Tebeau et al v. General Motors Corporation

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 10 MOTION to Remand Case to State Court to State Court filed by Plaintiff Carl W. Tebeau, Plaintiff Anita Tebeau motion is DENIED. Signed by Honorable E. Richard Webber on October 18, 2011. (MCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

CARL W. TEBEAU and
ANITA TEBEAU,
Plaintiffs,

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vs.
GENERAL MOTORS CORP.,
Defendant.

Case No. 4:09CV00398 ERW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Carl W. Tebeau and Anita Tebeau’s Motion
to Remand the case to state court [ECF No. 10].
I.

BACKGROUND
On January 23, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a petition in the Circuit Court for St. Charles County,

Missouri seeking damages for Plaintiff Carl Tebeau’s personal injuries suffered on Defendant General
Motors Corporation’s property and Plaintiff Anita Tebeau’s resulting loss of consortium.1 [ECF No.
1-2]. The petition avers that Plaintiffs are citizens of Missouri and that Defendant is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. The petition pleads a total of three
counts – two counts relate to Carl Tebeau and one count relates to Anita Tebeau. Each count prays
for damages “in excess of” $25,000.2

1

Under Missouri state law, the document which commences a civil action is called a
“petition,” not a complaint. Mo. R. Civ. P. 53.01. Thus, this Order will use the term “petition”
when describing Plaintiff’s initial pleading document.
2

Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 55.05 states: “If recovery of money is demanded, the
amount shall be stated, except that in actions for damages based upon an alleged tort, no dollar
amount shall be included in the demand except to determine the proper jurisdictional authority,
but the prayer shall be for such damages as are fair and reasonable.” Because this action is based
in tort, Plaintiffs were prohibited from alleging a dollar amount for damages beyond the amount
of $25,000. That amount triggers the jurisdictional authority of the Missouri Circuit Courts and

On March 11, 2009, Defendant moved for removal to this Court.3 The Notice of Removal
alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000. Although the Plaintiff’s request
damages for each count is “in excess of $25,000,” Defendant asserted that the language used to
describe the Plaintiffs injuries would amount to a sum in excess of $75,000.
Defendant filed for bankruptcy on June 1, 2009. [ECF No. 17]. The Court ordered the case
administratively closed, subject to reopening upon motion after the bankruptcy stay had been lifted.
At that time, “all pending motions [were] denied without prejudice subject to being refiled in the
event the case is reopened.” After the stay was lifted, Plaintiffs moved to reopen the case on
September 13, 2011. At the Rule 16 Conference, Plaintiffs’ counsel renewed this motion.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only the power authorized

by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). If a
federal court takes action in a dispute over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, that action is a
nullity. See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951); Hart v. Terminex Int’l, 336 F.3d
541, 541-42 (7th Cir. 2003). However, “[f]ederal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation . . .
to exercise the jurisdiction given to them.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a claim to
federal court only if it could have been brought in federal court originally. Thus, the diversity of
citizenship and amount-in-controversy requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 must be met, or the claim

divests authority from the Associate Circuit Courts. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 517.011(1) (2000).
3

After Defendant moved for removal, the case was assigned to the Honorable Donald J.
Stohr. Upon Judge Stohr’s retirement, the case was reassigned to this Court on August 4, 2011.
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must be based upon a federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Peters v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 80 F.3d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 2002).
To determine jurisdiction, the Court looks at the parties’ status at the time of the lawsuit’s
filing, Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004), or at the time of
removal. McLain v. Andersen Corp., 567 F.3d 956, 965 (8th Cir. 2009). When determining whether
the amount-in-controversy requirement is met, the amount contained in the pleadings is not
dispositive. State ex rel. Pemiscot County v. W. Sur. Co., 51 F.3d 170, 173 (8th Cir.1995). Rather,
the standard is “whether a fact finder might legally conclude” that a plaintiff's damages are greater
than $75,000. See Quinn v. Kimble, 228 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1040 (E.D.Mo.2002). “[A] single plaintiff
may properly aggregate all of the claims which he has against the defendants to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount.” Lynch v. Porter, 446 F.2d 225, 228 (8th Cir. 1971); Edwards v. Bates
County, 163 U.S. 269 (1896). Where there are multiple plaintiffs, only one plaintiff must allege a
claim that is in excess of $75,000 in order for the Court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over the
entire Article III “case or controversy.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,
561 (2005) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 abrogated portions of Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S.
583 (1939) and Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate
Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.3d 537, 541(D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying Exxon Mobile).
Defendants seeking removal “[have] the burden to prove the requisite amount by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2009). This burden
of proof applies regardless of whether the petition does not state a specific amount of damages or
states an amount under the jurisdictional minimum. Id. “Once the removing party has established
by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied, remand is only

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appropriate if the plaintiff can establish to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the requisite
amount.” Id.
Removal statutes are strictly construed. Nichols v. Harbor Venture, Inc., 284 F.3d 857, 861
(8th Cir. 2002). Any doubts about the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand. In re
Business Men’s Assurance Co., 992 F.2d 181,183 (8th Cir. 1993); McHugh v. Physicians Health Plan
of Greater St. Louis, 953 F. Supp. 296, 299 (E.D. Mo. 1997). If “at any time before final judgment
it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,” the Court must remand the case to
the state court from which it was removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs argue that the case should be remanded to state court because Defendant has offered

no “proof” that Plaintiffs’ claims exceed the amount-in-controversy requirement. Plaintiffs concede
that the parties are completely diverse and do not challenge jurisdiction on this ground.4
Defendant argues that the petition’s allegations, such as claims that Carl Tebeau’s’ injuries
are “severe and permanent,” that his earning capacity “has been impaired,” that he has “experienced
extreme pain, suffering, and disfigurement”and “undergone medical treatment” for his injuries, as
well as claims for punitive damages, should lead the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs’ damages will
exceed $75,000. Defendant asserts that “an objective assessment of these allegations alone clearly
demonstrates that a reasonable jury could easily find that Plaintiffs’ damages are in excess of
$75,000[.]” Additionally, Defendant has provided the Court with a copy of Carl Tebeau’s answers
to interrogatories [ECF No. 30-1] to substantiate its claim that the amount-in-controversy requirement
is met.

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The Court finds that the petition sufficiently alleges complete diversity of citizenship.
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Defendant bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the Plaintiffs’
damages exceed $75,000. Bell, 557 F.3d at 956. “The preponderance of the evidence standard
requires a defendant to demonstrate by sufficient proof that a plaintiff’s verdict reasonably may
exceed the jurisdictional amount.” City of University City, Missouri, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Servs.,
Inc., 229 F.Supp.2d 927, 932 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Defendant faces an uphill
battle because Missouri’s pleading requirements prohibit a plaintiff claiming tort damages to plead
a monetary amount beyond the state court’s jurisdictional requirement, which is $25,000 to invoke
the jurisdictional authority of the Missouri circuit courts. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.05; Mo. Rev. Stat. §
517.011(1) (2000); see also Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 324 F. Supp.2d 1028, 1034-35 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s amount-in-controversy argument is speculative and
insufficient to confer jurisdiction to the Court. Mere speculation on the part of a defendant or the
Court does not meet Defendant’s burden of proof under the preponderance standard. Hill, 324 F.
Supp.2d at 1036. The defendant in Hill asked the Court to presume that the amount in controversy
exceeded the jurisdictional minimum, “given the seriousness of Plaintiff’s allegations and the nature
of the relief sought.” Id. The Court declined to do so and remanded the case to state court. Id.
Hill is distinguishable from the pending case because Defendants have provided the Court
with answers to interrogatories that further reveal that the amount in controversy, at the time of
removal, exceeded $75,000. Recently, the Eighth Circuit stated:
“Subsequent events may ... be relevant to prove the existence or nonexistence of
diversity jurisdiction at the time of filing,” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Universal Crop
Prot. Alliance, Inc., 620 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir.2010), and a “distinction must be
made ... between subsequent events that change the amount in controversy and
subsequent revelations that, in fact, the required amount was or was not in
controversy at the commencement of the action.” [State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. ] Powell, 87 F.3d [93,] 97 [(3d Cir. 1996)] (internal quotation marks, citation and
emphasis omitted). In considering the types of materials which can contain such
“revelations,” courts have mentioned the “face of the pleadings,” St. Paul Mercury,

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303 U.S. at 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, and the “proof adduced to the court before trial,”
Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir.2002).
Schubert v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 817, 823 (8th Cir. 2011). Schubert underscores that this
notion of looking beyond the pleadings conflicts with traditional notions about when and how to
access a court’s subject matter jurisdiction: “There is admittedly certain tension between the principle
that post-removal events do not affect jurisdiction and that pre-trial proofs can be used to assess the
amount in controversy as it existed at the time of removal.” Id. This tension is resolved “by deferring
to the plaintiff’s estimate with respect to the amount in controversy whenever the impossibility of
recovery is not apparent from the face of the pleadings but emerges from adjudication of the merits.”
Id. A court may refer to materials developed in discovery merely to “amplify the meaning of the
complaint allegations.” Id.
Carl Tebeau’s interrogatories shed significant light on the damages sought by Plaintiffs and
“amplify the meaning of the [petition’s] allegations.” Id. Defendant directs the Court’s attention to
Interrogatory 13, 16, and 18. These interrogatories convince the Court that Carl Tebeau’s alleged
injuries, treatment, and lost wages in total amount to a considerable expense. For example, Carl
Tebeau states that he suffered a torn meniscus in his right knee and ultimately underwent surgery to
repair the tear. He also states that his injury caused him to be depressed and that his depression
requires treatment through different modalities. He also states that before his injury, he was earning
$32,000 and that he had lost wages and expects to continue losing earnings.
Another factor in the jurisdictional analysis is that the petition contains two tort claims that
relate to Carl Tebeau. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, Carl Tebeau’s tort claims may be aggregated.
Lynch, 446 F.2d at 228. Additionally, because Carl Tebeau’s aggregated claims exceed $75,000,
Anita Tebeau’s claim does not need to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. Exxon Mobile,

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545 U.S. at 561. Considering Schubert, Lynch, and Exxon Mobile, Defendant has sufficiently alleged
facts that demonstrate the jurisdictional amount will be met.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the

state-court petition, in light of Carl Tebeau’s interrogatory answers, requests damages that exceed
$75,000. The parties are completely diverse and the amount-in-controversy requirement is met.
Therefore, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and denies
the motion to remand.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand [ECF No. 10] is DENIED.
Dated this 18th day of October, 2011.

E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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