Taylor et al v. Cottrell, Inc. et al
Filing
439
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Cottrell's Motion to Sever under Rule 21, for Entry of Final Judgment on 1/12/10 Fall Claim, to Stay 10/1/07 Ratchet Claim, and to Vacate 7/21/2014 Trial Date Pending Appeal of the 1/12/10 Fall Claim, [Doc. No. 436 ], is granted; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court certifies there is no just reason to delay the entry of judgment pursuant to the Court's March 28, 2014 Opinion, Memorandum and Order Regarding Defendant s' Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 417 ]; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on the January 12, 2010 claim against Defendants. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 07/22/2014. (CLK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMMY A. TAYLOR and DEBORAH
TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
COTTRELL, INC., and AUTO
HANDLING CORPORATION,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:09CV536 HEA
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Cottrell’s Motion to Sever
under Rule 21, for Entry of Final Judgment on 1/12/10 Fall Claim, to Stay 10/1/07
Ratchet Claim, and to Vacate 7/21/2014 Trial Date Pending Appeal of the 1/12/10
Fall Claim, [Doc. No. 436]. Plaintiffs object For the reasons set forth below, the
Motion is granted.
Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendants for physical injuries
allegedly sustained by Plaintiff Timmy A. Taylor. Plaintiffs base their claims on
alleged defects in Defendants’ products, and certain failures to warn of said
defects.
On February 4,2014, the Court entered an Order barring one of Plaintiffs’
experts from testifying based on a finding that the expert had entered into a
contingency agreement with Plaintiffs. On March 26, 2014, the Court granted
Defendants’ Motion in Limine to bar any evidence of Plaintiffs’ alleged damages
or to Dismiss Claims based on use of the stricken expert’s records.
On March 28, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiffs request for a certification
for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The matter was
certified, however, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to entertain the
interlocutory appeal on May 1, 2014.
Subsequently, Cottrell filed the instant motion in which it seeks the
severance of the claims of Plaintiffs, entry of final judgment on Plaintiffs’ January
12, 2010 incident and stay the claims arising out of the October 30, 2007 incident.
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part,
“The court may [ ] sever any claim against any party.” Defendant’s argument is
well taken. The two incidents involved herein are separate and distinct incidents.
Although each incident involves the same parties, the incidents occurred on
different days, in different locations and involve different types of alleged injuries.
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When
an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim— or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as
to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
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expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise,
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties
and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained,
“[W]e generally consider only orders that dispose of all claims as
final and appealable under [28 U.S.C.] § 1291.” [ Huggins v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir.2009)]. “Rule
54(b) creates a well established exception to this rule by allowing a
district court to enter a final judgment on some but not all of the
claims in a lawsuit.” Clark v. Baka, 593 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir.2010)
(per curiam) (citations and quotation marks omitted). However, the
district court may enter final judgment under this rule “only if the
court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). We review the court's decision to grant Rule
54(b) certification for an abuse of discretion, noting that such
interlocutory appeals are “generally disfavored” and that “it is only
the special case that warrants an immediate appeal from a partial
resolution of the lawsuit.” Clark, 593 F.3d at 714–15 (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
When deciding whether to grant Rule 54(b) certification, the district
court must undertake a two-step analysis. The court “ ‘must first
determine that it is dealing with a final judgment .... in the sense that
it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim.’” Outdoor Cent.[,
Inc. v. GreatLodge.com, Inc .], 643 F.3d [1115,] 1118 [ (8th
Cir.2011)] (quoting Curtiss–Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S.
1, 7, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980)). Second, “[i]n determining
that there is no just reason for delay, the district court must consider
both the equities of the situation and judicial administrative interests,
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particularly the interest in preventing piecemeal appeals.” Id. (citation
and quotation marks omitted). “Certification should be granted only if
there exists ‘some danger of hardship or injustice through delay
which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.’” Hayden v.
McDonald, 719 F.2d 266, 268 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
Generally, we give substantial deference to the district court's
decision to certify orders under Rule 54(b) as the district court is “
‘most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable
reasons for delay.’” Clark, 593 F.3d at 715 (citation omitted).
However, this deference “rests on the assumption that the district
court undertook to weigh and examine the competing interests
involved in a certification decision.” Hayden, 719 F.2d at 268.... A
detailed statement of reasons why there is “no just reason for delay”
need not accompany a Rule 54(b) entry of judgment, but “where the
district court gives no specific reasons, our review of that court's
decision is necessarily more speculative and less circumscribed than
would be the case had the court explained its actions more fully.”
Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. United States De[‘t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 738 F.2d 310, 313 (8th Cir.1984) (per curiam). “If, as
here, a district court's decision does not reflect an evaluation of such
factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent
piecemeal appeals or show a familiar[ity] with the case and with any
justifiable reasons for delay, we scrutinize its decision carefully.”
Huggins, 566 F.3d at 774 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Williams v. County of Dakota, Neb., 687 F.3d 1064, 1067–68 (8th Cir.2012).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has set out “some of the relevant
factors in reviewing Rule 54(b) certifications” as including the following:
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(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated
claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not
be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the
possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the
same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or
counterclaim which could result in setoff against the judgment sought
to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic
and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of
competing claims, expense, and the like. Depending upon the facts of
the particular case, all or some of the above factors may bear upon the
propriety of the trial court's discretion in certifying a judgment as
final under Rule 54(b).
Hayden, 719 F.2d at 269 (quoting Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
521 F.2d 360, (3d Cir.1975), overruled on other grounds by Curtiss–Wright, 446
U.S. at 6–7).
With regard to the first step in the analysis, severance of the claims under
Rule 21 clearly establishes that the claims are separate; the claims have no
connection other than the same parties. The parties do not dispute that the Court is
“dealing with a final judgment ... in the sense that it is an ultimate disposition of
an individual claim.” Id. at 1067 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The order that Defendant asks the Court to certify for appeal, dismisses the
January 12, 2010 claim because the expert testimony has been barred, thereby
rendering the claim unprovable.
The second step of the analysis, determination of whether there is “no just
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reason for delay,” in light of “both the equities of the situation and judicial
administrative interests, particularly the interest in preventing piecemeal appeals,”
see Williams, 687 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), is
equally present. While the Court recognizes the “general [ ] disfavor[ ]” in which
Rule 54(b) interlocutory appeals are viewed and the need for a “special case” in
which “immediate appeal from a partial resolution of the lawsuit” is warranted,
Id., the Court concludes that a careful weighing of the relevant factors tips
sufficiently in favor of immediate appeal. The claims are separate and distinct. In
the event the Eighth Circuit finds the decision erroneous, both claims can be
joined for trial, thereby negating the need for two separate trials involving the
same parties. Moreover, Cottrell indicates to the Court that in the event of
reversal, the parties will be in a better posture to resolve the claims without a trial.
In the event the decision is affirmed, the remaining claim will be tried alone.
None of the parties will suffer any hardship or injustice through delay.
Because Plaintiffs’ January 12, 2010 claim was dismissed, they cannot assert that
they will suffer hardship or injustice if their ability to recover on a favorable
judgment in the event the claim is remanded after the appeal.
The Court believes that the relevant factors in this case do indicate that the
claims should be severed and that there is no just reason to delay entry of
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judgment on, and an immediate appeal of, the dismissal of the January 12, 2010
claim
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Cottrell’s Motion to Sever
under Rule 21, for Entry of Final Judgment on 1/12/10 Fall Claim, to Stay 10/1/07
Ratchet Claim, and to Vacate 7/21/2014 Trial Date Pending Appeal of the 1/12/10
Fall Claim, [Doc. No. 436], is granted;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court certifies there is no just
reason to delay the entry of judgment pursuant to the Court’s March 28, 2014
Opinion, Memorandum and Order Regarding Defendants' Motion in Limine [Doc.
No. 417]; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment
in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on the January 12, 2010 claim against
Defendants.
Dated this 22nd day of July, 2014.
_______________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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