Espinola v. Ingersoll Rand, Inc. et al
Filing
170
OPINION, MEMORANDUM, AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings shall be DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that individual defendants James Wardlaw, Gordon Shaw, Jim Kingsley, Carol Bloomfield and Sarah Gre enwood shall be DISMISSED as parties. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Plaintiff Espinola's Title VII disparate treatment claim is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Plaintiff Espinola's MHRA disparate treatment claim is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Plaintiff Espinola's Title VII and MHRA retaliation claims is DENIED. Signed by Honorable Henry E. Autrey on 3/8/12. (TRC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ALBERTO ESPINOLA, an individual, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
INGERSOLL RAND COMPANY,
)
JAMES WARDLAW, GORDON
)
SHAW, JIM KINGSLEY, CAROL
)
BLOOMFIELD, AND SARAH
)
GREENWOOD,
)
)
Defendants.
)
No. 4:09CV02090 HEA
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Ingersoll Rand Company
(“IRC”), James Wardlaw, Gordon Shaw, Jim Kingsley. Carol Blomfield, and
Sarah Greenwood’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings [ECF No. 141] and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF
No. 86]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is denied, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in
part, and denied in part.
Factual Background1
As an initial matter, “[t]he moving party bears the burden to demonstrate
that there is no issue of material fact. The plaintiff may not then simply point to
allegations made in her complaint but must identify and provide evidence of
‘specific facts creating a triable controversy.’ Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173
F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir. 1999). Simply providing a massive record does not
satisfy this burden, and we will not sort through a voluminous record in an effort
to find support for the plaintiff’s allegations. Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
355 F.3d 1112, 1113-14 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). See also Johnson v. City of
Shorewood, Nos. 02-3562/4081/03-2023, 2004 WL 405692, at *6 (8th Cir. Dec.
18, 2003) (‘It is not a court’s obligation to search the record for specific facts that
might support a litigant’s claim[.]’).”
We consider only admissible evidence and disregard portions of various
affidavits and depositions that were made without personal knowledge, consist of
hearsay, or purport to state legal conclusions as fact. See Shaver v. Independent
Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 723 (8th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).” Howard v.
Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist., __ F.3d __ (8th Cir. 4/13/2004). (‘[A] district court is
1
The Court’s recitation of the facts is drawn form the parties’ statements of material
facts filed in conjunction with Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s
opposition.
2
not “obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts
which might support the nonmoving party’s claim.”’) (internal citation omitted);
Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998) (“Rule 56 does
not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of
evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.”) (internal citation
omitted); c.f. United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991) (‘Judges
are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.’).” Crossley v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 2004).
In this case, both Plaintiff and Defendant submitted an excessive amount of
“uncontroverted,” “material facts”–most of which were not material to the case.
The following facts were drawn from the parties’ statement of facts, and deemed
material by this Court.
IRC is a global diversified industrial firm providing products and services
ranging from commercial and residential air conditioning to security systems, to
industrial tools, to golf carts. Plaintiff Espinola was an employee of IRC from
March, 2008 to August 31, 2009. At all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint,
Defendants Bloomfield and Greenwood were Human Resources managers at IRC;
Defendant Kingsley was the IRC’s Director of Operations in the Asia Pacific
region; Defendant Wardlaw was IRC’s Director of Global Operational
3
Excellence, Climate Control Technologies; and from July 2008 through the date of
Espinola’s termination, Defendant Shaw was the Director of Global Lean Six
Sigma and Espinola’s direct supervisor at IRC.2
Espinola was hired by IRC at its Bridgeton, Missouri headquarters, with an
effective hire date of March 24, 2008. Defendants contend that Wardlaw was the
IRC employee who hired him; however, Plaintiff claims it was either Rob Miller
or Wardlaw–he is not sure. Upon his hiring, Espinola was assigned to the Climate
Control Manufacturing Operations Excellence department of IRC with the title
Regional Lean Six Sigma Deployment Leader. Espinola’s position with IRC
required a substantial amount of travel, including multiple trips to China. Upon his
hire, Espinola received IRC’s Code of Conduct and IRC’s Harassment Policy. In
2008, Espinola submitted three separate forms reporting to IRC his personal
information, including changes to his address.
On March 3, 2009, Espinola sent an email to Shaw and Wardlaw which
stated that he would like to “base himself” in San Antonio, Texas and travel to
Bridgeton only when his work would require it. According to Defendants, at the
time of Espinola’s request, there was no IRC facility in San Antonio. Defendants
2
Plaintiff agrees that Shaw became his supervisor in July 2008; however, he
contends that between March 2008 and September 2008–when Shaw took over–Plaintiff had no
direct supervisor.
4
contend–and Espinola testified that–Defendant Shaw spoke to Espinola via
telephone and informed him that there will be work for him in St. Louis; therefore,
San Antonio was probably not an option.3
On May 13, 2009, days after Espinola returned from working on a job in
China, Defendant Shaw confronted Espinola and conducted a meeting with him at
Ingersol’s Bridgeton office. Shaw informed Espinola that he had received a
complaint from a manager in China to the effect that Espinola was displaying
disruptive behavior. At this time, Shaw discussed the possibility of Espinola
taking a 360 evaluation. According to Defendants, a 360 evaluation was not any
part of IRC’s disciplinary policy, but was used as a voluntary tool for development
purposes, designed to provide confidential feedback from peers and managers. On
May 15, 2009, Defendants Shaw and Bloomfield met with Espinola to discuss the
360 evaluation in further detail. According to Defendants, and Espinola’s
testimony, no one ever told Espinola that he would be subject to a claim of
insubordination if he did not submit to the 360 evaluation. Pursuant to their
discussion at the May 15 meeting, Defendants claim that they arranged for
Espinola to contact Rowena Hebert, a Manager of Talent Development, to act as a
3
Based on Espinola’s testimony, Shaw’s exact words were “I’m going to have work
for you here in St. Louis so San Antonio is probably out.” Defendants’ Exh. 1, Espinola Dep., at
78.
5
third party point of contact coordinating the 360 evaluation. Subsequent to the
meeting Hebert attempted to contact Espinola via email to initiate the evaluation;
however, Hebert sent the email to the wrong person and Plaintiff didn’t receive the
initial email.
On or about August 7, 2009, Espinola visited an Atlanta Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to discuss filing a charge of discrimination.4
His official charge was filed with EEOC on August 11, 2009, and it alleged “I
believe that I have been discriminated against because of my race (MexicanAmerican), and my national origin (Hispanic) in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended.” See Defendants’ Exh. 58, EEOC Charge of
Discrimination. The charge was in response to the proposed 360 evaluation. On
August 10, 2009, Espinola, using IRC’s online booking tool, booked an airline
ticket to St. Louis for August 24 from San Antonio to St. Louis, with a return on
August 28, 2009. Then, on August 15, 2009, Espinola emailed Defendant Shaw
and copied Wardlaw stating he had fallen ill, and given the symptoms he was
experiencing, he was not optimistic about the future. On August 19, 2009, Shaw
responded to Espinola via email and told him to take care of his health, and to
4
Defendants’ Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts asserts that Plaintiff went
to EEOC on August 6, 2009; however, Plaintiff’s Response contends that he went to EEOC on
August 7, 2009. Plaintiff’s PLNT-OPPO-SUM Exhibit A confirms that he actually went to EEOC
on August 7, 2009.
6
keep him informed regarding when he would return to work. Also on August 19,
Espinola filed an amended charge of discrimination with EEOC, which further
alleged retaliation. On August 24, 2009, Plaintiff Espinola received a telephone
call from Defendant Sarah Greenwood informing him that he was being terminated
for insubordination. The alleged insubordinate conduct in question stemmed from
Espinola’s relocation to San Antonio, Texas. On September 10, 2009, Espinola
amended his charge of discrimination again, adding that he was discharged on
August 24, 2009.
Discussion
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Defendants have filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No.
141] with regard to Plaintiff’s Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) claims, to
which Plaintiff responded [ECF No. 155], Defendants further replied [ECF No.
156], and Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply [ECF No. 161] For the reasons set forth
below, Defendants’ motion is denied.
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that “[a]fter
the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings.” “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where no
material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the movant is entitled to
7
judgment as a matter of law.” Faibisch v. Univ. of Minn., 304 F.3d 797, 803 (8th
Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip.,
207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir.2000)). When presented with a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, a district court must “ ‘accept as true all factual allegations set
out in the complaint” and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff[s], drawing all inferences in [their] favor.’ ” Ashley County, Ark. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Wishnatsky v. Rovner, 433
F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir.2006)).
The standard for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ashley
County, Ark., 552 F.3d at 665. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-70 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
8
merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 557) (quotation mark omitted).
To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must
identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. Id. at 1950-51. These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether
the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51. This is a “contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show
more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. The Court must review the
factual allegations in the complaint “to determine if they plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for
the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in determining
whether plaintiff’s proffered conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more
likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950, 1951-52.
9
Defendants have filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with regard
to Plaintiff’s MHRA claims, alleging that Plaintiff has failed to meet jurisdictional
prerequisites for filing a lawsuit pursuant to the MHRA. Plaintiff opposes the
motion by relying on Mo. Rev. Stat § 213.075(2), which reads as follows:
Any complaint which is filed with the federal Equal Opportunity
commission or other federal agencies with which the commission has a
work-sharing or deferral agreement, or with a local commission which as
been certified as substantially equivalent by the commission, shall be
deemed filed with the commission on the date that such complaint is
received by such federal agency or local commission. ...
Further, Plaintiff Espinola attached as exhibit his official right to sue letter
provided by the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”). See ECF No.
161, Exh. C. To initiate a claim under MHRA, a party must timely file an
administrative complaint with MCHR and either adjudicate the claim through the
MCHR or obtain a right-to-sue letter. Stuart v. General Motors Corp., 217 F.3d
621, 630 (C.A.8 (Mo), 2000); Alhalabi v. Missouri Dept. of Natural Resources,
300 S.W.3d 518, 524 (Mo.App.2009); Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 213.075(2), 213.111(1).
Before applying to the courts for relief, all remedies must be exhausted at the
administrative level. Id. When MHRA claims are involved, appellate courts are
guided by both Missouri law and federal employment discrimination case law that
is consistent with Missouri law. Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231
S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007). Because Plaintiff has provided his right to sue letter
10
issued by MCHR, he has followed the proper state administrative procedure. As
such, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied.
Liability of Individual Defendants
In addition to IRC, Plaintiff Espinola named James Wardlaw, Gordon Shaw,
Jim Kingsley, Carol Bloomfield and Sarah Greenwood as individual defendants in
his Title VII claims. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), liability can only attach to
employers, not individual employees. See also Powell v. Yellow Book USA, Inc.,
445 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2006) (Title VII addresses the conduct of employers
only and does not impose liability on coworkers. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701
et seq.). As such, Espinola’s claims against Defendants Wardlaw, Shaw, Kingsley,
Bloomfield, and Greenwood shall be dismissed.
Summary Judgment Standard - Employment Discrimination
The standards for summary judgment are well settled. In determining
whether summary judgment should issue, the Court views the facts and inferences
from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Woods v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005); Littrell v. City of
Kansas City, Mo., 459 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2006). The moving party has the
11
burden to establish both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that it
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986); Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). Once
the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the
allegations in its pleadings, but by affidavit or other evidence setting forth specific
facts that show a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “[A]
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323.
“Although summary judgment is to be used sparingly in employment
discrimination cases, it is appropriate where one party has failed to present
evidence sufficient to create a jury question as to an essential element of its
claim.” Arnold v. Nursing and Rehabilitation Center at Good Shepherd, LLC, 471
F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). “To successfully parry the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, [Plaintiff] must put forth either (1)
proof of ‘direct evidence’ of discrimination; or (2) a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination through circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting test, and then rebutting any proffered nondiscriminatory reasons
12
for the employment decision with sufficient evidence of pretext. Griffith, 387
F.3d at 736.” King v. Hardesty, 2008 WL 539238, 4 (8th Cir. 2008).
Direct evidence in this context must be strong enough to show “a specific
link between the [alleged] discriminatory animus and the challenged decision,
sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate
criterion actually motivated” the employment decision. Thomas v. First Nat'l
Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted). If
“the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff may survive the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment by creating an inference of unlawful
discrimination under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” McGinnis v. Union Pacific R.R.,
496 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir.2007). “Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a
presumption of discrimination is created when the plaintiff meets his burden of
establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. A minimal
evidentiary showing will satisfy this burden of production.” Davis v. KARK-TV,
Inc., 421 F.3d 699, 704 (8th Cir.2005). To establish his prima facie case of racial
discrimination, Plaintiff must show: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he
met her employer's legitimate expectations; 3) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and 4) similarly situated employees who were not members of the
13
protected class were treated differently. Tolen v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 879, 882
(C.A.8 (Mo), 2004). Under this framework, Plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McGinnis, 496 F.3d at 873
(citation omitted).
“The establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption of unlawful
discrimination, which in turn requires a defendant to come forward with evidence
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the defendant’s actions.” Id. (citation
omitted). “If the defendant articulates such a reason, the burden returns to the
plaintiff to show the defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Plaintiff’s Disparate Treatment Claim Under Title VII
Plaintiff alleges disparate treatment under Title VII and under the MHRA.
The Court will address his Title VII claim first. Plaintiff has not offered any direct
evidence of discrimination, therefore, he must show an inference of unlawful
discrimination under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” McGinnis v. Union Pacific R.R.,
496 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir.2007). In his Complaint, Plaintiff contends that he was
discriminated against when he was directed by Gordon Shaw of IRC to participate
in the 360 performance evaluation, and was given a deadline to complete the
14
evaluation. In applying the prima facie elements of race and national origin
discrimination, the Court notes that neither party disputes whether Plaintiff has
proved the first element of the test: Plainitff is a 61 year old Mexican-American,
therefore, he is a member of a protected class .5
Defendants do contend, however, that Plaintiff has failed to establish the
second element of a prima facie case. They argue that Espinola did not show that
he satisfied IRC’s legitimate expectations because he engaged in disruptive
behavior, insubordination, and abandoned his job. To support this claim,
Defendants cite to statements from multiple IRC employees, and individuals that
worked with IRC on a regular basis, who complained of Espinola’s disruptive
behavior. Based on deposition testimony given by Gordon Shaw, Espinola’s
supervisor, he was getting negative feedback from job sites where Espinola was
assigned. Shaw stated that Jim Kingsley, who worked with Espinola in China,
complained that Espinola was argumentative, displayed disruptive behavior, pitted
people against each other, and was overly demanding. See Def Exh. 7, Shaw Dep.,
at 78-82. Shaw testified that Kingsley received these complaints from Chris
Walmsley, Evren Akcora, and Grace Zhang–all employees who worked Plaintiff in
China. Shaw further testified that he personally received complaints from Katie
5
The Court realizes that Espinola’s age may have changed throughout the course of
this litigation; however, his age is not an issue in this case.
15
Borrer in Louisville, who told him that Espinola was being disruptive,
argumentative, not conducive to working on a team, demanding, and pitted people
against each other. See Id. Shaw also testified that he received direct
correspondence from Manuel Suarez and Ron Jacubek, both assigned at an IRC
job in Chino, California, complaining about Espinola.
The testimony offered by Jim Kingsley during his deposition confirmed
Shaw’s testimony: Kingsley received complaints directly from Walmsley, Akcora,
and Zhang regarding Espinola’s behavior. Kingsley further testified that John
Fenlon also complained to him, stating that Espinola was difficult to work with.
See Def. Exh. 9, Kingsley Dep., at 14-16. The deposition testimony off all these
individuals establishes that Espinola engaged in a pattern of disruptive work
behavior–a pattern that failed to meet the IRC’s legitimate expectations.
Defendants contend that Espinola’s abandonment of his job is what
ultimately led to his termination. As the facts show above, in March of 2009,
Espinola emailed his direct supervisor, Gordon Shaw, and sought permission to
“base himself” in San Antonio, and relocate from the St. Louis/Bridgeton site.
According to Espinola’s deposition testimony, Shaw contacted Espinola via
telephone and stated, “ I think I’m going to have work for you here in St. Louis, so
San Antonio is probably out.” Def. Exh 1, Espinola Dep., at 78. Plaintiff
16
responded, “okay, okay, Gordon [Shaw].” Id. It also undisputed that in 2008,
Espinola submitted three separate forms reporting to IRC his personal information,
including changes to his address. In March 2009, however, Espinola relocated to
Texas and failed to submit forms reporting his change of address. In his
deposition, Espinola contends that he merely “procrastinated” in notifying IRC of
his change of address. On August 4, 2009, over two months after his relocation to
Texas, Tammy Turner emailed Espinola and asked if he was still working out of
the St. Louis location. Def. Exh. 48. Espinola responded that same day stating,
“I’m no longer working out of St. Louis location.” Id.
These facts alone show that Espinola never received permission from his
supervisor, Gordon Shaw, to relocate to San Antonio. In fact, they show that
Espinola went against Shaw’s direct orders. Espinola offers no evidence showing
he had his supervisor’s permission to relocate to San Antonio. As such, Espinola
failed to show that he met IRC’s legitimate expectations by abandoning his job.
With regard to the third element required to prove a prima facie case,
Espinola’s termination is the only adverse employment action he experienced.
Espinola argues that the proposed 360 evaluation also constitutes an adverse
employment action. The Court finds that the evaluation falls short of the activity
covered by the prima facie test. As the undisputed facts state above, Espinola
17
never participated in the evaluation, and no one ever told him that he would be
subject to a claim of insubordination if he did not submit to the 360 evaluation.
With regard to the fourth element required to prove a prima facie case of
disparate treatment, Espinola relies on the Eighth Circuit’s Lake v. Yellow Transp.,
Inc., 596 F.3d 871 (C.A.8 (Minn.). 2010), and suggests that evidence of pretext
can be presumed through a showing that IRC failed to follow its own policies.6 In
the Lake case, the Eighth Circuit held that “[a] plaintiff may show pretext, among
other ways, by showing that an employer (1) failed to follow its own policies, (2)
treated similarly-situated employees in a disparate manner, or (3) shifted its
explanation of the employment decision.” Id. at 874.
Espinola alleges that the 360 evaluation was a violation of IRC’s own
policy by using it as a tool to gather facts, by Shaw requiring him to engage in the
evaluation, and by Rowena’s overview of the process. This argument fails.
According to deposition testimony by Wardlaw, Shaw, and Bloomfield, and a
sworn affidavit by Greenwood, a 360 evaluation was not any part of IRC’s
disciplinary policy, but was used as a voluntary tool for development purposes,
designed to provide confidential feedback from peers and managers. Based on
6
The Eighth Circuit has held that evidence of pretext, normally considered at step
three of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, can satisfy the inference-of-discrimination element of the
prima facie case. Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir.2003).
18
sworn affidavits in the record, both Greenwood and Kingsley participated in their
own 360 evaluation and both individuals stated that they have never been
disciplined in any way. See Def. Exh. 25, Greenwood Aff. and Def. Exh. 41,
Kingsley Aff. The evaluation is conducted by an outside resource and paid for by
IRC. Espinola has provided no evidence that the 360 evaluation violates IRC’s
policies, or that similarly situated employees were treated in a disparate manner.
Under this analysis, Plaintiff’s reliance on the Lake case to prove the fourth prima
facie element fails.
Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case that creates a presumption
of unlawful discrimination. Assuming in arguendo that he was able to establish
such, Defendants put forward evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for Plaintiff’s termination–Espinola’s disruptive behavior and the job
abandonment. As such, the burden returns to Plaintiff to show IRC’s decision to
terminate him was pretextual. McGinnis, 496 F.3d at 873 . Plaintiff has failed to
offer any evidence that he was treated differently than similarly situated nonHispanic and non-Mexican employees. He acknowledged in his deposition that no
IRC employee ever said anything to him about his race, national origin, ethnicity,
color of skin, or ancestry. As such, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim shall be granted.
19
Plaintiff’s Disparate Treatment Claim under MHRA
Because Plaintiff asserts claims under the MHRA, the Court also looks to
Missouri law in resolving Defendant's Motion. Under the MHRA, an employer is
prohibited from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual
based on, among other things, race and age. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.055. The MHRA
defines “discrimination” as “any unfair treatment based on [race, ... ]as it relates to
employment” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010(5). In Daugherty v. City of Maryland
Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 820-21 (Mo.2007) (en banc), the Missouri Supreme
Court held that a discrimination claim survives summary judgment “if there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether [race and/or age] was a ‘contributing
factor’ in [defendant's] termination decision.” Id. at 820; Baker v. Silver Oak
Senior Living Mgmt. Co., 2007 WL 2994318, at *7 (W.D.Mo. Oct.11,
2007)(analyzing age discrimination claim brought under MHRA using
contributory factor test).
Daugherty rejected defendant's argument in that case that the burdenshifting analysis that McDonnell Douglas requires be applied to Title VII cases to
make out an indirect federal discrimination claim applies to claims of harassment
under state law. Rather, Daugherty teaches, the right to sue under Missouri law is
quite naturally governed by the relevant Missouri statute, the MHRA. That statute:
20
defines “discrimination” to include “any unfair treatment based on race, color,
religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates to employment, disability,
or familial status as it relates to housing.” Section 213.010(5) (emphasis added).
Daugherty further stated that courts must look to Missouri Approved Jury
Instruction 31.24 to determine the elements a plaintiff must prove to prevail on an
employment discrimination claim. Under MAI 31.24, Espinola must establish that
1) Defendants terminated Plaintiff, 2) that Plaintiff’s race was a contributing factor
in his termination, and 3) as a direct result of the evaluation and termination,
Plaintiff suffered damage.
As discussed above, Espinola offers no evidence that his race was a
contributing factor that lead to his ultimate termination. And Plaintiff has no
evidence rebutting IRC’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its action.
Further, Espinola has failed to offer any evidence that shows his termination was a
pretext for intentional discrimination. Espinola admitted that no one at IRC ever
said anything to him about his national origin or race, . Because Plaintiff has failed
to provide any circumstance of unfair treatment based on his race, Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Espinola’s disparate treatment
claim is granted.
Plaintiff’s Title VII Retaliation Claim
21
Espinola contends that he was terminated due to his discrimination charge
he filed with the EEOC. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation,
plaintiff must establish that 1) he complained of discrimination; 2) Defendants
took adverse action against him; 3) the adverse action was causally linked to the
complaint of discrimination. Marzec v. Marsh, 990 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1993).
There is no question that on or about August 7, 2009, Espinola visited an Atlanta
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to discuss filing a charge
of discrimination, which was ultimately filed on August 11, 2009. On August 19,
Espinola filed an amended charge of discrimination with EEOC, which further
alleged retaliation. Five days later, on August 24, Sarah Greenwood of IRC called
Espinola and informed him that he had been terminated. With these facts in mind,
Espinola has met the first two elements of a prima facie retaliation claim: he
complained of discrimination when he filed his EEOC charge, and he suffered
adverse employment action when IRC terminated him. With regard to the third
element of the prima facie case, “[t]he requisite causal connection may be proved
circumstantially by proof that the discharge followed the protected activity so
closely in time as to justify an inference of retaliatory motive.” Rath v. Selection
Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.1992). Under this analysis, Plaintiff has
met the all of the prima facie elements. The fact the he was terminated a mere five
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days after he amended his EEOC charge, justifies an inference of retaliatory
motive. As such, Defendant’s request for summary judgment with regard to
Espinola’s retaliation claim is denied.
Plaintiff’s MHRA Retaliation Claim
As discussed above, the fact that Plaintiff was terminated such a short
time after filing his EEOC charge justifies an inference of retaliatory motive on
behalf of IRC. See Id.; See also Eckelkamp v. Beste, 201 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1032
(E.D.Mo.2002).
Conclusion
For the reasons indicated, Plaintiff Espinola’s claims against individual
defendants James Wardlaw, Gordon Shaw, Jim Kingsley, Carol Bloomfield and
Sarah Greenwood shall be dismissed. Additionally, the Court finds that
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings shall be denied because
Plaintiff showed the followed the proper administrative procedure by obtaining a
right to sue letter from the MCHR. The Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment with regard to Espinola’s disparate treatment claim because
he failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnel Douglass framework.
Additionally, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
with regard to Espinola’s MHRA disparate treatment claim because he failed to
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establish that racial discrimination was a contributing factor to his termination.
Espinola was able to establish a prima facie case with regard to his Title VII and
MHRA retaliation claims; therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims is denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings shall be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that individual defendants James Wardlaw,
Gordon Shaw, Jim Kingsley, Carol Bloomfield and Sarah Greenwood shall be
DISMISSED as parties.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment with regard to Plaintiff Espinola’s Title VII disparate treatment claim is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment with regard to Plaintiff Espinola’s MHRA disparate treatment claim is
GRANTED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment with regard to Plaintiff Espinola’s Title VII and MHRA retaliation
claims is DENIED.
Dated this 8th day of March, 2012.
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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