Liddell, et al v. Board of Education, et al

Filing 549

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State of Missouris Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, [Doc. No. 521 ], is granted.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no bond shall be required.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the States request for a temporary administrative stay is denied as moot.. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 1/26/2021. (AAT)

Case: 4:72-cv-00100-HEA Doc. #: 549 Filed: 01/26/21 Page: 1 of 7 PageID #: 2559

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CRATON LIDDELL, et al.,

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE )
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, et )
al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 4:72CV100 HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the State of Missouri’s Motion to Stay of
Judgment and Injunction Pending Appeal and for Temporary Administrative Stay,
[Doc. No. 521]. Caldwell/NAACP and Liddell Plaintiffs oppose the motion. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.
BACKGROUND
The factual background for the above-entitled matter is clearly and precisely
set forth in the Court’s previous orders that have spanned decades. On November
24, 2020, the Court issued an Opinion, Memorandum and Order regarding the
Motion to Enforce Settlement. The Court found that the money received from the
St. Louis City tax was specifically ear marked for desegregation purposes on a per
pupil basis for all city school students, which included the Charter School students.

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The Court ordered the State of Missouri to cease reducing the amount of funds
allocated to the District Schools by the amount of the City Desegregation tax.
On December 4, 2020, the State of Missouri filed a Notice of Appeal of the
Court's November 24, 2020 Opinion. On the same day, the State filed this Motion
to Stay pending appeal and sought a temporary administrative stay as well.
Specifically, Defendants seek an order staying their obligations related to the
Court’s Opinion.
DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), a “court may suspend,
modify, restore, or grant an injunction” pending the matter's resolution on appeal.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). “A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury
might otherwise result to the appellant. It is an exercise of judicial discretion. The
propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.”
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4, 10-11 (1942) (citations
omitted); see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). A court considers
four factors in determining whether to grant a motion to stay: “(1) whether the stay
applicant has made a strong showing of a likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
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proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S.
770, 776 (1987); see also Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th
Cir. 2011). The moving party bears the heavy burden to establish that a stay should
be granted in light of these four factors, and “[t]he first two factors ... are the most
critical.” See Nken, 556 U.S. at 433-34; see also 11 Charles Alan Wright, et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2904 (3d ed. April 2017 Update).
“Ultimately, [the court] must consider the relative strength of the four
factors, balancing them all.” Brady, 640 F.3d at 789 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The State argues that the four stay factors warrant the imposition of a stay
with respect to its obligations under the November 2020 Opinion. Plaintiffs, on the
other hand, argue that the State has not met its burden to justify a stay and ask the
Court to deny the motion.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The Court first considers whether the State has “made a strong showing that
[it] is likely to succeed on the merits.” Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776. “It is not enough
that the chance of success on the merits be better than negligible.... [M]ore than a
mere possibility of relief is required.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (quotation marks and
citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit has described this factor as “[t]he most

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important” for the court's consideration. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 151 F.3d
763, 764 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Brady, 640 F.3d at 789.
The State contends that it is likely to succeed on the merits because: (1) The
Settlement specifically provides that the City Board, and no other entity, shall
implement desegregation programs; (2) The Judgment orders the Department to
violate state law in its allocation of funds between District schools and charter
schools; (3) The Judgment imposes novel obligations on charter schools, which
were not involved in segregation and were non-parties to both the Settlement and
this case; (4) The Judgment provides relief that no party requested; (5) The
Judgment violates principles of federalism by intruding upon state and local
control in matters of educational policy; and (6) The Judgment makes little sense
as a matter of policy.
The Court finds that that the State has established a strong likelihood of
success on the merits on appeal.
The Court’s conclusion that the allocation of the Desegregation Tax should
be used by Charter schools for the purposes of desegregation programs was not
contemplated by the parties, rather all parties believe they are entitled to the entire
amount of the funds solely. While the Court remains of the opinion that its
Opinion coincides with the spirit of the Settlement Agreement between the
signatories thereto, the State’s position that the Opinion runs afoul of the parties’
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intent, the lack of charter school segregation, and requiring the State to act in a
manner which may violate State Law bolster the State’s likelihood of success on
the merits position.
Irreparable Harm
The Court also considers whether the State will be irreparably harmed absent
a stay. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776. As with each factor, the burden is on State to
establish that this factor weighs in favor of granting the motion. “[S]imply showing
some ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken,
556 U.S. at 434-35 (citation omitted).
The State asserts that it would be irreparably harmed if the Court declines to
grant a stay. “‘[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes
enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.’
New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351, 98 S.Ct.
359, 54 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).” Maryland v. King, 567
U.S. 1301 (2012). The State argues that the Opinion enjoins it from effectuating
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 160.415.4. Irreparable harm has been established for the purpose
of this Opinion.
Injury to Interested Parties
Next, the Court must consider whether issuance of the stay will substantially
injure interested parties, including Plaintiffs. See Hilton, 481 U.S at 776.
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The State argues that Plaintiffs will not suffer harm if the Court imposes a stay. In
the event the State loses on appeal, it can allocate the funds at that time. Plaintiffs
will suffer no harm since the State would be required to turn over the funds from
the date of the Opinion to the resolution of the appeal.
Public Interest
Finally, the Court considers the public interest. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776. The
Public interest factor on balance is neutral. The State’s position that the Opinion
disrupts long-settled expectations arising from the State’s established funding
formula, and because it reinserts the control of the federal district court into the
administration of state and local educational policy, under the aegis of a
desegregation case that was resolved decades ago. On the other hand, the local
sales tax revenue was enacted to attempt to fund desegregation in the St. Louis
City schools. The voters of St. Louis recognized the need for desegregation
programs. The tax should be used for the purpose it was intended with regard to
all public school children, and failure to utilize the tax for its intended purpose runs
afoul of years of dedicated efforts to eliminate an unacceptable system of
segregation.
CONCLUSION
In sum, upon considering the relevant factors, the Court will grant a stay in
this matter pending the resolution of the appeals. The Court finds that the State
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does not need to post a bond in light of the fact that it will be able to satisfy the
Judgment if necessary. The State’s request for a temporary stay is moot.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State of Missouri’s Motion for Stay
Pending Appeal, [Doc. No. 521], is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no bond shall be required.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State’s request for a temporary
administrative stay is denied as moot.
Dated this 26th day of January, 2021.

________________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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