Taylor et al v. Cottrell, Inc. et al

Filing 349

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 91 ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Dismissal orOther Remedy,[Doc. No. 91], is denied.. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Autrey on 2/2/14. (CEL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMMY A. TAYLOR and
DEBORAH TAYLOR,

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Plaintiffs,
vs.
COTTRELL, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 4:09CV536 HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Motion for Dismissal or
Other Remedy [Doc. No. 91]. After consideration of the arguments and
memoranda, the Court finds that the motion should be denied.
Facts and Background
Plaintiffs bring this product liability case against Defendant Cottrell
alleging that Plaintiff Timmy Taylor was injured when a tie down bar came loose
while he was using a Cottrell auto transport trailer’s chain and ratchet system in
Indiana on October 1, 2007. Plaintiff also claims that the rig lacked adequate
warnings that the tie down bars may become unsecured or come loose, subjecting
users to an unreasonable risk of injury.
After Taylor’s accident, Plaintiff filed an accident report stating that he was

tightening down B3 and the winch bar came out of ratchet. He states that he fell
and got up and his left arm was tingling, neck and back were hurting. The
Supervisor’s report stated, in answer to the question: What can be done to prevent
recurrence of this or a similar injury, “Make sure winch bar is in ratchet hole
securely before pulling on bar.”
There is no dispute that the tie down bar has not been produced by Plaintiff.
Defendant argues that this failure to produce the bar for it to inspect requires
dismissal of this action.
Discussion
“Under federal law, ‘there must be a finding of intentional destruction
indicating a desire to suppress the truth.’ [Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354
F.3d 739] at 746 (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Lewy v. Remington Arms
Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1111–12 (8th Cir.1988) (citing federal law for the general
proposition that the adverse inference instruction is appropriate only where the
spoliation or destruction of evidence is intentional and indicates a fraud or desire
to suppress the truth)).” Sherman v. Richem Co., Inc.; see also, Hallmark Cards,
Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 460 (8th Cir.2013)(To impose a sanction for
spoliation of evidence, “there must be a finding of intentional destruction
indicating a desire to suppress the truth.”; Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485
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F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir.2007).
Nothing before the Court establishes that Plaintiff intentionally destroyed
the tie bar or intent to suppress the truth. While Defendant strenuously argues that
Plaintiff’s intentions were to avoid production of the tie bar, Defendant’s
arguments are not supported by any evidence; Defendant’s arguments are clearly
an artful attempt to create ulterior motives that do not exist.
Conclusion
The Court has considered the memoranda of the parties regarding the
nonexistence of the tie bar. There is no evidence whatsoever to support
Defendant’s contention that the tie bar was intentionally destroyed with a desire to
suppress the truth. Defendants’ Motion will be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal or
Other Remedy,[Doc. No. 91], is denied.
Dated this 2nd day of February, 2014.

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HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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