Welch v. Berryhill

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (See Full Order) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. A separate judgment shall be entered incorporating this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge E. Richard Webber on 9/11/19. (EAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
JOHN WELCH,

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Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner
of Social Security,1
Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-0036-ERW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying the application of John
Welch (“Plaintiff”) for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et
seq. and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the Complaint (ECF 21) and
Defendant filed a brief in support of the Answer (ECF 26).
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSI under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act on May 27, 2015 (Tr. 210-215). Plaintiff was initially denied relief on July 30,
2015, and on August 31, 2015, he filed a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 155-161). After a hearing, by a decision dated April 19, 2017, the ALJ found
Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. 48-59). Plaintiff filed Request for Review of Hearing Decision on
Andrew M. Saul is now the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Andrew M. Saul should be substituted for Acting
Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill as the Defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be
taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of Section 205(g) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
1

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April 27, 2017 (Tr. 209). On April 5, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
review (Tr. 1-4). Plaintiff appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri on May 24, 2018 (ECF 1). As such, the ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision of
the Commissioner.
II.

DECISION OF THE ALJ
The ALJ determined Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security

Act through December 31, 2019, and Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since June 4, 2014, the alleged onset date of his disability (Tr. 50). The ALJ found Plaintiff has
the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease with lumbar spondylosis, and failed back
syndrome (Tr. 51). The ALJ found no impairment or combination of impairments which meets
or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 52).
The ALJ conducted a hearing with Plaintiff, his counsel, and a vocational expert, Mary
Schauwecker, on January 24, 2017 (Tr. 101). Plaintiff testified he possesses a current driver’s
license and drives two or three times a week (Tr. 104). Plaintiff suffered an injury in June 2014
which put him on work restrictions, and only returned to work in mid to late October (Tr. 105).
He was terminated by his employer in November 2014 (Tr. 104-106).
Plaintiff is unable to sit for “very long” before he experiences numbness in his legs (Tr.
107). He testified he is only able to stand about ten or fifteen minutes until his back hurts, and his
legs cramp up and fall asleep (Tr. 109). Plaintiff can walk about a half a mile before he has to sit
down (Tr. 109). He testified he lays down approximately 60% of the day either in a bed or on a
recliner (Tr. 116).

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Plaitniff has tried physical therapy but testified the physical therapist released him and
told him “he [could] do no more for [him] (Tr. 109). Palintiff takes medication for anxiety and
depression including Xanex, Lexapro, and Gabapentin (Tr. 113). Plaintiff has also been
prescribed Oxycodone for pain (Tr. 113). He testified his medications have side effects including
making him tired, and making it difficult for him to concentrate and he felt he was being “pushed
pills” by doctors Gessling and Rasmussen that “made me crazy” (Tr. 115).
Plaintiff testified he is unable to bend over to touch his knees, and cannot kneel down to
pick something up without falling (Tr. 116). He has had difficulty balancing since his back surfer
(Tr. 116).
Plaintiff testified he suffers from anxiety which causes him to get hot, sweaty, and
worked-up where he has to go sit by himself to calm down (Tr. 117). He experiences these
symptoms approximately two to three days a week (Tr. 117). Plaintiff experiences depression
because he is not able to hold down a job and support his family, which makes him feel
“worthless” (Tr. 117).
The vocational expert, Mary Schauwecker, testified Plaintiff has past work as a
production worker at a trailer company, a builder at a door shop, a laborer, a maintenance worker
for food industry, and as a welder (Tr. 119). Ms. Schauwecker testified Plaintiff cannot perform
any of his past work; however, he is able to work as an information clerk, an addresser, and a
document preparer (Tr. 119-132). The vocational expert also noted although the information
clerk position was light exertion, it could be performed by Plaintiff because it involved
negligible lifting, allowed for a sit/stand option (Tr. 119-132).
After considering the entire record, including Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff has the Residual Functioning Capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, except he

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requires a sit/stand option which working which allows a change in position every thirty minutes
for a few minutes at a time while remaining at the workstation (Tr. 53). The ALJ noted diagnoses
for cholelithiasis, diverticulosis, and anthersclerosis, but concluded the record does not indicate
these impairments cause more than minimal vocationally relevant functional limitations, and
therefore, the conditions are not severe (Tr. 51). The ALJ also found Plaintiff suffered from
medically determinable mental impairments including depressive disorder, anxiety disorder,
panic disorder, and polysubstance dependence, but these do not cause more than a minimal
limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic mental work activities, and are therefore not
sever (Tr. 51).
The ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work (Tr. 57). The ALJ
found there are jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff can
perform, including work as an information clerk, an addresser, and a document preparer (Tr. 58).
Thus, the ALJ’s conclusion for Plaintiff was “not disabled” (Tr. 59).
Plaintiff appeals, arguing the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of five
different medical sources, and erroneously concluded Plaintiff could perform sedentary work.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, the Commissioner must follow a five-step process for

determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1529. “If a claimant fails to
meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is
determined to be not disabled.” Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this sequential analysis, first
the claimant cannot be engaged in “substantial gainful activity” to qualify for disability benefits.
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must have a severe impairment. 20

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C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 404.1520(c). The Social Security Act defines “severe impairment” as “any
impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [claimant’s] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. . . .” Id. “‘The sequential evaluation process may be
terminated at step two, only when the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments
would have no more than a minimal impact on [his or] her ability to work.’” Page v. Astrue, 484
F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caviness v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir.
2001), citing Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment which meets or
equals one of the impairments listed in the Regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1520(d). If
the claimant has one of, or the medical equivalent of these impairments, then the claimant is per
se disabled without consideration of the claimant’s age, education, or work history. Id.
Fourth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work. 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(f), 404.1520(f). The burden rests with the claimant at this fourth step to
establish his or her RFC. Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 874 n.3 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Through step
four of this analysis, the claimant has the burden of showing that she is disabled.”). The ALJ will
review a claimant’s RFC and the physical and mental demands of the work the claimant has done
in the past to determine if the claimant can perform any past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(f).
Fifth, the severe impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any other work. 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g), 404.1520(g). At this fifth step of the sequential analysis, the
Commissioner has the burden of production to show evidence of other jobs in the national
economy which can be performed by a person with the claimant’s RFC. Steed, 524 F.3d at 874
n.3.

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“The ultimate burden of persuasion to prove disability, however, remains with the
claimant.” Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1069 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Harris v. Barnhart,
356 F.3d 926, 931 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 51153, 51155 (Aug. 26, 2003));
Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The burden of persuasion to prove
disability and to demonstrate RFC remains on the claimant, even when the burden of production
shifts to the Commissioner at step five.”). Even if a court finds there is a preponderance of the
evidence against the ALJ’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, if it is supported by
substantial evidence. Clark v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 65, 68 (8th Cir. 1984). “Substantial evidence is
less than a preponderance but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support
the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002).
See also Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2007).
It is not the job of the district court to re-weigh the evidence or review the factual record
de novo. Cox, 495 F.3d at 617. Instead, the district court must simply determine whether the
quantity and quality of evidence is enough, so a reasonable mind might find it adequate to
support the ALJ’s conclusion. Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing
McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). Weighing the evidence is a function of
the ALJ, who is the fact-finder. Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). Thus,
an administrative decision, which is supported by substantial evidence, is not subject to reversal,
merely because substantial evidence may also support an opposite conclusion, or because the
reviewing court would have decided differently. Krogmeier, 294 F.3d at 1022.
To determine whether the Commissioner’s final decision is supported by substantial
evidence, the court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and to consider:
(1) Findings of credibility made by the ALJ;

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(2) The education, background, work history, and age of the claimant;
(3) The medical evidence given by the claimant’s treating physicians;
(4) The subjective complaints of pain and description of the claimant’s physical activity
and impairment;
(5) The corroboration by third parties of the claimant’s physical impairment;
(6) The testimony of vocational experts based upon proper hypothetical questions which
fairly set forth the claimant’s physical impairment; and
(7) The testimony of consulting physicians.
Brand v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 1980).
IV. DISCUSSION
In his appeal of the Commissioner’s decision, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly
consider the opinions of five different medical sources leading to an erroneous conclusion
Plaintiff could perform sedentary work.
Medical opinions are given weight according to the guidelines outlined in the Title 20 of
the Code of Federal Regulations for claims filed before March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R §
404.1527. More weight is given to medical opinions from treating sources. Id. If a “treating
source's medical opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [an] impairment(s) is wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [Plaintiffs] case record, we will give it
controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. “A treating physician's opinion, however, ‘does not
automatically control or obviate the need to evaluate the record as a whole.’” Nowling v. Colvin,
813 F.3d 1110, 1122–23 (8th Cir. 2016) quoting Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir.
2001). An ALJ is “not required to rely entirely on a particular physician's opinion or choose

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between the opinions [of] any of the claimant's physicians.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 927
(8th Cir. 2011) citing Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007).
“If a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, then the ALJ must
review various factors to determine how much weight is appropriate.” McRoberts v. Berryhill,
No. 4:17 CV 1447, 2018 WL 2335746, at *9 (E.D. Mo. May 23, 2018) citing Julin v. Colvin,
826 F.3d 1082, 1088 (8th Cir. 2016). If the opinion is not given controlling weight, factors which
must be considered include length of treatment relationship and frequency of examination, nature
and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization and other
factors brought to the attention of the ALJ are considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c). The ALJ is
required to “give good reasons” for the weight given to a treating sources medical opinion. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
In his opinion, the ALJ outlines Plaintiff’s statements and testimony regarding his
symptoms and medical impairments,
[Plaintiff] made the following allegations: he is unable to work due to back and leg pain,
leg numbness, anxiety, depression, and problems reading. He suffered a work injury on
the alleged onset date and worked on and off with restrictions until he stopped working
completely in November 2014. He experiences back pain, leg cramping, leg numbness,
and imbalance that cause difficulties with sitting, standing, bending, kneeling, sleeping,
and doing anything, but he has not had any falls. He has 80 percent bad days, but can do
some walking on good days.
As for the claimant's treatment, he reported that he was temporarily better after surgery,
but worsened after undergoing a functional capacity evaluation a few weeks after
surgery. Although he was released from physical therapy in mid-2015, it did not help or
improve his symptoms, while his physical therapist told him it would not make him
better. He has tried many medications with problems taking some of them because they
were not effective or made him "sick" and "crazy." His current medications cause side
effects of sleepiness and difficulty concentrating. He is most comfortable lying down
with his left leg on a pillow. As for his daily activities, he was previously able to walk
two miles a day, but he worsened during physical therapy and after his functional
capacity evaluation in April 2015. He can drive short distances 2-3 times a week, but he
lies down 60 percent of the day. He can sit 5-10 minutes at a time, stand 10-15 minutes at
a time, and walk half a mile at a time (Tr. 53-54).
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In his opinion, the ALJ then concludes Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments
could be expected to cause alleged symptoms; however, Plaintiff’s statements regarding
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects are not consistent with the medical evidence in the
record (Tr. 54). Next, the ALJ considers the medical documentation from Plaintiff’s treating
physicians, and affords the opinions weight.
First, the ALJ affords great weight to Dr. Dennis Abernathie, Plaintiff’s treating
orthopedic surgeon (Tr. 56). The ALJ explains the reasons he afforded great weight to Dr.
Abernathie’s opinion, including statements by Dr. Abernathie Plaintiff could “probably do more
but for his lack of consistent effort,” and Plaintiff “could nonetheless perform work with at least
intermittent sitting, standing, and walking, with a 10 pound restriction” (Tr. 56). The ALJ noted
those statements were consistent with Dr. Abernathie’s “largely normal exams after surgery,” as
well as Plaintiff’s imaging, exams, and daily activities (Tr. 56). The ALJ affords little weight to
Dr. Abernathie’s statements Plaintiff could not work from December 2014 to February 2015,
because they were temporary and did not address the claimant’s subsequent improvement with
surgery (Tr. 56).
The care and treatment of Plaintiff by Dennis Abernathie, M.D., began on September 10,
2014 and continued until Plaintiff was discharged from his care May 11, 2015. Dr. Abernathie
had more time and experience with Plaintiff than any other physician or medical care provider.
His treatment notes are instructive in according weight to the testimony and statements of
Plaintiff.
On September 10, 2014, Dr. Abernathie encouraged Plaintiff to exercise, adopt a healthy
lifestyle, and stop smoking (Tr. 404). On September 23 2014, Plaintiff’s symptoms and
complaints of low back pain radiating to his right leg were unchanged and were made worse with
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physical therapy. Dr. Abernathie noted “The patient consumes alcohol daily,” and denies alcohol
or drug addiction. Evaluation of the lower back and lower extremities was unremarkable. The
lumbar spine exam revealed some tenderness over the L5-S1 fact joints with some spasms, but
strength, sensation, and gait were normal. Dr. Abernathie prescribed aspirin, Medral, Dosepak
and Cylobendapine, and advised Plaintiff to stop smoking. Dr. Abernathie also equipped
Plaintiff with an Aspen Qicckdraw brace (Tr 405-07).
On October 1, 2014, Plaintiff reported feeling zero percent better than the last visit.
Symptoms worsened with physical therapy. Plaintiff continued to drink alcohol and smoke daily.
He wore the Aspen brace, but reported it was ineffective. Dr. Abernathie diagnosed lumbago
and ordered a whole body bone SPECT scan (Tr. 408-09).
The bone scan conducted on October 7, 2014 was “perfectly normal.” Plaintiff continued
to have pain with flexion, but the lumbar spine examination showed good strength. Dr.
Abernathie opined that Plaintiff needed to become healthier, and they discussed smoking
restriction, alcohol limitation, and stress reduction. Dr. Abernathie notes, “[Plaintiff] has agreed
with me that limitations such as working above his knees, shoulders, 10 pounds lifting and sit
and stand and walk intermittently would be possible.” Although Plaintiff reported he was afraid
to go back to his old job because of the possibility of reinjury, Dr. Abernathie opined Plaintiff
needed to return to some kind of gainful employment (Tr. 410-12).
On October 21, 2019, Plaintiff reported worsening symptoms. Dr. Abernathie again
advised Plaintiff to discontinue daily alcohol use and smoking. An MRI showed age-related
information but not shown substantial inflammation suggesting injury. Dr. Abernathis again
advised, “I think this patient needs to return to some type of gainful employment.” He further
noted that Plaintiff had returned to the work force with restrictions set by Dr. Abernathie (Tr.

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414-16). On October 30, 2014, the physical therapist informed Dr. Abernathie that Plaintiff had
canceled several appointments due to family issues (Tr. 417).
A November 5, 2014, Plaintiff called to request pain medication and was informed the
office could not, because of a law change, call in for Schedule II drugs (Tr. 418). However, a
prescription for Ultram was called-in the patient’s pharmacy (Tr. 419). On November 18, 2014,
Dr. Abernathie noted illotibial band pain and left testicular pain. He took Plaintiff off work and
replaced the activity with physical therapy for a brief time. He ordered a discogram to determine
whether there was pathology at L5-S1 that was symptomatic and would require a fusion (Tr.
420-21).
The date of Plaintiff’s surgery is reported as November 19, 2014; however, surgery was
not conducted on that date. The treatment notes disclosed the extent of Plaintiff’s smoking,
excessive alcohol daily use and claimed former illicit drug use. The record shows a bone scan
was unremarkable. Dr. Abernathie noted, “[Plaintiff] becomes a problem with his subjective
state. Patient’s surgical consent to proceed” (Tr. 422-24).
On December 9, 2014, Dr. Abernathie and Plaintiff discussed the discogram and the
proposed surgery. While Plaintiff complained of more numbness down the lateral aspect of his
right leg, Dr. Abernathie noted Plaintiff’s back was less tender and his mobility a little better.
Dr. Abernathie advised there was a substantial increased complication rate in smokers and
recommended Plaintiff schedule his surgery for 6 weeks after he stopped smoking. Dr.
Abernathie noted if Plaintiff could “work in an office setting, where he was released for sitting
and standing, with minimal lifting and with knee to shoulder range of activity, he may be
functional” (Tr. 426-427).

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On January 13, 2015, Plaintiff reported cutting down smoking (Tr. 429-30). Fusion
surgery was performed February 12, 2015, and during a follow up appointment February 25,
2015, Plaintiff reported his leg pain was gone. Range of motion was normal in all tested areas
upon lumbar spine examination. Gait and station were normal, and Plaintiff ambulated without
assistance. This was the first time Dr. Abernathie saw Plaintiff smile. Plaintiff was happy about
the early results and was doing a lot of walking and stretching (Tr. 434-35).
On March 30, 2015, Dr. Abernathie noted Plaintiff looked great and was not complaining
of leg pain. Dr. Abernathie ordered physical therapy to encourage Plaintiff’s flexibility and work
toward activities for which he can be employed. Plaintiff reported being able to walk two miles
(Tr. 436).
On May 11, 2015, Plaintiff stated his leg pain was gone but reported pain at the incision
site. He had more flexibility from doing the PT. Dr. Abernathie noted Plaintiff expressed no
specific concerns. Plaintiff was smoking again and working toward an ability to work. Plaintiff
expressed a plan to go to school or get disability. Dr. Abernathie did not believe disability made
sense and opined Plaintiff was definitely capable of gainful employment with an option to sit,
stand and walk intermittently, as well as a 10 pound lifting restriction (Tr. 438-39).
The Court finds that Dr. Abernathie’s notes suggest good reasons for giving more weight
to his records and statements in support of the Commissioner’s conclusions. On Plaintiff’s very
last visit with Dr. Abernathie, Plaintiff cited no cause as to why he could not seek and maintain
employment, yet his response was a plan to seek disability (Tr. 438).
The ALJ provided good reasons for his determinations regarding Dr. Abernathie’s
conclusions including the consistency between Dr. Abernathy’s opinion and the overall medical
evidence in the record.

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The ALJ then affords little weight to the opinions of Dr. P. Brent Koprivica, an
independent medical examiner, who stated Plaintiff was probably permanently totally disabled
(Tr. 56). The ALJ explains Dr. Koprivia’s conclusion is based on a one-time evaluation where
Plaintiff was not taking his normal pain medications, only over-the-counter pain medication, and
a determination of disability was reserved for the Commissioner, and not an independent medical
examiners. The ALJ concludes Dr. Koprivia’s opinion “did not correspond with the vast majority
of [Plaintiff’s] post-operative exams showing intact strength, range of motion, and gait (Tr. 56).
The ALJ provided “good reasons” for affording little weight to Dr. Koprivica’s opinion
including the fact his opinion was based on a one-time evaluation.
The ALJ affords limited to partial weight to mid-2014 medical statements by Dr. Forest
Conley, and Dr. Joel Jeffries. The ALJ affords them limited to partial weight because Plaintiff’s
back surgery, imagining, and exams indicated he was still able to do less demanding work, and
both Drs.’ statements keeping Plaintiff out of work were clearly temporary and “did not
correspond with [Plaintiff’s] positive response to surgery and newer exams” (Tr. 56).
Dr. Heather Gessling, Plaintiff’s primary care physician, was also afforded little weight
(Tr. 56). The ALJ noted Dr. Gessling “cited minimal objective evidence in support” of her
claims, and “her assessment did not correspond with her exams showing largely normal
extremities and ambulation, [Plaintiff’s] limited mental health treatment, or his reported ability to
lift up to 10 pounds” (Tr. 56). The ALJ concludes by saying it appeared Dr. Gessling’s opinion
was based on Plaintiff’s subjective allegations, and the opinion of Dr. Abernathie merits greater
weight (Tr. 56). The ALJ may give less deference to an opinion based upon a claimant’s
subjective complaints rather than objective medical evidence. Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705,
709 (8th Cir. 2007). The ALJ provided “good reasons” for concluding Dr. Gessling’s opinion

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was entitled to little weight, including Dr. Gessling’s minimal citations to objective medical
evidence to support of her conclusions, and instead relying on subjective testimony from
Plaintiff.
The ALJ affords little weight to the opinions of Dr. Steven Street, a pain management
specialist, who stated in December 2016, Plaintiff had difficulty sitting or standing for more than
20 minutes (Tr. 56-57). The ALJ concluded this assessment was “not fully supported by the
[Plaintiff’s] stable findings on his post-operative medical imaging, exams, and conservative
care,” and appears to be based on Plaintiff’s “subjective reports” (Tr. 57). The ALJ provided
“good reasons” for discounting Dr. Street’s opinion, namely the conclusion was in contrast to
Plaintiff’s overall medical evidence.
James England, Jr., a vocational rehabilitation expert, also submitted a report which was
considered by the ALJ. The ALJ notes Mr. England is not an acceptable medical source, but his
opinion was considered by the ALJ and afforded little weight (Tr. 56). Mr. England opines
Plaintiff is totally disabled, which the ALJ discounts given Plaintiff’s other medical records and
prior work abilities, stating the ALJ believes Mr. England relied on Plaintiff’s subjective reports
(Tr. 56).
The ALJ is required to “give good reasons” for the weight given to a treating sources’
medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). As detailed above, the ALJ provided reasons for
affording certain weight to the opinions of the providers or experts, including stating certain
opinions were inconsistent with the medical records and appeared to be based on Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints rather than concrete medical evidence. By considering each provider and
explaining “good reasons” for affording certain opinions limited or little weight, the ALJ
correctly evaluated the opinions of treating physicians.

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In his brief, Plaintiff contends the overall medical record supports a different RFC
determination than the ALJ, however, a “decision which is supported by substantial evidence is
not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence may also support an opposite
conclusion or because the reviewing court would have decided differently.” Krogmeier v.
Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC limiting him to sedentary work with sit/stand option
allowing a change in position every 30 minutes for a few minutes at a time while remaining at
the work station (with no loss of production).
The ALJ properly evaluated the entire medical record, as well as testimony from
Plaintiff, to conclude Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and limitations were not entirely
consistent with the medical records. The ALJ also provided an adequate medical basis for a
determination of Plaintiff’s RFC when she evaluated the entire medical record, including
Plaintiff’s testimony, and evaluated the medical records of Plaintiff’s treating physicians.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s RFC.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds substantial evidence on the record, as a
whole, supports the Commissioner’s decision Plaintiff is not disabled.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

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A separate judgment shall be entered incorporating this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 11th day of September, 2019.

________________________________
E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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