Woods v. Hays et al

Filing 67

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (See Full Order.) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 54 is granted as to plaintiff Darrell Woods' Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force and sexual assault, and his First Amendme nt claims of retaliation, and these claims are dismissed with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Woods' remaining state law claims of negligence are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). An appropriate Judgment is entered herewith. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 3/19/2018. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
DARRELL WOODS,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICKY HAYS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:15 CV 13 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Missouri state prisoner Darrell Woods brings this civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that several correctional employees at Northeast
Correctional Center deprived him of his constitutional rights by assaulting him, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment; and/or retaliating against him for pursuing
grievances, in violation of the First Amendment.1 Woods also brings supplemental
state law claims of negligence. Because there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the undisputed evidence shows no violation of Woods’ constitutional
rights, I will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Woods’
constitutional claims. I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state
law claims.
1

Woods’ claims against several defendants, as well as all of his due process claims, were
previously dismissed from this action. (Memo. & Order, ECF 10.) Defendant Robert Lagore
was inadvertently dismissed but later reinstated. (Order, ECF 37.) In addition to Lagore, Taylor
Preston, Kristin Cutt, Tyree Butler, Stacie Lescalleet, and Tina Cobb remain as defendants in the
case.

Background2
At all times relevant to his complaint, Woods was incarcerated at Northeast
Correctional Center (NECC). He currently is incarcerated at Jefferson City
Correctional Center.
On July 1, 2014, defendant Correctional Officer I (COI) Taylor Preston
attempted to place handcuffs on Woods in order to escort him to sick call. The
handcuffs pinched Woods’ wrist, and Woods cried out in pain. Alleging that
Woods struck her hand and later grabbed her hand during the incident, Preston
issued a conduct violation to Woods for minor assault. Woods claims that
Preston’s conduct while placing the handcuffs on him constituted an assault and
amounted to excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He further
claims that Preston’s assault and issuance of the conduct violation were retaliatory
and done to justify Woods’ continued confinement in administrative segregation.
On October 16, 2014, defendant COI Robert Lagore pushed an empty milk
carton through the food slot of Woods’ cell door. The milk carton hit Woods in the
groin area. Believing that Lagore’s conduct was sexually motivated, Woods filed
an Informal Resolution Request (IRR) regarding the alleged assault. The
following day, Woods determined to pursue the matter under the Prison Rape

2

This general background is provided here only to summarize the claims raised in Woods’
complaint.
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Elimination Act (PREA).3 Woods claims that defendants Kristin Cutt and Tyree
Butler, Functional Unit Managers (FUMs), met with him and attempted to dissuade
him from filing a PREA report. Woods claims that Butler threatened to put him in
disciplinary segregation for six months if he filed the report. Woods also claims
that after he “made it clear” that he intended to pursue the report, Cutt issued an
improper conduct violation against him for threats.
On January 26, 2015, defendant Tina Cobb, another FUM, ordered Woods to
serve thirty days in disciplinary segregation on a conduct violation that arose out of
Woods’ PREA complaint. Woods claims that Cobb imposed this punishment in
retaliation for his having filed the PREA complaint.
Finally, Woods claims that defendant Case Manager II (CMII) Stacie
Lescalleet issued him a conduct violation for filing an IRR.
All defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed
evidence shows that the conduct alleged by Woods does not rise to the level of
constitutional violations. Defendants further argue that they are entitled to
qualified immunity on Woods’ claims.
Summary Judgment Standard
When considering a motion for summary judgment, I must view the facts
and inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
3

34 U.S.C. §§ 30301, et seq.
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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
As the moving parties, defendants must establish that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving parties have met this
burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in his pleadings, but
by affidavit or other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A verified complaint is
equivalent to an affidavit for summary judgment purposes. Hanks v. Prachar, 457
F.3d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
At the summary judgment stage, courts do not weigh the evidence and
decide the truth of the matter, but rather determine if there is a genuine issue for
trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. However, summary judgment may be
appropriate “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it[.]”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). In such circumstances, the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute will not serve to defeat summary
judgment; instead, the factual dispute must be “genuine.” Id.
In § 1983 actions, qualified immunity shields government officials from suit
unless their conduct violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable
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official would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987). For a plaintiff to overcome qualified immunity, existing
precedent must have placed the constitutional question “‘beyond debate.’” City &
Cnty. of S.F., Calif. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “When properly applied, [qualified immunity]
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743 (alteration added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The evidence before the Court, including Woods’ verified complaint, shows
that defendants’ alleged conduct did not amount to constitutional violations, and no
genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. For the following reasons, defendants
have shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Woods’
constitutional claims, and I will grant their motion for summary judgment.
Evidence and Discussion
A.

Use of Force – COI Preston
On July 1, 2014, defendant COI Preston attempted to place handcuffs on

Woods in order to escort him to sick call. The handcuffs pinched Woods’ wrist.

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Woods cried out in pain and pulled his hands away from Preston.4 As a result of
the incident, Woods suffered an abrasion to his wrist – about a quarter-inch in
length, with no bleeding. Woods acknowledges that the incident could have been
accidental and that his constitutional rights were not violated.5
“The Eighth Amendment bars correctional officers from imposing
unnecessary and wanton pain on inmates, regardless of whether there is evidence
of any significant injury.” Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir.
2006) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)). See also Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2010) (per curiam) (extent of resulting injury is not in
itself a threshold requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim). Nevertheless, the “Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses
of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the
conscience of mankind.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The core judicial inquiry when examining an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim is “whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.” Id. at 6-7 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)).
Although an unforeseeable accident may produce added anguish, it cannot on that
4
5

Defts.’ Exh. J (ECF 56-10).
Woods Depo. II at 31-32 (ECF 56-36).
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basis alone amount to malicious and sadistic intent to cause harm. Cf. Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 105 (1976); Campbell v. Grammer, 889 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 1989)
(distinguishing between accidental and intentional use of force). See also
Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 937 (10th Cir. 2018) (“accidentally
deploying force is antithetical to deploying that force maliciously or sadistically.”).
Preston is entitled to qualified immunity on Woods’ Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim. Woods himself acknowledges that the pinching with the
handcuffs may have been accidental, that his injury was de minimis, and that
Preston’s conduct in pinching his wrist while applying the handcuffs did not
violate his constitutional rights. From the undisputed evidence before the Court, a
reasonable inference can be made that during the course of Woods pulling his
hands away from Preston, his movement may have caused the handcuffs to pinch
his wrist. A correctional officer’s attempt to secure handcuffs while a prisoner is
pulling away does not alone violate that prisoner’s clearly established right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. Woods does not allege that Preston used
any other force to subdue him or cause harm. Preston’s use of force during this
incident was nothing more than de minimis. Further, there is no evidence that
Preston acted with subjective malicious intent to cause harm.6

6

An administrative investigation into Woods’ allegation of assault against Preston showed the
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Preston is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Woods’ Eighth
Amendment claim of excessive use of force.
B.

Sexual Assault – COI Lagore
On October 16, 2014, defendant COI Lagore pushed an empty milk carton

through the food slot of Woods’ cell door in an effort to stop Woods from himself
pushing the carton through the food slot and onto the floor outside his cell.7 When
Lagore pushed the milk carton, Woods was standing directly in front of and a
couple of inches away from the food slot. The opening of the food slot is at hip
level, and the milk carton hit Woods in the groin area.8 Lagore did not engage in
any conduct or make any statements to lead Woods to believe that this act was
sexual in nature. Woods believed Lagore’s conduct was sexually motivated only
because he thought Lagore was homosexual.9 In his affidavit, Lagore attests that
his conduct was not sexually motivated.10
Because sexual abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer can never serve a
legitimate penological purpose and may well result in severe physical and
psychological harm, such abuse can, in certain circumstances, constitute the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997). To prevail on an Eighth
claim to be unfounded. (Ptlf.’s Exh. Q, ECF 58-2.)
7
Defts.’ Exh. C (ECF 56-3).
8
Woods Depo. II at 10-11 (ECF 56-36).
9
Id. at 11, 14-15.
10
Defts.’ Exh. C (ECF 56-3).
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Amendment claim of sexual abuse, therefore, the inmate must prove, as an
objective matter, that the alleged abuse caused pain and, as a subjective matter, that
the officer acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id.
Woods does not allege that being struck in the penis area by an empty milk
carton caused him any pain, psychological or otherwise. Accordingly, Woods has
failed to show Lagore’s conduct to be sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective
component of an Eighth Amendment claim. In addition, Lagore’s unrebutted
affidavit shows that his conduct was not sexually motivated, and there is no
evidence that Lagore acted with a culpable state of mind in pushing the milk carton
through the food slot.
Lagore is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Woods’ Eighth
Amendment claim of sexual assault.
C.

Retaliation – Conduct Violations and Disciplinary Action
Woods claims that he was issued several conduct violations, was threatened,

and suffered disciplinary action as punishment for engaging in protected conduct.
An inmate may maintain a cause of action for retaliatory
discipline under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where a prison official files
disciplinary charges in retaliation for an inmate’s exercise of
constitutional rights. But an inmate’s retaliation claim fails if the
alleged retaliatory conduct violations were issued for the actual
violation of a prison rule. Thus, a defendant may successfully defend
a retaliatory discipline claim by showing “some evidence” the inmate
actually committed a rule violation. [A] report from a correctional
officer, even if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other
evidence, legally suffices as “some evidence” upon which to base a
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prison disciplinary violation, if the violation is found by an impartial
decisionmaker.
Bandy-Bey v. Crist, 578 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (alteration in Bandy-Bey).
1.

July 1, 2014 – Conduct Violation for Minor Assault, COI Preston

On July 1, 2014, COI Preston issued a conduct violation to Woods for minor
assault, reporting that during her attempt to handcuff Woods to take him to sick
call, Woods struck her hand and grabbed her hand to push it away.11 Woods
denies that he struck Preston and claims that she issued the conduct violation in
response to his IRR about being confined in administrative segregation (ad seg)
and to provide justification for his continued confinement in ad seg.
Defendants submitted an inter-office communication (IOC) from Preston
describing the incident, as well as an IOC from COI Robert Grote12 who reported
that he observed Woods engage in the offending conduct.13 Woods was found
guilty after a hearing on the violation,14 and there is no evidence that the
decisionmaker was not impartial. Reviewing staff in the grievance process found
that Woods was properly issued the conduct violation, that his guilt was based on
the evidence presented, and that he was sanctioned appropriately.15
11

Defts.’ Exh. I (ECF 56-9).
Woods’ claims against Grote were previously dismissed. (Memo. & Order, ECF 10.)
13
Defts.’ Exhs. G, H (ECF 56-7, 56-8).
14
Defts.’ Exh. L (ECF 56-12).
15
Defts.’ Exhs. M, N (ECF 56-13, 56-14).
12

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Because defendants have presented “some evidence” that Woods actually
committed the rule violation, Preston is entitled to summary judgment on this
claim.
2.

October 17, 2014 – Threats of Disciplinary Action, FUM Butler

The day after the Lagore milk carton incident, Woods decided he wanted to
pursue a PREA complaint because he thought Lagore’s conduct was sexually
motivated. FUMs Cutt and Butler interviewed Woods regarding the complaint. In
his verified complaint in this action, Woods attests that during this interview,
Butler threatened to write him up for giving false information and keep him in “the
hole” for six months if he pursued the complaint. Butler and Cutt attest that Butler
merely advised Woods that the consequences of filing a false PREA allegation
would be a conduct violation for giving false information.16
Even taking Woods’ allegation as true, that Butler threatened him with a
conduct violation and disciplinary segregation if he pursued his PREA complaint,
Butler is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on this retaliation claim.
To prevail on this claim of retaliation, Woods must show: 1) that he
engaged in protected activity, 2) that Butler took adverse action against him that
would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and 3)
that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by Woods’ exercise of the

16

Defts.’ Exhs. D, E (ECF 56-4, 56-5).
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protected activity. Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing
Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004)). A threat of retaliation is a
sufficient injury if the threat was made in retaliation for an inmate’s use of a prison
grievance procedure. Id. at 992.
The filing of a PREA complaint is protected activity. See Haynes v.
Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 2009). And for purposes of this
discussion, I will assume that Butler’s alleged threat to impose disciplinary
sanctions for pursing this protected activity is sufficient to satisfy the third prong of
Santiago. However, it cannot be said that in the circumstances of this case Butler’s
statement would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the
protected activity. “‘The ordinary-firmness test . . . is designed to weed out trivial
matters from those deserving the time of the courts as real and substantial
violations of the First Amendment.’” Santiago, 707 F.3d at 992 (quoting Garcia v.
City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2003)). This test is an objective one.
While the question is not whether Woods himself was deterred but what a prisoner
of ordinary firmness would have done in reaction to the threat, I may nevertheless
consider how Woods himself reacted as evidence of what a reasonable prisoner
would have done. Id.
Here, Woods continued to pursue his PREA complaint regardless of the
threat. He also continued to file and pursue other grievances against various prison
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officials. Woods was therefore not deterred by Butler’s conduct. Nor would a
reasonable prisoner be deterred in the circumstances of this case. By no stretch of
the imagination could Lagore’s conduct in pushing the milk carton toward Woods
be considered actionable under the PREA. See 34 U.S.C. § 30309(9), (10)
(definitions of “rape” and “sexual assault with an object,” respectively). Especially
since by Woods’ own admission, Lagore did not engage in any conduct or make
any statements to lead Woods to believe that Lagore was acting in a sexual
manner. Further, as discussed more fully below, investigation of the PREA
complaint – which included review of Woods’ statements, staff interviews, and
recorded video – showed Woods’ allegation against Lagore to be false and
unfounded.17 A reasonable prisoner would understand that making false statements
to support a complaint could lead to disciplinary action, and this is what Butler
warned against. Cf. Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1990) (no
claim of retaliation when discipline is imparted for acts that prisoner is not entitled
to perform). A threat to take disciplinary action against a prisoner who engages in
this prohibited conduct would not deter a reasonable prisoner from continuing to
pursue legitimate complaints under established grievance procedure.
Butler is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Woods’ claim of
retaliatory threats.
17

Defts.’ Exhs. X, Y (ECF 56-24, 56-25). Woods was issued a conduct violation for giving false
information and was later found guilty of the violation.
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3.

October 17, 2014 – Conduct Violation for Threats, FUM Cutt

On October 17, 2014, Cutt issued a conduct violation to Woods for threats,
reporting that when exiting her office following the PREA interview, Woods stated
in a loud and threatening manner, “Man I am going to get these people.”18 In his
verified complaint, Woods himself attests that he “made it clear” that he was going
to follow through with his PREA complaint. Woods claims that Cutt’s issuance of
the conduct violation was in retaliation for his PREA complaint.
Defendants submitted an IOC from Cutt in which she described the incident,
and specifically that Woods became aggravated during the PREA interview and
felt he was being harassed. After Cutt informed Woods that he could face
disciplinary action if he provided false information, Woods became more upset and
made the statement that constituted the basis of the violation, directing the
statement toward Cutt.19 Woods was found guilty after a hearing on the
violation,20 and there is no evidence that the decisionmaker was not impartial.
Reviewing staff in the grievance process found that Woods was properly issued the
conduct violation and that his own conduct caused him to receive the violation.21
Because defendants have presented “some evidence” that Woods actually
committed the rule violation, Cutt is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
18

Defts.’ Exh. T (ECF 56-20).
Defts.’ Exh. S (ECF 56-19).
20
Pltf.’s Exh. F (ECF 59-1 at p. 7).
21
Defts.’ Exh. U (ECF 56-21).
19

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4.

January 8, 2015 – Conduct Violation for False Information, CMII
Lescalleet

On December 31, 2014, Woods went to the case management office at
NECC and requested an IRR form so that he could file a complaint against
Correctional Officer Chad Ream for harassment. Woods was given the form.
Woods returned the form on January 7, 2015, completed with information against a
different correctional officer, Officer Fronick, for alleged harassment that occurred
that same date, January 7. Lescalleet issued a conduct violation to Woods for
giving false information in order to obtain an IRR form.22 Woods was permitted to
proceed with his IRR against Fronick.23 Woods claims that Lescalleet’s issuance
of the conduct violation was in retaliation for his filing IRRs.
Woods filed an IRR against Lescalleet for retaliation. During the
investigation of this IRR, reviewing staff found that Lescalleet properly issued the
conduct violation because requesting an IRR for one purpose, holding on to it, and
then filing it for a different purpose could be considered misuse of the grievance
process under rule D5-3.2 of the grievance policy. The investigating staff
determined that Lescalleet was justified in her belief that Woods abused the
grievance process by obtaining an IRR under false pretenses.24 Woods was found

22

Defts.’ Exhs. F, EE (ECF 56-6, 56-31).
See Defts.’ Exh. FF (ECF 56-32).
24
Defts.’ Exh. GG (ECF 56-33).
23

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guilty after a hearing on the violation,25 and there is no evidence that the
decisionmaker was not impartial.
Because defendants have presented “some evidence” that Woods actually
committed the rule violation, Lescalleet is entitled to summary judgment on this
claim.
5.

January 26, 2015 – Imposition of Discipline for Conduct Violation,
FUM Cobb

On January 14, 2015, Investigative Officer James Rhodes26 issued Woods a
conduct violation for giving false information and creating a disturbance for
making a false PREA allegation against Lagore.27 Cobb conducted a hearing on
the violation on January 26, at which she reviewed witness statements and
confidential material. From her review, she found the evidence to support the
allegations. She therefore found Woods guilty of the violation and ordered him to
serve thirty days in disciplinary segregation.28 Woods claims that Cobb imposed
this punishment in retaliation for his having filed the PREA complaint.
Defendants submitted a report from Rhodes in which he described his
investigation into Woods’ PREA complaint, and specifically that evidence
obtained during the inquiry – including Woods’ own statements, staff interviews,
and recorded video – showed that Woods’ allegation regarding the Lagore incident
25

Pltf.’s Exh. G (ECF 59-1 at p. 8).
Woods’ claims against Rhodes were previously dismissed. (Memo. & Order, ECF 10.)
27
Defts.’ Exh. W (ECF 56-23).
28
Defts.’ Exh. Y (ECF 56-25).
26

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was false and unfounded. Rhodes also reported that Woods had been advised prior
to filing his PREA complaint that making false allegations could result in a
conduct violation.29 Based on evidence presented at a hearing, Cobb determined
the conduct violation to be appropriate.30 There is no evidence that Cobb was not
impartial.
Because defendants have presented “some evidence” that Woods actually
committed the rule violation, Cobb is entitled to summary judgment on this claim
of retaliatory discipline.
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on Woods’ constitutional claims. Because I will dismiss all claims over which this
Court has original jurisdiction, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Woods’ state law claims of negligence. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See also
Anderson v. Franklin Cnty., Mo., 192 F.3d 1125, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999); American
Civil Liberties Union v. City of Florissant, 186 F.3d 1095, 1098-99 (8th Cir. 1999)
(when state and federal claims are joined and all federal claims are dismissed on a
motion for summary judgment, state claims are ordinarily dismissed without
prejudice); Willman v. Heartland Hosp. E., 34 F.3d 605, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1994)
(same).
29
30

Defts.’ Exh. X (ECF 56-24).
Defts.’ Exhs. B, Y (ECF 56-2, 56-25).
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [54] is granted as to plaintiff Darrell Woods’ Eighth Amendment claims
of excessive force and sexual assault, and his First Amendment claims of
retaliation, and these claims are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Woods’ remaining state law claims of
negligence are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
An appropriate Judgment is entered herewith.

_________________________________
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 19th day of March, 2018.

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