Williams et al v. Tucker et al

Filing 84

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM. (See Full Order.) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Frederick P. Tucker's motion for summary judgment [# 48 ] is granted as to the claims of plaintiff Donna Williams, and is denied as to the claims of plaintiff Linda Jenkins. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Kevin Shoemaker's motion for summary judgment [# 51 ] is granted on the basis of qualified immunity. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions to strike affidavits and statement of facts [## [5 8], 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 74 ] are denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will hold a telephone conference with counsel for plaintiff Jenkins and counsel for defendant Tucker on Tuesday, December 1, 2015 at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiffs counsel must place the call and have all necessary counsel on the line before calling my chambers at [phone]. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 11/9/2015. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
DONNA WILLIAMS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JUDGE FREDERICK P. TUCKER,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:14 CV 38 CDP

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
At the hearing held on the record on November 5, 2015, I stated my
rationale for my ruling on the motions for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity, but I mistakenly failed to rule on the motion filed by defendant
Frederick P. Tucker seeking summary judgment on the claims to the extent they
were brought against him in his official capacity. The conclusions I stated on the
record regarding qualified immunity also provide my rationale for my rulings on
the claims against Judge Tucker on the merits, and so that statement is
incorporated herein. For the reasons stated on the record at the hearing, I am
granting summary judgment to defendant Judge Tucker – both in his individual
and official capacity – on Donna Williams’ claims, but I am denying his motion for
summary judgment on Linda Jenkins’ claims. I am granting summary judgment to
defendant Shoemaker on all claims against him.

In their First Amended Complaint plaintiffs Donna Williams and Linda
Jenkins sued defendant Tucker in his official capacity and in his individual
capacity, alleging that he took adverse employment action against them in
retaliation for their exercise of their rights under the First Amendment. Plaintiff
Donna Williams alleges that Tucker terminated her from her position as secretary
in the Juvenile Office of Missouri’s Forty-First Judicial Circuit because she
complained about employees campaigning for Judge Tucker at the courthouse,
about employee violations of comp time rules, about an employee making false
entries on his time sheet and about uneven work distribution. Plaintiff Linda
Jenkins contends that Judge Tucker ordered her position of bailiff moved from the
Court budget to the Sheriff’s budget, which ultimately had the effect of causing her
to lose hours and pay.
At the hearing I set out in detail my reasons for concluding that Judge
Tucker, in his individual capacity, was not entitled to qualified immunity on the
claims brought by plaintiff Linda Jenkins. The same disputes of material fact that
preclude qualified immunity are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude
summary judgment on those same claims against Judge Tucker in his official
capacity. Judge Tucker’s motion for summary judgment is denied on the claims of
Linda Jenkins.
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At the hearing I also concluded that Judge Tucker was entitled to qualified
immunity on the claims brought by plaintiff Donna Williams. That determination,
however, did not resolve Williams’ claim against Tucker in his official capacity.
The conclusions I made there, however, also support granting his motion for
summary judgment on the merits of Williams’ claims.
The undisputed evidence shows that Judge Tucker made the decision to
terminate Donna Williams because of her negative behavior toward her coworkers,
including what he was told about her blow-up at a meeting held on October 21,
2013. As I stated in more detail at the hearing, her speech at the meeting was not
speech protected by the First Amendment. Although she had made complaints the
year before that arguably could be considered protected speech, the undisputed
evidence show that those earlier complaints were not any part of Judge Tucker’s
motivation for her termination. Therefore, he is entitled to summary judgment on
Williams’ claim both on the merits and on the basis of qualified immunity.
For the reasons set out above and on the record at the hearing held on
November 5, 2015,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Frederick P. Tucker’s motion
for summary judgment [#48] is granted as to the claims of plaintiff Donna
Williams, and is denied as to the claims of plaintiff Linda Jenkins.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Kevin Shoemaker’s motion
for summary judgment [#51] is granted on the basis of qualified immunity.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions to strike affidavits
and statement of facts [## 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 74] are denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will hold a telephone
conference with counsel for plaintiff Jenkins and counsel for defendant Tucker on
Tuesday, December 1, 2015 at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff’s counsel must place the call
and have all necessary counsel on the line before calling my chambers at (314)2447520.

CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 9th day of November, 2015.

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