal prosecution and
presenting the state’s case at trial. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976). “Absolute
immunity covers prosecutorial functions such as the initiation and pursuit of a criminal
prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case at trial, and other conduct that is intimately
associated with the judicial process.” Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir.
1996). See Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016) (same).
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In this case, plaintiff has not made specific claims of bias or corruption relating to
Prosecutors Jain or Oliver. His claims are merely speculative and conclusory. A prosecutor is
immune from suit even if he knowingly presents false, misleading, or perjured testimony, or
withholds or suppresses exculpatory evidence, and plaintiff has not alleged that Jain went so far
as to do so in this case. Reasonover v. St. Louis County, Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 580 (8th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations against Jain and Oliver are subject to dismissal.
F. Plaintiff’s Claims Against his Criminal Attorney Are Subject to Dismissal.
Plaintiff accuses his criminal attorney, John McMullan, of failing to properly represent him
in his prior criminal action. Because plaintiff’s defense attorney did not act under of color of state
law, he cannot be liable for any violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights under § 1983.
“The essential elements of a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim are: (1) that the defendant(s) acted
under color of state law, and (2) that the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a
constitutionally protected federal right.” Green v. Byrd, 972 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2020).
However, a defense attorney, whether appointed or retained, does not act under color of state law,
and thus cannot be liable for the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (stating that “a public defender does not
act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a
defendant in a criminal proceeding”); Myers, 960 F.2d at 750 (stating that attorneys who
represented plaintiff, “whether appointed or retained, did not act under color of state law and, thus,
are not subject to suit under section 1983”). For the aforementioned reasons, plaintiff’s allegations
against John McMullan are subject to dismissal.

23

Conclusion
Having thoroughly reviewed and liberally construed the complaint and the supplemental
documents, the Court concludes that it is subject to dismissal because it is frivolous and/or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court can envision no amendment to the
complaint that would cause it to state a plausible claim for relief. The Court will therefore dismiss
this action at this time, without prejudice, and will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over plaintiff’s state law claims, such as those he wishes to bring under the Missouri Constitution
and/or any Missouri State law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S 715, 726 (1966) (if federal claims are dismissed before trial, remaining state claims should
also be dismissed); Crest Construction II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 359 (8th Cir. 2011) (where
all federal claims have been dismissed, district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction
over state claims is “purely discretionary”).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to commence this action
without prepaying fees or costs [ECF No. 2] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order,
Plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $37.58. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance
payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison
registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s claims of unlawful conditions of
confinement and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs are SEVERED AND
DISMISSED without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all remaining federal claims in this action are
DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any state law claims brought by plaintiff in this action
are DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 22nd day of November, 2024.

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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