Woods v. St. Louis City Police Dept. et al

Filing 171

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Donnell Boyd's Motion to Reconsider Denial of Request to Set Aside Default Judgment, filed November 4, 2010 (# 156 ) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default Judgment ordered ag ainst Defendant Donnell Boyd (# 93 ) is VACATED. Defendant Boyd is granted fourteen days through and including April 26, 2011, to file an answer or otherwise respond to plaintiffs complaint. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following motions are DENIED as moot as the result of the Court's vacating the Default Judgment against Defendant Boyd: Plaintiffs Motion to File Affidavit in Support of Damages (# 140 ), Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Plaintiff's Affidavit for Damages (#[1 54]), Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint a Payee for Damages (# 155 ), Defendant Boyd's Motion for Extension to Reply to Plaintiff's Motion to File Affidavit in Support of Damages (# 158 ), and Defendant Boyd's Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion toAssign Damages (# 163 ). Signed by Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. on 4/12/11. (ARL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN HENRY WOODS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF ST. LOUIS POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 4:07CV931SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Donnell Boyd’s Motion to Reconsider
Denial of Request to Set Aside Default Judgment, filed November 4, 2010 (#156) and related
motions. Responsive pleadings have been filed.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed this action on May 4, 2007, claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to his arrest in July of 2004 in St. Louis City. Plaintiff
brought suit against the City of St. Louis Police Department, Officer Donnell Boyd, Unknown
Tyson, and Officer Michael W. McAteer. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Boyd lacked probable
cause to arrest him and search his vehicle, that the defendants conspired to fabricate police
reports, and that his vehicle was taken into police custody and never returned.
Defendants City of St. Louis Police Department and Unknown Tyson were dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) on May 31, 2007. Defendant Boyd was
dismissed on July 29, 2008, but this Court added Boyd again as a defendant in the order filed
June 12, 2009. A default judgment was entered against Defendant Boyd on May 26, 2010, but

damages have not been addressed.
Defendant Boyd, then pro se, moved to set aside the default judgment on June 4, 2010
(#96), stating that the entry of default “was due to Donnell Boyd’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect.” One June 24, 2010, the Court denied the motion because a mere
formulaic recitation of Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was insufficient to
relieve Boyd from the default order.
Boyd has since obtained counsel, and counsel has filed the motion currently before the
Court along with an affidavit from Boyd. Boyd states in his affidavit that, beginning shortly after
plaintiff’s July 4, 2004 arrest, plaintiff repeatedly sent correspondence to defendant Boyd. Boyd
states that, eventually, he ceased opening correspondence from plaintiff. When defendant Boyd
was served with the complaint, Boyd states that he believed plaintiff was sending him
correspondence via certified mail, and Boyd disregarded the complaint. Boyd says he did not
realize the “certified mail” had in fact been a civil complaint until he received notice of the
default judgment from the Court on or about May 28, 2010.
Boyd said that he immediately contacted the St. Louis Police Association seeking
representation. Counsel appeared on behalf of defendant Boyd on October 6, 2010 and filed the
instant motion on November 4, 2010.
II.

Discussion
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), the Court may relieve a party from a

final judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” “Excusable neglect” in this
context is generally “‘understood to encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a
filing deadline is attributable to negligence.’” Union Pac. R.R. v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp., 256
-2-

F.3d 781, 782 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S.
380, 394 (1993)). In assessing whether such neglect is excusable, several factors are relevant,
including (1) the length of the delay and its potential impact on proceedings; (2) the danger of
prejudice to the non-moving party; (3) whether the movant acted in good faith; and (4) the reason
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant. Pioneer, 507
U.S. at 395. The Court takes into account “all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s
omission.” Id.
Defendant Boyd argues that his failure to recognize he had been named as a defendant in
a lawsuit is excusable neglect, and that the default order should be vacated because (1) the delay
caused is minimal at best; (2) there is no danger of prejudice to plaintiff; and (3) the defendant
has acted in good faith.
Boyd was personally served on August 4, 2009 by Deputy U.S. Marshal William
O’Shaughnessy, according to the Process Receipt and Return filed with the Court (#57). It seems
odd that Boyd, a former police officer, would mistake a U.S. Marshal for a U.S. Postal Worker.
Further, it is surprising that Boyd would not recognize a summons and complaint. That said,
Boyd’s neglect was excusable and appears to have occurred in good faith in light of the harassing
correspondence he says he received from the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not refuted Boyd’s
statements with evidence that is properly before the Court. Boyd’s good faith was also
demonstrated by his prompt (although initially unsuccessful) attempt to vacate the default
judgment.
Additionally, Boyd has sufficiently shown that the delay caused by vacating his default
judgment will be minimal. Indeed, discovery is still in progress, and Boyd’s counsel has been
-3-

engaged in this matter since entering an appearance in October 2010. Plaintiff has been
attempting to add parties to the complaint, as well, and although he has been unsuccessful in
doing so, Boyd is correct that the deadline for adding parties to the complaint passed only
recently.
Finally, Boyd is correct that plaintiff is unlikely to be prejudiced if the default is vacated.
Boyd did not delay seeking to vacate the default judgment, and, as indicated above, discovery has
been minimal thus far. Plaintiff will not need to retake any depositions because the only
deposition that has been taken has been plaintiff’s. It is also likely that any written discovery
plaintiff would seek from Boyd would have already been sought from the Board of Police
Commissioners. In sum, vacating Boyd’s default judgment at this time will not undermine
plaintiff’s ability to advance his claim.
Because Boyd’s failure to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint was the result of
excusable neglect, his default judgment shall be vacated.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Donnell Boyd’s Motion to Reconsider
Denial of Request to Set Aside Default Judgment, filed November 4, 2010 (#156) is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default Judgment ordered against Defendant
Donnell Boyd (#93) is VACATED. Defendant Boyd is granted fourteen days through and
including April 26, 2011, to file an answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff’s complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following motions are DENIED as moot as the
result of the Court’s vacating the Default Judgment against Defendant Boyd: Plaintiff’s Motion
-4-

to File Affidavit in Support of Damages (#140), Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Plaintiff’s
Affidavit for Damages (#154), Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint a Payee for Damages (#155),
Defendant Boyd’s Motion for Extension to Reply to Plaintiff’s Motion to File Affidavit in
Support of Damages (#158), and Defendant Boyd’s Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Assign Damages (#163).

Dated this

12th

day of April, 2011.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-5-