Process Controls International, Inc. v. Emerson Process Management et al

Filing 439

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (see order for details) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, for a new trial [# 425 ] is denied. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 06/03/2013. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
PROCESS CONTROLS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., d/b/a
AUTOMATION SERVICE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EMERSON PROCESS
MANAGEMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:10CV645 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before me is Automation Service’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter
of law, or in the alternative, motion for a new trial. I granted summary judgment on
some claims; the case was tried before a jury as to the breach of contract and
misappropriation of trade secrets counts; the remaining claims were settled. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Emerson Process Management and awarded
$5,343,874 in damages for breach of contract and $102,027 in damages for
misappropriation of trade secrets.
Judgment as a Matter of Law
Automation renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(b). I denied Automation’s motions for judgment as a matter of law at the
close of its case, and again at the close of all the evidence. Automation contends

that Emerson failed to make a submissible case for the following reasons: (1)
Emerson failed to present any evidence of a breach of contract; (2) Emerson failed to
present any evidence showing damages or linking such damages to an alleged
breach; and (3) Emerson failed to present any evidence that John Rooneo employed
“improper means” as required to prove Emerson’s claim for misappropriation of
trade secrets.
A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if the jury's
verdict is utterly lacking in evidentiary support. In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig.,
586 F.3d 547, 571 (8th Cir. 2009). When deciding a Rule 50 motion, I must
construe the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and draw all inferences
in its favor, denying the motion “if reasonable persons could differ as to the
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” W. Am., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur.
Co., 915 F.2d 1181, 1183 (8th Cir. 1990). I may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence. In re Prempro, 586 F.3d at 572 (citing
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). Under
these standards, the motion must be denied.
Emerson presented sufficient evidence during the trial to support the jury
verdict. The evidence, in its totality and after review, supports the jury’s
conclusion that Automation breached its contract with Emerson, that the breach
damaged Emerson, and that Rooneo employed “improper means” in taking and

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using Emerson’s design drawings. The jury was presented with witness testimony
and exhibits about the labels and sales documents used by Automation in its
remanufacture and sale of Emerson products, the plain language of the contract at
issue, and actual customer confusion. The jury was also presented with expert
testimony on damages calculations, and a range of sales prices for the products at
issue. Furthermore, the jury heard witness testimony about the improper means by
which Rooneo acquired Emerson’s drawings, as well as testimony and exhibits
regarding the confidentiality of those drawings. I previously denied Automation’s
motion, and the evidence presented at trial does not change this conclusion or serve
as a basis for disturbing the jury’s verdict. For these reasons, the renewed motion
for judgment as a matter of law will be denied.
Motion for New Trial
Automation alternatively requests a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a)(1)(A). Under this rule, “[a] new trial is appropriate when the first trial,
through a verdict against the weight of the evidence, an excessive damage award, or
legal errors at trial, resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d
1472, 1480 (8th Cir. 1996). A miscarriage of justice does not result whenever there
are inaccuracies or errors at trial; instead, the party seeking a new trial must
demonstrate that there was prejudicial error. Buchholz v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 120
F.3d 146, 148 (8th Cir. 1997). A new trial based on errors in jury instructions will

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only be granted where the error likely affected the jury's verdict. Sherman v. Winco
Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 720 (8th Cir. 2008).
“The district court is afforded broad discretion in choosing the form and
substance of the jury instructions . . .” Friedman & Friedman, Ltd. v. Tim
McCandless, Inc., 606 F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 2010). “The instructions need be
neither technically perfect nor a model of clarity.” Id. Jury instructions must,
when “taken as a whole, fairly and adequately represent the evidence and applicable
law in light of the issues presented to the jury in a particular case.” Swipies v.
Kofka, 419 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “An erroneous instruction warrants a new trial only if the error misled the
jury or had a probable effect on the verdict.” Friedman, 606 F.3d at 499 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Automation argues that the jury verdict was against the weight of the
evidence, and that there were errors in the jury instructions. I conclude that the
verdict was not against the weight of the evidence for the reasons discussed above.
Additionally, Automation argues that jury instructions 6–9 were improperly given
because Emerson failed to make a submissible case on its claims, and that I should
have submitted Automation’s proposed insert 7a and 9a. Because I find that
Emerson made a submissible case on all its claims, instructions 6–9 were proper.
Further, for the same reasons I stated on the record on December 7, 2012, I continue

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to find that inserts 7a and 9a were unnecessary. The instructions taken as a whole
fairly and adequately represent the evidence and issues presented to the jury. For
these reasons, Automation is not entitled to a new trial.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant=s motion for judgment as a
matter of law, or alternatively, for a new trial [#425] is denied.

CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 3rd day of June, 2013.

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