Walls v. Colvin

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM: For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. An appropriate Judgment Order is issued herewith. Signed by Magistrate Judge David D. Noce on 3/13/17. (JAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
BRIAN G. WALLS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:16 CV 17 DDN

MEMORANDUM
This action is before this court for judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security finding that plaintiff Brian G. Walls is not disabled and,
thus, not entitled to either disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq, or Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385. The parties have consented to the exercise of
plenary authority by the undersigned United States Magistrate judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is
affirmed.

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on February 23, 1970. (Tr. 189, 196). He protectively filed his

applications for DIB and SSI on October 10, 2012, eventually amending his disability
onset date to the same date. (Tr. 214-15). Plaintiff claimed that the following conditions
limited his ability to work: depression, bipolar disorder, attention deficit disorder, lupus,
1

Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Ms. Berryhill is hereby substituted for Carolyn W.
Colvin as Acting Commissioner of Social Security and as the defendant in this action. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (last sentence).

and anxiety. (Tr. 219). Plaintiff’s application was denied on January 9, 2013, and he
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 11, 111-15, 11819). A hearing was held in October 2014, where plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”)
testified. (Tr. 33-92). By decision dated November 7, 2014, the ALJ found that plaintiff
was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Tr. 11-23). The ALJ determined that
plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform jobs available in
significant numbers in the national economy. Id. On January 14, 2016, the Appeals
Council of the Social Security Administration denied plaintiff’s request for review of the
ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 1-3). Consequently, the ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision
of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Specifically, he asserts that the ALJ erred in not giving his treating physician’s opinion
controlling weight, failed to fully develop the record, and failed to perform a proper
credibility analysis of plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff asks that the ALJ’s decision be
reversed or that the case be remanded for a new administrative hearing.

A.

Medical Record and Evidentiary Hearing
The court adopts plaintiff’s unopposed statement of facts (ECF No. 18), as well as

defendant’s unopposed statement of facts. (ECF No. 23). These facts, taken together,
present a fair and accurate summary of the medical record and testimony at the
evidentiary hearing. The court will discuss specific facts as they are relevant to the
parties’ arguments.

B.

ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

his alleged onset date. (Tr. 13). She also found that plaintiff suffered from the severe
impairments of degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, lumbago, discoid lupus,
recurrent bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, bipolar disorder, and attention deficit disorder.
Id. However, the ALJ concluded that none of these impairments, individually or in
2

combination, met or equaled an impairment listed in the Commissioner’s regulations.
(Tr. 14-15). With respect to plaintiff’s mental impairment, the ALJ found that the
“paragraph B” and “paragraph C” criteria were not met, because plaintiff had no
restrictions in activities of daily living; only mild difficulties in social functioning;
moderate difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace; and no extended
episodes of decompensation. Id.
The ALJ determined that plaintiff’s impairments left him with the RFC to
“perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),” except that he
can only occasionally lift and carry up to 20 pounds, can frequently lift and carry up to 10
pounds, can only stand or walk six hours in an eight-hour workday, and can sit six hours
in an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 15). He cannot crawl or climb on ropes, ladders, or
scaffolds, and he must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and work
hazards like heavy machinery. Id. The ALJ also found that he must avoid ultraviolet
light exposure, though fluorescent lights are permissible. Id. Finally the ALJ found that
plaintiff can handle and finger bilaterally on a frequent basis. Id. The ALJ found that
plaintiff had diagnoses for his impairments, but that plaintiff’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were “not entirely credible.”
(Tr. 16-17).
The ALJ reasoned that the objective medical evidence did not substantiate
plaintiff’s allegations. (Tr. 17). Specifically, the ALJ observed that the record was
“devoid of any evidence showing a significant degree of nerve compression, muscle
atrophy, paravertebral muscle spasm, sensory or motor loss, reflex abnormality, abnormal
coordination, or consistent gait disturbance.” Id. The ALJ noted that plaintiff’s physical
examinations produced normal or mild findings, his impairments required no
hospitalization, and his sole visit to the emergency room was to refill a prescription, not
because the severity of his pain required such a visit. (Tr. 16-17, 650) (with the doctor
stating, “really suspect this is tramadol withdraw[a]l . . . fairly classic presentation. Will
give 10 tablets of tramadol to get him through”). The ALJ also considered plaintiff’s
activities of daily living to be inconsistent with his allegations of debilitating carpal
3

tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 18). He texts messages, uses a computer keyboard, does not drop
objects, and is able to manipulate a cigarette out of its package and light it.

Id.

Ultimately, the ALJ decided that plaintiff may be experiencing some degree of pain, but
that his physical impairments are addressed in the limitations of his RFC. Id.
As to plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ emphasized plaintiff’s normal
mental status examinations; normal appearance, behavior, affect, mood, thought,
judgment, and insight; and documented good response to treatment. (Tr. 19). He also
noted a number of inconsistent statements in the record that erode plaintiff’s credibility.
Id. For example, plaintiff reported to the ALJ that he did not play video games, yet he
reported to mental health care providers that he played video games on a frequent basis.
(Tr. 57, 736, 740, 745).
In terms of the medical opinions in the record, the ALJ explained that he gave
“little weight” to plaintiff’s treating physician, Mark Tucker, DO, because his opinion
was inconsistent with his own medical records. (Tr. 20). For example, when plaintiff
told Dr. Tucker he hurt his back while shoveling, Dr. Tucker showed him correct lifting
techniques to avoid injuries while shoveling. (Tr. 697). As the ALJ noted, “[s]uch
counsel is inconsistent with the functional limitations opined in the medical source
statement.” (Tr. 20).
The ALJ also gave the opinions of psychiatrists David E. Goldman, DO, and Lyle
A. Clark, MD “little weight” because they were not supported by the medical evidence.
Id. at 20-21.

She noted in particular that their Global Assessment of Functioning

(“GAF”) scores2 of 45 and 36, respectively, which indicate very serious psychological

2

A GAF score represents a clinician’s judgment of an individual’s overall ability to
function in social or occupational settings, not including impairments due to physical or
environmental limitations. Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th
ed.) (DSM-IV) at 32. GAF scores of 31-40 indicate some impairment in reality testing or
communication or “major” impairment in social or occupational functioning; scores of 41
to 50 reflect “serious” impairment in these functional areas; scores of 51-60 reflect
“moderate” impairment; and scores of 61 to 70 indicate “mild” impairment. However, in
the fifth edition of the DSM, it was recommended that the GAF be dropped for several
4

symptoms, were of limited probative value because they were assigned during an initial
evaluation. Id. She noted that GAF scores are generally considered “snapshots” of a
plaintiff’s abilities at the time of examination, and do not reflect his day-to-day
capabilities or how treatment may control symptoms. Id.
The ALJ gave partial weight to the opinion of an examining prison doctor who
assigned plaintiff a GAF score of 60, because it indicated the claimant was experiencing
moderate psychological symptoms, which she found to be consistent with the medical
evidence. Id at 21.
She gave no weight to the statement of a state agency psychologist, Stanley
Hutson, Ph.D., because he concluded that there was insufficient evidence upon which to
offer an opinion, when the plaintiff submitted additional records at a later date, at the
hearing level. Id. The ALJ found these later records provided sufficient evidence to
properly assess plaintiff’s RFC. Id.
Finally, the ALJ relied on the testimony of the VE to find that there were jobs in
significant numbers in the national economy that a person with plaintiff’s RFC and age,
education, and work experience could perform. (Tr. 21-23). Accordingly, the ALJ
concluded that plaintiff was not disabled. Id.

II.

DISCUSSION
As stated, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to accord controlling

weight to the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician, failing to fully develop the record,
and failing to make a proper credibility determination. The court disagrees.

A.

General Legal Principles
In reviewing the denial of Social Security disability benefits, the court’s role is to

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings comply with the relevant legal
requirements and are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Patereasons, including its conceptual lack of clarity and questionable psychometrics. DSM-5
at 16.
5

Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009). “Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support
the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the evidence is substantial,
the court considers evidence that both supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s
decision. Id. As long as substantial evidence supports the decision, the court may not
reverse it merely because substantial evidence exists in the record that would support a
contrary outcome or because the court would have decided the case differently. See
Johnson v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 2011).
To be entitled to disability benefits, a claimant must prove that he is unable to
perform any substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment that would either result in a death or which has lasted or could be
expected to last for at least twelve continuous months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(D),
(d)(1)(A); Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. A five-step regulatory framework is used to
determine whether an individual is disabled. 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4); see also PateFires, 564 F.3d at 942 (describing the five-step process).
Steps One through Three require the claimant to prove (1) he is not currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) he suffers from a severe impairment, and (3)
his disability meets or equals a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(iii). If
the claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the
Commissioner’s analysis proceeds to Step Four and Five.

Step Four requires the

Commissioner to consider whether the claimant retains the RFC to perform his past
relevant work (PRW). Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The claimant bears the burden of
demonstrating he is no longer able to return to his PRW. Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. If
the Commissioner determines the claimant cannot return to PRW, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at Step Five to show the claimant retains the RFC to perform other work
that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
404.1520(a)(4)(v).

6

Id.; 20 C.F.R. §

B.

The ALJ Properly Accorded Little Weight to Plaintiff’s Treating Physician
An ALJ must give good reasons for the weight she apportions the opinions in the

record. Andrews v. Colvin, 791 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2015). Factors for evaluating
opinion evidence include the relationship between a treating source and the claimant,
including the length, nature, and extent of examination; the degree to which the source
presents an explanation and evidence to support an opinion; how consistent the opinion is
with the record as a whole; and the training and expertise of the source. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527 and 416.927; SSR 06-3p.
In this case, the ALJ gave “little weight” to plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Mark
Tucker, because she found his opinion to be inconsistent with his own medical records.
(Tr. 20). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have afforded Dr. Tucker’s opinion more
weight, because treating physicians are generally able to provide the most “detailed,
longitudinal picture” of the nature of a plaintiff’s impairments.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2). Plaintiff relies on the Commissioner’s commentary explaining that “all
things being equal . . . we will always give greater weight to the treating source’s opinion
than to the opinions of non-treating sources even if the other opinions are also reasonable
or even if the treating source’s opinion is inconsistent with other substantial evidence of
record.” 56 Fed. Reg. 36,932, 36,935 (Aug. 1, 1991) (commenting on 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2)). This is because treating sources typically have the most knowledge
about their patients’ conditions. Id.
However, Eighth Circuit jurisprudence on this topic holds that a treating
physician’s opinion will only be given controlling weight if it is supported by medically
acceptable evidence and consistent with the record. Andrews, 791 F.3d at 928 (citations
omitted). It “may be discounted or entirely disregarded where other medical assessments
are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence.” Id. (citations omitted).
Similarly, when a treating source’s examination notes are inconsistent with his or her
opinion, the ALJ may decline to give that source controlling weight. Hacker v. Barnhart,
459 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2006).

7

After treating plaintiff for approximately one and a half years, Dr. Tucker opined
that plaintiff could not lift more than ten pounds, sit for more than two hours in a
workday, or stand or walk for more than two hours in a workday. (Tr. 636-47, 659-63,
687-724, 756-68). The ALJ found these limitations to be inconsistent with Dr. Tucker’s
own assessments and treatment notes. (Tr. 20). Dr. Tucker made clinical observations of
the full range of motion in plaintiff’s extremities, normal lifting tests, negative straight
leg raises (indicating no herniated disk),3 and plaintiff’s reports that pain medication was
“working well.” (Tr. 643, 700, 703, 709, 712). Additionally, when plaintiff hurt his back
shoveling in July 2013, Dr. Tucker did not restrict plaintiff’s lifting; instead, he simply
educated plaintiff on proper lifting techniques to avoid injury when shoveling or lifting in
the future. (Tr. 697).
The ALJ further noted that the objective medical evidence was inconsistent with
Dr. Tucker’s recommended limitations.

(Tr. 20).

Medical imaging revealed no

significant nerve impingement in plaintiff’s cervical and lumbar spine, only “mild”
degeneration, and good disk spacing.

(Tr. 691-92, 697, 709).

Dr. Tucker himself

observed that plaintiff’s MRI scan did not reveal nerve impingement. (Tr. 709). Another
examining doctor found plaintiff to have normal muscle strength and tone and negative
straight leg raises, assessing plaintiff’s low back pain as only a “2” on a scale of 1 to 10.
(Tr. 671).
Finally, the ALJ determined that Dr. Tucker’s opinion did not seem to rely on
clinical findings or testing, but simply seemed to adopt plaintiff’s subjective complaints.
(Tr. 20, 659-63). Dr. Tucker’s treatment notes for the day he completed his opinion state
that plaintiff “tells me” his low back pain is causing him severe pain, plaintiff “tells me”
that he can only lift or carry less than ten pounds, and that plaintiff “tells me” he has
various sitting and standing limitations. (Tr. 765-68). Specifically, plaintiff told Dr.
Tucker he could only stand and walk for no more than two hours in an eight-hour
workday, sit for no more than two hours in a workday, and rest four times in a workday.
3

See, e.g., Cathy Speed, Low Back Pain (ABC of Rheumatology), 328 British Med. J.
1119, 1119-1121 (2004), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC406328/.
8

(Tr. 766). After comparing these notes with Dr. Tucker’s opinion, the ALJ concluded
that Dr. Tucker’s opinion was based not on his medical observations and findings, but on
plaintiff’s own allegations regarding his limitations. (Tr. 20).
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Tucker’s opinion little weight was
supported by substantial evidence. Although he was plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr.
Tucker’s opinion was inconsistent with much of the record, including Dr. Tucker’s own
treatment notes, and it was not supported by the objective medical evidence.
Furthermore, it appears to have been based largely on plaintiff’s subjective complaints
rather than on objective medical evidence. The Eighth Circuit has held that an ALJ is
entitled to give less weight to such an opinion. See Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1104
(8th Cir. 2014). While there may have been some evidence in the record to support Dr.
Tucker’s decision (Tr. 667), the ALJ’s decision to give the opinion only little weight was
supported by other, substantial evidence, and the court may not reverse “merely because
substantial evidence would support a contrary outcome.” Johnson, 628 F.3d at 992.

C.

The ALJ Fully Developed the Record
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record, in that the ALJ

did not properly account for plaintiff’s need to avoid ultraviolet light. Social Security
hearings are non-adversarial, and the ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and
fairly, independent of the plaintiff’s burden to prove his case. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377
F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the record is insufficient for
the ALJ to determine whether the plaintiff is disabled, he or she must further develop the
record. McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 612 (8th Cir. 2011).
At the hearing in this case, plaintiff’s attorney submitted an article, a workplace
accommodations webpage, and an article abstract stating that people with systemic lupus
may be sensitive to fluorescent light as well as the sun. (Tr. 395-403). He and the ALJ
asked the VE a series of questions about the impact a limitation on fluorescent light
exposure would have on the jobs available to plaintiff. (Tr. 80-84). While this discussion
may have been inconclusive, the ALJ did not err by failing to further develop the record
9

as to this issue. This is because the ALJ concluded that plaintiff only suffered from
discoid lupus, not the more severe systemic lupus, and in any case, did not need a
limitation on fluorescent lighting. (Tr. 13, 14, 18, 20). She noted no diagnostic testing to
support Dr. Tucker’s assessment that plaintiff’s lupus had become systemic. (Tr. 20,
703). On the contrary, after testing, it was confirmed that plaintiff’s lupus was not
systemic. (Tr. 636). The ALJ further reasoned that plaintiff’s physician only counseled
plaintiff about “protection” from ultraviolet light exposure, and not “avoidance.” (Tr. 18,
644). The ALJ also noted that there was no evidence that plaintiff’s lupus disease
activity actually increased with exposure to fluorescent lights, and plaintiff and doctors
only ever reported limitations related to sunlight. (Tr. 18, 364, 367, 644, 702, 765).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have developed the record “by submitting
interrogatories to Dr. Tucker” or “by bringing in a medical expert on discoid lupus to
review the file and explain the issue of exposure to fluorescent and UV light.” (ECF No.
18 at 10-11). However, an ALJ need not seek additional medical evidence “if other
evidence in the record provides a sufficient basis for the ALJ’s decision.” Kamann v.
Colvin, 721 F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 2013). As long as there is enough evidence to
determine the effect of an impairment on a plaintiff’s ability to work, then the ALJ need
not further develop the record. See Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007).
When there is little evidence of an alleged impairment and “substantial evidence to the
contrary,” an ALJ can make an informed decision without having to further develop the
record. See Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2012).
As the ALJ noted, there is no medical source suggesting that plaintiff needs to
avoid exposure to fluorescent light. (Tr. 18). Plaintiff himself reported that the only
medical recommendation he had received was to “avoid direct sunlight” and work
indoors. (Tr. 364, 367, 702, 765). The articles submitted suggest fluorescent light
exacerbates systemic lupus, not discoid lupus, and further state that LED, halogen, and
natural lighting can accommodate those with systemic lupus. (Tr. 395-403). The ALJ’s
determination that plaintiff did not suffer from systemic lupus and only needed to avoid
direct sunlight is supported by substantial evidence in the record and was adequately
10

addressed by VE testimony. Accordingly, the ALJ was under no duty to further develop
the record.

D.

The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Credibility
Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated his credibility. He

asserts that the ALJ used “boilerplate language” instead of providing specific reasons for
his determination that plaintiff’s testimony was not credible.

(ECF No. 18 at 11).

Plaintiff relies on SSR 96-7p for this argument, which states that the ALJ must cite
“specific reasons,” supported by evidence in the record, for a credibility finding.4 He
also notes that the ALJ did not expressly discuss the Polaski factors. See Polaski v.
Heckler, 739 F.3d 1320, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1984).
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ articulated the regulatory factors for
evaluating plaintiff’s claims about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his
symptoms (Tr. 15-16), and she gave specific reasons for concluding plaintiff’s claims
were not supported. (Tr. 16-20). First, the ALJ found that the clinical and objective
findings in the record were inconsistent with plaintiff’s allegations of total disability. In
terms of plaintiff’s lower back pain, lumbar x-rays and MRIs showed “mild”

4

While this SSR was rescinded by SSR 16-3p on March 16, 2016, it was still in force at
the time of the ALJ’s decision in November 2014. The superseding 2016 ruling rejects
the use of the term “credibility,” because “subjective symptom evaluation is not an
examination of an individual’s character.” SSR 16-3p. However, in terms of the
evaluation of symptoms, both rulings direct ALJs to consider all evidence in the record,
and both incorporate the factors to be considered under regulations 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3). As applied to this case, the rescission of SSR 96-7p
would not appear to have any practical effect on the outcome. Under either ruling, an
ALJ must point to specific reasons for the weight given to a plaintiff’s subjective
complaints. Many courts have chosen to apply this ruling retroactively because it
clarifies rather than changes the administrative interpretation of the rules. See, e.g.,
Mendenhall v. Colvin, 2016 WL 4250214, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2016); Vonderau v.
Colvin, 2016 WL 4435620, at *5, n. 2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2016). However, because SSR
16-3p does not alter the rule that the ALJ must provide specific reasons for the weight
accorded a plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this court need not reach the issue of
whether it applies retroactively.
11

degenerative changes and a “moderate” protrusion. (Tr. 691-92). Plaintiff had no nerve
impingement in his lower back, and an x-ray showed good disc spacing and no narrowing
of disc spaces. (Tr. 697, 709). Straight-leg raises were repeatedly negative, and lifting
tests were normal. (Tr. 17, 643, 671, 700, 703, 709). As to plaintiff’s neck complaints,
while cervical x-rays revealed degenerative disc disease, and some mild nerve
compression, they also showed normal alignment, natural fusion, and only mild height
loss. (Tr. 46-47, 665, 667). An examining orthopedist noted “good active range of
motion” in plaintiff’s neck.

(Tr. 17, 665).

In terms of plaintiff’s wrist and hand

complaints, an electromyography study showed neuropathies in his hands possibly
consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome.

(Tr.666, 90).

However, hospital records

reflected normal range of motion and strength in his fingers. (Tr. 678). Responding to
complaints of numbness in his left hand, a doctor found it to be neurovascularly intact.
(Tr. 665). Additionally, according to plaintiff, a carpal tunnel specialist did not think that
operatory intervention was necessary. (Tr. 709). The ALJ found that these were not the
kind of testing results one would expect given plaintiff’s allegations of debilitating pain.
(Tr. 18).
The ALJ also observed that plaintiff’s conservative treatment history was
inconsistent with his allegations of total disability. (Tr. 18). As the ALJ noted, plaintiff’s
treatment for his allegedly disabling pain consisted of osteopathic manipulation,
medication management, and recommendations that he stop smoking cigarettes. (Tr. 18,
52, 643, 650, 672, 697, 708-09, 712). Despite claiming debilitating back pain, plaintiff
denied ever needing physical therapy or home exercises to strengthen his back. (Tr. 18,
52, 669). He refused epidural steroid injections because he is afraid of needles. (Tr. 52).
He did not require any surgeries, nerve blocks, or other treatment. (Tr. 18, 669). There is
also no evidence that he required a cane, brace, or other assistive device for support while
standing or walking. (Tr. 18, 669). As for plaintiff’s hand and wrist issues, an examining
specialist informed plaintiff that surgery was unnecessary and recommended that plaintiff
continue conservative treatment and stop smoking. (Tr. 18, 709). The record does not
reflect that plaintiff received any more substantial treatment for his neck, back, or hand
12

pain. (Tr. 18, 52, 643, 650, 672, 708-09, 712); see Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 985
(8th Cir. 2015) (finding that the ALJ properly considered the claimant's treatment history
of exercises and medication as relatively conservative).
Moreover, and as the ALJ noted, the record reflects that plaintiff’s pain improved
with treatment. (Tr. 18, 643, 697, 712). Approximately seven months prior to the
hearing, plaintiff told his treating doctor that pain medication was “working well.” (Tr.
712). He also reported “good results” from osteopathic manipulations on his neck and
back. (Tr. 18, 643, 697). In January 2014, a pain management specialist rated plaintiff’s
pain as only a “2” on an ascending scale of 1 to 10. (Tr. 671). See Lawson v. Colvin, 807
F.3d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that if a claimant's pain is controlled by treatment
or medication, it is not considered disabling).
Finally, the ALJ found plaintiff’s activities to be inconsistent with his allegations
of total disability. Plaintiff reported debilitating back and neck pain since October 2012,
but he irritated his back shoveling in July 2013. (Tr. 697). The ALJ properly found this
strenuous activity to be inconsistent with plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain. (Tr.
18). Plaintiff also drove daily without apparent difficulty. (Tr. 19, 40, 737, 745). He can
shop for groceries and cook meals independently, and he has no problems doing the
laundry. (Tr. 19, 58, 733). As to plaintiff’s allegations of hand numbness, his daily
activities also belie the intensity alleged. Plaintiff testified he can send telephone text
messages and use a computer for one to two hours per day. (Tr. 19, 56). He denied
having any hand problems while using either a computer or a cell phone. (Tr. 57). He
has not reported any problems with dropping objects, and he can take a cigarette out of its
package and light it without incident. (Tr. 18, 49). He also reported playing video games
after his alleged onset date, contrary to his hearing testimony. (Tr. 57, 736, 740, 745-46).
Such inconsistencies between a claimant's subjective complaints and daily activities
undermine his claims of disabling pain and support denial of benefits. Medhaugh v.
Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 817 (8th Cir. 2009); Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir.
2005).

13

The ALJ pointed to each of these specific reasons in her decision regarding the
credibility of, or the weight given to, plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Her evaluation
was based on the entire record, reflects consideration of the appropriate factors, and is
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it was not error.

III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security is affirmed. An appropriate Judgment Order is issued herewith.

/S/ David D. Noce
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Signed on March 13, 2017.

14