Pitts et al v. City of Cuba et al

Filing 165

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Scott Parish's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 148 ] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Frank Magel and Shane Spratt's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 155 ] is DENIED. Signed by District Judge E. Richard Webber on August 30, 2012. (BRP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

SHARON PITTS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF CUBA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:10CV00274 ERW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Scott Parish’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 148] and Defendants Frank Magel and Shane Spratt’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 155].
I.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 16, 2010, Plaintiffs Sharon Pitts, Lisa King, Marilyn Copling, and Daniel

Pitts (“Plaintiffs”) filed a pro se complaint against twenty-two individuals and eight public entities
[ECF No. 1], and an amended complaint January 31, 2012 [ECF No. 89]. Plaintiffs set forth
thirty-five counts of alleged constitutional and civil rights violations.
On April 25, 2012, Defendant Scott Parish filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF
No. 148], alleging that Plaintiffs Sharon Pitts, King, and Copling had made no claims against
Parish, and that Plaintiff Daniel Pitts had released any and all claims against Parish [ECF No.
151]. Plaintiffs did not file a response to Defendant Parish’s motion.
On June 12, 2012, Defendants Frank Magel and Shane Spratt filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 155], alleging that Plaintiffs had failed to timely respond to Defendants’ Rule
36 Requests for Admission, that Plaintiffs were deemed to have admitted each statement set forth,

and that as a result there existed no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that Defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition July 6,
2012 [ECF No. 160]. Defendants filed their reply July 13, 2012 [ECF No. 162].
II.

DISCUSSION
A court shall grant a motion for summary judgment only if the moving party shows that

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a
genuine dispute is one “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). There is no genuine issue as
to any material fact if the nonmoving party has failed to “make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case . . . .” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
A.

DEFENDANT PARISH’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On April 25, 2012, Defendants Scott Parish and Nicholas Mathews filed a Joint
Stipulation to Dismissal with Prejudice, agreed to by Plaintiff Daniel Pitts, requesting an Order of
Dismissal with Prejudice as to the causes of action against the two defendants [ECF No. 151].
That Order was entered by this Court April 26, 2012 [ECF No. 152]. Defendant Parish is now
seeking summary judgment, alleging that the order disposed of all counts against him.
A review of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint finds four counts directed against Defendant
Parish: Counts IV, IX, XIII, and XVIII [ECF No. 89 at *76-86]. Each count alleges a violation
by Defendant Parish of “Plaintiff Daniel Pitts”’s constitutional rights. Every factual allegation
against Defendant Parish made by Plaintiffs relates to alleged conduct by Parish against Plaintiff

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Daniel Pitts. Thus there remains no factual basis on which any plaintiff but Daniel Pitts, whose
claims have been dismissed, could maintain suit against Defendant Parish.
Because this Court concludes there remains no genuine issue of material fact as to
Defendant Parish, in that there are no facts supporting any element of the remaining Plaintiffs’
claims, this Court will grant Defendant Parish’s motion for summary judgment.
B.

DEFENDANTS MAGEL AND SPRATT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Rule 36, Plaintiffs were served with a set of thirty requests for admission
[ECF No. 157-1]. Rule 36 states in part that:
A party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of
the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)
relating to: facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either; and the
genuineness of any described documents. . . . A matter is admitted unless, within
30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the
requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed
by the party or its attorney.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). While requests for admission may properly pertain to “the application of
law to fact,” pure legal conclusions, or the truth of legal conclusions, are outside the scope of
requests for admission. See Aventure Communications Technology, L.L.C. v. MCI
Communications Services, Inc., 2008 WL 4280371 at *1 (N.D. Ia. 2008); OpenMethods, LLC v.
Mediu, LLC, 2012 WL 2736471 at *1-2 (W.D. Mo. 2012).
This Court has no trouble concluding that requests 1-6 were improper requests for
Plaintiffs to admit legal conclusions. As an example, request 2 demands, “Admit that Defendants
did not conspire to deprive you or the other Plaintiffs, either directly or indirectly, of equal
protection of rights or to obstruct justice.” [ECF No. 157-1 at *3]. Regardless whether Plaintiffs

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timely responded to these admissions, Defendants’ requests for admissions 1-6 exceeded the
scope of Rule 36 and form no basis for requested relief by Defendants.
Requests 7-30 present a more difficult question, as they ask Plaintiffs to admit that they
possess no evidence supporting their claims. This Court notes that requests for admission are not
intended to obtain discovery, “but rather are intended to establish the admission of facts about
which there is no real dispute.” Stockdale v. Stockdale, 2009 WL 5217001 at *2 (E.D. Mo.
2009). Defendants’ requests are largely argumentative, repetitive, and ambiguous. For instance,
Request 9 asks Plaintiffs to “[a]dmit that you do not have any documents or tangible things
demonstrating or indicating that your rights were violated by Defendants . . . .” while request 10
asks Plaintiffs to “[a]dmit that you are in possession of documents or tangible things
demonstrating or indicating that your rights were violated by Defendants . . . .” [ECF No. 157-1
at *4 (italics added)]. These overly broad, general, and repetitive questions fail to adhere to the
scope and purpose of Rule 36, in that they are not intended to narrow issues for trial, but rather
appear intended to dispose of Plaintiffs’ claims. Requesting that Plaintiffs admit they possess no
evidence supporting a claim is hardly more appropriate than requesting they admit they have no
claim. This Court concludes that Defendants’ requests fail to comply with the letter and spirit of
Rule 36, in that they are not crafted in a manner to resolve facts as to which there is no real
dispute. The purpose of Rule 36 is to “promote efficiency, reduce costs, and narrow the issues
for trial.” Stockdale, 2009 WL 5217007 at *2. However, “the[se] requests appear to have the
opposite effect, multiplying the proceedings and unnecessarily burdening [the opposing party] and
the Court . . . .” Id. Thus any constructive admission by Plaintiffs to Defendants’ requests for
admissions 7-30 form no basis for requested relief by Defendants.

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Even if this Court were to conclude that Defendants’ requests were appropriate under
Rule 36, this Court would nonetheless conclude that Plaintiffs, in submitting their answers out of
time, effectively withdrew any deemed admission. Plaintiffs’ response was submitted some forty
days after expiration of the thirty-day window [ECF No. 157-2]; thus pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)
the matters would have been deemed admitted. However, in this circuit late responses are treated
as the functional equivalent of a motion to withdraw admissions under Rule 36(b). Warren v.
Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 544 F.2d 334, 33940 (8th Cir. 1974); Quasius v. Schwan Food Co., 596 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir. 2010) (“These
decisions are best understood as exercising authority to permit withdrawal or amendment of
admissions under Rule 36(b), because the party who admitted matters later filed with the court a
pleading that was sufficient to constitute a ‘motion’ under a liberal reading of the rule.”); see also
Bergemann v. United States, 820 F.2d 1117, 11211 (10th Cir. 1987) (treating a motion in
response to summary judgment motion, along with late responses to requests for admission, as “in
essence, motions to withdraw the admissions.”). In light of Plaintiffs’ pro se status, this Court is
comfortable employing a liberal standard. Plaintiffs’ motion in response to summary judgment,
along with their late responses to Defendants’ requests for admission, are treated as motions to
withdraw their admissions. The question thus is whether allowing the constructive motion to
withdraw would satisfy the two-prong test for acceptance of a late admission: that acceptance
would “promote the presentation of the merits” and would not “prejudice the requesting party.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Prusia, 18 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir.
1994).
The first test is easily satisfied. Defendants’ requests for admission seek less to establish
factual predicates for trial and more to dismantle Plaintiffs’ claims. Each request seeks to have

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Plaintiffs admit either that no constitutional violations occurred or to admit that Plaintiffs have no
evidence supporting their allegations. If the admissions would prevent Plaintiffs from having their
claims considered, allowing withdrawal promotes the presentation on the merits. See Prusia, 18
F.3d at 640 (8th Cir. 1994); Bryant v. Laiko Int’l Co., 2006 WL 2788520 at *2 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
As to the second test, accepting Plaintiffs’ response opposing summary judgment as a
withdrawal of admissions will not prejudice Defendants. A defendant is prejudiced to the extent
they are harmed in presenting their case. Laiko Int’l, 2006 WL 2788520 at *3. In evaluating
harm to Defendants, this Court finds it appropriate to ask whether Defendants could reasonably
have believed that Plaintiffs intended to admit facts which were so vital that they amounted to a
complete waiver of Defendants’ liability. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Triumph Motorcycle Corp.,
71 F.R.D. 192, 192 (D. Conn. 1976). This Court concludes that Defendants would not have been
reasonable in believing that Plaintiffs’ tardy response constituted a waiver of Defendants’ liability.
Defendants knew or should have known that the nature of their requests for admission would not
result in information which would aid in discovery or trial preparation, as Plaintiffs would not
have intended to admit facts so vital that they would have waived Defendants’ liability. Because
Defendants could not reasonably have relied upon Plaintiffs’ late Responses as admissions, they
cannot reasonably claim prejudice in allowing withdrawal of those admissions.
Because this Court concludes that accepting Plaintiffs’ response as a withdrawal of
admission will promote the resolution of Plaintiffs’ suit on the merits, and because Defendants are
not prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ late submission of their response to admission, this Court concludes
that Defendants’ request for summary judgment based on Plaintiffs’ untimely response should be
denied.

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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Scott Parish’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 148] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Frank Magel and Shane Spratt’s Motion
for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 155] is DENIED.
Dated this 30th Day of August, 2012.

_______________________________________
E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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