Baucom v. Berryhill

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed, and Baucoms complaint is dismissed with prejudice. A separate Judgment is entered herewith. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 3/27/2019. (NEP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
STEPHEN RILEY BAUCOM,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision denying his applications for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Because the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, I will affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
Procedural History
On December 15, 2014, Plaintiff Stephen Baucom filed an application for
disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. This
claim was initially denied on May 6, 2015. Thereafter, Baucom filed a written
request for hearing on May 11, 2015. Prior to the hearing, on July 5, 2016,
Baucom protectively filed an application for supplemental security income

pursuant to Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. Plaintiff alleged an amended
onset date of December 30, 2013. Plaintiff alleged disability because of diabetes
mellitus, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, hyperthyroidism NOS, mild degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral Dupuytren’s contracture, and depression.
After a hearing, an ALJ denied Baucom’s application on February 24, 2017.
After the Appeals Council denied Baucom’s request for review, Baucom filed a
complaint in this Court.
In this action for judicial review, Baucom contends that the ALJ erred in her
consideration of his residual functional capacity (RFC) and by not according
proper weight to certain medical evidence in this case. Plaintiff asks that I reverse
the Commissioner’s final decision and remand the matter for further consideration.
For the reasons that follow, I will affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
Medical Records and Other Evidence Before the ALJ
With respect to the medical records and other evidence of record, I adopt
Baucom’s recitation of facts set forth in his Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts (ECF No. 15-1) to the extent they are admitted by the Commissioner (ECF
No. 21-1).1 I also adopt the additional facts set forth in the Commissioner’s
Statement of Additional Material Facts (ECF No. 21-2), as they are unrefuted by
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The Commissioner makes three clarifications and a denial. The Commissioner clarifies that (1) “Steven Akeson,
Psy.D., issued an opinion about Plaintiff’s mental impairments,” (2) “Dr. Sandri diagnosed Plaintiff with controlled
type 1 diabetes and controlled hypertension,” and (3), “Dr. Sandri diagnosed Plaintiff with ‘lower extremity
weakness, etiology unclear.’ ” (ECF No. 21-1 at 2). “The Commissioner denies that Dr. Sandri described Plaintiff’s
groin pain was significant.” (Id.)

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Baucom. Additional specific facts will be discussed as needed to address the
parties’ arguments.
Legal Standards
To be entitled to disability benefits, a claimant must prove that he is unable
to perform any substantial gainful activity due to a medically-determinable
physical or mental impairment that would either result in death or which has lasted
or could be expected to last for at least twelve continuous months. 42 U.S.C. §
423(a)(1)(D), (d)(1)(a). To determine whether claimants are disabled, the
Commissioner evaluates their claims through five sequential steps. 20. C.F.R. §
404.1520; Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing the
five-step process).
Steps one through three requires that the claimant prove (1) he is not
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) he suffers from a severe
impairment, and (3) his disability meets or equals a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(iii). If the claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment
or its equivalent, the Commissioner’s analysis proceeds to steps four and five.
Step four (4) requires the Commissioner to consider whether the claimant retains
the RFC to perform his past relevant work . Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The
claimant bears the burden of demonstrating he is no longer able to return to his past
relevant work. Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. If the Commissioner determines the
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claimant cannot return to past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five to show the claimant retains the residual functioning capacity (RFC) to
perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.;
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
The ALJ is required to evaluate the credibility of a claimant’s testimony,
including the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain. Holmstrom v. Massanari,
270 F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2001). In so doing, the ALJ is not permitted to ignore
the claimant’s testimony even if it is inconsistent with objective medical evidence.
Basinger v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1984). After considering the
claimant’s testimony, the ALJ may disbelieve it if it is inconsistent with the record
as a whole. Battles v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 1990). To properly
evaluate the claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ must consider the factors
enumerated in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984):
[The] claimant’s prior work record, and observations by
third parties and treating and examining physicians
relating to such matters as: (1) the claimant’s daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the
pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4)
dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; and
(5) functional restrictions.
Id. at 1322. While the ALJ must consider the Polaski factors, she need not
enumerate them specifically. Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 968 (8th
Cir. 2010). When the ALJ explicitly disbelieves the claimant’s testimony and
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gives good reasons for such disbelief, a reviewing court will typically defer to the
ALJ’s finding. Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 696 (8th Cir. 2007). However, the
ALJ retains the responsibility to develop the record fully and fairly in the course of
the non-adversarial administrative hearing. Hildebrand v. Barnhart, 302 F.3d 836,
838 (8th Cir. 2002).
In reviewing the ALJ’s denial of Social Security disability benefits, my role
is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings comply with the relevant
legal requirements and are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole. Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. “Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the evidence
is substantial, I must consider evidence that both supports and detracts from the
Commissioner’s decision. Id. As long as substantial evidence supports the
decision, I may not reverse it merely because substantial evidence exists in the
record that would support a contrary outcome or because I would have decided the
case differently. See Johnson v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 2011). I must
“defer heavily to the findings and conclusions of the Social Security
Administration.” Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal
citation omitted).

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ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ first found that Baucom met the insured-status requirements of the
Social Security Act through December 31, 2014. (Tr. 12). She found that Baucom
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date.
(Tr. 12). She also determined that Baucom suffered from the severe impairment of
diabetes mellitus. (Tr. 12). The ALJ did not find Baucom’s alleged
hyperlipidemia, hyperthyroidism NOS, and benign hypertension to be severe
impairments. (Tr. 13). The ALJ also did not find Baucom’s alleged mild
degenerative disc disease or bilateral Dupuytren’s contracture to be a severe
impairment. (Tr. 13). The ALJ found that Baucom’s depression was not a severe
impairment because her depression causes no more than “mild” limitation in any
functional areas. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1). The ALJ determined that Baucom
did not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that equates to one of
the listings denominated in 20 CFR 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (Tr. 14-15).
Next, the ALJ determined that Baucom retained the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c)
and § 416.967(c). According to the ALJ, Baucom can occasionally lift no more
than fifty pounds and frequently lift and carry up to twenty-five pounds. (Tr. 15).
The ALJ further found that Baucom can stand or walk at least six hours out of an
eight-hour workday with no limits on sitting. Finally, the ALJ determined that
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Baucom can perform work that does not require climbing on ropes, ladders, or
scaffolds and should avoid exposure to work hazards such as unprotected heights
and being around dangerous or moving machinery. (Tr. 15).
Based on this RFC determination, the ALJ found that Baucom retains the
capacity to perform past relevant work as a laborer. (Tr. 17). Additionally, the
ALJ consulted a vocational expert (VE) to assess whether other jobs within
Baucom’s RFC existed in significant numbers in the national economy.
(Tr. 18-19). The VE identified the jobs of Cleaner II, Laundry Laborer, and Hand
Packager; he further identified these jobs as medium unskilled work within
Baucom’s RFC. (Tr. 19). Finally, the VE identified 390,000 Cleaner II jobs,
39,000 Laundry Laborer jobs, and 173,000 Hand Packager jobs in the national
economy. (Tr. 19). The ALJ therefore determined that Baucom was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 21).
Discussion
A.

RFC Determination
Baucom contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole, because the ALJ improperly rejected
relevant medical evidence.
RFC is defined as “what [the claimant] can still do” despite his “physical or
mental limitations.” 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1545(a). The ALJ must determine a
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claimant’s RFC based on all of the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own
description of his limitations. McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th
Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995)). The
record must include some medical evidence that supports the RFC. Dykes v.
Apfel, 223 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). However,
“there is no requirement that an RFC finding be supported by a specific medical
opinion.” Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016).
Baucom essentially argues that I should reweigh the medical evidence
considered by the ALJ in her determination of Baucom’s RFC. However, my
review is limited to reviewing the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence. I cannot reweigh the evidence. Hensley,
829 F.3d at 934. As discussed below, the ALJ properly considered an assessment
of Baucom’s credibility and objective medical findings when conducting her RFC
determination. In so doing, the ALJ did not substantially err.
The objective medical findings relied on by the ALJ include the following:
Baucom was examined by his primary care physician, Dr. Conkright in
September 2014, June 2015, and June 2016. The first two examinations revealed
that Baucom’s monofilament examination was normal with no edema. (Tr. 314 &
375). Additionally, during the June 2015 examination, Dr. Conkright indicated
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that Baucom consistently remained neurologically intact with normal balance, gait,
and coordination. (Tr. 375). At his June 2016 appointment, Dr. Conkright made
note of infrequent hypoglycemic episodes relieved by eating or drinking and stated
that Baucom’s diabetes was otherwise stable. (Tr. 376). Based on the Jun 2016
exam, Dr. Conkright indicated that there was no extremity edema or neurological
defects. (Tr. 379). Finally, Baucom alleged numbness and tingling in his lower
extremities. However, nerve conduction studies conducted as recently as October
2016 were normal. (Tr. 425). The ALJ relied upon these findings of relatively
normal examination results in reaching her RFC determination, and in doing so,
the ALJ did not substantially err.
The ALJ also properly considered Baucom’s daily activities and assessed
Baucom’s RFC consistent with his credible limitations. Baucom’s daily activities
included driving a car, providing care for his wife, preparing meals, grocery
shopping, vacuuming, taking care of pets, and paying bills, counting change, and
using a checkbook. Given these activities, the ALJ was not required to fully credit
all of Baucom’s assertions regarding his limitations. See Johnson v. Chater, 87
F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir.
2010) (“Acts which are inconsistent with a claimant’s assertion of disability reflect
negatively upon that claimant’s credibility.”); Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805,
817 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Acts such as cooking, vacuuming, washing dishes, doing
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laundry, shopping, driving, and walking, are inconsistent with subjective
complaints of disabling pain.”). The ALJ also considered Baucom’s own
testimony, third-party statements and testimony, and the objective medical
evidence, when considering Baucom’s credibility.
Even if the ALJ could have drawn a different conclusion about Baucom’s
credibility after reviewing his daily activities, I may not reverse the
Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence could also support a
contrary determination. McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010).
Here, the ALJ discounted Baucom’s subjective complaints only after evaluating
the entirety of the record. In so doing, the ALJ did not substantially err, as
subjective complaints may be discounted if inconsistencies exist in the evidence as
a whole. Hinchey v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 428, 432 (8th Cir. 1994). Where, as here, an
ALJ seriously considers but, for good reasons, explicitly discredits a claimant’s
subjective complaints, the Court will not disturb the ALJ’s credibility
determination. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
Substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s RFC
determination. As a result, I must affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
B.

Weight Accorded to Opinion Evidence
When evaluating opinion evidence, an ALJ is required to explain in her

decision the weight given to any opinions from treating sources, non-treating
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sources, and non-examining sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii). The
Regulations require that more weight be given to the opinions of treating
physicians than other sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). A treating physician’s
assessment of the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments should be given
controlling weight if the opinion is well supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in the record. Id.; see also Forehand v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 984, 986 (8th
Cir. 2004). A treating physician has the best opportunity to observe and evaluate a
claimant’s condition,
since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most
able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s]
medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the
medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical
findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as
consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
When a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, the
Commissioner must look to various factors in determining what weight to accord
that and any other medical opinion of record. The relevant factors include the
length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature
and extent of the treatment relationship, whether the physician provides support for
her findings, whether other evidence in the record is consistent with the physician’s
findings, and the physician’s area of specialty. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
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Inconsistency with other substantial evidence alone is a sufficient basis upon which
an ALJ may discount a treating physician’s opinion. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d
785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2005). The Commissioner “will always give good reasons in
[the] notice of determination or decision for the weight [given to the] treating
source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of medical
expert Dr. Sandri. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have given controlling
weight to Dr. Sandri’s April 11, 2015 opinion, which would have precluded
Baucom from performing medium work. For the reasons that follow, the ALJ did
not substantially err.
In discounting the opinion of Dr. Sandri, the ALJ noted that Dr. Sandri’s
opinion was based on a single interaction with Baucom. Moreover, Dr. Sandri’s
opinion relied heavily on Baucom’s lower extremity weakness of an unknown
etiology that does not appear anywhere else in the medical record during the
periods at issue. (Tr. 17). The physical examinations in the record repeatedly
showed no abnormalities, and nerve conduction studies of the lower extremities
were unremarkable. (Tr. 314, 375, 379, & 425). Additionally, during the June
2015 examination, Dr. Conkright indicated that Baucom consistently remained
neurologically intact with normal balance, gait, and coordination. Furthermore, by
June 2016, Dr. Conkright noted infrequent hypoglycemic episodes, which were
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relieved by eating or drinking. Dr. Conkright stated that Baucom’s diabetes was
otherwise stable. (Tr. 376). After a physical examination, Dr. Conkright indicated
no extremity edema or neurological deficits. (Tr. 379). Finally, despite Baucom’s
allegations of numbness and tingling in his lower extremities, nerve conduction
studies conducted as recently as October 2016 were normal. (Tr. 425). The ALJ
therefore did not err when the ALJ discounted Dr. Sandri’s opinions as inconsistent
with other substantial evidence of record. See Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082,
1088 (8th Cir. 2016) (opinions of treating physicians may be given limited weight
if they are inconsistent with the record) (citing Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126,
1132 (8th Cir. 2015)).
Here, the ALJ fashioned an RFC to account for Baucom’s credible physical
limitations by limiting him to medium work. When assessing a Baucom’s RFC,
“the ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician’s opinion or
choose between the opinions [of] any of the claimant’s physicians.” Martise v.
Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 927 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the ALJ must determine a
claimant’s RFC based on her review of the record as a whole. The ALJ evaluated
all of the medical evidence of record and adequately explained her reasons for the
weight given this evidence. For the reasons set out above, substantial evidence on
the record as whole supports the weight accorded by the ALJ to the medical
opinion evidence in this case.
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C.

ALJ’s Duty to Develop the Record
Finally, Baucom argues that due to the ALJ’s failure to properly evaluate Dr.

Sandri’s opinion, the ALJ did not develop the record enough to determine
Baucom’s disability onset date.
An ALJ has a duty to fairly develop the record if a crucial issue is
underdeveloped. See Smith v. Barnhart, 435 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2006); Garza
v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 1087, 1089-90 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). However, an
ALJ “is not required to seek additional clarifying statements from a treating
physician unless a crucial issue is undeveloped.” Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963,
969 (8th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). An ALJ may discount a doctor’s opinion if
she finds that it was “inconsistent with other substantive evidence. In such cases,
an ALJ may discount an opinion without seeking clarification.” Goff v. Barnhart,
421 F.3d 785, 791.
As discussed above, the ALJ found Dr. Sandri’s opinion inconsistent with
other substantive evidence in the record. In particular, the ALJ determined that Dr.
Sandri’s opinion deserved little weight because it was based on a one-time
examination and inconsistent with the medical findings of Dr. Conkright. (Tr. 17).
Furthermore, the ALJ also considered Baucom’s daily activities, which included
preparing meals, driving a car, grocery shopping, vacuuming, taking care of pets,
and caring for his wife, among others. (Tr. 14). Finally, the ALJ found Baucom’s
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own statements concerning intensity of the alleged disabilities to be inconsistent
with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Tr. 15).
The ALJ met her duty to fully and fairly develop the record. The ALJ
carefully considered Dr. Sandri’s opinion in light of the facts described above. As a
result, the ALJ’s credibility determination of Dr. Sandri and the chosen onset date
are supported by substantial evidence on the record.
Conclusion
Because substantial evidence on the record supports the ALJ’s decision, I
must affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that the decision of the Commissioner is
affirmed, and Baucom’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
A separate Judgment is entered herewith.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 27th day of March, 2019.

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