Cloyed v. Astrue

Filing 19

OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. A separate judgment in accordance with this Opinion, Memorandum and Order is entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Autrey on 1/2/14. (CLA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION

LOREN L. CLOYED,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
1
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. 2:12CV46 HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s request for judicial review
under 28 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of Defendant denying Plaintiff’s
applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
will affirm the Commissioner's denial of Plaintiff's applications.
Facts and Background
Plaintiff was 49 years old at the time of the hearing. He has an associates
degree of arts. The ALJ found Plaintiff had the impairments of: obesity, statuspost bilateral inguinal hernias, status-post coronary artery disease with stenting of

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Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin should be substituted
for Michael J. Astrue as the Defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be taken to continue this
suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

two coronary arteries, mild to moderate chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
and hypertension, hyperlipidemia, hypothyroidism, and gastroesophageal reflux
disease controlled by medication. At the July 27, 2010 hearing, Plaintiff testified
that his unemployment ran out in June, 2010. Plaintiff is married and lives with
his wife and her daughter. Plaintiff has a driver’s license and drove himself to the
hearing. Plaintiff testified that he can do some dishes and can stand for 15-20
minutes at a time before having to sit down. Plaintiff has lower back pain while
sitting. Plaintiff had a heart attack in 2007 and was doing factory work at the time.
Plaintiff weighs about 290 pounds. He does the laundry. Plaintiff takes the
following medications: Lipitor, Plavix, Levothyroxin, Lisinpril, Metoprolol,
generic Paxil, Paroxetine, and Prilosec. Plaintiff testified that he has daily
episodes of dizziness, which last about 10-15 seconds.
A vocational expert also testified. The VE concluded that Plaintiff could
still do his past relevant job as a sales agent/loan clerk in the manner in which
Plaintiff performed that job. However, the VE also testified that Plaintiff would
be unemployable if he would need more that one extra 15 minute break during the
work day or if he were confined to a “low stress” job that required more than a
sedentary level of exertion.
Plaintiff’s application for social security and supplemental security income
benefits under Titles II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. And XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §
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1381, et seq was denied on January 15, 2009. On October 26, 2010, the ALJ
issued an unfavorable decision. On April 24, 2012, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. Thus, the decision of the ALJ
stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
Standard For Determining Disability
The Social Security Act defines as disabled a person who is “unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738
(8th Cir.2010). The impairment must be “of such severity that [the claimant] is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him,
or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
A five-step regulatory framework is used to determine whether an
individual claimant qualifies for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),
416.920(a); see also McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir.2011)
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(discussing the five-step process). At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant is currently engaging in “substantial gainful activity”; if so, then he is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I); McCoy, 648 F.3d at
611. At Step Two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a severe
impairment, which is “any impairment or combination of impairments which
significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities”; if the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4)(ii), 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c);
McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Three, the ALJ evaluates whether the claimant's
impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant has such an impairment, the Commissioner will
find the claimant disabled; if not, the ALJ proceeds with the rest of the five-step
process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Prior to Step Four, the ALJ must assess the claimant's “residual functional
capacity” (“RFC”), which is “the most a claimant can do despite [his] limitations.”
Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir.2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545
(a) (1)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). At Step Four, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant can return to his past relevant work, by
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comparing the claimant's RFC with the physical and mental demands of the
claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f),
416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the claimant can
perform his past relevant work, he is not disabled; if the claimant cannot, the
analysis proceeds to the next step. Id.. At Step Five, the ALJ considers the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine whether the
claimant can make an adjustment to other work in the national economy; if the
claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the claimant will be found
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); McCoy, 648 F.3d at
611.
Through Step Four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove that he is
disabled. Moore, 572 F.3d at 523. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to establish that the claimant maintains the RFC to perform a
significant number of jobs within the national economy. Id.; Brock v. Astrue, 674
F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir.2012).
ALJ’s Decision
Applying the foregoing five-step analysis, the ALJ in this case determined
at Step One that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
August 27, 2008, the alleged onset date of disability. At Step Two, the ALJ found
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that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: obesity, status-post bilateral
inguinal hernias, status-post coronary artery disease with stenting of two coronary
arteries, mild to moderate chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and
hypertension, hyperlipidemia, hypothyroidism, and gastroesophageal reflux
disease controlled by medication. At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled in
severity of any impairment listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
Prior to Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity to perform the physical exertional and nonexertional requirements of
work, except for possibly doing prolonged or frequent standing or walking; lifting
or carrying objects weighing more than 10 pounds; doing more than occasional
climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling; or having
concentrated or excessive exposure to dust, fumes, chemicals, temperature
extremes, high humidity or dampness, and other typical allergens, pollutants, and
atmospheric irritants.
At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing
his past relevant work as a payday loan manager, and therefore, Plaintiff was not
disabled, and the ALJ was not required to proceed to Step Five.
Standard For Judicial Review
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The Court’s role in reviewing the Commissioner’s decision is to determine
whether the decision “‘complies with the relevant legal requirements and is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.’” Pate–Fires v. Astrue,
564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th
Cir.2008)). “Substantial evidence is ‘less than preponderance, but enough that a
reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Renstrom
v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d
520, 522 (8th Cir.2009)). In determining whether substantial evidence supports
the Commissioner’s decision, the Court considers both evidence that supports that
decision and evidence that detracts from that decision. Id. However, the court
“‘do[es] not reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ, and [it] defer[s] to the
ALJ’s determinations regarding the credibility of testimony, as long as those
determinations are supported by good reasons and substantial evidence.’” Id.
(quoting Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir.2006)). “If, after
reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s
findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.’” Partee v. Astrue, 638 F.3d
860, 863 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th
Cir.2005)). The Court should disturb the administrative decision only if it falls
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outside the available “zone of choice” of conclusions that a reasonable fact finder
could have reached. Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir.2006).
Discussion
In his appeal of the Commissioner's decision, Plaintiff makes the following
arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by failing to give proper weight to the opinion of
Plaintiff’s treating physicians; (2) the ALJ erred in failing to provide specific
rationale for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, as required by SSR 96-7p.
Weight of Opinion of Treating Physicians
The ALJ is entitled to discount treating physician opinions if it is not
supported by credible medical findings of diagnostic tests and other screening.
Likewise, if the opinion is largely based on a plaintiff’s subjective complaints,
rather than objective medical evidence, the opinion is entitled to less weight.
McDade v. Astrue, 720 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 2013). The ALJ in this matter
determined that the opinions of Dr. Knorr and Dr. Snyder fell within these
categories, based upon the medical evidence he considered. The Court finds no
error, based upon the ALJ’s articulated and supported decision.
Rationale for Rejecting Plaintiff’s Testimony
A claimant's RFC is the most an individual can do despite the combined
effects of all of his or her credible limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. An
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ALJ's RFC finding is based on all of the record evidence, including the claimant's
testimony regarding symptoms and limitations, the claimant's medical treatment
records, and the medical opinion evidence. See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959,
969 (8th Cir.2010); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545; Social Security Ruling (SSR)
96–8p. An ALJ may discredit a claimant's subjective allegations of disabling
symptoms to the extent they are inconsistent with the overall record as a whole,
including: the objective medical evidence and medical opinion evidence; the
claimant's daily activities; the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of medications and medical treatment; and the
claimant's self-imposed restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322
(8th Cir.1984); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 96–7p.
Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiffs impairments and did determine that
Plaintiff could perform his relevant past work. Several of Plaintiff’s chronic
conditions predated his alleged disability and he was able to work productively in
spite of these conditions. Significantly, Plaintiff was not referred to physical
therapy or pain management. Plaintiff has no significant side effects from his
medications, which provide Plaintiff relief from the conditions of which he claims
to be disabled. Considering the medically supported limitations Plaintiff has, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform his previous sedentary work, with
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certain limitations, as listed above.
The medical evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s conclusions.
Plaintiff’s symptoms and conditions are controlled by medication. Plaintiff
testified that he can drive, do laundry and the dishes.
When analyzing a claimant's subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must
consider the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler: (1) the claimant's daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating
and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;
and (5) functional restrictions. See 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984); see also
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. “The ALJ [is] not required to discuss
methodically each Polaski consideration, so long as he acknowledge[s] and
examine[s] those considerations before discounting [the claimant's] subjective
complaints.” Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir.2000). “Because the ALJ
[is] in a better position to evaluate credibility, we defer to his credibility
determinations as long as they [are] supported by good reasons and substantial
evidence.” Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir.2006). As the
Commissioner correctly argues, the ALJ articulated the inconsistencies on which
he relied in discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

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Conclusion
After careful examination of the record, the Court finds the Commissioner's
determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and
therefore, the decision will be affirmed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security is affirmed.
A separate judgment in accordance with this Opinion, Memorandum and
Order is entered this same date.
Dated this 2nd day of January, 2014.

_______________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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