Seid v. Colvin
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the relief requested in Plaintiffs Complaint and Brief in Support of Complaint is DENIED. [Docs. 1 , 13 .] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will enter a judgment in favor of the Commissioner affirming the decision of the administrative law judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge Nannette A. Baker on 3/3/15. (KJS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
MITCHELL SEID,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:14-CV-31 NAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Mitchell Seid’s (“Seid”) appeal regarding the
discontinuation of his disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. The Court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties have
consented to the exercise of authority by the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
[Doc. 8.]
The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefs and the entire
administrative record, including the hearing transcript and the medical evidence. Based on the
following, the Court will affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
I.
Background
Seid received an award of disability insurance benefits, beginning July 2008, due to
listing level affective mood disorder and anxiety. (Tr. 57, 62-65, 105.) In accordance with
social security law and regulations, the Social Security Administration performed a continuing
disability review pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1589. On March 26, 2012, the Social Security
Administration determined that Seid’s health had improved and he was able to work as of March
15, 2012. (Tr. 79-82.) Seid filed an appeal before a disability hearing officer and a hearing was
held on August 8, 2012. (Tr. 103-110.) The disability hearing officer determined that Seid’s
medical condition had improved and his disability had ceased. (Tr. 110.)
The Social Security Administration granted Seid’s timely request for a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”).
(Tr. 111-116.) An administrative hearing was held on
January 15, 2013. (Tr. 33- 56.) The ALJ issued a written decision affirming the denial of
benefits on March 21, 2013. (Tr. 14-28.) Seid requested a review of the ALJ’s decision from the
Appeals Council. (Tr. 9.) On January 14, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Seid’s request for
review.
(Tr. 1-3.)
The decision of the ALJ thus stands as the final decision of the
Commissioner. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000).
Seid filed this appeal on March 12, 2014. [Doc. 1.] The Commissioner filed an Answer
and Administrative Transcript on May 15, 2014. [Docs. 11, 12.] Seid filed a Brief in Support of
Complaint on June 16, 2014. [Doc. 13.] The Commissioner filed a Brief in Support of the
Answer on September 4, 2014. [Doc. 18.]
II.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews decisions of the ALJ to determine whether the decision is supported
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is
less than a preponderance but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support
the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002).
Therefore, even if a court finds that there is a preponderance of the evidence against the ALJ’s
decision, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v.
Heckler, 733 F.2d 65, 68 (8th Cir. 1984). To determine whether the Commissioner’s final
decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court is required to review the administrative
record as a whole and to consider:
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(1) The findings of credibility made by the ALJ;
(2) The education, background, work history, and age of the claimant;
(3) The medical evidence given by the claimant’s treating physicians;
(4) The subjective complaints of pain and description of the claimant’s physical
activity and impairment;
(5) The corroboration by third parties of the claimant’s physical impairment;
(6) The testimony of vocational experts based upon proper hypothetical questions
which fairly set forth the claimant’s physical impairment; and
(7) The testimony of consulting physicians.
Brand v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 1980).
The continuing disability review process is governed by a sequential analysis contained
in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f).
The regulations provide that determining whether a
claimant’s disability has ceased may involve up to eight
steps in which the Commissioner must determine the
following: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaging in
substantial gainful activity, (2) if not, whether the disability
continues because the claimant’s impairments meet or equal
the severity of a listed impairment, (3) whether there has
been a medical improvement, (4) if there has been a medical
improvement, whether it is related to the claimant’s ability to
work, (5) if there has been no medical improvement or if the
medical improvement is not related to the claimant’s ability
to work, whether any exception to medical improvement
applies, (6) if there is medical improvement and it is related
to the claimant’s ability to work, whether all of the
claimant’s current impairments in combination are severe,
(7) if the current impairment or combination of impairments
is severe, whether the claimant has the residual functional
capacity to perform any of his past relevant work activity,
and (8) if the claimant is unable to do work performed in the
past, whether the claimant can perform other work.
Dixon v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 997, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2003). “When benefits have been denied
based on a determination that a claimant’s disability has ceased, the issue is whether the
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claimant’s medical impairments have improved to the point where he is able to perform
substantial gainful activity.”
Delph v. Astrue, 538 F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(f)). “The medical improvement standard requires the Commissioner to compare a
claimant’s current condition with the condition existing at the time the claimant was found
disabled and awarded benefits.” Delph, 538 F.3d at 945.
III.
Summary of Evidence Before the ALJ
A.
Administrative Hearing
The ALJ heard testimony from Seid and Vocational Expert Alissa Smith. Seid was
represented by a personal representative.
1.
Seid’s Testimony
Seid testified that he was thirty-one years old at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 38.) He
lived alone and his kids visit three to four days a week. (Tr. 38.) Seid’s education included
some college, but he did not receive a degree.
(Tr. 39.) Seid had many jobs, including
telemarketing and sales. (Tr. 39-43.) He has not worked at any job for a long period of time
where he has not been fired. (Tr. 43.) He was fired from his jobs for lack of focus, not staying
on task, and arguing with his supervisors. (Tr. 40-42.)
Seid testified that he is able to maintain his personal care, do laundry, wash dishes, take
out the trash, and vacuum, but he does not do it as often as he should. (Tr. 43-44.) His attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) makes it hard to stay focused on tasks and he gets
sidetracked easily and forgets things. (Tr. 44.) He becomes depressed a lot. (Tr. 45.) He
testified that he has bad days where he doesn’t do much and just stays in bed. (Tr. 45.) His bad
days occur about a minimum of three days per week, if not four or five. (Tr. 45.) His bipolar
disorder causes him to have lots of mood swings. (Tr. 46.) At least two or three nights a week,
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he has problems sleeping. (Tr. 46.) He thinks about suicide, but does not believe he would act
on it. (Tr. 47.)
Seid testified that he goes to the doctor just to get his medication. (Tr. 48.) Seid stated
that he could try to work, but it is the same result in the end. (Tr. 48.) He would have problems
with focus and getting along with his boss. (Tr. 48.) He would like a job where he could get
paid to stay home and not have to show up, but he doesn’t think that job exists. (Tr. 49.)
Nothing has changed with his impairments. (Tr. 49.) If he lost his benefits and did not have
medicine, he would not be able to function at all. (Tr. 50.)
2.
Vocational Expert Testimony
Vocational Expert Alissa Smith testified that a hypothetical person with Seid’s age, work
experience, and education who had no exertional limitations, but was limited to unskilled work
with no contact with the general public and only occasional contact with co-workers and
supervisors would be precluded from Seid’s past relevant work. (Tr. 54.) She opined that the
hypothetical person would be able to perform the jobs of hospital cleaner, dishwasher, and order
filler. (Tr. 54-55.) She also testified that a hypothetical person of Seid’s age, work experience,
and education who was off task at least twenty percent of the time or absent from work two to
four times each month would be unable to perform Seid’s past relevant work or any work in the
national economy. (Tr. 54.)
B.
Medical Record
Seid received medical care from Ventura County Medical Center in California from 2008
to 2010. (Tr. 321-365.) He received treatment for severe ADHD, anxiety, obsessive compulsive
disorder, depression, marijuana abuse, and bipolar disorder not otherwise specified.
Seid
received treatment from Community Medical Associates in Missouri from 2011 to 2013. (Tr.
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214-244, 275-292, 367-406.) Seid’s primary care physician, Dr. James Bowers treated him for a
variety of physical and mental impairments, including depression, anxiety, hypertension, ADHD,
bipolar disorder, tooth pain, burns, chronic rhinitis, tachycardia, dental caries, and asthma. Seid
also received treatment from Dr. Jerry Wait, Dr. David Dollins, and Dr. Waclaw Dymek. Seid’s
mental status examinations at Community Medical Associates were substantially normal. (Tr.
215-216, 219-220, 223-224, 226, 231, 239, 275, 277, 367-369, 372, 374, 380, 386, 388, 390,
394, 396, 398, 401, 403, 406.) On most visits, Seid reported no symptoms including being
distracted by extraneous stimuli, not listening when spoken to, fidgeting, being unable to stay in
seat, or blurting out or interrupting others. (Tr. 218, 220, 222, 229, 231, 232, 239, 275, 367, 384,
393, 395, 397, 400, 405.) On November 28, 2011, Dr. Wait stated that he would not prescribe
Seid any more amphetamines without a psychological evaluation. (Tr. 216-217.) Dr. Bowers
agreed and referred Seid to Dr. Richard Hall for a mental health evaluation for ADHD. (Tr. 214,
216.) Dr. Hall then held counseling sessions and recommended medications for Seid between
March 2012 and May 2013. (Tr. 310-320, 407-417.)
Dr. Hall completed two opinions regarding Seid’s functional limitations. (Tr. 366, 412417.) Dr. Brooke J. D. Preylo also completed a psychological consultative evaluation regarding
Seid’s functional limitations.
(Tr. 250-254.) Dr. Keith L. Allen and Dr. Martin Isenberg
reviewed Seid’s medical records and completed Psychiatric Review Techniques and Mental
Residual Functional Capacity Assessments about Seid’s functional limitations. (Tr. 260-274,
293-307.)
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IV.
ALJ Decision
The ALJ determined that at the time of the comparison point decision (“CPD”) of July
15, 2008, Seid had the medically determinable impairments of affective disorders and anxiety
disorder, which met listing 12.04 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 16.) The
ALJ found that through March 15, 2012, the date Seid’s disability ended, he did not engage in
substantial gainful activity. (Tr. 16.) The ALJ also found that Seid continued to have the same
impairments and did not develop any additional severe impairments after the CPD through
March 15, 2012. (Tr. 16.) The ALJ determined that Seid did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments which met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed
in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 and medical improvement occurred as of March
15, 2012. (Tr. 16-17.) Next, the ALJ found that the medical improvement was related to work,
because as of March 15, 2012, Seid no longer had an impairment or combination of impairments
that met the same listing (12.04) that was met at the time of the CPD. (Tr. 21.) The ALJ also
found, however, that Seid’s impairments were severe and continued to be severe impairments
through the date of the decision. (Tr. 21.) Next, the ALJ determined that, as of March 15, 2012,
Seid had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels with the non-exertional limitations of simple, unskilled work with no contact
with the general public and only occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors. (Tr. 22.)
The ALJ also determined that Seid was unable to perform any of his past relevant work, but that
there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that he could perform. (Tr. 2627.) Finally, the ALJ concluded that Seid’s disability ended as of March 15, 2012 and he has not
become disabled again since that date. (Tr. 28.)
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V.
Discussion
Seid presents two issues for review. First, Seid asserts that the administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) failed to properly weigh the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Hall. Second, he
contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
A.
Dr. Hall’s Opinion
First, Seid contends that that the ALJ failed to properly analyze Dr. Hall’s opinion and
give good reasons for dismissing the limitations contained in his opinion. All medical opinions,
whether by treating or consultative examiners are weighed based on (1) whether the provider
examined the claimant; (2) whether the provider is a treating source; (3) length of treatment
relationship and frequency of examination, including nature and extent of the treatment
relationship; (4) supportability of opinion with medical signs, laboratory findings, and
explanation; (5) consistency with the record as a whole; (6) specialization; and (7) other factors
which tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Generally, a treating
physician’s opinion is given controlling weight, but is not inherently entitled to it. Hacker v.
Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2006).
A treating physician’s opinion “does not
automatically control or obviate the need to evaluate the record as a whole.” Leckenby v. Astrue,
487 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2007). A treating physician’s opinion will be given controlling
weight if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case
record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); SSR 96-2p; see also Hacker, 459 F.3d at 937. “Whether the
ALJ grants a treating physician’s opinion substantial or little weight, the regulations provide that
the ALJ must ‘always give good reasons’ for the particular weight given to a treating physician’s
evaluation.” Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2000).
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In making a disability determination, the ALJ shall “always consider the medical
opinions in the case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence in the record.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(b); see also Heino v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir. 2009). “[T]he ALJ
is not qualified to give a medical opinion but may rely on medical evidence in the record.”
Wilcockson v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir. 2008). The ALJ “is not required to rely
entirely on a particular physician’s opinion or choose between the opinions of any of the
claimant’s physicians.
Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 927 (8th Cir. 2011).
The RFC
determination is based on all of the evidence in the medical record, not any particular doctor’s
treatment notes or medical opinion. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001).
In this case, the ALJ gave little weight to the February 5, 2013 opinion of Seid’s treating
psychologist, Dr. Hall. (Tr. 25.) The ALJ states, without any further explanation, that Dr. Hall’s
opinion was contradicted by his own treatment notes. (Tr. 25.) Dr. Hall began treating Seid on
March 1, 2012. (Tr. 314-320.) At the initial visit with Dr. Hall, Seid completed a Beck
Depression Inventory1, which indicated the mild range of clinical depression. (Tr. 314, 318320.) Dr. Hall observed that Seid was alert, aware, and cooperative and oriented to time, place,
and self. (Tr. 314.) He also noted that Seid’s insight and judgment were intact and adequate.
(Tr. 314.) Dr. Hall diagnosed Seid with ADHD and major depressive disorder, recurrent without
psychosis. (Tr. 314.) He opined that Seid’s global assessment functioning 2 (“GAF”) score was
65, which indicated mild symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school
functioning, but generally functioning pretty well. DSM-IV-TR at 34. The treatment notes from
October 2012 to May 2013 focus on Seid’s application for social security disability benefits and
1
The Beck Depression Inventory is a “twenty-one item, self-report rating inventory that measures characteristic
attitudes and symptoms of depression.” Perry v. Colvin, No. 13-1185 JNE/TNL, 2014 WL 4113015 at *12, no. 12
(D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2014).
2
Global Assessment Functioning score is a “clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of functioning.
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. Text Rev. 2000) (“DSM-IV-TR”).
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how Seid feels about the discontinuation of benefits. (Tr. 311-313, 407-411.) Dr. Hall also
wrote that Seid had bipolar disorder. (Tr. 312-313, 408.) Dr. Hall noted that Seid was beginning
to progress in therapy. (Tr. 311.)
Dr. Hall completed two opinions regarding Seid.
On February 5, 2013, Dr. Seid
completed a Mental Medical Source Statement (“MMSS”). (Tr. 366.) In the MMSS, Dr. Hall
wrote that anxiety, depression, mood disorder, and ADHD affected Seid’s ability to work. Dr.
Hall indicated that Seid would likely be absent 3 times per month as a result of his impairment,
symptoms, or treatment. (Tr. 366.) Using a checklist, Dr. Hall opined that Seid’s symptoms
would interfere with his ability to get along with and function with others cooperatively in a
work setting 61% to 100% of the time. (Tr. 366.) He also opined that Seid would be off-task in
a work setting 61% to 100% of the time. (Tr. 366.) Further, he opined that Seid would be
limited in his ability to focus, organize, complete work tasks timely, and handle work demands,
persistence, and expectations 61% to 100% of the time. (Tr. 366.)
Dr. Hall also completed a Mental Impairment Medical Source Statement (MIMSS) on
August 29, 2013 3. (Tr. 412-417.) In the MIMSS, Dr. Hall diagnosed Seid with major depression
and ADHD. (Tr. 412.) He opined that Seid’s GAF score currently and for the past year was 65.
(Tr. 412.)
Dr. Hall indicated that Seid’s symptoms included mood disturbance (major
depression), psychomotor agitation, and difficulty concentrating. (Tr. 413.) He also noted that
Seid’s Beck Inventory score placed him in the mild range of depression. (Tr. 413.) He wrote
3
Seid submitted the MIMSS to the Appeals Council after the ALJ’s decision. In cases involving the submission of
supplemental evidence subsequent to the ALJ's decision, the record includes that evidence submitted after the
hearing and considered by the Appeals Council.” Bergmann v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing
Jenkins v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1999)). “In such a situation, “[a] court’s role is to determine whether
the ALJ’s decision ‘is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, including the new evidence
submitted after the determination was made.’” Id. (citing Riley v. Shalala, 18 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1994)). “In
practice, this requires [a] court to decide how the ALJ would have weighed the new evidence had it existed at the
initial hearing.” Id. (citing Riley, 18 F.3d at 622). Thus, the appropriate inquiry is not whether the Appeals Council
erred, but whether the record as a whole supports the decision made by the ALJ. Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086,
1093 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Cunningham v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2000)).
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that Seid was responding to prescribed medication by his primary care physician and there were
no known side effects. (Tr. 413-414.) Dr. Hall estimated that Seid’s impairments or treatment
would cause him to be absent from work about twice a month. (Tr. 414.) He indicated in a
checklist that Seid had poor or no ability to maintain attention for a two hour segment, sustain an
ordinary routine without supervision, perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods, or carry out detailed instructions. (Tr. 415-416.) He opined
that Seid had constant deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace resulting in the failure
to complete tasks in a timely manner and three or more repeated episodes of deterioration or
decompensation in work or work like settings. (Tr. 416.)
Based on the Court’s review of the record as a whole, the Court finds that the ALJ did not
err in giving little weight to Dr. Hall’s opinion. His opinions are inconsistent with his treatment
notes. For example, Dr. Hall’s opinions indicate that Seid’s impairments include ADHD and
major depression, but his treatment notes also indicate bipolar disorder. Dr. Hall’s treatment
notes also do not support the limitations contained in the opinions. Most of the treatment notes
reflect that Seid is depressed regarding the status of his disability benefits. The notes contain no
substantive information regarding limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. There is
also no support anywhere else in the record that Seid would be unable to function regarding
concentration, persistence, or pace 61% to 100% of the time. Finally, the GAF score given by
Dr. Hall for the year he treated Seid indicated mild symptoms in social, school, and occupational
functioning. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Dr. Hall’s
opinion.
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B.
RFC Determination
Next, Seid contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence. The RFC is defined as what the claimant can do despite his or her limitations, and
includes an assessment of physical abilities and mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
The RFC is a function-by-function assessment of an individual’s ability to do work related
activities on a regular and continuing basis. 4 SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996).
It is the ALJ’s responsibility to determine the claimant’s RFC based on all relevant evidence,
including medical records, observations of treating physicians and the claimant’s own
descriptions of his limitations.
Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217.
RFC is a medical question.
Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). An RFC determination made by an
ALJ will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Cox v. Barnhart,
471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). In making a disability determination, the ALJ shall “always
consider the medical opinions in the case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence in
the record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b); see also Heino, 578 F.3d at 879. “A disability claimant
has the burden to establish her RFC.” Eichelberger, 390 F.3d at 591 (citing Masterson v.
Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 2004)). Seid contends that the case should be remanded so
that the ALJ can obtain medical evidence in support of the RFC. Seid also states that his
testimony supports his contention that he is unable to perform any competitive work.
The ALJ’s opinion demonstrates a very thorough review of the evidence. The RFC
determination is well supported by Seid’s activities of daily living, the medical evidence in the
record, the consultative examination completed by Dr. Brooke J. D. Preylo and the non-
4
A “regular and continuing basis” means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. SSR
96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1.
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examining consultative opinions of Dr. Allen and Dr. Isenberg. As to Seid’s credibility, the
Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility determination was also supported by substantial evidence.
“While the claimant has the burden of proving that the disability results from a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment, direct medical evidence of the cause and effect
relationship between the impairment and the degree of claimant’s subjective complaints need not
be produced.” Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). The ALJ must fully
consider all of the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints, including the claimant’s
prior work record, and observations by third parties and treating and examining physicians
relating to such matters as:
(1) the claimant’s daily activities;
(2) the subjective evidence of the duration, frequency, and
intensity of the claimant’s pain;
(3) any participating or aggravating factors;
(4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication; and
(5) the claimant’s functional restrictions
Id. “The ALJ must make express credibility determinations and set forth the inconsistencies in
the record which cause him to reject the claimant’s complaints.” Masterson, 363 F.3d at 738.
Although credibility determinations are primarily for the ALJ and not the court, the ALJ’s
credibility assessment must be based on substantial evidence. Rautio v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 176,
179 (8th Cir. 1988).
A review of the record indicates that Seid’s activities of daily living do not support his
allegations regarding functional limitations. His symptoms were well controlled by medication.
He did not require medication management by a psychiatrist. He only received mental health
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treatment from a specialist, because his doctors refused to give him additional medication
without a mental health evaluation. See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 965 (an impairment
controlled by treatment or medication cannot be considered disabling); Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d
1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 2007) (“‘While not dispositive, a failure to seek treatment may indicate the
relative seriousness of a medical problem’”); Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2005)
(ALJ can disbelieve subjective complaints if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole
and lack of corroborating evidence is just one of the factors the ALJ considers). Seid has some
restrictions in his functioning and ability to perform work related activities; however, he did not
carry his burden to prove a more restrictive RFC determination. See Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217
(it is the claimant’s burden, not the Social Security Commissioner’s burden, to prove the
claimant’s RFC). Based upon a review of the evidence in the record as a whole, the Court finds
that the RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commissioner’s
decision will be affirmed.
VI.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Seid’s disability
ended March 15, 2012 is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The
Commissioner’s final decision to discontinue benefits will be affirmed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the relief requested in Plaintiff’s Complaint and Brief
in Support of Complaint is DENIED. [Docs. 1, 13.]
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will enter a judgment in favor of the
Commissioner affirming the decision of the administrative law judge.
Dated this 3rd day of March, 2015.
/s/ Nannette A. Baker
NANNETTE A. BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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