Dawdy v. Allen et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs claims brought under the Eighth Amendment are DISMISSED without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue against defendants Shelly Orf and Renee Wombles because, as to these defendants, the amended complaint is legally frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or both. Plaintiffs claims in the amended complaint against Shelly Orf and Renee Wombles are DISMISSED without prejudice.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 02/21/2018. (KCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
CRAIG DAWDY,

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Plaintiff,
v.
LARRY ALLEN, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 2:17-CV-49 AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon initial review following plaintiff’s filing of his
amended complaint.1 After reviewing the amended complaint, the Court will partially dismiss
the complaint and will order the Clerk to issue process or cause process to be issued on the nonfrivolous portions of the complaint.
Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

A plaintiff must

demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.”
Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a

1

On July 28, 2017, the Court granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court has
not, however, conducted an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. Id. at 679.
When reviewing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court accepts the well-pled
facts as true. Furthermore, the Court liberally construes the allegations.
The Complaint
Plaintiff, an inmate at Northeast Correctional Center (“NECC”), brings this action against
fourteen prison officials and food service staff at the Missouri Department of Corrections
(“MDOC”) and NECC, seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief pursuant to the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, et seq. (“RLUIPA”),
and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has named as defendants in both their individual and
official capacities: Larry Allen (Food Service Manager, NECC); Troy Bartley (Food Service
Coordinator, MDOC); Sheri Brothers (Business Office Manager, NECC); Travis Case (Canteen
Manager, NECC); Alan Earls (Deputy Division Director, Missouri Adult Institutions); Chantay
Godert (Assistant Warden, NECC); Richard Griggs (Assistant Warden, NECC); James Hurley
(Warden, NECC); William Jones (Deputy Warden, NECC); Gil Long (Central Canteen Manager,
MDOC); Shelly Orf (Food Service Secretary, NECC); Murry Phillips (Chaplain, NECC); Anne
L. Precythe (Director, MDOC); and Renee Wombles (Captain Corrections Officer III, NECC).
Certified Religious Diet Meals on Sabbath, High Holy Days, and Passover
Plaintiff first claims that the certified religious diet (“CRD”) kosher meals prepared by
NECC violate Jewish dietary laws on the Sabbath, High Holy Days, and during Passover.
Plaintiff states that the CRD meals would need to include grape juice, matzo, fish and meat items
on the Sabbath, High Holy Days, and during Passover to conform to Jewish dietary laws.
Plaintiff refers to these items as ritual kosher food items. Further, the NECC canteen does not
sell kosher grape juice, matzo, or any kosher meat item, and therefore plaintiff has no means to

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abide by his Jewish dietary laws on the Sabbath, High Holy Days, and during Passover. Plaintiff
states Jewish offenders are served peanut butter in the CRD kosher meals during Passover, which
is strictly prohibited under Jewish dietary law, and none of the items served to Jewish offenders
during Passover are labeled as “Kosher Passover.”
Additionally, to qualify for kosher meals on the Sabbath, High Holy Days, and during
Passover, NECC requires offenders to adhere to the daily kosher dietary law. Offenders are not
allowed to engage in dietary restrictions under their religion only on the Sabbath, High Holy
Days, and during Passover. In contrast to the treatment of Jewish offenders, plaintiff states
Muslim offenders are not required to be receiving daily CRD Muslim meals to participate in
Ramadan services. He states these groups are provided their religious dietary meals every
evening and morning during Ramadan.
Retaliation—Allegations Against Defendant Larry Allen
On October 25, 2016, plaintiff alleges he was retaliated against by defendant Larry Allen
for practicing his kosher diet.

He states he was removed from the CRD kosher diet for

purchasing pinto beans at the canteen. Plaintiff states the pinto beans were marked with the
kosher symbol, but apparently had not been placed on the canteen’s approved list for the kosher
diet. Defendant Allan had plaintiff removed from his CRD kosher diet.
On November 4, 2016, plaintiff was reprimanded by defendant Chaplain Phillips for
buying mustard fish steak from the NECC canteen. Plaintiff advised Mr. Phillips that the
mustard fish steaks had been on the CRD kosher approved list from 2014 and were marked
kosher.

Defendant Allen and his secretary defendant Shelly Orf submitted a CRD non-

compliance form and had plaintiff removed from the CRD meals. On November 14, 2016,
plaintiff received notice from Deputy Warden Jones that he was being removed from his CRD
kosher meals for six months for purchasing the mustard fish steaks.

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Plaintiff states defendants Griggs, Hurley, and Earls refuse to contract with a kosher
vendor, and rely on the vendor purchase invoice (i.e., not the product labeling) to determine
whether an item is kosher. This allows them to remove plaintiff from the CRD kosher meal
program even when plaintiff is not violating his kosher diet.
Allegations Against Defendants Sheri Brothers and Renee Wombles
Plaintiff alleges defendant Sheri Brothers, NECC’s Business Manager, misappropriated
offender chapel funds that had been approved for purchasing romaine lettuce for plaintiff’s seder
service on April 10, 2017. He alleges this was a deliberate act of discrimination against plaintiff
for practicing his religious faith. He claims Ms. Brothers provided funds to Christians, Muslins,
and Native Americans, but not to Jewish offenders.
Plaintiff alleges Captain Renee Wombles cancelled plaintiff’s seder service on April 11,
2017 and refused to allow plaintiff to access the NECC chapel for the prescheduled service.
MDOC’s Policy Regarding a Religious Community
Plaintiff alleges defendants Precythe, Earls, Hurley, Jones, Godert, Griggs, and Chaplain
Phillips have created a MDOC policy mandating at least five offenders must attend any religious
service or Torah study group to qualify as a religious community. Plaintiff states this policy
prevents him from holding meetings for three to four Jewish offenders.

Also, his Jewish

community does not qualify to use the money in the inmate canteen fund to purchase Jewish
materials under Missouri Revised Statute § 217.195.
Section 217.195 allows for the creation of an inmate canteen fund at each correctional
center. These funds are to be used for “the benefit of the offenders in the improvement of
recreational, religious, or educational services.” Plaintiff states that NECC’s Christian and
Muslim communities have access to these funds, but because of how MDOC defines a “religious
community,” his small Jewish community does not have access to these funds.

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Discussion
Plaintiff brings his amended complaint in nine counts, many of which have overlapping
factual and legal allegations. For purposes of initial review, the Court will evaluate plaintiff’s 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims and his RLUIPA claims separately.
I.

Plaintiff’s Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A.

Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claims

Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment to exercise
his religious beliefs, and retaliated and discriminated against him for exercising these beliefs.2
While prisoners retain their constitutional rights, they are subject to limitations on those rights
“in light of the needs of the penal system.” Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 982 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 991 (2004). An inmate’s constitutional claims are evaluated under a
lesser standard of scrutiny, even though such claims would receive strict scrutiny analysis if
brought by a member of the general population. Id. “A prison regulation or action is valid,
therefore, even if it restricts a prisoner's constitutional rights if it is ‘reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.’” Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
The Court finds plaintiff has stated First Amendment claims sufficient to survive initial
review under § 1915(e) against defendants Larry Allen, Troy Bartley, Sheri Brothers, Travis
Case, Alan Earls, Chantay Godert, Richard Griggs, James Hurley, William Jones, Gil Long,
Murry Phillips, and Anne Precythe.
1.

Plaintiff’s Claims Against MDOC Director Anne L. Precythe and Alan
Earls, Deputy Division Director, Missouri Adult Institutions

2

A prisoner's claim under RLUIPA is evaluated under a different standard than a First
Amendment claim. “By enacting RLUIPA, Congress established a statutory free exercise claim
encompassing a higher standard of review than that which applies to constitutional free exercise
claims.” Murphy, 372 F.3d at 987 (8th Cir. 2004). See Part II, infra.
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Plaintiff names as defendants MDOC Director Anne L. Precythe and MDOC Deputy
Division Director, Missouri Adult Institutions, Alan Earls. Plaintiff states they are denying him
access to religious materials and religious community services by enforcing a MDOC policy at
NECC that offenders must have five actively participating members of the Jewish faith before
being allowed to practice as a religious community. Plaintiff alleges this denies Jewish offenders
access to the inmate canteen funds, which they could use to purchase religious materials and
kosher foods. Plaintiff also alleges defendants Precythe and Earls refuse to add kosher items to
the approved CRD kosher purchasing list, and refuse to contract with a kosher vendor.
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Precythe and Earls survive review under §
1915(e)(2)(B) and should not be dismissed at this time.

The Court will order that these

defendants respond to the amended complaint.
2.

Plaintiff’s Claims Against Food Service Defendants and Canteen
Managers

Plaintiff alleges First Amendment violations against the following food service and
canteen employees: Larry Allen, Food Service Manager, NECC; Troy Bartley, Food Service
Coordinator, MDOC; Travis Case, Canteen Manager, NECC; and Gil Long, Central Canteen
Manager, MDOC. He alleges these defendants do not provide him with the specific ritual food
items to abide by the Jewish dietary laws on the Sabbath, High Holy Days, and during Passover,
and these items are not available for purchase at the canteen. Additionally, the food service
defendants place peanut butter in plaintiff’s CRD kosher meals during Passover, which is a
violation of Jewish dietary laws.
As to defendant Larry Allen, plaintiff states Mr. Allen directly discriminated and
retaliated against him by removing him from his CRD kosher meals for six months for eating
kosher-marked foods from the canteen (pinto beans and mustard fish steaks) that were not listed
on the canteen vendor’s invoice as kosher.
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Plaintiff’s claims against the food service and canteen defendants survive review under §
1915(e)(2)(B) and should not be dismissed at this time.

The Court will order that these

defendants respond to the second amended complaint.
3.

Plaintiff’s Claims Against NECC Defendants

In addition to the food service and canteen defendants, plaintiff states the following
defendants also knew of his requirement for ritual foods during the Sabbath, High Holy Days,
and Passover and made no accommodations for such foods: Chantay Godert, Assistant Warden,
NECC; Richard Griggs, Assistant Warden, NECC; James Hurley, Warden, NECC; William
Jones, Deputy Warden, NECC; and Murry Phillips, Chaplain, NECC.
Plaintiff states Godert, Griggs, Hurley, Jones, and Phillips are members of the Offender
Canteen Committee and personally approve what items are obtained from the central canteen
manager, Gil Long. Plaintiff alleges these defendants are personally involved in establishing the
CRD kosher meal program at NECC and overseeing its implementation. These defendants
refuse to place kosher items on the approved CRD purchase list unless the vendor had listed the
item as kosher on its purchase invoice. Plaintiff alleges these defendants have denied plaintiff
kosher items from the canteen, and have failed to stock ritual foods (kosher meats, matzo, and
grape juice) in the canteen.
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Godert, Griggs, Hurley, Jones, and Phillips survive
review under § 1915(e)(2)(B), and the Court will order these defendants to respond to the second
amended complaint.
4.

Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendant Shelly Orf

Plaintiff identifies defendant Shelly Orf as the secretary to defendant Larry Allen. He
states Mr. Allen directed Ms. Orf to review plaintiff’s canteen purchases to see if the items were

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listed on the vendor’s invoice as kosher. It was Mr. Allen, however, who ordered plaintiff off his
daily CRD kosher meals, not Ms. Orf.
The Court finds plaintiff’s claims against defendant Shelly Orf do not rise to the level of
a constitutional violation, and do not survive review under § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will
dismiss plaintiff’s claims against Ms. Orf.
5.

Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants Sheri Brothers and Renee Wombles

Plaintiff alleges defendant Sheri Brothers, NECC’s Business Office Manager,
misappropriated funds that were meant to purchase ritual foods for plaintiff’s seder service on
April 10, 2017. Plaintiff alleges this was a deliberate act of discrimination against plaintiff for
practicing his religious faith. The Court finds plaintiff’s claims against defendant Brothers
survive initial review under § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will order defendant Brothers to respond
to plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff alleges defendant Renee Wombles cancelled plaintiff’s seder service on April
11, 2017, which plaintiff and eleven other Jewish offenders had been approved to attend. None
of plaintiff’s Counts I through IX, however, are not brought against defendant Wombles.
Because plaintiff has not alleged any Counts against defendant Renee Wombles, the Court will
dismiss her from this action.
B.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims

In Counts I through VI, plaintiff brings claims for equal protection violations. The equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits religious discrimination by the state.
To establish an equal protection claim, plaintiff must show that he is treated differently from
similarly-situated inmates and that the different treatment is based upon a suspect classification
or a fundamental right. See Patel v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 816 (8th Cir.
2008). Religion is a suspect classification, and therefore, plaintiff must show that the decision

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of the defendants was motivated by intentional discrimination and furthered no legitimate
penological interest. Id. at 816-17; see also Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff alleges the following equal protection violations against defendants:
Defendant Allen targeted and discriminated against plaintiff by removing him
from his CRD kosher meals in violation of MDOC CRD policy and was
motivated by religious discrimination.
Defendants Case, Allen, and Phillips manipulate the list of approved CRD kosher
purchase items at the NECC canteen to catch plaintiff buying foods that are
technically kosher, but do not appear on the approved CRD purchase list.
Plaintiff alleges these actions are also done for purposes of religious
discrimination.
Defendants Precythe, Earls, Hurley, Jones, Godert, Griggs, Long, and Case
provide at least ten different types of meat items sold at MDOC canteens. The ten
meats contain pork and non-pork items to accommodate Christians and Muslims,
but no meat item sold at the NECC canteen is kosher.
Jewish inmates have to be approved for daily CRD kosher meals to be provided
with CRD kosher meals on the Sabbath, High Holy Days, and Passover. Muslim
offenders, by contrast, are not required to be approved for daily CRD Muslim
meals to be provided with CRD Muslim meals during Ramadan.
Defendants Precythe, Earls, Hurley, Jones, Godert, Brothers, and Phillips use
offender canteen funds to support Christian and Muslim offenders, and not Jewish
offenders.
Because NECC’s Jewish community is not larger than five inmates, they are
unable to hold Torah study groups unlike the Christian and Muslim communities.
Having carefully reviewed and liberally construed the plaintiff’s complaint, the Court
finds plaintiff has stated plausible equal protection claims against defendants Precythe, Earls,
Hurley, Jones, Godert, Brothers, Griggs, Long, Case, Phillips, and Allen.
C.

Plaintiff’s Due Process Claims

In Counts I through VI, plaintiff alleges due process violations against defendants. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §
1.

There are two components to this due process right—a substantive component and a
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procedural component. Substantive due process prevents the government from interfering with
rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Procedural due process ensures that “[w]hen
government action depriving a person of life, liberty or property survives substantive due process
scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
746 (1987). The Court will consider both plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process
rights.
(1)

Plaintiff’s Substantive Due Process Claims

Substantive due process prevents the government from engaging in conduct that “shocks
the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). The state violates plaintiff’s substantive due process when
it infringes on fundamental liberty interests, without narrowly tailoring the interference to serve a
compelling state interest. Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998).
The Supreme Court has found fundamental liberty interests include the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997); see
also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart
of liberty [protected by Fourteenth Amendment] is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”). Plaintiff has a
fundamental liberty interest in practicing his religion freely—a freedom protected by the First
Amendment. Liberally construing the complaint, plaintiff has alleged that defendants have
placed restraints on his practice of religion that are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. On initial review, the Court finds plaintiff has stated a plausible claim against
defendants of violation of his substantive Due Process rights.
(2)

Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claims

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To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff need not only show a protected
interest, but must also show that he was deprived of that interest without sufficient process, i.e.,
without due process. Clark v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir. 2004). The
due process clause ensures every individual subject to a deprivation “the opportunity to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The circumstances of the
deprivation dictate what procedures are necessary to satisfy this guarantee. Swipies v. Kofka,
419 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2005).
The majority of plaintiff’s procedural due process claims contain only conclusory
allegations and fail to allege any facts, which if proved, would afford a basis for granting relief.
The Court finds, however, that plaintiff has stated a plausible procedural due process claim
against defendant Allen. Plaintiff alleges that he was approved to receive CRD kosher meals in
accordance with MDOC CRD policy beginning in November 2014. Plaintiff alleges defendant
Allen ordered him off of CRD kosher meals on October 28, 2016 without authorization of
Deputy Warden Jones and in direct violation of MDOC CRD policy. Plaintiff alleges Allen was
not authorized to remove plaintiff from his CRD kosher meals without providing him a due
process review hearing and without being approved by Deputy Warden Jones. For this reason,
the Court finds plaintiff has alleged a plausible procedural due process claim against defendant
Allen. The Court will dismiss without prejudice plaintiff’s procedural due process claims as to
the other defendants.
D.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff alleges defendants’ actions infringing upon the practice of his Jewish faith have
caused irreparable harm to his body and soul in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.

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To state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, an
inmate must show that the alleged deprivations denied him the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities and that defendants were deliberately indifferent to excessive risk to his health
or safety. See Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir. 1995). “[T]he Eighth Amendment
prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” See
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
Liberally construing the complaint, the Court finds plaintiff has not stated a plausible
Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment. He has not alleged the type of
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain sufficient to violate the Eighth Amendment.
Moreover, he has not alleged that defendants’ actions were punitive or created a substantial risk
of harm. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 700, 737 (2002) (finding cruel and unusual
punishment where inmate was handcuffed to a hitching post for seven hours, shirtless in the
burning sun, and given water only once or twice, and not given bathroom breaks); Obama v.
Burl, 477 F. App’x 409, 412 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (finding allegations of insufficient food
in prison and constant lighting in isolation that caused inability to sleep, emotional distress, and
headaches, survive preservice dismissal). For these reasons, the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s
claims brought under the Eighth Amendment.
II.

Plaintiff’s Claims Brought Under the RLUIPA
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act provides, in relevant part:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as
defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person -(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

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(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “The Act defines 'religious exercise' to include ‘any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.’” Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). “’A person may
assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government.’” Id. at 716 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a)).
Having carefully reviewed the complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff has made a
sufficient threshold showing of a substantial burden on his religious exercise to survive initial
review. He has stated the religious significance of his kosher diet and certain ritual foods. He
has alleged defendants are substantially burdening the exercise of his religion by not providing
access to ritual foods, and by denying access to kosher foods. He alleges the MDOC policy
regarding distributions from the inmate canteen funds violates RLUIPA because it denies funds
to the Jewish community (defined as at least five offenders) at NECC. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA
claims against defendants Allen, Bartley, Brothers, Case, Earls, Godert, Griggs, Hurley, Jones,
Long, Phillips, and Precythe, in their official capacities, pass initial review under § 1915(e)(2).3
As such, process shall issue as to these defendants on plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process or cause process to issue
upon the amended complaint pursuant to the service agreement the Court maintains with the
3

Naming a government official in his or her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the
government entity—the State of Missouri—that employs the official. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against the
defendants under RLUIPA will be dismissed, however, as the statute does not allow for claims
against individuals. Blake v. Cooper, 2013 WL 523710, *1 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2013); Waff v.
Reisch, No. Civ. 07–4166, 2010 WL 3730114, *11 (D.S.D. July 30, 2010)(“RLUIPA does not
authorize individual capacity claims against prison officials.”); Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 536 F. Supp.
2d 1110, 1118 (D.S.D.)(same), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 581 F.3d 639 (8th
Cir. 2009).
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Missouri Attorney General’s Office as to defendants Larry Allen, Troy Bartley, Sheri Brothers,
Travis Case, Alan Earls, Chantay Godert, Richard Griggs, James Hurley, William Jones, Gil
Long, Murry Phillips, and Anne Precythe in their official and individual capacities, according to
the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RLUIPA claims outlined above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s claims brought under the Eighth
Amendment are DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to
issue against defendants Shelly Orf and Renee Wombles because, as to these defendants, the
amended complaint is legally frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or both. Plaintiff’s claims in the amended complaint against Shelly Orf and Renee Wombles are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
An Order of Partial Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 21st day of February, 2018.

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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