Local 682 Health and Welfare Trust Fund, et al. v. Today's Trucking, Inc.

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for default judgment [Doc. # 16 ] is granted. A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be entered this same date.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/4/11. (KKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LOCAL 682 HEALTH AND WELFARE,
TRUST FUND, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
TODAY’S TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendant.

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No. 4:09-CV-1199 (CEJ)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ second motion for default judgment
pursuant to Rule 55, Fed. R. Civ. P.
I.

Background

Plaintiffs, an employee-benefit fund and its trustees, allege that defendant has
failed to submit contributions owed for hours worked by employees pursuant to the
parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Plaintiffs seek recovery under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which provides that employers
shall make contributions when required by the terms of a CBA. 29 U.S.C. § 1145.
The record indicates that a summons and copy of the complaint was personally
served upon Robert Wallace, defendant’s registered agent, on September 27, 2009.
(Doc. #3). Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 8, 2010. Counsel for
plaintiffs has submitted an affidavit stating that he sent defendant a copy of the
amended complaint by certified mail on September 8, 2010. (Doc. #9-1). Defendant
has not answered or filed any responsive pleadings in this matter and the Clerk of the
Court entered default against defendant on November 3, 2010. (Doc. #12).

Plaintiffs filed their first motion for default judgment on November 1, 2010.
Finding the record insufficient to support the amount of damages claimed by plaintiffs,
the Court ordered plaintiff to supplement their motion for default judgment on
December 14, 2010. On April 18, 2011, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for default
judgment without prejudice as still deficient. On May 16, 2011, plaintiffs filed a second
motion for default judgment. Attached to plaintiffs’ motion is a revised affidavit by
Tina Pannier1 that further explains the basis for plaintiffs’ damages calculations. (Doc.
#16). Plaintiffs have also submitted an additional memorandum explaining the amount
of interest and interest in lieu of liquidated damages that plaintiffs request. (Doc.
#17).
II.

Legal Standard

"[E]ntry of default by the Clerk does not entitle the non-defaulting party to a
default judgment as a matter of right." United States v. $345,510.00 in U.S. Currency,
2002 WL 22040 at *2 (D. Minn. 2002). Default judgments are not favored in the law.
United States ex rel. Time Equip. Rental & Sales, Inc. v. Harre, 983 F.2d 128, 130 (8th
Cir.1993).

Whether to grant default judgment is a separate question within the

discretion of the Court. See Fingerhut Corp. v. Ackra Direct Marketing Corp., 86 F.3d
852, 856 (8th Cir. 1996). In considering a motion for default judgment, the Court is
mindful that, by defaulting, defendant is deemed to have admitted for purposes of this
action all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint.
Ballwin, 859 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1988).

See Taylor v. City of

While factual allegations in the

complaint are generally taken as true, those allegations relating to the amount of
damages must be proven. See Everyday Learning Corp. v. Larson, 242 F.3d 815, 818

Tina Pannier is an administrator for the plaintiff-trust-fund.

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(8th Cir. 2001); Stephenson v. El-Batrawi, 524 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 2008)
(district court must provide detailed findings regarding damage calculations, even in
default judgments, and “generic reference to evidentiary support for the damages
determination” is insufficient. Id. at 917).
III.

Discussion

Taking the allegations in their complaint as true, plaintiffs have established that
defendant was bound by the CBA submitted by plaintiffs during the period from April
1, 2004 through June 30, 2007. They have also established that defendant breached
the CBA by failing to submit contributions owed for the same period. Consistent with
ERISA, the CBA provides for liquidated damages, fees and costs associated with these
unpaid contributions as well as a right to examine defendant’s payroll records. 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). Having determined that plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment
based upon their amended complaint, the Court must next examine whether they have
submitted sufficient evidence to show they are entitled to the amount of damages they
seek. Stephenson, 524 F.3d at 916-17.
The Court denied plaintiffs’ first motion for default judgment due to several
evidentiary shortcomings that prevented the Court from determining whether the
amounts requested by plaintiffs were reasonable. (Doc. #15). Specifically, the Court
noted in its April 18, 2011 order that plaintiffs had failed to provide any evidence
explaining how the weekly-contribution rate provided for in the parties’ CBA was
determined.

The Court also noted that plaintiffs had not explained the damages

amounts claimed for pre-judgment interest and interest in lieu of liquidated damages.
Finally, the Court directed plaintiffs to include a memorandum in support of any future
motion for default judgment pursuant to Local Rule 4.01(A).

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The additional memoranda and affidavit submitted by plaintiffs in support of
their second motion for default judgment have addressed these deficiencies and the
Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to the damages requested in their second motion
for default judgment. The revised affidavit by Tina Pannier, attached to plaintiffs’
second motion for default judgment, explains that the weekly-contribution rate owed
by defendant for any unreported hours is set by plaintiffs at their discretion through
notices issued periodically to employers that are parties to the CBA. (Doc. #16-1).
This explanation is not inconsistent with the terms of the parties’ CBA. (Doc. #1-3 and
1-4).

Plaintiffs have also submitted a spreadsheet indicating the amount of

contributions owed by defendant on a week-by-week basis as determined by a payroll
audit performed by the firm Wolfe Nilges Nahorski, P.C. at plaintiffs’ request. (Doc.
#10-3 and 14).

The amount of damages requested by plaintiffs for unpaid

contributions-- $2,485.58--is supported by these calculations and is consistent with the
terms of the CBA. (Doc. #1-3). The amount damages for interest on the unpaid
contributions--$223.70--is also in accordance with the parties’ CBA and the payroll
audit calculations submitted by plaintiffs. (Doc. #19-5).
Next, plaintiffs request that the Court award an additional $223.70 in lieu of
liquidated damages based upon 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). (Doc. No. 19-5 and 20-2).
Section 1132(g)(2)(c) provides that, in addition to unpaid contributions and interest,
the Court shall award “an amount equal to the greater of-- (i) interest on the unpaid
contributions, or (ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an amount not
in excess of 20 percent.” As such, plaintiffs are entitled to an additional award equal
to the amount of interest owed on the contributions owed by defendant and the total

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amount of damages owed to plaintiffs equals $2,932.98 ($2,485.58+$223.70
+$223.70).
Finally, plaintiffs request that the Court award them attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $2,187.00 and costs in the amount of $475.92. Plaintiffs have submitted
an affidavit by their attorney, Daniel McLaughlin, that indicates that his firm expended
16.2 hours on this matter. (Doc. #10-1). This amount does not include any time
spent to remedy the deficiencies the Court found in plaintiffs’ original motion for default
judgment. Id. The McLaughlin affidavit further states that his hourly rate is $135.00
per hour and that plaintiffs have incurred expenses in the amount of $475.9 for the
cost of filing, copies, postage, and service. Id. The Court finds that the amount of
attorneys’ fees requested by plaintiffs is reasonable in light of the nature and amount
of work performed in this matter.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment [Doc.
#16] is granted.
A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be
entered this same date.

CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 4th day of October, 2011.

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