Small Hearts Daycare II, LLC et al v. Quick

Filing 124

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Kathy Quick's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [ECF No. 90 ] is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion to Strike [ECF No. 120 ] is DENIED. Signed by Honorable Henry E. Autrey on 3/30/12. (TRC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SMALL HEARTS DAYCARE
CENTER II, LLC & WALTER
COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
KATHY QUICK, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:09CV2132 HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Kathy Quick’s Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [ECF
No. 90]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.
Background
Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of
their right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs operate a daycare center. Plaintiffs
received the proper state license to run the center in 2007. In 2009, plaintiffs filed
an application for renewal of the license. Before receiving an official response to
the application, Quick ordered plaintiffs to stop providing care for more than four
unrelated children, and Quick told plaintiffs that if they continued to provide care

to more than four unrelated children, they would be subject to criminal penalties.
After ordering plaintiffs to reduce their business, Quick informed third parties that
plaintiffs’ license had expired. At this point, plaintiffs had not received any
formal hearing on the matter. Plaintiffs argue that Quick failed to conform to the
relevant state statutes governing administrative review of the disruption or
modification of the use and enjoyment of daycare licenses. Plaintiffs further argue
that Quick’s actions violated their right to procedural due process under the
Constitution because they were entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing under
Missouri law. And plaintiffs maintain that defendants tortiously interfered with
their business in violation of Missouri law.
After this case was filed, plaintiff Small Hearts Daycare Center, LLC,
(“Small Hearts”) entered into an agreement with the Missouri Department of
Health and Senior Services, Section for Child Care Regulation (“DHSS”) to renew
the license to operate the daycare center, with Small Hearts to serve a probationary
period of six months.
Defendant moves to dismiss the action on the grounds that the settlement
with DHSS mooted this action, that the Court should abstain from hearing this
action under the Pullman, Younger, and Rooker-Feldman doctrines, that the

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Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims, and that she is entitled to
qualified immunity.
Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a civil rights complaint must contain facts
which state a claim as a matter of law and must not be conclusory.” Gregory v.
Dillards, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quotations and citation
omitted).
[A] plaintiff must assert facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest
that the pleader has the right he claims rather than facts that are
merely consistent with such a right. While a plaintiff need not set
forth detailed factual allegations or specific facts that describe the
evidence to be presented, the complaint must include sufficient
factual allegations to provide the grounds on which the claim rests. A
district court, therefore, is not required to divine the litigant’s intent
and create claims that are not clearly raised, and it need not conjure
up unpled allegations to save a complaint.
Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
Discussion
1.

Mootness

Defendant argues that the settlement of the state administrative case moots
the instant lawsuit because there is nothing left to adjudicate. The Court
disagrees. Plaintiff is suing defendant for compensatory damages relating to the
notices she sent to third parties and for the alleged deprivations of her right to due
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process. And plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of a permanent injunction
prohibiting defendant from denying hearings to daycare owners. These matters
were not adjudicated in the settlement between Small Hearts and DHHS. As a
result, defendant’s argument fails.
2.

Abstention Doctrines

Defendant argues that the Court should abstain from adjudicating plaintiffs’
claims pursuant to the Pullman, Younger, and Rooker-Feldman doctrines.
Defendant filed a “notice of supplemental authority in support of [her] motion to
dismiss” on September 28, 2011. The filing is somewhat surprising because the
“supplemental authority” is a case from this Court finding, in part, that the
abstention doctrines did not apply in circumstances very similar to this case. See
T.Y.B.E. Learning Center v. Hon. Joseph Bindbeutel, 4:09CV1463 CEJ, 2011 WL
2898496 (E.D. Mo. July 19, 2011). The Court finds the reasoning in T.Y.B.E.
Learning Center on this issue to be persuasive.
a.

Pullman Doctrine

The Pullman abstention doctrine requires consideration of (1) the effect
abstention would have on the rights to be protected by considering the nature of
both the right and necessary remedy; (2) available state remedies; (3) whether the
challenged state law is unclear; (4) whether the challenged state law is fairly
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susceptible to an interpretation that would avoid any federal constitutional
question; and (5) whether abstention will avoid unnecessary federal interference in
state operations. Beavers v. Arkansas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 151 F.3d
838, 840–41 (8th Cir.1998).
Where resolution of the federal constitutional question is dependent
upon, or may be materially altered by, the determination of an
uncertain issue of state law, abstention may be proper in order to
avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations, interference with
important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state
law, and premature constitutional adjudication. . . . The doctrine . . .
contemplates that deference to state court adjudication only be made
where the issue of state law is uncertain.
Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 511 (1972) (quoting Harman v.
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965)) (alterations in original).
Defendant has failed to identify a state law that is unclear, susceptible to an
interpretation that would avoid any federal constitutional question. As a result, the
Pullman doctrine is inapplicable.
b.

Younger Doctrine

The Younger abstention doctrine1 provides that federal courts should
abstain from exercising jurisdiction when (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding,
(2) which implicates important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate

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See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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opportunity to raise any relevant federal questions in the state proceeding.
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982). Even if these three requirements are met, a federal court should not
abstain if there is a showing of “bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary
circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Plouffe v. Ligon, 606
F.3d 890, 893 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)). Plaintiffs did not have an opportunity
to raise their federal claims in the administrative proceedings with the DHHS. As
a result, the Younger doctrine does not apply.
c.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine stands for the general principle that, with the
exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to review state court judicial decisions. Prince v. Arkansas Bd. of
Examiners in Psychology, 380 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir.2004) (citing D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–83 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923)). However, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine is
concerned only with state court determinations and presents no jurisdictional
obstacle to judicial review of executive actions, including decisions made by state
administrative agencies. Gilbert v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900
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(7th Cir.2010) (citing Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n of
Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n. 3 (2002)). Many litigants who lose in state
administrative proceedings seek relief in federal district court under civil rights
legislation such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and they generally do not have to exhaust
administrative remedies before pursuing such claims. Lemonds v. St. Louis
County, 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir.2000) ( citing Van Harken v. Chicago, 103
F.3d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir.1997) and Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002))
(internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs’ claims against defendants do not involve
state court judicial decisions, and thus, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine is
inapplicable.
3.

Official Capacity Claims

Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ claims against her in her official capacity
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, “the Eleventh Amendment
permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in
violation of federal law.” Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437
(2004). As a result, plaintiffs’ official capacity claims will not be dismissed.
4.

Qualified Immunity

Defendant argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because “there
exists no constitutional right to be free from Missouri’s daycare licensure
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requirements.” However, plaintiff has brought no such claim. Plaintiffs allege
that defendant violated their due process rights by failing to follow Missouri law.
As a result, defendant has failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to qualified
immunity.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Kathy Quick’s Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [ECF
No. 90] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike [ECF No.
120] is DENIED.
Dated this 30th day of March, 2012.

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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