Minear v. Colvin

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION..Judgment will be entered separately in favor of Defendant in accordance with this Memorandum.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Abbie Crites-Leoni on 3/28/18. (MRS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
LARENDA MARIE MINEAR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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) Case No. 2:16 CV 88 ACL
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MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Larenda Marie Minear brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g), seeking
judicial review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s denial of her applications
for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that, despite Minear’s severe physical
impairments, she was not disabled as she had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy.
This matter is pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with
consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). A summary of the entire record is
presented in the parties’ briefs and is repeated here only to the extent necessary.
For the following reasons, the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
I. Procedural History
Minear filed applications for DIB and SSI on February 12, 2013, claiming that she became
unable to work on January 9, 2013, because of lower back and hip pain. (Tr. 113-16, 393-03.)
Page 1 of 17 

Minear was 40 years of age at the time of her alleged onset of disability. Id. Her claims were
denied initially. (Tr. 29-41.) An initial administrative hearing was held on January 26, 2015.
(Tr. 424.) The ALJ determined that a consultative orthopedic examination was necessary before
he could render a decision. (Tr. 437-38.) Following a supplemental administrative hearing,
Minear’s claims were denied in a written opinion by an ALJ, dated September 25, 2015. (Tr.
16-28.) Minear then filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council of
the Social Security Administration (SSA), which was denied on October 12, 2016. (Tr. 9-12.)
Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. ''
404.981, 416.1481.
In the instant action, Minear first argues that the “RFC determination is unsupported by
substantial evidence because the ALJ accorded inadequate weight to the supported opinions of
treating physician Dr. Dymek.” (Doc. 19 at 1.) She next claims that the “ALJ’s Step 5 finding is
not supported by substantial evidence.” Id.
II. The ALJ=s Determination
The ALJ first found that Minear met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through December 31, 2017, and did not engage in substantial gainful activity since January 9,
2013, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 18.)
In addition, the ALJ concluded that Minear had the following severe impairments: asthma,
osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine, and obesity. Id. The ALJ found that Minear did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments. (Tr. 20.)
As to Minear’s RFC, the ALJ stated:

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After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and
416.967(a). The claimant can lift or carry 10 pounds occasionally.
The claimant can stand for 15 minutes at a time, for up to 2 hours in
an 8-hour workday. The claimant can walk for 1 hour a day for 20
minutes at a time. The claimant can sit for 1 hour at a time, for up
to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. The claimant can push or pull in
the limits for lifting and carrying. The claimant can occasionally
climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps and stairs. The claimant
should not stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. The claimant can
continually balance. The claimant should not work at unprotected
heights. In addition, the claimant would need to change positions
occasionally within the limits already given.
(Tr. 20.)
The ALJ found that Minear’s allegations regarding the extent of her limitations were not
entirely credible. (Tr. 24.) In determining Minear’s RFC, the ALJ indicated that he was
assigning “partial weight” to the opinions of treating physician Waclaw Dymek, M.D.; and
“significant weight” to the opinions of consultative physician Kathrina Alexander, M.D. (Tr. 26.)
The ALJ further found that Minear was unable to perform past relevant work, but was
capable of performing other jobs existing in the national economy, such as document preparer,
eyeglass polisher, and patcher. (Tr. 27-28.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Minear was not
under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from January 9, 2013 through the date of
the decision. (Tr. 28.)
The ALJ’s final decision reads as follows:
Based on the application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits filed on February 12, 2013, the claimant is not
disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act.
Based on the application for supplemental security income
protectively filed on February 12, 2013, the claimant is not disabled
under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.
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Id.

III. Applicable Law
III.A. Standard of Review
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance of the evidence, but enough that a reasonable person would find it adequate to
support the conclusion. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). This “substantial
evidence test,” however, is “more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the
Commissioner’s findings.” Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole . . .
requires a more scrutinizing analysis.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, the Court must review the entire administrative record and consider:
1.

The credibility findings made by the ALJ.

2.

The plaintiff’s vocational factors.

3.

The medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians.

4.

The plaintiff’s subjective complaints relating to exertional and
non-exertional activities and impairments.

5.

Any corroboration by third parties of the plaintiff’s
impairments.

6.

The testimony of vocational experts when required which is
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based upon a proper hypothetical question which sets forth the
claimant’s impairment.
Stewart v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal
citations omitted). The Court must also consider any evidence which fairly detracts from the
Commissioner’s decision. Coleman, 498 F.3d at 770; Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050
(8th Cir. 1999). However, even though two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the
evidence, the Commissioner's findings may still be supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Young v.
Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[I]f there is substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, we must affirm the administrative decision, even if the record could also have supported an
opposite decision.” Weikert v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). See also Jones ex rel. Morris v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 974, 977 (8th
Cir. 2003).
III.B. Determination of Disability
A disability is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905. A claimant
has a disability when the claimant is “not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education and work experience engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists … in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in
several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security
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Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the
regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). First,
the Commissioner will consider a claimant’s work activity. If the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner
looks to see “whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant’s
physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.” Dixon v. Barnhart, 343 F.3d 602,
605 (8th Cir. 2003). “An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that
would not significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 416.921(a).
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to
do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b). These abilities and aptitudes include (1) physical
functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or
handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and
remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to
supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work
setting. Id. § 416.921(b)(1)-(6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “The
sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant’s impairment
or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on her ability to work.”
Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will consider the
medical severity of the impairment. If the impairment meets or equals one of the presumptively
disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is considered disabled, regardless

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of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d); see Kelley
v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 1998).
Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the
presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the claimant’s RFC to
determine the claimant’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements” of
the claimant’s past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). “RFC is a
medical question defined wholly in terms of the claimant’s physical ability to perform exertional
tasks or, in other words, what the claimant can still do despite his or her physical or mental
limitations.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The claimant is responsible for providing evidence the
Commissioner will use to make a finding as to the claimant’s RFC, but the Commissioner is
responsible for developing the claimant’s “complete medical history, including arranging for a
consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant]
get medical reports from [the claimant’s] own medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3).
The Commissioner also will consider certain non-medical evidence and other evidence listed in
the regulations. See id. If a claimant retains the RFC to perform past relevant work, then the
claimant is not disabled. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant’s RFC as determined in Step Four will not allow the claimant to
perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is other
work that the claimant can do, given the claimant’s RFC as determined at Step Four, and his or her
age, education, and work experience. See Bladow v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 356, 358-59 n.5 (8th Cir.
2000). The Commissioner must prove not only that the claimant’s RFC will allow the claimant to
make an adjustment to other work, but also that the other work exists in significant numbers in the

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national economy. Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, then the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. If
the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the Commissioner will find that the
claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a)(4)(v). At Step Five, even though the burden of
production shifts to the Commissioner, the burden of persuasion to prove disability remains on the
claimant. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004).
IV. Discussion
Minear challenges the ALJ’s physical RFC determination,1 the ALJ’s evaluation of the
medical opinion evidence, and the ALJ’s resulting step five finding.
RFC is what a claimant can do despite her limitations, and it must be determined on the
basis of all relevant evidence, including medical records, physician’s opinions, and claimant’s
description of her limitations. Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir. 2001). Although
the ALJ bears the primary responsibility for assessing a claimant’s RFC based on all relevant
evidence, a claimant’s RFC is a medical question. See Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir.
2001); Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2000). Therefore, an ALJ is required to
consider at least some supporting evidence from a medical professional. See Lauer, 245 F.3d at
704 (some medical evidence must support the determination of the claimant’s RFC); Casey v.
Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2007) (the RFC is ultimately a medical question that must find
at least some support in the medical evidence in the record). An RFC determination made by an
ALJ will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Cox v. Barnhart,

1

The ALJ found that Minear’s medically determinable mental impairment of anxiety was not
severe and did not include any resulting limitations in her RFC. (Tr. 19.) Minear does not
challenge these findings. Consequently, the undersigned will not discuss the evidence regarding
Minear’s mental impairments.
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471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006).
Minear first argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ assigned inadequate weight to the opinions of treating physician Dr.
Dymek.
Dr. Dymek completed a Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire on October 7, 2013,2
in which he expressed the opinion that Minear could sit for sixty minutes at a time, and sit for a
total of five hours in an eight-hour workday; stand or walk for fifteen minutes at a time, and stand
or walk a total of three hours in an eight-hour workday; could occasionally lift less than ten
pounds; and grasp, reach, and use her fingers for fine manipulation 50% of an eight-hour workday.
(Tr. 276-77.) He found that Minear would need to recline or lie down during an eight-hour
workday, would need to take an unscheduled fifteen-minute break at least every hour; requires a
job that permits shifting positions at will from sitting, standing, or walking; and was likely to be
absent from work more than four times a month due to her impairments. Id.
The ALJ discussed Dr. Dymek’s opinion. (Tr. 26.) The ALJ found that Minear would be
restricted in “sitting, standing and walking based on objective findings including positive straight
leg raise and lesion of the hip.” Id. The ALJ, however, stated that he found “no basis for lifting
limitations of less than 10 pounds (specifically physical examinations reveal normal bulk, muscle
tone and strength) or that the claimant would miss over 4 days a month of work secondary to her
alleged complaints.” Id. He indicated that he therefore afforded Dr. Dymek’s opinion “only
partial weight.” Id.
“‘It is the ALJ’s function to resolve conflicts among the various treating and examining
physicians.’” Tindell v. Barnhart, 444 F.3d 1002, 1005 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Vandenboom v.

2

Dr. Dymek completed two subsequent questionnaires—on June 18, 2014, and November 17,
2014—in which he set out the same limitations. (Tr. 316, 356.)
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Barnhart, 421 F.3d 745, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal marks omitted)). The opinion of a
treating physician will be given “controlling weight” only if it is “well supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] record.” Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (8th Cir. 2000).
The record, though, should be “evaluated as a whole.” Id. at 1013 (quoting Bentley v. Shalala, 52
F.3d 784, 785-86 (8th Cir. 1997)). The ALJ is not required to rely on one doctor’s opinion
entirely or choose between the opinions. Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 927 (8th Cir. 2011).
The ALJ properly weighed Dr. Dymek’s opinion. The ALJ provided a detailed summary
of Dr. Dymek’s treatment records. Dr. Dymek noted that Minear saw him for routine care from
August 2011 to August 2015. (Tr. 22.) On June 29, 2012, Minear complained of weight gain
and back pain, but was otherwise “doing ok.” (Tr. 22, 264.) Minear’s musculoskeletal
examination revealed normal symmetry, tone, strength, and range of motion; there was no
effusion, instability or tenderness to palpation; and her gait was within normal limits. (Tr. 22,
265-66.) Dr. Dymek counseled Minear on weight management and regular exercise; encouraged
her to stop smoking; and renewed her prescriptions for Soma3 and ibuprofen. (Tr. 22, 266.) On
January 7, 2013, Minear presented with complaints of back pain. (Tr. 22, 261.) Upon
examination, Minear’s back was tender and her range of motion was restricted by pain, but her
musculoskeletal examination revealed normal tone, strength, and range of motion, with no
instability or tenderness to palpation. Id. Her gait was within normal limits. Id. Dr. Dymek
diagnosed Minear with low back pain, and prescribed Lortab.4 Id. Minear returned two days

3

Soma is indicated for the treatment of muscle pain. See WebMD, http://www.webmd.com/drugs
(last visited March 23, 2018).
4

Lortab is a combination of opioid and non-opioid pain reliever indicated for the treatment of
moderate to severe pain. See WebMD, http://www.webmd.com/drugs (last visited March 23,
2018).
Page 10 of 17 

later with complaints of low back pain that “felt like someone was sticking a knife in her.” (Tr.
22, 257.) Upon examination, Minear ambulated without difficulty; no tenderness was noted on
palpation; she had normal range of motion; and her strength and sensation were intact. Id. Dr.
Dymek ordered imaging of the lower spine, and advised Minear to continue taking her
medications. Id. The ALJ noted that Minear presented to Dr. Dymek from June 2013 to June
2014 for a variety of routine healthcare issues including upper respiratory infection, cough,
congestion, right shoulder pain, and hypertension. (Tr. 22, 280-313.) Minear also continued to
complain of back and hip pain. Id. Examinations revealed occasional back tenderness on
palpation and range of motion restricted by pain. Id. The ALJ pointed out that, on January 31,
2014, Dr. Dymek advised Minear that he would “no longer be prescribing chronic narcotic pain
medication.” (Tr. 23, 286.) Dr. Dymek offered Minear a referral to a pain specialist. Id. On
August 29, 2014, Dr. Dymek referred Minear to physical therapy for her low back pain. (Tr. 23,
338.) On October 23, 2014, Minear presented requesting refills of Norco5 for pain and Xanax6
for anxiety. (Tr. 23, 330.) Upon examination, Dr. Dymek noted lumbar tenderness, mildly
decreased range of motion, and a mildly antalgic gait. Id. Dr. Dymek stated that he advised
Minear that there was “no hint of a dangerous problem and that rapid recovery was expected.” Id.
He further advised Minear that bedrest was only recommended for severe leg pain, and was
otherwise not needed and could inhibit her recovery. Id. Dr. Dymek recommended aerobic
activity such as walking, swimming, stationary bicycle, or light jogging. Id. On November 14,
2014, Minear returned, requesting that Dr. Dymek complete disability paperwork. (Tr. 23, 328.)

5

Norco is a combination of opioid and non-opioid pain reliever indicated for the treatment of
moderate to severe pain. See WebMD, http://www.webmd.com/drugs (last visited March 23,
2018).
6
Xanax is a benzodiazepine drug indicated for the treatment of anxiety and panic disorders. See
WebMD, http://www.webmd.com/drugs (last visited March 23, 2018).
Page 11 of 17 

Recent treatment notes from August 2015 reveal a continued diagnosis of low back pain, with
some decreased range of motion but normal strength and sensation, and a mildly antalgic gait.
(Tr. 24, 388.)
The ALJ’s finding that Dr. Dymek’s limitations were not entirely supported is consistent
with Dr. Dymek’s treatment notes. Although Dr. Dymek occasionally noted some limitation of
motion of the spine and tenderness, he consistently found normal muscle tone and strength, normal
sensation, and a normal or mildly antalgic gait. The extreme limitations that the ALJ
rejected—Minear’s inability to lift even ten pounds, need for frequent breaks, and need to miss
four days of work a month due to her impairments—were unsupported by Dr. Dymek’s treatment
notes and he offered no elaboration for the findings in his checklist-style opinion. A checklist
format and conclusory opinions, even of a treating physician, are of limited evidentiary value.
See Thomas v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 704215 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2018) (The ALJ properly accorded
treating physician’s assessments little weight because “[t]hose assessments … consist of nothing
more than vague conclusory statements – checked boxes, circled answers, and brief
fill-in-the-blank responses…. and provide little to no elaboration, and so they possess ‘little
evidentiary value.’”); Wildman, 596 F.3d at 964; Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 715, 721 (8th
Cir. 2001) (“The checklist format, generally, and incompleteness of the [RFC] assessments limit
their evidentiary value.”).
The ALJ next discussed the opinion of consultative physician Dr. Kathrina Alexander.
(Tr. 26-27, 370-383.) The ALJ noted at Minear’s initial administrative hearing that Dr. Dymek’s
opinions were “kind of check the blank,” and that a consultative orthopedic examination would
therefore assist him in making a determination. (Tr. 438.) Minear saw Dr. Alexander on March
21, 2015, between his two administrative hearings. Minear reported a history of lower back and

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left hip problems since 2010, secondary to a c-section. (Tr. 370.) She complained of pain,
occasional numbness in her toes, dizziness with standing too quickly, fatigue, weakness, and
shortness of breath. Id. She described constant, achy, sharp, shooting pain in her back, buttocks,
and hips, which she rated as a six out of ten at that time and a maximum of eight. Id. Upon
examination, Minear’s gait and station were normal, no assistive device was present or necessary,
muscle bulk and tone were normal, sensory examination was intact throughout, straight leg raise
test was positive for radicular signs (namely lower back pain) on the right at 70 degrees, and no
swelling or tenderness of the joints was noted. (Tr. 372-73.) Minear was able to lift, handle, and
carry light objects; touch her toes; squat and rise from a chair; mount and dismount the
examination table without assistance; lie and rise from the supine position without assistance;
stand on her heels and toes; stand on one foot; and perform the tandem gait. (Tr. 373.) She was
not able to hop on one foot, and was only able to crouch halfway. Id. Minear had full range of
motion of her back and extremities, except that her straight leg raise was positive on the right.
(Tr. 376-77.) Dr. Alexander diagnosed Minear with lower back pain and left hip pain. (Tr. 373.)
She stated that Minear is able to sit, stand, and walk on exam; lift and carry light burdens, although
her lumbar spine issues as noted by her positive straight leg raise test may require her to change
positions frequently and may reasonably limit the weights she can lift and carry; reach, handle, and
finger without significant impediment; is unable to kneel, crouch, or crawl; and has no significant
deficits with regard to heat, cold, or vibration. (Tr. 373-74.) Dr. Alexander also completed a
Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Physical), in which she
expressed the opinion that Minear could: occasionally lift and carry eleven to twenty pounds, and
continuously lift or carry up to ten pounds; sit for one hour at a time and sit a total of six hours in an
eight-hour workday; stand for fifteen minutes at a time and stand a total of two hours in an

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eight-hour workday; walk for twenty minutes at a time and walk a total of one hour in an
eight-hour workday; occasionally climb stairs, ramps, ladders, or scaffolds; and never stoop,
kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Tr. 378-81.) As support for these findings, Dr. Alexander noted the
presence of an osteoblastic lesion on Minear’s left hip on imaging and the positive straight leg
raise testing on the left. Id.
The ALJ stated that Dr. Alexander’s findings are “consistent with information in physical
examinations, objective x-rays and MRI’s, the claimant’s daily activities and physician’s
recommendations encouraging exercise.” (Tr. 27.) He stated that he was therefore affording the
opinion “significant weight,” and had accounted for the limitations in his RFC determination. Id.
Minear contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting without explanation Dr. Dymek’s finding
that Minear was limited to sitting only five hours a day, and in relying upon the opinion of the
consultative examiner instead. She also argues he erred in failing to include the limitations in
reaching, handling, or fingering.
The Court finds that that the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion evidence.

An

ALJ may give more weight to a consultative physician’s opinion where, as here, her opinion is
supported by better or more thorough medical evidence. Cantrell v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 1104, 1107
(8th Cir. 2000). The ALJ is not required to adopt in its entirety any particular doctor’s opinion or
to choose between the opinions of any of the claimant’s physicians. Martise, 641 F.3d at 927.
In this case, the ALJ properly ordered a consultative examination after finding Dr.
Dymek’s opinions lacked support. Dr. Alexander performed a comprehensive examination,
which revealed mostly normal findings, including the ability to lift, touch her toes, squat, lie and
rise from the supine position without assistance. Dr. Alexander provided a detailed explanation
of Minear’s work capacities. She specifically found that Minear was able to reach, handle, and

Page 14 of 17 

finger without significant impediment, contrary to Dr. Dymek’s finding. (Tr. 373-74.) Because
Dr. Alexander provided an explanation for her findings and supported them with her clinical
findings on examination, the ALJ did not err in according her opinion significant weight.
The ALJ concluded that Minear has functional limitations resulting from her impairments,
but her allegation of disability was not credible. (Tr. 26.) He found that Minear is limited to a
restricted range of sedentary work. Id.
The ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by the medical evidence including, the opinion
of consultative physician Dr. Alexander. In fact, the ALJ’s assessment was slightly more
restrictive, in that Dr. Alexander found that Minear could lift up to twenty pounds, whereas the
ALJ found she was limited to lifting no more than ten pounds. The ALJ properly considered the
opinion of treating physician Dr. Dymek, and incorporated many of Dr. Dymek’s findings. The
ALJ did not err in declining to include Dr. Dymek’s limitations regarding sitting, reaching,
handling, or fingering, as he set forth sufficient reasons for relying on Dr. Alexander’s opinions
instead.
The ALJ also discussed other evidence of record, including imaging revealing spondylosis
at L1 to L3 but otherwise a normal lumbar spine with no root compression at any level. (Tr. 24,
389.) He summarized the records of Sisenando Galvez, M.D., another physician Minear saw on
occasion for her pain complaints. The ALJ stated that, in March 2014, Dr. Galvez noted that
Minear requested opioids when he did not think she needed them. (Tr. 23, 283.) Dr. Galvez
indicated that he believed Minear and her husband were sharing medications. Id. Upon
examination, Dr. Galvez found that Minear’s gait was normal, and no significant abnormalities
were noted. (Tr. 23, 284.)
In determining Minear’s RFC, the ALJ also performed a credibility analysis and found her

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allegations were not entirely credible. Before determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must first
evaluate the claimant’s credibility. Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 2007); Tellez v.
Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005). Credibility questions are “primarily for the ALJ to
decide, not the courts.” Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 558 (8th Cir. 2003). “If an ALJ
explicitly discredits the claimant’s testimony and gives good reasons for doing so, the Court
should defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination.” Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d 710, 713 (8th
Cir. 2003). The ALJ discredited the credibility of Minear’s subjective complaints of disabling
symptoms for the following reasons: (1) she has a history of low earnings; (2) evidence in the
medical records indicate Minear is a pain medication seeker; (3) she has not utilized conservative
treatment such as physical therapy despite her treating physician’s referral to physical therapy; (4)
she is able to manage her pain with medication; (5) her treating physician has recommended
exercise, indicating that she is capable of light activity; and (6) her daily activities, including the
ability to take care of her child, cook, perform routine household duties, care for her garden, shop,
and drive are inconsistent with her allegations. (Tr. 24-25.)
In sum, the ALJ’s RFC determination is based on substantial evidence on the record as a
whole. The ALJ assessed Minear’s physical RFC based on the treatment notes of Minear’s
treating and consulting physicians, the objective imaging, and Minear’s testimony. The ALJ
performed a proper credibility determination and found Minear’s allegations of total disability
were not entirely credible. Minear did not meet her burden to establish a more restrictive RFC.
The record, when considered as a whole, supports a conclusion that Minear is capable of
performing a limited range of sedentary work. The fact that the record might also support a
contrary conclusion is not a basis for reversing the ALJ’s decision in this case. See Reece v.
Colvin, 834 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2016); McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir.

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2010).
As to Minear’s claim that the ALJ’s Step Five finding was not supported by substantial
evidence, the hypothetical question the ALJ posed to the vocational expert (VE) was based on the
RFC formulated by the ALJ, which accounted for all of Minear’s credible limitations.
Consequently, the hypothetical question posed to the ALJ was proper. See Martise, 641 F.3d at
927 (“Based on our previous conclusion ... that ‘the ALJ’s findings of [the claimant’s] RFC are
supported by substantial evidence,’ we hold that ‘[t]he hypothetical question was therefore proper,
and the VE’s answer constituted substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s denial of
benefits.’”) (quoting Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Accordingly, Judgment will be entered separately in favor of Defendant in accordance with
this Memorandum.

/s/ Abbie Crites-Leoni
ABBIE CRITES-LEONI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 28th day of March, 2018.

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