Delmater v. Colvin

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shirley Padmore Mensah on 3/27/18. (LGK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
BOBBI J. DELMATER,
Plaintiff,
v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 2:16-CV-70-SPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the final
decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, denying
the applications of Plaintiff Bobbi J. Delmater (“Plaintiff”) for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq.
(the “Act”). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 8). Because I find the decision denying benefits was supported by
substantial evidence, I will affirm the Commissioner’s denial of Plaintiff’s application.

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Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill should be substituted for Acting
Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be taken
to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 23, 2013, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging that she had been unable to

work since June 2, 2010, due to fibromyalgia, depression, bursitis, chronic pain, headaches,
degenerative disc disease, anxiety, restless leg syndrome, overactive bladder, and fatigue. (Tr. 43845, 446-47, 461). Her applications were initially denied. (Tr. 347, 366, 369-73). Plaintiff filed a
request for a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 377). On August 24, 2015,
Plaintiff amended the alleged disability onset date to December 11, 2012. (Tr. 456). On September
14, 2015, following a hearing, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined
in the Act. (Tr. 8-27). On November 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of Hearing
Decision with the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council. (Tr. 39). On August 26,
2016, the Appeals Council declined to review the case. (Tr. 1-4). Plaintiff has exhausted all
administrative remedies, and the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
At the hearing before the ALJ, held on August 25, 2015, Plaintiff testified as follows. She
was 44 years old; was five feet, seven inches tall; and weighed 260 pounds. (Tr. 299, 301). She
lived with her husband and sixteen-year-old son. (Tr. 301). She was able to drive herself to
appointments and stores. (Tr. 301). She had completed two years of college and could read, write,
and do simple math. (Tr. 301-02). She had worked in the past doing secretarial and housekeeping
work and also at an insurance company, processing claims. (Tr. 303-04).
Plaintiff testified that the main reason she has been unable to work is her fibromyalgia,
which causes pain in her neck, back, and other areas. (Tr. 306). She also testified that she has
degenerative disc disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome, and restless leg
syndrome. (Tr. 312-16, 322). She testified that because of her pain, she has difficulty washing her

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hair, and it takes her two to three days to clean the house because she has to take breaks. (Tr. 306).
She testified that she can stand for seven to ten minutes before having problems and can sit for 20
minutes before she needs to change positions. (Tr. 308). She also testified that her neck surgery
helped with her neck pain, but it is still stiff. (Tr. 313-14). She testified that the stimulator that was
put in her lower back helps with her back pain in one particular area but that she still has issues
with the rest of her back from degenerative disc disease. (Tr. 314-15). She also testified that she
has carpal tunnel syndrome in her right wrist and that she often drops things. (Tr. 312, 322). She
has fatigue and naps at least once a day. (Tr. 319). She sometimes elevates her feet for half an hour
because of swelling, but not every day. (Tr. 320)
Plaintiff testified that she has trouble concentrating and that her short-term memory is very
bad. (Tr. 306, 309). She often sits down to do one task and gets diverted. (Tr. 310). Her short-term
memory is so bad that her family has to constantly remind her that she has already told them
something or already asked them a question. (Tr. 310). She has depression, feels that she is
worthless and cannot do what she has done in the past, and has crying spells at least once or twice
a week, lasting for an hour. (Tr. 317-18). She also thinks she has “maybe anxiety as well, too,”
which causes her to worry about bills and other things. (Tr. 318).
With regard to Plaintiff’s medical records and work history, the Court accepts the facts as
presented in the parties’ respective statements of facts and responses. The Court will discuss
specific facts relevant to the parties’ arguments as needed in the discussion below.
II.

STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY UNDER THE ACT
To be eligible for benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must prove he or she

is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). The Social Security Act defines as disabled

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a person who is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010). The
impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he
would be hired if he applied for work.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a five-step
evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see also McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d
605, 611 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing the five-step process). At Step One, the Commissioner
determines whether the claimant is currently engaging in “substantial gainful activity”; if so, then
he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At
Step Two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment, which is
“any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities”; if the claimant does not have a severe
impairment, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii),
416.920(c); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the
claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (the “listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); McCoy, 648
F.3d at 611. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Commissioner will find the claimant

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disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds with the rest of the five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(d), 416.920(d); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Prior to Step Four, the Commissioner must assess the claimant’s “residual functional
capacity” (“RFC”), which is “the most a claimant can do despite [his or her] limitations.” Moore
v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). At Step Four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can
return to his past relevant work, by comparing the claimant’s RFC with the physical and mental
demands of the claimant’s past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f),
416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the claimant can perform his past
relevant work, he is not disabled; if the claimant cannot, the analysis proceeds to the next step. Id.
At Step Five, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work
experience to determine whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work in the national
economy; if the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the claimant will be found
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Through Step Four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove that he is disabled.
Moore, 572 F.3d at 523. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that,
given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, there are a significant number of
other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.; Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d
1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012).
III.

THE ALJ’S DECISION
Applying the foregoing five-step analysis, the ALJ here found that Plaintiff met the insured

status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2015; that she has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since December 11, 2012, the alleged onset date; and that she had the following

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severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, fibromyalgia, mild
carpal tunnel syndrome status post surgeries, a depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder, and
obesity. (Tr. 13). The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 14). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following RFC:
[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined
in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except the claimant can never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds and can occasionally climb stairs or ramps. She can occasionally
stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. She should avoid hazards such as unprotected heights
and moving and dangerous machinery. She is limited to work involving simple,
routine tasks and simple work related decisions. She is limited to work involving
only occasional interactions with the public and coworkers. She can perform work
that involves only occasional decision making and changes in the work setting. The
claimant is also limited to frequent use of her upper extremities for handling,
fingering, and reaching.
(Tr. 16-17). At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not able to perform her past relevant
work as a claims processor. (Tr. 25). However, at Step Five, relying on the testimony of a
vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of performing other jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy, including representative occupations such as sealer
and semi-conductor bonder. (Tr. 26). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a
disability, as defined in the Act, from December 11, 2012, through September 14, 2015, the date
of his decision. (Tr. 27).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision on two grounds: (1) that the ALJ’s RFC

determination is not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) that the ALJ erred by failing to
give controlling weight to the opinions of treating rheumatologist Dr. Chad Ronholm and treating
psychiatrist Dr. David Goldman.

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A. Standard for Judicial Review
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it complies with the relevant legal
requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g); 1383(c)(3); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564
F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). “Substantial
evidence ‘is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.’” Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Moore, 572 F.3d at 522). In determining whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision, the court considers both evidence that supports that decision and
evidence that detracts from that decision. Id. However, the court “‘do[es] not reweigh the evidence
presented to the ALJ, and [it] defer[s] to the ALJ’s determinations regarding the credibility of
testimony, as long as those determinations are supported by good reasons and substantial
evidence.’” Id. at 1064 (quoting Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir. 2006)). “If,
after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s
decision.” Partee v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d
785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005)). The Court “will not disturb the denial of benefits so long as the ALJ’s
decision falls within the available zone of choice.” Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir.
2011).
B. The ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinion Evidence From Plaintiff’s
Treating Physicians
The Court first considers Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by failing to give
controlling weight to the opinions of treating rheumatologist Dr. Chad Ronholm and treating

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psychiatrist Dr. David Goldman. Plaintiff also argues that even if the ALJ did not give controlling
weight to these opinions, the ALJ should have given them greater weight.
Under the regulations applicable to Plaintiff’s claim, if the Social Security Administration
finds that a treating source’s medical opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant’s
impairments “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case
record,” the Social Security Administration will give that opinion “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(c)(2) & 416.927(c)(2). 2 See also Tilley v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2009)
(“A treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [a claimant’s] case record.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ
may discount a treating physician’s opinion if it is inconsistent with or contrary to the medical
evidence as a whole. Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 930 (8th Cir. 2010). The ALJ should
consider several factors in weighing medical opinions from a treating source, including the length
of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the
treatment relationship, the evidence provided by the source in support of the opinion, the
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, the level of specialization of the source, and
other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). “[W]hen an ALJ
discounts a treating physician’s opinion, he should give good reasons for doing so.” Martise v.
Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 925 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Davidson v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir.
2007)). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2); 416.927(c)(2) (stating that the Social Security

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These regulations apply to claims filed before March 27, 2017. For claims filed on or after
March 27, 2017, the rule that a treating source opinion is entitled to controlling weight has been
eliminated. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c & 416.920c.
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Administration “will always give good reasons in [the] notice of determination or decision for the
weight [it] gives [the claimant’s] treating source’s medical opinion”).
The undersigned will consider separately the opinion of Dr. Ronholm and the opinion of
Dr. Goldman.
1. The Opinion of Treating Rheumatologist Dr. Ronholm
On June 29, 2015, Dr. Ronholm filled out a Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do
Work-Related Activities (Physical). (Tr. 1210-13). Dr. Ronholm found that because of Plaintiff’s
generalized pain and herniated disc, Plaintiff could lift and carry ten pounds frequently and twenty
pounds occasionally; could stand and walk about four hours during an eight-hour day; and could
sit without limitation. (Tr. 1210). He opined that with her chronic back pain with degenerative disc
disease and herniated disc, she could never twist, stoop, crouch, or climb ladders and could
occasionally climb stairs. He found that due to arthralgias and pain in her hands and upper
extremities, she could occasionally push/pull; could frequently reach, handle, and finger; and could
constantly feel. (Tr. 1211). He also stated that she should avoid concentrated exposure to perfumes,
soldering fluxes, solvents/cleaners, and chemicals, and should avoid moderate exposure to extreme
cold, extreme heat, high humidity, and fumes, odors, dusts, and gases. (Tr. 1212). He found that
Plaintiff’s impairments or treatment would cause her to be absent from work about three days per
month and would cause her to be off task 15% of a typical workday (Tr. 1212-13) He also found
that it was unknown whether Plaintiff would need to take unscheduled breaks during the workday
but that she might need to do so several times per month for five to thirty minutes due to muscle
weakness, chronic fatigue, pain, parathesias, numbness, and adverse effects of medication. (Tr.
1213).

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The ALJ discussed Dr. Ronholm’s opinion and gave it “some weight.” (Tr. 24). The ALJ
discounted Dr. Ronholm’s opinion regarding environmental and pulmonary restrictions because
Plaintiff did not have any corresponding impairments. (Tr. 24). He also found no support for Dr.
Ronholm’s opinions regarding absences and unscheduled breaks. (Tr. 24).
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the length of the treating
relationship between Dr. Ronholm and Plaintiff, noting that Plaintiff had been seeing Dr. Ronholm
for almost two full years before Dr. Ronholm offered his opinion. The undersigned finds no error.
Plaintiff correctly points out that the length of a treatment relationship is a proper factor to consider
in weighing the opinion of a treating physician. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)(i),
416.927(c)(2)(i). However, the ALJ was not required to expressly discuss every factor set forth in
the regulations in assessing Dr. Ronholm’s opinion. See Derda v. Astrue, No. 4:09-CV-01847AGF, 2011 WL 1304909, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2011) (“While an ALJ must consider all of
the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527[ ], he need not explicitly address each of the factors.”).
Failure to discuss each factor does not mean the ALJ did not consider them. Moreover, two years
is not a particularly long treatment relationship, and it is not obvious that the length of the
relationship should have been a significant factor in determining the appropriate weight to give the
opinion.
Plaintiff also argues that although there was no objective evidence to support several of the
environmental and pulmonary restrictions in the record, there is evidence to support the opinion
that Plaintiff should avoid extreme cold. She cites a record from July 1, 2013, in which Dr.
Ronholm noted in Plaintiff’s review of systems that she had “increased cold intolerance.” (Tr.
875). The undersigned finds no error. Plaintiff does not point to, and the Court has not found, any
evidence to suggest that Plaintiff had any ongoing complaints of cold intolerance or that any of

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her treatment providers made any objective findings regarding Plaintiff’s inability to tolerate cold.
Moreover, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff’s chest and lung examinations were normal. (Tr. 847,
1167, 1219). The absence of treatment notes to support the opined limitations was a good reason
for the ALJ not to include those limitations. See Toland v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 931, 936 (8th Cir.
2014) (ALJ properly discounted treating doctor’s opinion regarding environmental restrictions
related to temperature changes, fumes, odors, chemicals, and gases where the doctor provided no
explanation for why those restrictions were necessary and where neither the doctor’s treatment
records nor the other medical evidence in the record provided a medical justification for the
restrictions); Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming the ALJ’s decision to
discount the opinion of a treating physician where it contained limitations that “stand alone” and
“were never mentioned in [the physician’s] numerous records of treatment . . . ”).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ incorrectly found that the record did not support the
absenteeism or need for unscheduled breaks in Dr. Ronholm’s opinion. Plaintiff argues that the
evidence of pain and fatigue in the record supports a need for absences and breaks. Plaintiff also
argues that a need for absences and breaks is supported by evidence that Plaintiff has told her
doctors that she naps during the day due to her inability to sleep and night or as a way to cope with
her anger and stress. However, as the ALJ reasonably found, the record as a whole did not fully
support Plaintiff’s complaints of severe pain, stress, and fatigue that might cause such limitations.
(Tr. 17-24). The ALJ considered that Plaintiff’s cervical spine surgery had been successful in
reducing or eliminating her cervical pain (Tr. 23, 1006, 1007, 1009, 1023, 1064); that Plaintiff’s
back pain had been significantly improved by medication and by the implantation of her spinal
cord stimulation device (Tr. 23, 1020, 1042, 1046, 1056, 1060, 1067, 1127-29, 1130, 1190-93,
1217-19, 1244); that Plaintiff had reported good sleep (Tr. 21, 963, 1020, 1067); that Plaintiff

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reported that her medication had improved her mood and her fibromyalgia symptoms, that she was
feeling better, and that her symptoms were stable (Tr. 22, 1244-45); and that Plaintiff’s mental and
physical examination findings were often mild or normal (Tr. 790, 824, 833, 838, 841-42, 847,
850, 856, 862, 877, 885, 1017-18, 1022, 1067-68, 1072-73, 1098, 1104, 1109, 1156, 1191, 121819, 1227-28, 1245). It was not unreasonable for the ALJ to find Dr. Ronholm’s opinion about
Plaintiff’s need for absences and breaks due to pain, stress, and fatigue was not supported by the
record as a whole.
For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ gave good reasons, supported by
substantial evidence, for partially discounting Dr. Ronholm’s opinions. The ALJ’s assessment of
this opinion fell within the “available zone of choice,” and thus this Court will not disturb that
assessment. See Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 938 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no error in ALJ’s
decision to discount opinion of a treating physician where that decision was supported by good
reasons and did not “lie[] outside the available zone of choice”).
2.

The Opinion of Treating Psychiatrist Dr. David Goldman

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not give sufficient weight to the opinion of her
treating psychiatrist, Dr. David Goldman. On July 17, 2015, Dr. Goldman completed a Medical
Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Mental). (Tr. 1222-25). On the checkbox portions of the form, Dr. Goldman found Plaintiff had “extreme” limitations 3 (the most severe
option given) in every area assessed. He indicated that Plaintiff had extreme limitations in the
ability to understand and remember simple instructions, the ability to carry out simple instructions,

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The form asks the person completing it to evaluate the existence and extent of limitations on the
individual’s ability to do various work-related activities on a sustained basis. The options for
answers are none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. “Extreme” is defined as “There is major
limitation in this area. There is no useful ability to function in this area.” (Tr. 1222).
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the ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions, the ability to understand and
remember complex instructions, the ability to carry out complex instructions, and the ability to
make judgments on complex work-related decisions. (Tr. 1222-23). In support of those limitations,
he noted that Plaintiff had “extreme difficulty with short-term memory” and that she takes many
medications and has anxiety, depression, and physical problems that adversely impact her memory,
concentration, and judgment. (Tr. 1223). He also found that Plaintiff had extreme limitations in
the ability to interact appropriately with the public, the ability to interact appropriately with coworkers, the ability to interact appropriately with supervisors, and the ability to respond
appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. (Tr. 1223). He
noted that because of her mood disorder, anxiety disorder, and physical problems, Plaintiff was
prone to becoming easily and quickly frustrated and to “shutting down” in social interactions. (Tr.
1223). Dr. Goldman also noted that due to her chronic pain, Plaintiff had difficulty using her arms,
legs, hands, and back, and will go through periods when she cannot stand, cannot sit, and can find
relief only from lying down. (Tr. 1224). Dr. Goldman also opined that Plaintiff’s impairments
were likely to produce “good days” and “bad days”; that Plaintiff would be absent from work more
than four days per month; that Plaintiff would typically be off-task 25% or more of the time; and
that Plaintiff would need to change positions and take breaks of 15 to 20 minutes every hour at a
minimum (due to panic attacks, anxiety, crying spells, adverse effects of medication, and other
problems). (Tr. 1224).
The ALJ discussed Dr. Goldman’s opinion and gave it “no weight.” The ALJ found that
“the extreme findings in all areas” were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s limited mental health care,
Plaintiff’s presentation at the hearing, Plaintiff’s own testimony, and the objective medical
evidence discussed in the ALJ’s opinion. (Tr. 24).

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After review of the record, the Court finds substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
decision to give no weight to the extreme limitations in Dr. Goldman’s opinion. As the ALJ noted,
Dr. Goldman’s extreme limitations were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence in his
own treatment notes, which involved generally normal or nearly normal findings. Plaintiff began
seeing Dr. Goldman in January 2015, at which time he reviewed her history, described her
subjective complaints, and conducted a mental status examination. (Tr. 1077-81). He noted that
she was alert and oriented to person, place, time, and situation; that she correctly identified the
current and former presidents; that she correctly spelled a word forward and backward without
hesitation; that she identified similarities between various words but could not think of a similarity
between fly and tree; and that when challenged to remember the words, “cup, clock, and phone”
after eight minutes, she remembered them as “cup, phone, and clock. (Tr. 1078-79). Dr. Goldman
diagnosed dysthymic disorder and major depressive disorder, assigned a Global Assessment of
Functioning (“GAF”) score of 35, 4 and prescribed medications. (Tr. 1079-81). At her next visit, in
February 2015, Plaintiff reported that she thought her medication was helping, and Dr. Goldman
noted that she had a “good response” to medication, with no side effects. (Tr. 1067). He found
that her appearance, behavior, activity level, orientation, speech, affect, thought processes, insight,
judgment, cognition, and impulse control were all normal. (Tr. 1067-68). At her next visit, in April
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The Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF) is a psychological assessment tool wherein
an examiner is to “[c]onsider psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical
continuum of mental health-illness”; it does “not include impairment in functioning due to physical
(or environmental) limitations.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSMIV), 32 (4th ed. 1994). A GAF score between 31 and 40 indicates “[s]ome impairment in reality
testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure, or irrelevant) OR major
impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood
(e.g., depressed man avoid friends, neglects family, and is unable to work; child frequently beats
up younger children, is defiant at home, and is failing at school).” Id. at 32.

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2015, Plaintiff reported that she thought her medication was working but wondered if it would
help more if she bumped it up. (Tr. 1072). She also reported that her sleep had been up and down
and asked about medications for weight loss. (Tr. 1072). Dr. Goldman again reported that she had
a “good response” to medication, with no side effects, and again found that her appearance,
behavior, activity level, orientation, speech, affect, thought processes, insight, judgment,
cognition, and impulse control were all normal. (Tr. 1072-73). At her next visit in July 2015,
Plaintiff reported being stressed out and anxious due to money problems and said that she was
very depressed and her leg was constantly bouncing. (Tr. 1227). Dr. Goldman gave her samples
of a new medication and reported that her response to medication was “fair.” (Tr. 1227). He found
that her activity level, orientation, speech, thought processes, cognition, and impulse control were
normal, though he found her appearance, affect, behavior, insight, and judgment abnormal due to
stress, pain, and depression. (Tr. 1228). Dr. Goldman’s treatment records dated in the months after
the ALJ’s decision similarly show that Plaintiff generally had a good response to medication, and
that her mental status examinations findings were generally either completely normal or mostly
normal. (Tr. 245-46, 252-53, 260-61, 268-69). Dr. Goldman’s generally normal findings with
regard to Plaintiff’s cognition, judgment, and thought processes are inconsistent with Dr.
Goldman’s conclusion that Plaintiff had such severe symptoms that she could not even understand,
remember, and carry out even simple instructions and could not make judgments on even simple
work-related decisions. His normal findings with regard to Plaintiff’s speech, behavior, and
impulse control are inconsistent with his opinion that Plaintiff would be completely incapable of
interacting with coworkers and others. Moreover, Dr. Goldman almost always reported that
Plaintiff had “no side effects” from her medications, which is inconsistent with his suggestion that
her many medications cause extreme limitations in her abilities. (Tr. 245, 252, 268, 1072, 1227).

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As the ALJ also properly noted, Dr. Goldman’s extreme opinions are inconsistent with the
objective findings of other treatment providers, who often indicated that although Plaintiff had
anxiety and/or depression and sometimes had attention and concentration problems, she generally
had a cooperative attitude, normal speech and thought content, appropriate judgment and insight,
and intact cognitive function, memory, attention, and concentration. (Tr. 824, 833,838, 841-42,
847, 850, 862, 1017-18, 1098, 1104, 1109, 1012, 1191, 1218).
Moreover, as the ALJ also noted, some of Dr. Goldman’s opinions are inconsistent with
Plaintiff’s own testimony. (Tr. 24). Dr. Goldman opined that Plaintiff would need to take breaks
every hour during the day due in part to panic attacks, anxiety, crying spells, and medications.
However, Plaintiff testified that she only had crying spells once or twice a week for about an hour,
and that as of August 2015 she had only ever had a single panic attack. (Tr. 318). In addition,
Plaintiff’s testimony about her impairments did not include any indication that Plaintiff had
difficulty making judgments and decisions, nor did it include any indication that Plaintiff had
difficulty interacting with others.
In sum, it was entirely reasonable for the ALJ to find that the record was inconsistent with
Dr. Goldman’s opinion that Plaintiff is completely incapable of performing any mental workrelated functions. The Court also notes that although the ALJ stated that he gave “no weight” to
Dr. Goldman’s opinions, the ALJ did incorporate some of the limitations in Dr. Goldman’s
opinions in the RFC. Dr. Goldman’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s inability to understand, carry
out, and follow complex instructions is accommodated by the limitation in the RFC to work
involving simple, routine tasks and simple work-related decisions. Dr. Goldman’s opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s limited ability to interact appropriately with others is partially accommodated
by the limitation in the RFC to work involving only occasional interactions with the public and

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coworkers. Dr. Goldman’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s inability to respond appropriately to usual
work situations and to changes in a routine work setting is partially accommodated by the
limitation in the RFC to work involving only occasional changes in the work setting.
For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ gave good reasons, supported by
substantial evidence for his evaluation of Dr. Goldman’s opinions. See Toland v. Colvin, 761 F.3d
931, 935-36 (8th Cir. 2014) (ALJ properly discounted treating physician’s opinion that was
inconsistent with physician’s own treatment notes); Halverson, 600 F.3d at 930 (ALJ appropriately
discounted treating doctor’s limitations when they were inconsistent with the plaintiff’s mental
status examinations). As with Dr. Ronholm’s opinion, the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Goldman’s
opinion fell within the available “zone of choice,” and the Court will defer to that decision. See
Hacker, 459 F.3d at 938.
C. The ALJ’s RFC Assessment and Credibility Determination
The Court next considers Plaintiff’s argument that the RFC assessment is not supported by
substantial evidence. Plaintiff also challenges several aspects of the ALJ’s analysis of the
credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. After review of the record, the Court finds
substantial evidence to support the RFC assessment and credibility analysis.
A claimant’s RFC is “the most a claimant can do despite her limitations.” Moore v. Astrue,
572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)). “The ALJ must assess a
claimant’s RFC based on all relevant, credible evidence in the record, ‘including the medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his
[or her] limitations.’” Tucker v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting McKinney
v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)).

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“Before determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ first must evaluate the claimant’s
credibility.” Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). When
evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ must consider several
factors: “(1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, intensity, and frequency of pain; (3)
the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; (5) any functional restrictions; (6) the claimant’s work history; and (7) the absence of
objective medical evidence to support the claimant’s complaints.” Moore, 572 F.3d at 524 (citing
Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008), and Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322
(8th Cir. 1984)). “An ALJ who rejects subjective complaints must make an express credibility
determination explaining the reason for discrediting the complaints.” Moore, 572 F.3d at 524
(quoting Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2000)). However, the ALJ is not required to
explicitly discuss each of these factors in relation to a claimant. Id. The court “will defer to the
ALJ’s credibility finding if the ALJ ‘explicitly discredits a claimant’s testimony and gives a good
reason for doing so.’” Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 558 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wildman v.
Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 968 (8th Cir. 2010)).
The Court first considers the physical RFC finding, which limited Plaintiff to sedentary
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), with the additional limitations that
Plaintiff could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; could occasionally climb stairs or ramps;
could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; should avoid hazards such as unprotected
heights and moving and dangerous machinery; and was limited to frequent use of her upper
extremities for handling, fingering, and reaching. (Tr. 16-17). Sedentary work is defined in the
regulations as follows:
Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally
lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a
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sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking
and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if
walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) & 416.967(a). The Eighth Circuit has noted that a limitation to sedentary
work “in itself is a significant limitation.” Ellis v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2005).
The Court finds substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff
was capable of this significantly limited range of physical work. First, the physical RFC finding is
supported in part by the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Chad Ronholm, which the
ALJ gave “some weight.” (Tr. 24, 1210-13). Dr. Ronholm opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff could
lift and carry ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally, could stand and walk about
four hours during an eight-hour day, and could sit without limitation. (Tr. 1210). These sitting,
standing, walking, lifting, and carrying limitations match or exceed those required for sedentary
work, providing support for the RFC. The physical RFC finding is also supported by treatment
records showing that many of Plaintiff’s asserted symptoms improved significantly with treatment.
The record shows that Plaintiff had significant neck pain, but it also shows that her cervical spine
surgery was largely successful in addressing that pain. Plaintiff reported minimal neck pain at a
follow-up visit two weeks after surgery and then denied any neck pain at a follow-up visits several
months after surgery. (Tr. 23, 1006, 1007, 1009, 1023, 1064). As the ALJ also noted, although
Plaintiff had significant lower back pain at times, she reported that the implantation of a spinal
cord stimulator significantly decreased her pain, including reports at times that it provided 80%
relief or brought her lower back pain level down to a 1/10, 2/10 or 3/10. (Tr. 23, 1042, 1046, 1056,
1060, 1127-29, 1130, 1190-93, 1217-19, 1244); shortly after the ALJ’s decision, she reported her
pain as a 0/10. (Tr. 41, 43). In addition, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff reported that her
medication had improved her mood and her fibromyalgia symptoms, and she told her doctor that

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she was feeling better and her symptoms were stable. (Tr. 22, 78, 1244-45). Impairments that can
be controlled by treatment do not support a finding of disability. See Brown v. Astrue, 611 F.3d
941, 955 (8th Cir. 2010) (“If an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot
be considered disabling.” (quoting Brace v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2009)); Davidson
v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 838, 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Impairments that are controllable or amenable to
treatment do not support a finding of disability.”). The physical RFC finding is further supported
by the numerous mild or normal objective findings in the record. These include EMG findings of
only mild carpal tunnel syndrome (Tr. 885); findings of normal range of motion and strength (Tr.
877, 1022, 1156, 1245); mild findings on imaging of Plaintiff’s neck (Tr. 790, 856); and negative
straight leg raise test results (Tr. 43, 48, 1219).
The Court also finds substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s mental RFC finding. The
Court first notes that the ALJ did not entirely discount the evidence in the record that Plaintiff
suffered from significant mental symptoms, but instead limited Plaintiff to work involving simple,
routine tasks and simple work-related decisions; work involving only occasional interactions with
the public and coworkers; and work involving only occasional decision making and changes in the
work setting. The ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could perform work within these limits is
supported by the record. First, as discussed at length above in the section addressing Dr. Goldman’s
opinions, this mental RFC is supported by the many treatment records from Plaintiff’s treating
psychiatrist and others showing that although Plaintiff had some anxiety, depression, and difficulty
concentrating, she was generally alert, cooperative, had normal speech and thought processes, had
normal judgment and insight, and had normal memory, concentration, cognition, and impulse
control. (Tr. 824, 833,838, 841-42, 847, 850, 862, 1017-18, 1098, 1104, 1109, 1068, 1073, 1012,
1191, 1218, 1228). Second, the mental RFC finding is supported by evidence suggesting that

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Plaintiff’s mental impairments improved with medication, including Plaintiff’s treating
psychiatrist’s frequent notes that she had a “good” (or sometimes “fair”) response to medication.
(Tr. 1067, 1072, 1227, 245, 252, 266, 268). Third, the mental RFC is supported by Plaintiff’s own
testimony about her abilities, as well as her husband’s report about her abilities. At the hearing
before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that she has depression and “maybe anxiety,” but she did not
describe debilitating symptoms; instead, she described having crying spells for about an hour once
or twice a week and described worrying about bills and other things. (Tr. 318). She also testified
to being easily diverted when trying to concentrate on a task and to requiring reminders to assist
her with her memory, but she did not suggest that she is unable to complete even simple and routine
tasks. In Plaintiff’s husband’s third-party function report, Plaintiff’s husband indicated that
although Plaintiff had some concentration problems and did not handle stress or changes in routine
well, she was able to pay bills, handle a savings account, use a checkbook, count change, read,
play on the computer, visit with others, and go to church; did not need to be reminded to go places;
did not have any problems getting along with family, friends, neighbors, or others; and followed
written and spoken instructions well. (Tr. 470-76).
The Court also finds that the ALJ conducted a proper credibility analysis, supported by
good reasons and substantial evidence. As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff asserted that she was disabled
due to a combination of back pain, neck pain, other pain from fibromyalgia, pain in her hands,
obesity, concentration and memory problems, and depression and anxiety that caused crying spells.
(Tr. 17). The ALJ expressly found Plaintiff’s complaints only partially credible after consideration
of several of the relevant factors. (Tr. 17-23). First, as discussed above, the ALJ reasonably
considered the history of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and mental symptoms along with
the evidence that they improved with treatment. See Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 802 (8th

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Cir. 2005) (“Evidence of effective medication resulting in relief . . . may diminish the credibility
of a claimant’s complaints.”). Second, as discussed above, the ALJ considered objective medical
evidence showing several normal or mild examination findings, both physical and mental. (Tr. 23).
See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that it was proper for the ALJ
to consider unremarkable or mild objective medical findings as one factor in assessing credibility
of subjective complaints). Third, the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s daily activities—which
included caring for her teenaged son, cleaning up after the dog, driving a car, preparing simple
meals, dusting, vacuuming, mopping, cleaning the bathroom, doing dishes, attending church,
visiting with friends and family, reading, beading, and using the computer—were inconsistent with
her complaints of disabling pain and mental symptoms. (Tr. 22-23, 486-91). See, e.g., Wagner v.
Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 852-53 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding a claimant’s accounts of “extensive daily
activities, such as fixing meals, doing housework, shopping for groceries, and visiting friends”
supported the ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant’s complaints were not fully credible). Fourth,
the ALJ reasonably considered the relatively limited mental health treatment sought by Plaintiff
during the relevant period, which involved several visits to a psychiatric nurse in 2013 but only
two visits in 2014, and no visits to a psychiatrist until 2015. Cf. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d
964, 967 (8th Cir. 2003) (“An ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain based
on the claimant’s failure to pursue regular medical treatment.”). Fifth, the ALJ also reasonably
considered Plaintiff’s ability to answer questions at the hearing, which he found consistent with
the ability to perform unskilled, low-stress work with limited social interactions. (Tr. 23). See
Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147-48 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The ALJ’s personal observations of
the claimant’s demeanor during the hearing is completely proper in making credibility
determinations.”).

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In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ conducted an express credibility determination,
considered several of the relevant factors, and gave good reasons for finding Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints not entirely credible. The Court will therefore defer to that analysis. See Renstrom v.
Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th Cir. 2012) (“If an ALJ explicitly discredits the claimant’s
testimony and gives good reason for doing so, [the court] will normally defer to the ALJ’s
credibility determination.”) (quoting Juszczyk v. Astrue, 542 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2008)).
The Court will briefly address several specific arguments raised in Plaintiff’s brief. First,
Plaintiff describes at length the numerous records indicating that Plaintiff complained of, and
received significant treatments for, her pain. The Court acknowledges that there is significant
evidence in the record that Plaintiff experienced pain from fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease,
and other conditions. However, the mere fact that Plaintiff experiences pain does not necessarily
mean that she is disabled. See Perkins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 2011) (“While pain
may be disabling if it precludes a claimant from engaging in any form of substantial gainful
activity, the mere fact that working may cause pain or discomfort does not mandate a finding of
disability.”) (quoting Jones v. Chater, 86 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1996)). As discussed above, the
ALJ considered both the evidence tending to support Plaintiff’s assertion that her pain imposed
disabling limitations and the evidence tending to undermine that assertion, weighed the evidence,
and came to a conclusion that was supported by substantial evidence. The Court may not reweigh
that evidence. See, e.g., Renstrom, 680 F.3d at 1064.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ should not have relied on Plaintiff’s daily activities to
find her complaints not fully credible. Plaintiff also points out that the Eighth Circuit has cautioned
that a claimant’s ability to do limited housework does not indicate that a claimant can perform the
requirements of full-time work throughout the working day and week. Plaintiff also notes that she

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reported that she has to split up her housework tasks over multiple days; that she sometimes has
difficulty with personal care tasks; and that her son and husband also help with pet care, meal
preparation, and laundry. The Court finds no error. The Eighth Circuit has recognized that its cases
“send mixed signals about the significance of a claimant’s daily activities in evaluating claims of
disabling pain.” Clevenger v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 567 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2009); compare, e.g.,
Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 875 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[A]cts such as cooking, vacuuming,
washing dishes, doing laundry, shopping, driving, and walking, are inconsistent with subjective
complaints of disabling pain.”), with Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“[T]his court has repeatedly observed that the ability to do activities such as light housework and
visiting with friends provides little or no support for the finding that a claimant can perform fulltime competitive work.”) (quotation marks omitted). However, Eighth Circuit cases generally
suggest that where such daily activities are inconsistent with a Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, it
is proper for the ALJ to consider them in conjunction with other factors affecting the credibility of
a Plaintiff’s complaints. See, e.g., Halverson, 600 F.3d at 932-33 (holding that the ALJ properly
considered daily activities in conjunction with other inconsistencies in the record in assessing the
credibility of Plaintiff’s complaints); Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d at 852-53 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding
a claimant’s accounts of “extensive daily activities, such as fixing meals, doing housework,
shopping for groceries, and visiting friends” supported the ALJ’s conclusion that his complaints
were not fully credible). The record here indicates that Plaintiff’s daily activities included not only
housework, but also driving, walking, shopping in stores, paying bills, going to church, visiting
with neighbors, reading, beading, playing on the computer, cleaning up after the dog, and
vacuuming. Even if some of those activities take her some time to complete, and even if she
indicated that she sometimes gets assistance with those activities, it was not unreasonable for the

24

ALJ to consider her ability to perform them along with other relevant factors in assessing the
credibility of her allegations of disabling pain, anxiety, depression, and inability to concentrate.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by describing her mental health treatment as
“limited,” noting that in addition to seeing a psychiatric nurse and seeing Dr. Goldman in 2015,
Plaintiff regularly saw Connie Ronimous at Mark Twain Behavioral Health. The Court
acknowledges that Plaintiff did frequently met with Ms. Ronimous to discuss Plaintiff’s medical
and mental health issues and to receive education about relaxation exercises and coping
mechanisms. However, Ms. Ronimous is described in the record as a Community Support
Specialist, and it does not appear that she was actually providing mental health treatment to
Plaintiff. (Tr. 1026). The Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ’s statement that Plaintiff’s
mental health treatment was “limited,” particularly as this was only one of several factors he
considered.
Plaintiff also argues that because the ALJ gave no weight to Dr. Goldman’s opinions, it
was improper for the ALJ to make a mental RFC determination without obtaining additional
medical opinion evidence regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments rather than drawing his own
conclusions from the medical records. The Court finds this argument without merit. “The ALJ is
not required to rely entirely on a particular physician’s opinion or choose between the opinions
[of] any of the claimant’s physicians.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d at 927 (quotation marks
omitted). Here, the ALJ considered all of the evidence in the record, including the opinion evidence
from Plaintiff’s treating doctors, the treatment notes and mental status examination findings of
Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, the treatment notes and mental status examination findings of
Plaintiff’s other treatment providers, and Plaintiff’s own testimony about her mental impairments.
There was sufficient evidence in the record to permit the ALJ to make his mental RFC

25

determination. Cf. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 749 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding no error in
failing to obtain additional medical opinion evidence where “there was substantial evidence in the
record to allow the ALJ to make an informed decision”).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to account for Plaintiff’s obesity. Plaintiff’s
argument is without merit. The Social Security Administration recognizes that “[t]he combined
effects of obesity with musculoskeletal impairments can be greater than the effects of each of the
impairments considered separately.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 1.00(Q). See also SSR
02–1p, 2002 WL 34686281 (Sept. 12, 2002). Thus, at all stages of the sequential evaluation
process, including the RFC determination, “adjudicators must consider any additional and
cumulative effects of obesity.” 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 1.00(Q). Here, the ALJ
expressly discussed Plaintiff’s BMI and obesity, but he found that her reports of her daily activities
suggested that she was able to manage quite well despite her weight problems. (Tr. 17, 23). That
conclusion was reasonable in light of the evidence in the record showing that she could drive, shop,
clean up after a dog, prepare simple meals, and do housework (albeit with some difficulty).
Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not point to any evidence in the record showing that
Plaintiff’s obesity caused any limitations that would render her unable to perform sedentary work.
Because the ALJ’s discussion makes it clear that he reasonably considered her obesity in
evaluating her RFC, the Court finds no reversible error. See Brown v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 1150,
1153 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that an ALJ adequately considered obesity when he “specifically
referred to [the claimant’s] obesity in evaluating his claim”); Heino v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 873, 881–
82 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ALJ adequately took into account a claimant’s obesity where
the ALJ “made numerous references on the record” to claimant’s obesity, noted her weight and
height, and included “has a history of obesity” in the hypothetical to the VE; stating, “Because the

26

ALJ specifically took [the claimant’s] obesity into account in his evaluation, we will not reverse
that decision.”).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not adequately discuss Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and
the effects that it would have on her residual functional capacity. However, the ALJ found
Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia to be a severe impairment (Tr. 13); expressly discussed Plaintiff’s
fibromyalgia at several points in his RFC analysis (including discussion of the fact that Plaintiff
had trigger points consistent with fibromyalgia) (Tr. 15-23); discussed Plaintiff’s physicians’
treatment notes related to fibromyalgia (Tr. 15-23); and discussed and evaluated the opinions of
Plaintiff’s treating physicians, who based their opinions in part on the effects of Plaintiff’s
fibromyalgia (Tr. 24). Moreover, as noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff reported in June 2015 that her
medication had improved her mood and her fibromyalgia symptoms, and she told her doctor that
she was feeling better and her symptoms were stable. (Tr. 22, 78, 1244-45). The Court finds no
indication that the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia or that there is any need to
remand the case for additional discussion of fibromyalgia.
In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination and credibility analysis are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
V.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.

SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 27th day of March, 2018.

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