Espinola v. Ingersoll Rand Company et al

Filing 8

OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pltff.'s 5 MOTION to Remand Case to State Court to St. Louis County, Missouri is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that deft. Ingersoll Rand Inc. will be substituted for Hussmann. Signed by Honorable Henry E. Autrey on 8/30/10. (CLA)

Espinola v. Ingersoll Rand Company et al

Doc. 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT E A S T E R N DISTRICT OF MISSOURI E A S T E R N DIVISION A L B E R T O ESPINOLA, P l a i n t if f , v. H U S M A N N CORPORATION, C A R O L BLOOMFIELD AND S A R A H GREENWOOD, D e fe n d a n t. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

N o . 4:10-CV-00407HEA

O P I N I O N , MEMORANDUM AND ORDER T h is matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Doc. No. 5]. Defendant Hussmann Corporation ("Hussmann") opposes the Motion. For the reasons set o u t below, the Motion is denied. F a c ts and Background P r io r to initiating the instant case, on December 21, 2009, Plaintiff commenced an a c tio n in this Court entitled Alberto Espinola v. Ingersoll Rand, Inc., James Wardlaw, G o r d o n Shaw, Jim Kingsley, Carol Bloomfield and Sarah Greenwood (Case No. 4:09C V -0 2 0 9 0 ) ("Original Action"). The Original Action alleged employment discrimination u n d e r Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis of race, color, religion, g e n d e r , or national origin and retaliation contrary to the anti-retaliation provisions also c o n ta in e d therein.

Dockets.Justia.com

P la in tiff then initiated a second action, this action, by filing a Petition in the M is s o u ri Circuit Court, Twenty-First Judicial Circuit (County of St. Louis) on or around F e b ru a ry 25, 2010. In this action, Plaintiff named Hussmann, Carol Bloomfield, and S a ra h Greenwood as defendants. Plaintiff asserts discrimination claims under the M is s o u ri Human Rights Act, § 213.101 R.S.Mo., et seq. ("MHRA"), alleging defendants d is c rim in a te d against him on the basis of his race and national origin, and in retaliation fo r his objections and complaints regarding the alleged discriminatory acts. In the instant case, Defendant Hussmann, along with third party Ingersoll Rand C o m p a n y ("Ingersoll Rand"), filed a Notice of Removal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, o n March 8, 2010 arguing that this Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 3 2 . Additionally, Defendant Hussmann argued that it had been fraudulently joined in the state court lawsuit for the purpose of destroying diversity jurisdiction in federal court. Hussmann alleges that Ingersoll Rand is the proper defendant and requests the Court d is m is s it from the action and substitute Ingersoll Ran in its place. On April 7, 2010, P lain tiff filed his Motion to Remand the Case to State Court. In his Motion, Plaintiff a rg u e s that the Court lacks jurisdiction due to lack of diversity of citizenship among the d e fe n d a n ts . The question before the Court is who was Plaintiff's employer. The employer is th e real party in interest and, thus, the party whose citizenship must be examined to d e te rm in e diversity jurisdiction. S t a n d a r d for Jurisdiction 2

" F e d e ra l courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power a u th o riz e d by Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 3 7 5 , 377 (1994). A claim may be removed to federal court only if it could have been b r o u g h t in federal court originally; thus, the diversity and amount in controversy re q u ire m e n ts of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 must be met, or the claim must be based upon a federal q u e s tio n pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Peters v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 80 F.3d 257, 260 (8 th Cir. 1996). The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that the p re re q u is ite s to jurisdiction are satisfied. Green v. Ameritide, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 595 (8th C ir. 2002); In re Bus. Men's Assurance Co., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993). Removal statutes must be strictly construed because they impede upon states' rig h ts to resolve controversies in their own courts. Nichols v. Harbor Venture, Inc., 284 F .3 d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2002). Although a defendant has a statutory right to remove when ju ris d ic tio n is proper, the plaintiff remains the master of the claim and any doubts about th e propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand. See In re Bus. Men's Assurance C o ., 992 F.2d at 183; McHugh v. Physicians Health Plan of Greater St. Louis, 953 F. S u p p . 296, 299 (E.D. Mo. 1997). If "at any time before final judgment it appears that the d istric t court lacks subject matter jurisdiction," the case must be remanded to the state co u rt from which it was removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). D is c u s s io n In his state court petition, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the MHRA b y requiring him to do a "360 Evaluation," by not allowing him to live in Texas, and for 3

te rm in a tin g his employment. As discussed above, Plaintiff's state court action listed H u s s m a n n , Carol Bloomfield, and Sarah Greenwood­all Missouri residents­as d e fe n d a n ts . Ingersoll Rand, a New Jersey corporation, was not a named defendant in the sta te court action. However, when Defendant Hussmann filed its Notice of Removal, co u n sel for Ingersoll Rand, who also represents Hussmann, requested that the Court s u b s titu te Ingersoll Rand for Hussmann as the proper defendant, thereby establishing d iv e rsity jurisdiction. Furthermore, counsel for Hussmann and Ingersoll Rand suggests th a t Plaintiff has attempted to avoid the jurisdiction of this Court by intentionally naming th e wrong party to the lawsuit. G e n e ra lly , "[j]oinder designed solely to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction is fra u d u le n t and will not prevent removal." Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. AT & T C o m m u n ic a tio n s , Inc.. 2001 WL 36143293 at *2. "Joinder is fraudulent, if on the face of th e state court complaint, no cause of action lies against the resident defendant." Id. (c itin g Reeb v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 185, 187 (E.D. Mo. 1995)). Additionally, when "the reviewing court finds that the plaintiff has no real intention of p ro se c u tin g the action against the resident defendant, joinder is fraudulent and removal is p ro p e r. Reeb, 902 F.Supp at 187. The burden of proving the existence of fraudulent jo in d e r rests with the removing party. Parnas v. General Motors Corp., 879 F.Supp. 91, 9 2 (E.D.Mo. 1995). C o u n se l for Hussmann and Ingersoll Rand assert that diversity jurisdiction exists b e c a u s e the proper defendant, Ingersoll Rand, is a New Jersey citizen. Plaintiff is a 4

c itiz e n of Texas, and both defendants Bloomfield and Greenwood are Missouri citizens. T h u s , if Ingersoll Rand is substituted as the proper defendant, there will be diversity of c itiz e n s h ip . In support of their position, Defendant Hussmann has provided the Court with v a rio u s documents which, they contend, confirm that Ingersoll Rand is, in fact, the proper d e fe n d a n t. Of note, Hussmann and Ingersoll provided the Court with, inter alia, P la in tif f' s W-2's and pay stubs which bear the Ingersoll Rand name [Doc. #1, Attach. 13], p ro o f that Plaintiff authorized Ingersoll Rand to directly deposit his paycheck [Doc #1, A tta c h . D2], an "offer of employment" correspondence from Ingersoll Rand [Doc #1, A tta c h . D1], and various documents which reaffirm that Plaintiff was an employee of In g e rs o ll Rand [see Doc. #1]. In addition to these documents, Defendant Hussmann d ire c ts the Court's attention to the Original Action Plaintiff brought before the Court prior to filing their state court complaint. In his Original Action, Plaintiff continually asserts th a t Ingersoll Rand was his employer and seeks to hold the corporation liable under Title V II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Remand focuses entirely on In g e rso ll Rand's failure to file a formal motion to join or intervene, and is completely d ev o id of any assertion that Ingersoll Rand is not the proper defendant. Plaintiff's re lia n c e on formality over legality is misplaced. W h e n the Court determines jurisdiction, we look to "the citizenship of the real p arties in interest; and where there is complete diversity between them, the presence of a 5

n o m in a l party with no real interest in the controversy will be disregarded. Sprint S p e c tr u m L.P., WL 36143293 at *4 (citing Hann v. City of Clinton, Okla., ex rel. S c h u e tte r , 131 F.2d 978, 981 (10th Cir. 1942)). Based upon consideration of the record, it is clear that Plaintiff has no cause of action against Hussmann. Plaintiff was, in fact, e m p lo y e d by Ingersoll Rand; therefore, they are the proper defendant in this employment d iscrim inatio n action. Hussmann has been fraudulently named as a defendant in an effort to defeat federal jurisdiction in this matter. Therefore, the Court finds that Ingersoll Rand s h a ll be substituted for Defendant Hussmann as the proper defendant in this lawsuit. As a re s u lt, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand will be denied. CONCLUSION B a se d upon the foregoing analysis, Ingersoll Rand is the proper defendant in this a c tio n and it will be substituted for Defendant Hussmann. Thus, there is complete d iv e rs ity of citizenship between Plaintiff and Defendants, and the Court therefore denies P la in tif fs ' Motion for Remand. Accordingly, I T IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Doc. No.5] is D E N IE D . I T IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Ingersoll Rand Inc. will be substituted for H u s s m a n n .. D a te d this 30th day of August, 2010.

6

______________________________ HENRY EDWARD AUTREY U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7