Williams et al v. Silvey et al

Filing 171

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERD that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 152) filed by Defendants is GRANTED in its entirety; IT IS ORDERED that a separate judgment in Defendants' favor will be entered incorporating this Memorandum and Order. Granting 152 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Noelle C. Collins on 6/30/2014. (NCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

ERNEST CORNELIUS WILLIAMS and
DORRIS ELLIS WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs,
V.
JUDITH SILVEY, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV211NCC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Correctional
Officer Judith Silvey (CO Silvey), Sergeant Sarah Whitener (Sergeant Whitener), Potosi
Correctional Center Warden Donald “Don” Roper (Warden Roper), and Deputy Warden Cindy
Griffith (Deputy Warden Griffith). (Doc. 152). The matter is fully briefed and ready for
disposition. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 137).
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The court may grant a motion for summary judgment Aif the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The
substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. See also
Fenny v. Dakota, Minn. & E.R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that an issue is
genuine Aif the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party@).
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the court of the basis of its motion.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party
must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material
fact, not the Amere existence of some alleged factual dispute.@ Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247. The
nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 256. AFactual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary@ will not preclude summary
judgment. Id. at 248.
Where the non-moving party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as
required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion
. . . [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials – including the facts
considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled to it . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.
Id. at 255; Raschick v. Prudent Supply, Inc., 830 F.2d 1497, 1499 (8th Cir. 1987). The court's
function is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. However, A[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support
of the [nonmoving party=s] position will be insufficient.@ Id. at 252. With these principles in
mind, the court turns to an analysis of Defendants’ Motion.

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BACKGROUND and UNDISPUTED FACTS1
At all relevant times, Plaintiff Ernest C. Williams (Mr. Williams) was an inmate in the
custody of Missouri Department of Corrections (the DOC); Plaintiff Dorris Ellis Williams (Mrs.
Williams) was the wife of Mr. Williams; and CO Silvey, Sergeant Whitener, Warden Roper, and
Deputy Warden Griffith (jointly, Defendants) were employed by the DOC at the Potosi
Correctional Center (PCC).
In their First Amended Complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. and Mrs.
Williams (jointly, Plaintiffs) allege that Defendants retaliated against them for exercising their
First Amendment right to petition the government. In support of their claims, Plaintiffs state:
(a) Prior to January 19, 2008 and after, defendant Silvey routinely harassed,
belittled, used racial epithets and generally made the Plaintiffs’ visits with each
other in the PCC visiting room uncomfortable and stressful.
(b) During Plaintiffs’ visits, CO Silvey threatened plaintiffs with the termination
of their visiting privileges and disciplinary action because Plaintiffs filed
grievances and made complaints to the PCC administration regarding the visiting
room.
(c) On January 19, 2008, after Plaintiffs had completed their visit in the PCC
visiting room, defendants CO Silvey and Sergeant Whitener issued a false
conduct violation against Mr. Williams and Mrs. Williams alleging that they had
violated a number of institutional rules during their visit.
(d) CO Silvey and Sergeant Whitener issued the false conduct violation in
retaliation for Plaintiffs’ filing grievances and complaints regarding the PCC
visiting room.
(e) On May 18, 2008, during Mrs. Williams’ visit at PCC, Mr. Williams asked
CO Silvey whether he could use the vending machines or microwave because
Mrs. Williams had severe knee or leg pain. CO Silvey rejected Mr. Williams’
request.
(f) The fact that Mrs. Williams had knee replacement surgery was a medically
documented fact as she was not allowed to visit Mr. Williams until it was verified
because of the steel in her left knee.
1

The facts are undisputed unless otherwise stated.
3

(g) PCC policy allows for inmates to use the vending machine and microwave in
the visiting room if their visitor has a medically documented disability.
(h) CO Silvey’s insistence that Mrs. Williams use the vending machines, etc. was
in retaliation for Plaintiffs filing grievances and complaints regarding the visiting
room.
(i) On May 18, 2008, while Plaintiffs were playing a card game in the visiting
room, CO Silvey further retaliated against them for filing grievances and
complaints by threatening to issue Mr. Williams a conduct violation for insulting
behavior. Subsequently, CO Silvey forced Mr. Williams to sign the “warning
logbook.”
(j) On May 22, 2008, Mr. Williams sent Warden Roper a letter notifying him of
CO Silvey’s unconstitutional actions. Although Warden Roper was informed that
there was an ongoing violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights he took no
action and allowed these violations to continue. Warden Roper subsequently
forwarded the letter to Deputy Warden Griffith. Warden Roper was deliberately
indifferent to the ongoing retaliation that Plaintiffs were suffering.
(k) Deputy Warden Griffith, even though on notice of CO Silvey’s violation of
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, also took no action despite the claim that CO
Silvey was under her authority and control. Similarly, Deputy Warden Griffith
was deliberately indifferent to the ongoing retaliation that Plaintiffs were
suffering.
(Doc. 100 at 3-5).
As clarified by the parties’ pleadings relevant to the pending Motion, Plaintiffs assert CO
Silvey harassed them by “belittling” them, “using racial epithets,” and “making their visits
uncomfortable,” as evidenced by the following specific conduct:
a.

Issuing Mr. Williams a conduct warning for sharing a coffee bag;

b.

Requiring Mr. Williams to sign a warning log for playing a card game;

c.
Prohibiting Mr. Williams from using the PCC’s visiting room’s vending machine
or microwave;
d.

Prohibiting Plaintiffs from sitting where they chose in the PCC’s visiting room;

e.
Instructing officers in administrative segregation to retaliate against Mr. Williams,
including issuing false conduct violations against him;

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f.

Restricting the type of earrings worn by Mrs. Williams;

g.

Restricting the barrettes worn by Mr. and Mrs. Williams’ grandchildren;

h.

Restricting the wigs worn by Mrs. Williams;

i.

Threatening Mr. and Mrs. Williams’ visiting privileges; and

j.

CO Silvey’s belittling Plaintiffs, using racial epithets, and making their visits
uncomfortable.

(Doc. 153.1 Defendant’s Statement of Untroverted Material Facts, hereafter (D.S.U.M.F.) ¶ 8;
Doc. 163 Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts,
hereafter (“Pls. Ans.”) ¶ 8).
Defendants deny that they engaged in the above conduct and that by doing so they
deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights; and Defendants deny that Plaintiffs suffered
emotional distress, mental anguish, and humiliation as a result of Defendants’ conduct. Plaintiffs
sue Defendants in their individual and official capacities, and seek injunctive relief,
compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other relief which the court
deems proper. (Doc. 100, ¶ 10, p. 6).
A.

Mr. Williams’ Testimony
Mr. Williams testified in his deposition that he had been incarcerated since at least 1989,

and that, most recently, he had been at the PCC since 2000. (Doc. 153-2 at 9). When asked
about CO Silvey’s allegedly objectionable conduct, Mr. Williams testified that, when in the
visiting room at PCC, CO Silvey told his grandchildren that they were not allowed to wear
barrettes in their hair, despite the fact that other children were allowed to wear barrettes; CO
Silvey would interrupt card games he and Mrs. Williams played in the visiting room, asked them
questions about the cards and would have other guards come to their table and interrupt their
visits; and Mr. Williams felt the guards were continually watching him and his wife, as a result
5

of CO Silvey’s instructions that they do so. Mr. Williams testified that he first filed a grievance
about CO Silvey’s conduct in the visiting room concerning events on January 19, 2008, when he
received a conduct violation for sharing a cup of coffee with Mrs. Williams; in fact, they shared
coffee bags, not a cup of coffee. (Doc. 153-2 at 9-23). It is undisputed that Mr. Williams
appealed the conduct violation he received for sharing coffee, and it was ordered that the
violation be dismissed and expunged. (Doc. 153-10).
Mr. Williams further testified that CO Silvey picked on black people in the visiting room;
he never heard CO Silvey make a racial comment; CO Silvey “grouped together” all prisoners
and “talked down to all of the prisoners”; while Mr. Williams had visitors, “most of the time” he
was put in the front of the room; and CO Silvey would “sit there and stare at” him and his
visitors. Mr. Williams felt this staring was harassment. He did not know if CO Silvey tried to
irritate anyone else. (Doc. 153-2 at 24-27).
Mr. Williams additionally testified that CO Silvey threatened to terminate his visiting
privileges with Mrs. Williams; CO Silvey never actually did so, although she interrupted their
visit once when she called Mrs. Williams into the hall about her wearing a wig; and, once, CO
Silvey told Mr. Williams that she was tired of his complaining, and stated, “one more time, you
are done.” (Doc. 153-2 at 29-30).
When asked about being put in the hole specifically linked to CO Silvey, Plaintiff said he
was put there once, in June 2009, for passing canteen items in the general population; he
admitted that he “passed canteen,” which means that he passed food to another inmate. Mr.
Williams testified that he did not think that CO Silvey had anything to do with his being put in
the hole, but that “once [he] got to the hole, [] she had something to do with what was going on
over there,” which was that he was “tortured,” and denied food, showers, recreation, proper

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clothing, and a mattress. The basis of this allegation was that CO Silvey’s fiancé, Charles
Conrad, was working in the hole. Mr. Williams was in the hole from June 2009 until February
2010. While in the hole, Mr. Williams said he received conduct violations about every other
day, which resulted in his long stay there. (Doc. 153-2 at 33-36). Mr. Williams also testified
that he believed he was kept in the hole for the period from June 2009 to February 2010 because
he filed grievances against CO Silvey and because he filed the instant lawsuit; the lawsuit was
filed just a few months before he went into the hole.2 (Doc. 153-2 at 37-43).
Mr. Williams testified that CO Silvey kept him from using the vending machines and
using the microwave in the visiting room despite a rule, then in effect, that permitted an inmate
to go to the vending machine or use the microwave when his visitor had a disability. Mr.
Williams testified that a disabled visitor had to provide documentation of her disability; and that
Mrs. Williams provided such documentation. (Doc. 153-2 at 44-45).
Mr. Williams said that, on May 18, 2008, CO Silvey made him sign a warning log after a
situation occurred while he and his wife were playing a card game; CO Silvey asked what kind
of card game they were playing; Mr. Williams did not think CO Silvey was serious, so she asked
him again; Mr. Williams said, “My deuce”; and CO Silvey said, “Like you mean I should mind
my own business.” When the visit was over, Williams said that CO Silvey threatened to write
him up if he did not sign the warning log. (Doc. 153-2 at 48-49). It is undisputed that Mr.
Williams did not get a conduct violation as a result of the incident and of his signing the warning
log.
On May 26, 2008, Mr. Williams filed a grievance alleging that PCC staff was harassing
him and his wife in the visiting room by not letting him go to the vending machines, by asking
him what card game he and his wife were playing, and by making him sign a warning about
2

The original Complaint in this matter was filed on February 5, 2009. (Doc. 1).
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visiting room rules. Mr. Williams alleged that he felt that staff treated him differently than
others in the visiting room. (Doc. 153-16).
When asked if there was any other behavior against him by CO Silvey which he
considered harassment or retaliation, other than that described above, Mr. Williams responded
that she was “rude.” (Doc. 153-2 at 49).
As for Sergeant Whitener, Mr. Williams testified that he did not see her as often as he did
CO Silvey, and that the only contact he had with Sergeant Whitener was when she issued him a
conduct violation along with CO Silvey (for sharing the coffee); Sergeant Whitener conducted
the interview with CO Silvey for the violation. When asked what his complaint against Sergeant
Whitener was, Mr. Williams responded that she should have corrected the conduct violation “on
the spot”; Sergeant Whitener processed the violation to support CO Silvey. Mr. Williams never
filed a grievance about the visiting room that had anything to do with Sergeant Whitener,
although he thought the grievance he filed about the January 19, 2008 coffee incident was
against both CO Silvey and Sergeant Whitener. Mr. Williams testified that he felt all the prison
officers were related; they were “kinfolk and if you step on one of them’s shoes, you stepped on
all of them shoe.” He did not know if CO Silvey and Sergeant Whitener were related, but he felt
Sergeant Whitener picked on him when she processed “that write up.” (Doc. 153-2 at 53-57).
When asked about his complaints about Deputy Warden Griffith, Mr. Williams testified
that she was “pretty much [] CO Silvey’s boss,” and he thought “she allowed whatever CO
Silvey was doing to” him and his wife. Mr. Williams said that Deputy Warden Griffith knew
about his problems with CO Silvey, particularly the card game incident, because when he wrote
to Warden Roper about it, Roper referred the complaint to Deputy Warden Griffith.

Mr.

Williams testified that Deputy Warden Griffith said she was not going to do anything about his

8

complaint because he had filed a grievance on the matter. Mr. Williams further testified that
Deputy Warden Griffith could have corrected the problem but that she did not. Mr. Williams
also testified that he thought Deputy Warden Griffith’s normal way of doing things was to
postpone doing something or doing nothing at all; he did not know if she treated other inmates
any differently than she treated him; Mr. Williams did not remember if he ever filed a grievance
against Deputy Warden Griffith; and he could not recall if he ever filed a grievance that affected
Deputy Warden Griffith in any way. (Doc. 153-2 at 58-63; Doc. 153-15 (05/28/2008 memo
from Griffith to Williams suggesting he await the outcome of his grievance)).
When asked what his complaints against Warden Roper were, Mr. Williams testified: “I
think he let me down, as far as his legal duty toward maintaining my safety and well being and
I’ve got injuries now that I can’t get treated for, just from being in the hole, under those
conditions, for that period of time. My body got all these spots on it and they won’t treat it. It
causes me a lot of discomfort and itching.” He said he had a rash because of being in the hole.
Mr. Williams thought Warden Roper treated him differently than other inmates because other
inmates were not put in the hole for minor or manufactured violations. (Doc. 153-2 at 65-66).
Mr. Williams testified that he told Warden Roper, in a letter, that he felt like the
Correctional Officers in the visiting room, including CO Silvey, were “trying to concoct some
type of situation for [him] to be put in the hole,” but that he was not put in the hole after he wrote
the letter. (Doc. 153-2 at 60). He felt that, when he was in the hole in 2009, he made Deputy
Warden Griffith, Warden Roper, and others aware of what he was going through and “nobody
done anything”; he felt that they would not do anything because he filed grievances “against the
prison”; and he based this belief “on the way they get back at prisoners for filing grievances or a
lawsuit around [the prison].” (Doc. 153-2 at 60-63; Doc. 153-14 (05/22/2008 letter)). Mr.

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Williams testified that he did not know any other prisoners who never filed a grievance; he did
not feel like he was being treated differently; he felt like he was being “targeted”; he “really
[had] no idea” why he was being targeted; and CO Silvey, Griffith, and Roper targeted him.
(Doc. 153-2 at 63-64). Specifically, Mr. Williams testified: “I think I was a target and I don’t
know, I don’t know. I don’t know what the reasons behind this was or what was on their mind
when they was doing it. I just know how I was feeling when it was happening to me.” (Doc.
153-2 at 65).

Mr. Williams testified that he was aware of “repercussions or possible

repercussions” from his filing grievances, including grievances about the visiting room, but that
he did not have a choice and continued to file grievances. (Doc. 153-2 at 70).
B.

Mrs. Williams’ Testimony
In regard to the earrings incident, Mrs. Williams testified that CO Silvey made a rule,

around 2007 or 2008, that visitors had to wear post-style earrings; prior to that time she could
wear other types of earrings. She reiterated what Mr. Williams said about the card game.

In

regard to the wig incident described by Mr. Williams, Mrs. Williams said she had been wearing a
“ponytail wig” since 1997 at every prison in which Mr. Williams had been; then one day she put
on her other wig. She acknowledged that nobody could wear a wig or hairpiece without a
doctor’s statement, but she also testified that “other people wore wigs” and that she was singled
out.

She further said that she felt CO Silvey “told them to change” the rules and that she

actually “changed the rules down in the vising room, that [visitors] couldn’t wear a wig or
hairpiece.”

Mrs. Williams also testified that CO Silvey made her granddaughter take her

barrettes out. (Doc. 153-3 at 21-28).
Mrs. Williams testified that one time CO Silvey came to the table where she and Mr.
Williams were in the visiting room and told Mr. Williams that “if he continued to file grievances

10

and writ[e] the warden, then she was going to take [their] privileges from [them],” but that their
privileges were never taken from them. Mrs. Williams said that she had written the warden, the
President, and Senator Claire McCaskill about the situation. (Doc. 153-3 at 28-29).
Mrs. Williams testified that she felt like prison staff picked on her and Mr. Williams
because of CO Silvey; CO Silvey went around to different tables in the visiting room and talked
against Mr. Williams and herself; she “did not have a clue why [CO Silvey] started picking on
[her]”; she felt CO Silvey picked on “most of the black people”; and CO Silvey told the black
people where to sit but she would ask the white inmates where they wanted to sit. Mrs. Williams
testified both that CO Silvey started picking on Mr. and Mrs. Williams before Mr. Williams filed
any grievances, and that she did not remember if they had filed grievances when CO Silvey
started picking on them. (Doc. 153-3 at 33-36).
Mrs. Williams also testified that when she wrote and called Warden Roper, he never
contacted her; she thought that complaining and filing grievances helped the situation; and prison
personnel had no longer been picking on Mr. Williams and herself like they had been. (Doc.
153-3 at 42-44).
Plaintiffs acknowledged in their depositions that there were rules against sharing
beverages, wearing wigs, and inmates using the visiting room vending machines and
microwaves, although Mrs. Williams testified that other people “didn’t have to obey that rule.”
(Doc. 153-3 at 37).
C.

Attestations by Defendants
CO Silvey attested that she does not have the authority to make visiting room rules, as

those rules are made by the DOC and PCC; each institution has authority to make stricter rules,
but does not have authority to make more lenient rules; CO Silvey does not have the authority to

11

interpret rules; and visiting room rules are subject to change. CO Silvey also attested that it was
her understanding that sharing a coffee bag was tantamount to sharing a beverage. She further
attested that visiting room rules, in 2008, included no sharing of food and beverages; only
visitors were allowed to use vending machines and microwaves; exceptions to the vending
machine/microwave rule could be made with proper documentation of a visitor’s medical
condition; inmates were to be seated by staff; only post-type earrings were allowed; hard plastic
or metal barrettes were not allowed to be worn by visitors; and wigs were allowed to be worn by
visitors only if the visitor had a doctor’s note. (Doc. 153-4 (Silvey Aff.)).
As for the incident involving Plaintiffs’ playing cards, CO Silvey attested that she
believed Plaintiffs were sharing prohibited information and using the card game as a code to pass
prohibited information because she heard Mr. Williams identify specific areas of the institution
as he was laying out cards, which included the tower, an armed post. She disagreed with Mr.
Williams’ testimony that Mr. Williams responded “My Deuce”; rather, CO Silvey attested that
she heard Plaintiff respond “nunya,” meaning none of your business. (Silvey Aff. ¶¶ 13-14).
As for the incident involving the vending machine, CO Silvey attested that neither Mr.
nor Mrs. Williams gave her documentation regarding Mrs. Williams’ disability, although Mrs.
Williams testified that she had a note regarding her disability on file at the time of the incident.
As for CO Silvey’s not permitting Plaintiffs to choose their seats in the visiting room, CO Silvey
attested, and written policy establishes, that inmates and visitors are not allowed to choose their
seats. (Silvey Aff. ¶ 8; Doc. 153-13, Visiting Room Rules, Rule 6). As for Mr. Williams’
treatment while he was in the hole, CO Silvey attested that, as a correctional officer assigned to
the visiting room, she has no authority to dictate or command any other correctional officers,

12

including those assigned to administrative segregation, and that she did not direct or instruct any
other correctional officer to discipline or punish Mr. Williams. (Silvey Aff. ¶ 9).
Sergeant Whitener was never assigned to the visiting room at PCC on a permanent basis.
On January 19, 2008, she was temporarily assigned there, for less than one hour, for the sole
purpose of reading a conduct violation to Mr. Williams. Correctional officers’ duties include
issuing conduct violations against inmates when warranted. If a correctional officer issues a
conduct violation, neither the warden nor other staff members can remove it unilaterally. There
is a due process procedure in place at the PCC which an inmate may pursue if he feels a conduct
violation is unwarranted.3
Warden Roper attested that, when he received a complaint letter regarding a
constitutional violation, he either investigated the matter or sent it to an assistant warden for
purposes of investigation. (Doc. 153-6 (Roper Aff.) ¶ 3). In regard to a letter written by Mrs.
Williams, dated September 4, 2008, concerning the vending machines, Warden Roper referred
the matter to Assistant Warden Michael Lundy. Lundy concluded, in a letter written to Mrs.
Williams, CO Silvey was not harassing Mrs. Williams, but was following rules with the
information she had; and he concluded that Mrs. Williams could use the vending machines and
microwave if she provided a doctor’s note, but that Plaintiffs could not alternate use. (Doc. 15312). As for a May 22, 2008 letter Mr. Williams sent to Warden Roper, complaining of CO
Silvey’s treatment of him in the visiting room (Doc. 153-14), Warden Roper forwarded the letter
to Deputy Warden Griffith (Doc. 153-15).

Deputy Warden Griffith sent a memo to Mr.

3

Plaintiffs do not provide documentation to refute the attestations of Sergeant Whitener, Warden
Roper, or CO Silvey concerning the above mentioned facts, and thus, their factual attestations
are undisputed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.
13

Williams, on May 28, 2008, indicating that, since a grievance had been filed on the matter, he
should await the outcome of the grievance. (Doc. 153-15).
LEGAL FRAMEWORK and DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiffs’ Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiffs have made claims for damages and injunctive relief.

With regard to the

damages claim, a state official acting in his or her official capacity is not a person within the
meaning of § 1983.

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Consequently, state officials cannot be sued for damages in their official capacity under § 1983.
Id. In the instant case, Plaintiffs have sued all Defendants in their individual and official
capacities. (Doc. 100).
Although federal courts may entertain suits seeking only prospective injunctive relief
against state officials only under some circumstances, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159160 (1908); Will, 491 U.S. at 71, an exception applies against officials “who threaten and are
about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties
affected by an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution.” Young, 209 U.S. at 156.
See also Reprod. Health Servs. Of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc., 428 F.3d 1139,
1145 (8th Cir. 2005) (Young’s exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies only to
action seeking prospective injunctive relief against an official with some connection to the
enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute).
Mrs. Williams testified that the alleged retaliation has subsided; things have gotten better;
and she believed her and her husband’s grievances and complaints helped resolve the alleged
negative treatment they experienced. Moreover, Mrs. Williams testified that CO Silvey picked
on Plaintiffs before Mr. Williams filed grievances. Mr. Williams testified that it seemed that

14

sometimes after he complained, things might improve or cease for a while; possible
repercussions did not stop him from filing grievances; and his visiting privileges were never
taken away; and he had no idea why he was “targeted.”
To the extent Plaintiffs cite Randolph v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 1999), to support
their argument that they face future retaliation and that, therefore, prospective injunctive relief is
warranted, the court finds that Randolph does not support granting such relief in the matter under
consideration. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit held, in Randolph, 170 F.3d at 856, that “[a]
claim for equitable relief is moot ‘absent a showing of irreparable injury.’” The irreparable
injury requirement cannot be met “where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that
the plaintiff will be wronged again.’” (internal citation omitted). Notably, as discussed above,
Mrs. Williams testified that the situations of which Plaintiffs complain had improved. Further, in
Randolph, the DOC did not provide a sign language interpreter for a deaf inmate during
grievance proceedings, and indicated that it would not do so in the future; in the instant matter,
Plaintiffs’ assertion of a future threat of retaliation is speculative. In any case, as set forth above,
Defendants’ conduct regarding Plaintiffs’ grandchildren’s barrettes, Mrs. Williams’ wig,
Plaintiffs’ sharing a coffee bag, Plaintiffs’ being told where to sit in the visiting room, and
referring complaints to administrative staff was consistent with their reasonable beliefs about the
situations and their enforcement of prison rules and procedures. As such, the court finds that
summary judgment should be granted in Defendants’ favor in regard to Plaintiffs’ official
capacity claims.
B. Legal Standard for Plaintiffs’ ' 1983 Individual Capacity Claims
The two essential elements of a cause of action pursuant to ' 1983 are: A>(1) whether the
conduct of which the plaintiff complains Awas committed by a person acting under color of state

15

law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.=@ DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir.
1999) (citations omitted).
A claim is not cognizable under § 1983 where a plaintiff fails to allege or prove that
defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for the incidents that injured him or
her. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d
966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (respondeat superior theory inapplicable in § 1983 suits). Liability
under § 1983 requires a causal link and direct responsibility for the alleged deprivation of rights.
Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). Cf. Walton v. Dawson, _ F.3d _,
2014 WL 2053835, at *12 (8th Cir. May 20, 2014) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity requires
“an individualized analysis of each officer's alleged conduct.”; finding it insufficient that
plaintiff’s evidence of subjective knowledge rested on knowledge of another officer).
To prevail on a § 1983 First Amendment claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1)
he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant took adverse action against him that would
chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity; and (3) that the adverse action
was motivated by the exercise of the protected activity. Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 991 (8th
Cir. 2013) (citing Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004)).

The filing of

grievances and lawsuits are protected activity, see Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir.
2007), but simply because the alleged adverse action occurred after such filing does not make it
retaliatory conduct, see Wise v. Oglesby, 2007 WL 5022104, at *13 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 7, 2007)
(unpublished). Likewise, inmates have a constitutional right, under the First Amendment, to
access the courts. Cf. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).

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Further, a plaintiff’s mere belief that defendants acted with retaliatory motive is simply
insufficient to show intent. Wise, 2007 WL 5022104, at *13 (citing Wilson v. Northcutt, 441
F.3d 586, 593 (8th Cir. 2006)). Thus, to avoid summary judgment on a retaliation claim, a
plaintiff must submit “affirmative evidence” of a retaliatory motivation for a prison official’s
objectionable conduct.

See Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007).

Bare

allegations of malice on the part of the defendants are not enough to establish a retaliation claim,
see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 558 (1998); to resist summary judgment where an
inmate alleges retaliation for filing grievances, the inmate must provide sufficient evidence that
the prison official’s conduct of which he complains “would chill an inmate of ordinary firmness
from filing grievances,” see Lewis, 486 F.3d at 1029. See also Walton, 2014 WL 2053853, at
*12 (summary judgment is appropriate where non-moving party provides nothing but
‘speculation, conjecture, or fantasy” to rebut moving party’s factual assertions). The “ordinary
firmness requirement “is designed to weed out trivial matters from those deserving the time of
the courts as real and substantial violations of the First Amendment.” Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d
984, 992 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Further, an inmate’s retaliation claim fails if the alleged retaliatory conduct violations
were issued for the actual violation of a prison rule. Thus, a defendant may successfully defend
a retaliatory discipline claim by showing “some evidence” the inmate actually committed a rule
violation. Bandy-Bey v. Crist, 578 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2009). Thus, when a prisoner claims
that he was disciplined for exercising his First Amendment rights, he must satisfy the “heavy
burden of showing that the prison officials who disciplined him had an impermissible motive for
doing so, and that but for this impermissible motive, the disciplinary charges would not have
been brought.” Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).

17

Additionally, a constitutional violation is not established where an inmate suffers no
harm as a result of alleged unconstitutional conduct. See id. (access to courts claim failed
because inmate did not demonstrate that defendants' failure to grant him the library time he
requested “resulted in an actual injury, that is, the hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably
meritorious underlying legal claim”) (citation omitted); Hamm v. Moore, 984 F.2d 890, 892 (8th
Cir. 1992) (upholding summary judgment in favor of defendant where inmate alleged prison
officials harassed him to prevent him from carrying out his duties as prison law clerk; inmate
could not “state a claim for relief based on retaliatory conduct in view of his concession that the
defendants have not fired him from his job”); see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 (requirement that
an inmate show “actual injury” derives from the constitutional principle of standing). Broad and
conclusory allegations of retaliation are insufficient to give rise to a constitutional violation. See
Flittie v. Solem, 827 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1987).
Finally, as previously stated by the Eighth Circuit in this matter, a prison visitor may state
a claim of retaliation against prison officials. Williams v. Silvey, 375 Fed. Appx. 648 (8th Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (unpublished).

Although the parties do not address law specifically

applicable to Mrs. Williams, the court notes that when addressing prison visitors’ claims of
constitutional intrusions upon summary judgment, courts balance the interest of a prison to
maintain institutional security with the intrusion upon the visitor. Cf. Smothers v. Gibson, 778
F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit has held that “[t]he Due process Clause has not been
held to guarantee an interest in prison visitation. Pfender v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrs.,
443 Fed. Appx. 749, 752 (3rd Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Ky. Dep't of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (rejecting notion that “unfettered visitation is guaranteed

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directly by the Due Process Clause”); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (observing
that “freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration”).
Once a prison establishes rules permitting visitation, however, a liberty interest in
visitation is created for a prisoner. Taylor v. Armontrout, 894 F.2d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 1989).
Nonetheless, where a right to visitation exists, there is no constitutional violation when actions of
prison officials regarding a visitor are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Pfender, 443 Fed. Appx. at 751 (prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in
preventing inmates from possessing items that can be used to escape). See also Bills v. Dahm,
32 F.3d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 1994) (prison officials entitled to qualified immunity on alleged equal
protection violation based on overnight visits with children being permitted in women’s prison
and not in men’s prison; prison officials could find the denial of such privileges were “rationally
related to a legitimate penological objective”); Bumgarner v. Bloodworth, 768 F.2d 297, 301
(8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“We recognize that visitation rights are “rights” with respect to
which the Supreme Court has given broad discretionary authority to administrators in order to
manage the prison.”) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983)). Further, the Eighth
Circuit has noted that “attributes of privacy of a jail may hardly be equated with those of a home,
an automobile, an office, or a hotel room.” Bumgarner, 768 F.2d at 301.
C.

Allegations Against CO Silvey
First, given that Plaintiffs have not refuted CO Silvey’s testimony regarding visiting

room rules, the court finds that the existence of these rules is undisputed. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 247; See also Walton, 2014 WL 2053835, at *12.
As a general matter, as discussed above, Plaintiffs did not testify that CO Silvey’s
allegedly objectionable conduct was due to retaliatory reasons. Plaintiffs speculated that CO

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Silvey had “her picks,” she had “mental issues,” and that Plaintiffs’ race played a factor.
Additionally, both Mr. and Mrs. Williams testified that they did not know why CO Silvey
allegedly harassed them. On this basis alone, the court finds that summary judgment should be
granted in Defendants’ favor as to all claims against CO Silvey. See Walton, 2014 WL 2053835,
at *12 (reasoning that speculation, conjecture, or fantasy are insufficient to defeat summary
judgment); Santiago, 707 F.3d at 991 (requiring retaliatory motive for constitutional violation
based on retaliation); Lewis, 486 F.3d at 1029 (requiring affirmative evidence of retaliatory
motive for objectionable conduct).
Although Plaintiffs argue in response to the pending Motion that they also have said CO
Silvey had retaliatory intent, any change in their deposition testimony is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to CO Silvey’s motivation. See Marathon Ashland Petroleum,
LLC, v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 300 F.3d 945, 951 (8th Cir. 2002) (summary judgment
appropriate where party’s sudden and unexplained revision of testimony creates an issue of fact
where none previously existed). As for Plaintiffs’ allegations that CO Silvey generally harassed
them and made them feel uncomfortable, these broad and conclusory allegations are insufficient
so support a constitutional violation. See Flittie, 827 F.2d at 281.
(1)

Conduct Violation for Sharing Coffee Bag:

It is undisputed that visiting room rules prohibit the sharing of food and beverages; that
Plaintiffs shared a coffee bag on January 19, 2008; that, when she issued Mr. Williams a conduct
violation for Plaintiffs’ sharing a coffee bag, CO Silvey thought that sharing a coffee bag was the
same thing as sharing a beverage; and that, after Mr. Williams appealed the conduct violation,
the violation was dismissed. The court finds, given CO Silvey’s reasonable belief that sharing a
coffee bag was a violation of visiting room rules, that the undisputed facts establish that CO

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Silvey did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by issuing the conduct violation. In any
case, because the violation was rescinded and Plaintiffs suffered no adverse consequence, it
cannot be said that CO Silvey’s issuance of a conduct violation would have chilled a person of
ordinary firmness from filing complaints or grievances; in fact, the contrary can be said, as
rescinding the violation would have encouraged a person of ordinary firmness to file complaints
or grievances. See Santiago, 707 F.3d at 991; Orebaugh, 910 F.2d at 529.
(2)

Signing the Warning Log:

It is undisputed that CO Silvey was responsible for enforcing rules in the visiting room;
that she believed she heard Mr. Williams discussing a map of the prison when Plaintiffs were
playing cards in the visiting room; and that she thought Mr. Williams responded that it was none
of CO Silvey’s business when she questioned Plaintiffs about the card game. Whether Mr.
Williams actually responded “my deuce” or “nunya” to CO Silvey’s question regarding the card
game he and Mrs. Williams were playing is not “material”; what is material is what CO Silvey
thought Mr. and Mrs. Williams were discussing.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

In view of the

undisputed facts establishing that CO Silvey had reason to believe that Plaintiffs were violating
rules, that her job required her to enforce rules in the visiting room, and that Plaintiffs suffered
no harm as a result of Mr. Williams’ signing the log, and in view of Plaintiffs offering no
affirmative evidence of a retaliatory motive on CO Silvey’s part, the court finds that the
undisputed facts do not establish a constitutional violation as a result of CO Silvey’s requiring
Mr. Williams to sign the warning log. See Bandy-Bey, 578 F.3d at 766.
3.

Assigned Seating in Visiting Room:

Plaintiffs allege that CO Silvey assigned them seating in the visiting room, but let other
inmates and their visitors choose their seats. It is undisputed, however, that prison rules required

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CO Silvey to seat inmates and their visitors, and that, by telling Plaintiffs where to sit, CO Silvey
was merely performing her job. Further, Plaintiffs assert, without factual support, that CO Silvey
did not assign seats to others, see Walton, 2014 WL 2053835, at *12, and Plaintiffs fail to
establish that they suffered any harm as a result of their being assigned seating, Orebaugh, 910
F.2d at 529. Assigning seats in the visiting room, moreover, is reasonably related to penological
considerations. See Bumgarner, 768 F.2d at 301. As such, the court finds that the undisputed
facts fail to establish that CO Silvey violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by assigning them
seating in the visiting room.
4.

Punitive Treatment in Administrative Segregation:

Mr. Williams admits that he passed canteen in violation of prison rules when he was
placed in administrative segregation in June 2009 through February 2010. Thus, any claim that
he was placed in administrative segregation by CO Silvey out of retaliation fails. See BandyBey, 578 F.3d at 766. To the extent Plaintiffs speculate CO Silvey was responsible for Mr.
Williams’ objectionable treatment while in administrative segregation simply because she was
engaged to a person who worked there or simply because all the prison officials allegedly are
related, Plaintiffs present no affirmative evidence to support such arguments.

CO Silvey,

moreover, attested that she had no involvement in establishing conditions in administrative
segregation. As such, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden on summary
judgment to refute CO Silvey’s attestations regarding Mr. Williams presence in administrative
segregation and failed to show that CO Silvey played any role in the allegedly objectionable
conditions of Mr. Williams’ confinement while he was in administrative segregation.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247; Walton, 2014 WL 2053835, at *12.

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See

5.

Wearing of Earrings, Barrettes, and Wigs:

Plaintiffs do not sufficiently refute CO Silvey’s attestation that, at the least, she did not
have a note verifying Mrs. Williams’ disability at the time of the vending machine incident. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247; Walton, 2014 WL 2053835, at *12 (“speculation, conjecture, or
fantasy” are insufficient to rebut sworn testimony). As for Plaintiffs’ claims that CO Silvey told
Mrs. Williams she could only wear post-earrings and that she could not wear a wig, and as for
CO Silvey’s telling Plaintiffs’ grandchildren that they could not wear certain barrettes, CO
Silvey was performing her duty to enforce visiting room rules when she did so. See Bandy-Bey,
578 F.3d at 766. Further, the prohibition against wearing wigs and certain earrings and barrettes
would not chill a person of ordinary firmness from filing complaints or grievances.

See

Santiago, 707 F.3d at 991.
6.

Threatening Visiting Privileges:

Although Plaintiffs contend that CO Silvey threatened to take away their visiting
privileges, it is undisputed that she never did so. As such, the court finds that the undisputed
facts establish that Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were not violated. See Bandy-Bey, 578 F.3d
at 766.
D.

Allegations Against Sergeant Whitener
Plaintiffs claim Sergeant Whitener violated their constitutional rights because she did not

correct CO Silvey’s conduct when CO Silvey issued a conduct violation for the incident
involving Plaintiffs’ sharing a coffee bag. First, Mr. Williams filed a grievance which resolved
the matter, and, as the conduct violation was rescinded, Mr. Williams suffered no adverse
consequence as a result of the conduct violation. See Bandy-Bey, 578 F.3d at 766. Second,
Plaintiffs’ simply speculating that Sergeant Whitener supported CO Silvey is insufficient to

23

establish their claim of a constitutional violation. See Wise, 2007 WL 5022104, at *13. Finally,
the undisputed facts establish that the decision to issue the conduct violation was CO Silvey’s,
see Madewell, 909 F.2d at 1208, and that Sergeant Whitener had no authority to rescind the
violation, see Martin, 780 F.2d at 1338. As such, the court finds that the undisputed facts
establish that Sergeant Whitener did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and that
summary judgment should be granted in Defendants’ favor in regard to Plaintiffs’ claims against
Sergeant Whitener.
E.

Allegations Against Warden Roper
Mr. Williams claims Warden Roper treated him differently from other prisoners when

Mr. Williams was in the hole; Mr. Williams holds Warden Roper responsible for the conditions
he suffered while in the hole and for his being placed and kept in the hole for minor infractions.
Mr. Williams also complains that Warden Roper never contacted him in response to his May 22,
2008 letter complaining of CO Silvey’s alleged harassment of Plaintiffs in the visiting room.
First, the undisputed facts do not establish that Warden Roper had any direct involvement
with Mr. Williams’ being placed in administrative segregation. See Walton, 2014 WL 2053835,
at *12 (individualized analysis of each officer’s conduct required); King, 702 F. Supp. 2d at
1081-82). Second, Mr. Williams admits that he committed the infraction pursuant to which he
was placed in administrative segregation, and he does not deny that he committed the infractions
which caused his continued placement in administrative segregation. Third, Warden Roper did
take action in response to Mr. Williams’ letter in which he complained about CO Silvey’s
alleged harassment of Plaintiffs in the visiting room; Warden Roper followed prison procedure
and referred Mr. Williams’ letters to an Assistant Warden Griffith, who did respond; Assistant
Warden Griffith’s response noted that, since a grievance was filed regarding the alleged

24

harassment, Mr. Williams should await the grievance’s outcome. Assistant Warden Griffith’s
response was in accordance with the prison grievance procedure established by the Missouri
Department of Corrections.
Fourth, in response to Mrs. Williams’ September 4, 2008 letter indicating she was
disabled and complaining that CO Silvey would not let Mr. Williams use the vending machines,
Warden Roper took action, and referred the matter to an assistant warden; the assistant warden
investigated the matter and concluded that CO Silvey was enforcing the rules based on the
information available to her and was not harassing Plaintiffs; he also informed Mrs. Williams
that Mr. Williams could use the vending machines if Mrs. Williams provided a doctor’s note.
Plaintiffs do not assert that after providing a note, Mr. Williams was not permitted to access the
microwave or vending machines, although, as discussed above, Mrs. Williams suggests, without
verification, that she had submitted a note prior to the vending machine incident.
Fifth, when asked in his deposition why Warden Roper targeted him, Mr. Williams
replied that he “really [had] no idea.” (Doc. 153-2 at 64). Mrs. Williams testified that she did
not know if Warden Roper normally contacts people when they write him letters. When asked if
she had reason to believe that Warden Roper did not contact her because of grievances that were
filed, Mrs. Williams responded, “I don’t have an idea.” (Doc. 153-3 at 43). Sixth, as discussed
above, Mrs. Williams also testified that she thought her complaining and filing grievances
“helped.” (Doc. 153-3 at 42-43). The court finds, therefore, that the undisputed facts do not
establish that Warden Roper had a retaliatory motive when he failed to contact Mrs. Williams, or
that he engaged in any conduct which would chill a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
his or her right to engage in protected activity, particularly filing grievances. The court further
finds that the undisputed facts establish that Warden Roper did not violate Plaintiffs’

25

constitutional rights and that summary judgment should be granted in Defendants’ favor in
regard to Plaintiffs’ claims against Warden Roper.
F.

Allegations Against Deputy Warden Griffith
Plaintiffs claim Deputy Warden Griffith ignored CO Silvey’s conduct in the visiting

room and that she did not do anything about it. As discussed above, when Warden Roper
forwarded Mr. Williams’ letter complaining about CO Silvey to Deputy Warden Griffith, Deputy
Warden Griffith took action; she investigated the matter and concluded that the issue should be
deferred to Mr. Williams’ pending grievance.

Further, Plaintiffs have not suggested any

evidence of retaliatory motive on Deputy Warden Griffith’s part. As such, the court finds that
the undisputed facts establish that Deputy Warden Griffith’s conduct would not have chilled a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her right to engage in protected activity,
particularly filing grievances or lawsuits; that Deputy Warden Griffith did not violate Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights; and that, therefore, summary judgment should be granted in Defendants’
favor in regard to Plaintiffs’ claims against Deputy Warden Griffith.
G.

Qualified Immunity
Defendants contend that summary judgment should be granted in their favor because they

are entitled to qualified immunity. AIn a ' 1983 action, state actors may be entitled to qualified
immunity.@

McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Qualified immunity may shield a government official from liability when performing
discretionary functions where his conduct does not violate Aclearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.@ Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 446 (8th Cir. 2010). Qualified
immunity is a question of law, not a question of fact. McClendon v. Story Cnty. Sheriff=s Office,

26

403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2005). Qualified immunity is Aan immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.@ Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the Supreme Court held that a court must
determine whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish whether
a constitutional right has been violated and whether that right had been clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation. The Court further held in Pearson, that, while often appropriate, it
is not mandatory to consider these issues in any particular sequence. Under Pearson, courts are
Apermitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
hand.@ Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Qualified immunity should be granted when either of the two
prongs has been satisfied.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity requires ‘an individualized analysis of each officer’s
alleged conduct.’” Walton, 2014 WL 2053835, at *21 (quoting Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723
F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). To withstand summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, “[i]t is not enough to say a factual question exists: the factual dispute must
be both ‘genuine’ and ‘material.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). As discussed above,
Plaintiffs have established that they were engaged in constitutionally protected activity.
However, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendants retaliated against them and
disciplined or warned Mr. Williams because he was engaging in constitutionally protected
activity. Given that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that any of Defendants violated their
constitutional rights, the court further finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Bills v. Dahm, 32 F.3d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 1994).

27

Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERD that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 152) filed by
Defendants is GRANTED in its entirety;
IT IS ORDERED that a separate judgment in Defendants’ favor will be entered
incorporating this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 30th day of June 2014.

/s/ Noelle C. Collins
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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