Bowen v. Colvin

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (See Full Order.) For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned finds that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled between November 1, 2011 and July 29, 2014. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner denying Social Security benefits to Plaintiff for the period November 1, 2011 to July 29, 2014 is AFFIRMED. A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is entered this date. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Cohen on 12/29/2017. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
TERRI L. BOWEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 2:16cv00016 PLC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Terri L. Bowen (“Plaintiff”) seeks review of the decision of the Social Security
Administration denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental
Security Income from her alleged onset date of November 1, 2011 until July 29, 2014. 2 Because
the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the decision to deny benefits for the period in
question, the Court affirms the denial of Plaintiff’s applications.
I.

Background and Procedural History
In February 2012, Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Security Income alleging she was disabled as of November 1, 2011 as a result of:
arthritis, “chronic pain throughout body,” right arm numbness, “hips give out,” asthma, and
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). (Tr. 413-24). In May 2014, an administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) conducted a hearing and, on August 20, 2014, entered a decision denying
1

Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill should be substituted for Acting
Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be
taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2
The parties consented to the exercise of authority by the United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 13).

Plaintiff’s applications for benefits. 3 (Tr. 134-54). On July 29, 2014, between the dates of
Plaintiff’s hearing and the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff underwent a mammogram and subsequently
received a diagnosis of invasive ductal breast cancer. (Tr. 765-66).
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision and submitted new evidence of breast cancer. (Tr.
294-98).

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s

decision and remanded the case to a different ALJ for additional proceedings. (Tr. 155-57). In
the remand order, the SSA Appeals Council directed the ALJ, in relevant part, to: “Give further
consideration to the claimant’s maximum residual functional capacity and provide appropriate
rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations (20
CFR 404.1545 and 416.945 and Social Security Ruling 96-8p).” (Id. at 157).
Pursuant to the remand order, the ALJ conducted a hearing on August 25, 2015. (Tr. 3368). An impartial medical expert, Dr. Lee Fischer, Plaintiff, and a vocational expert testified at
the hearing. Id. In a partially favorable decision dated October 14, 2015, the ALJ applied the
five-step evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920 4 and concluded: “[Plaintiff]
3

In that decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a disability from November 1, 2011
through the date of the decision because she had the residual functional capacity to perform light
work with the following limitations:
[S]he can lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and 5 pounds frequently, with
the dominant right upper extremity, lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and
10 pounds frequently with the left upper extremity, and stand, sit, and walk 6
hours each in an 8-hour workday. She cannot crawl or climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds, but can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, or crouch.
She can occasionally operate hand controls and reach overhead with the
dominant right upper extremity. She must avoid even moderate exposure to
vibration, extreme cold, heat, humidity, wetness, fumes, odors, dusts, gases,
poor ventilation, and pulmonary irritants, and should not work an unprotected
heights or around dangerous moving machinery.
(Tr. 141).
4
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a five-step
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Those steps require a claimant to
show that he or she: (1) is not engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits his or her physical or
2

was not disabled prior to July 29, 2014[, the date of her breast cancer diagnosis,] but became
disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of this decision[.]” (Tr.
20) (citations to regulations omitted).
The ALJ found that, since the alleged onset date of disability (November 1, 2011),
Plaintiff had the severe impairments of: osteoarthritis, right shoulder impingement, COPD, and
mild degenerative disc disease; and the non-severe impairments of hypertension, headaches,
obesity, and hyperactive bladder. (Tr. 13). After reviewing Plaintiff’s testimony and medical
records and finding that Plaintiff was “not entirely credible,” the ALJ found that, between
November 1, 2011 and July 29, 2014, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform sedentary work with specified limitations. (Tr. 14). The ALJ further determined that,
since November 1, 2011, Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work, but, for the
period between November 1, 2011 and July 29, 2014, there existed a significant number of jobs
in the national economy that she was capable of performing. (Tr. 18).
Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision with the SSA Appeals Council,
which denied review on January 12, 2016. (Tr. 1-5) Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative
remedies, and the ALJ’s decision stands as the SSA’s final decision. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S.
103, 106-07 (2000).
II.

Standard of Review
A court must affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence ‘is less than a preponderance, but enough so that a
reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion.’” Cruze v. Chater, 85 F.3d
1320, 1323 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Oberst v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1993)). In
mental ability to do basic work activities or (3) has an impairment which meets or exceeds one of
the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) is unable to return to his or her
past relevant work; and (5) the impairments prevent him or her from doing any other work. Id.
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determining whether the evidence is substantial, a court considers evidence that both supports
and detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th
Cir. 2009). However, a court “do[es] not reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ and [it]
defer[s] to the ALJ’s determinations regarding the credibility of testimony, as long as those
determinations are supported by good reason and substantial evidence.” Renstrom v. Astrue, 680
F.3d 1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gonzales v.
Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir. 2006)).
“If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court
must affirm the ALJ’s decision.” Partee v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005)). The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that
a court should “defer heavily to the findings and conclusions” of the Social Security
Administration. Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010); Howard v. Massanari, 255
F.3d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 2001).
III.

Discussion
Plaintiff claims substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that she

was not disabled from November 1, 2011 through July 29, 2014. (ECF No. 18). Plaintiff
contends that the ALJ erred in failing to: (1) comply with the SSA Appeals Council’s remand
order; and (2) accord “any weight to the lay evidence of onset.” (Id. at 8-15). In response,
Defendant

asserts

that:

(1)

the

ALJ

complied

with

each

of

the

SSA

Appeals Council’s directives; (2) substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC finding; and (3)
the ALJ properly evaluated the third-party statements of record. (ECF No. 25).
A. Failure to comply with remand order

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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not comply with the SSA Appeals Council’s order to
“give further consideration to the Plaintiff’s maximum functional capacity and provide
appropriate rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed
limitations.” (ECF No. 18 at 8-12). Although couched in terms of a failure to comply with the
remand order, Plaintiff, in fact, argues that, in formulating her RFC, the ALJ failed to: (1)
adequately address Plaintiff’s COPD and pain in her shoulder, neck, and back; and (2) assign
proper weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician. Id. Defendant counters that the
ALJ complied with the remand order in that he re-examined the entire medical record and cited
the clinical findings and medical opinions that supported his RFC finding. (ECF No. 25 at 7).
Defendant further asserts that the ALJ: (1) accounted for Plaintiff’s COPD and musculoskeletal
pain by limiting her to sedentary work; and (2) properly assigned reduced weight to the treating
physician’s opinion because it was inconsistent with the evidence as a whole. (Id. at 7-14).
1. RFC determination
RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite” his or her physical or mental
limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). See also Masterson v. Barnhart, 363
F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 2004). “The ALJ should determine a claimant’s RFC based on all
relevant evidence including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others,
and an individual’s own description of his limitations.” Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 2006)). The claimant bears
the burden of “persuasion to prove disability and demonstrate” his or her RFC. Martise v.
Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vossen v.
Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010)).

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In this case, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records, opinion evidence,
and testimony in formulating her RFC. The ALJ found that, between November 1, 2011 and
July 29, 2014, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with the
following limitations:
[Plaintiff] was unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant was
limited to occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing of
ramps and stairs. [Plaintiff] was unable to engage in overhead reaching with
the right upper extremity and was limited to frequent reaching in all other
directions. [Plaintiff] could frequently handle, finger, push, and pull with the
right upper extremity. [Plaintiff] had to avoid hazards such as unprotected
heights and moving and dangerous machinery. She had to avoid concentrated
exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, dust, and gases.
(Tr. 14).
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ “failed to consider that prior to her diagnosis of breast
cancer she had severe COPD that now has her on oxygen.” (ECF No. 18 at 9). However,
contrary to Plaintiff’s claim, the ALJ specifically addressed the impact of Plaintiff’s “respiratory
symptoms” on her RFC prior to her July 2014 breast cancer diagnosis. (Tr. 16). The ALJ noted
that, in October 2012, Plaintiff “was evaluated for her COPD” and “exhibited normal oxygen
saturation levels and respiratory signs.” (Tr. 15). The ALJ also wrote: “In February 2013, the
claimant continued to have problems with COPD and she exhibited wheezing during her exam.
One month later, she sought emergency room treatment for coughing up blood, but her chest xrays were normal.” Id. (citations to the record omitted). The ALJ further observed that imaging
of Plaintiff’s chest from May 2014 “showed that she had right basal linear atelectasis and a
nodule in her left lobe” and, during a consultative examination in July 2014, Plaintiff “exhibited
wheezing during her examination but her oxygen saturation levels were normal.” Id.
In addition to noting Plaintiff’s history of COPD, the ALJ expressly accounted for
Plaintiff’s respiratory symptoms in the RFC. The ALJ determined: “While the claimant had
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evidence of coughing, wheezing . . . she exhibited overall intact pulmonary functioning” and
Plaintiff’s “spirometry tests and oxygen saturation during her exams indicated that she had
overall normal pulmonary functioning[.]”

Id.

The ALJ therefore found that Plaintiff’s

respiratory condition, combined with Plaintiff’s other impairments, “[l]imited her to performing
sedentary exertion with the postural, manipulative, and environmental limitations included in the
residual functional capacity.” Id.
Based on the record, the Court finds that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s COPD
when formulating the RFC and the medical evidence relating to Plaintiff’s COPD does not
support more severe limitations. “The mere fact that working may cause pain or discomfort does
not mandate a finding of disability[.]” Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider her musculoskeletal
impairments – namely, osteoarthritis, right shoulder impingement, and mild degenerative disc
disease – when formulating her RFC. (ECF No. 18 at 9-12). However, the ALJ included these
impairments in his review of the evidence and accounted for them in the RFC. The ALJ wrote
that, in November 2011, Plaintiff “complained of neck and shoulder pain” and “exhibited
tenderness with rotation and [] was diagnosed with right shoulder osteoarthritis and
sternoclavicular joint pain.” (Tr. 15). Medical imaging of Plaintiff’s right shoulder revealed
Plaintiff “had small osteophytes with subchondral geodes and sclerosis” and a “hypertrophic
stenoclavicular joint.”

Id.

Additionally, the ALJ observed that, during a consultative

examination in April 2012, Plaintiff “exhibited tenderness in her right trapezius, thoracic
vertebrae, [] right sternoclavicular joint[,]” and “decreased range of motion in her right
shoulder[.]” Id. In May 2014, “x-rays of claimant’s right shoulder showed that she had a
laterally downsloping acromion” and, in July 2014, Plaintiff “exhibited pain with motion in her

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right shoulder and tenderness to palpation” and “was diagnosed with possible right shoulder
arthralgia versus arthritis[.]” (Tr. 16).
The ALJ considered the evidence of Plaintiff’s shoulder, neck, and back pain from the
alleged onset date and factored it into the RFC. The ALJ explained that, while Plaintiff suffered
musculoskeletal pain, she exhibited “significant motor functioning.” (Tr. 16). Consequently, the
ALJ found that “while the claimant experienced limited range of motion in her right shoulder,
lumbar tenderness,” she could perform a range of sedentary work with limitations, including a
prohibition on overhead reaching with the right arm. Id. The ALJ further limited Plaintiff to no
climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and occasionally stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling,
and climbing ramps and stairs. Id.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the record contains substantial evidence
to support the ALJ’s RFC assessment, which properly accounted for Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal
pain.

Although Plaintiff cites evidence that might support a contrary decision, substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination and, as such, this Court is required to affirm.
See Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2007).
2. Treating physician opinion
Plaintiff contends the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ
“improperly gave little weight to the opinion of treating physician, Dr. Jan Onik.” (ECF No. 18
at 9). “A treating physician’s opinion regarding an applicant’s impairment will be granted
controlling weight, provided the opinion is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the
record.” Hamilton v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Singh v. Apfel, 222
F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2000)). “The ALJ may discount or disregard such an opinion if other

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medical assessments are supported by superior medical evidence, or if the treating physician has
offered inconsistent opinions.” Id. (quoting Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2001)).
See also Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2000). Whether the ALJ grants a
treating physician’s opinion substantial or little weight, “[t]he regulations require that the ALJ
‘always give good reasons’ for the weight afforded to a treating physician’s evaluation.” Reed v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)); see also 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
Based on the record, it appears that Dr. Onik treated Plaintiff’s neck and back pain in
November and December 2011. (Tr. 567-83). Dr. Onik resumed treating Plaintiff in May 2014,
when Plaintiff sought treatment for her COPD and pain in her shoulder, back, joints, elbow and
hip. (Tr. 567-83, 738-81).
In June 2014, Dr. Onik completed a medical source statement (“MSS”) relating to
Plaintiff’s mental ability to perform work-related activities. (Tr. 738-40). Dr. Onik opined that,
as a result of “poor cardiovascular circulation,” Plaintiff was mildly limited in her ability to
understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and moderately limited in her ability to
understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions. 5 (Tr. 738). Dr. Onik affirmed that
Plaintiff’s disability began on November 1, 2011. (Tr. 740).
Dr. Onik completed an MSS of Plaintiff’s physical ability to perform work-related
activities in November 2014, several months after Plaintiff was diagnosed with breast cancer.
(Tr. 307-10). In the statement, Dr. Onik again affirmed that Plaintiff’s disability began on
November 1, 2011. (Tr. 310). Dr. Onik reported that Plaintiff “would sometimes need to lie
down at unpredictable intervals during an 8 hour working shift” and could: occasionally lift or
5

Although Dr. Onik checked the box stating that Plaintiff’s impairments did not affect her ability
to interact appropriately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public, Dr. Onik checked
individual boxes indicating that each of these abilities was moderately restricted. (Tr. 739).
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carry less than ten pounds; sit less than two hours in an eight-hour workday; stand or walk less
than two hours in an eight-hour workday; sit thirty minutes at a time; and stand twenty minutes
at a time. 6 (Tr. 307). In addition, Dr. Onik stated that Plaintiff could never stoop, crouch, or
climb ladders, but could occasionally twist, climb stairs, reach, handle, finger, feel, push, and
pull. (Tr. 308). Dr. Onik estimated that Plaintiff would miss work more than four days per
month, be off-task at least 25% of the day, and require more than ten unscheduled breaks during
a work day. (Tr. 309-10).
The ALJ thoroughly reviewed Dr. Onik’s treatment notes, evaluations, and MMS’s and
explained his reasons for assigning Dr. Onik’s opinions “reduced weight.” (Tr. 18). The ALJ
discredited the June 2014 mental MSS, because: “there is no indication in the claimant’s
medical records to indicate that she experienced decreased concentration, social functioning, or
an inability to care for her needs as a result of her impairments.” (Tr. 17). As to the November
2014 physical MSS, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s medical records contained “no indication that
the claimant’s COPD, right shoulder pain, or lumbar tenderness would cause her to miss more
than four days of work per month.” (Tr. 17). The ALJ explained: “[A]lthough the claimant
exhibited tenderness and reduced range of motion in her shoulder prior to her established onset
date, her overall basic motor functioning remained intact and there was no indication that she
would require breaks to lie down, would be off-task, or would need to miss significant periods of
work as a result of her pain.” (Tr. 18).
The Court finds that the ALJ gave proper weight to Dr. Onik’s opinions as they pertained
to the period of time between November 2011 and July 2014. Nothing in Dr. Onik’s treatment
notes supports her statements that Plaintiff’s mental and social functioning were mildly to
6

In response to the question, “what medical findings support the limitations described above?,”
Dr. Onik attributed the limitations to Plaintiff’s cancer and cancer treatments. (Tr. 307).
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moderately limited and Plaintiff would miss work more than four days per month, be off-task at
least 25% of the day, and require more than ten unscheduled breaks per workday. “A treating
physician’s own inconsistency may [] undermine [the doctor’s] opinion and diminish or
eliminate the weight given [the doctor’s] opinions.” Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2006)) (first alteration in
original).
Additionally, the medical evidence did not support the severity of the limitations
contained in Dr. Onik’s opinion. For example, Dr. Onik found that Plaintiff could sit thirty
minutes at a time, stand twenty minutes at a time, and only occasionally reach, handle, or finger.
However, in April 2012, a consultative examiner found that, despite Plaintiff’s reduced range of
motion in her right arm, she had fair upper extremity strength, “would not have major problems
with activities sitting or even standing for 2-3 hours interrupted by breaks,” and “manual
dexterity again is not impaired[.]” (Tr. 591). In a follow-up examination with her primary care
physician in October 2012, Plaintiff reported no neck pain and had a normal chest exam. (Tr.
642). Plaintiff also had normal chest, lung, and cardio examinations in February 2013 and
October 2013. (Tr. 726). In July 2014, another consultative examiner found that Plaintiff had
“full motor strength in upper and lower extremities,” normal lumbar flexion, and “could put her
arms over her head.” (Tr. 744-48). “An ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion if it is
inconsistent with the record as a whole.” McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 616 (8th Cir. 2011).
In sum, Plaintiff fell short of meeting her burden to establish that her RFC was more
restricted than the ALJ determined. See Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 931-32 (8th Cir.
2016).

The Court therefore finds that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s COPD,

musculoskeletal pain, and treating physical opinion when formulating the RFC.

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B. Lay opinions
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred “in failing to accord any weight to the lay evidence of
onset,” specifically, the reports completed by Plaintiff’s brother and daughter. (ECF No. 18 at
12-15). Defendant counters that the ALJ properly evaluated the third-party statements of record.
(ECF No. 25 at 14-16).
“Since symptoms sometimes suggest a greater severity of impairment than can be shown
by objective medical evidence alone,” the SSA states it “will carefully consider any other
information” a claimant submits about claimant’s symptoms, including information provided by
other persons. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). “In determining the credibility of the
individual's statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire case record, including . . .
statements and other information provided by . . . other persons about the symptoms and how
they affect the individual. . . .” SSR 96–7P, 1996 WL 374186 (S.S.A.1996).
Importantly, the ALJ has more discretion to discount non-medical opinion evidence than
medical opinion evidence, and may consider any inconsistencies between the non-medical
opinion and other evidence in the record. Raney v. Barnhart, 396 F.3d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir.
2005). Questions of credibility are primarily for the ALJ to decide, and a court “will normally
defer” to the ALJ’s credibility determination so long as the ALJ supports the determination with
good reasons. Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d 710, 713-14 (8th Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff’s brother and daughter completed questionnaires about Plaintiff’s
impairments and functional abilities in March 2014. (Tr. 514-16, 518-20). Plaintiff’s brother
stated that Plaintiff: was unable to walk or sit “for very long [because] her back, hip[s], and legs
want to give out”; suffered pain from “her head to her toes”; “choke[d] and vomit[ed] from the
condition her lungs are in”; and struggled to “accomplish[] simple tasks d[ue] to remembering,

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concentrating and staying focused and physically capable.” (Tr. 514-16). Likewise, Plaintiff’s
daughter reported that Plaintiff: was “short of breath a lot”; suffered pain “throughout her entire
body,” making it “extremely difficult for her to perform simpl[e] daily tasks”; “has days she
cannot walk”; and requires a cane or wheelchair “because she loses her balance often.” (Tr. 51820). Neither report provided an onset date, either by agreeing or disagreeing with Plaintiff’s
claimed date of November 1, 2011 or by providing an alternate date.
The ALJ considered the reports filed by Plaintiff’s brother and daughter, found they were
“not fully credible,” and assigned them “reduced weight because they are not consistent with the
objective evidence.” (Tr. 16). The ALJ explained: “Their statements that the claimant is limited
to sitting, standing, and walking for short periods is not supported by the mild findings in the
claimant’s lumbar imaging and her otherwise intact gait and motor strength.” Id.
To the extent Plaintiff contends the ALJ gave insufficient consideration to her brother’s
and daughter’s reports, the ALJ discounted their assertions regarding Plaintiff’s limitations for
the same reasons he found Plaintiff’s claims not credible. An ALJ may discount corroborating
testimony from third parties on the same basis used to discredit a claimant’s testimony. See
Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 1998).
In arguing that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the lay opinions as evidence of
Plaintiff’s onset date of disability, Plaintiff cites Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-20. However,
that SSR does not support Plaintiff’s position. SSR 83-20 describes the “relevant evidence to be
considered when establishing the onset date of disability[.]” SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249.
When determining the onset date for a progressive impairment, such as Plaintiff’s, the ALJ
should consider the claimant’s allegations, work history, and the medical and other evidence,
such as “information . . . obtained from family members.” Id.

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In this case, the ALJ considered, among other evidence, information obtained from Plaintiff’s
family members and found it incredible.

Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

decision to assign the third-party reports reduced weight, the Court defers to his determination.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that substantial evidence in the

record as a whole supports the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled between
November 1, 2011 and July 29, 2014.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner denying Social
Security benefits to Plaintiff for the period November 1, 2011 to July 29, 2014 is AFFIRMED.
A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is entered this date.

PATRICIA L. COHEN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 29th day of December, 2017

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