Joseph v. Allen, et al.,
Filing
83
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Kenneth L. Allen's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Latavia Jones's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.75) is DENIED, witho ut prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Joseph's claim for malicious prosecution against Latavia Jones and Defendant Latavia Jones's Counterclaim for Tort Damages Against Plaintiff Stanley Joseph (ECF No. 15) are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Signed by Honorable John A. Ross on 5/15/12. (LAH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STANLEY JOSEPH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH L. ALLEN, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:10CV1521 JAR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 45) and Defendant Latavia Jones’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.75).
Defendants Officer Kenneth L. Allen (“Allen”) and Lieutenant Edward J. Harper (“Harper”) move
for summary judgment on Joseph’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 based upon the doctrine of
qualified immunity. They also seek summary judgment on Joseph’s state law claims, asserting,
among other things, the doctrine of official immunity. In turn, defendant Jones moves for summary
judgment on Joseph’s malicious prosecution claim based upon his alleged failure to state a claim
for malicious prosecution. These matters are fully briefed and ready for disposition.
BACKGROUND
On February 3, 2008, plaintiff Stanley Joseph (“Joseph”) and defendant Latavia Jones
(“Jones”) were involved in a verbal and physical altercation at Joseph’s residence in the Gentry’s
Landing apartment complex in downtown St. Louis. (Defendants’ Statement of Uncontroverted
Material Facts (“DSUMF”), ECF No. 47, ¶¶3, 4-5). At 4:55 p.m., Joseph called 9-1-1 and told the
dispatcher, “A lady is going crazy in my house.”
(Plaintiff’s Additional Statement of
Uncontroverted Material Facts (“PSUMF”), ECF No. 64, pp. 8-15, ¶¶3, 4; DSUMF, ¶6). Around
5:00 p.m., Allen arrived at Joseph’s apartment. (PSUMF, ¶8; DSUMF, ¶7). Sometime thereafter,
Allen’s supervisor, Harper, came to assist in Joseph’s arrest. (DSUMF, ¶¶1, 7).
When Allen arrived on the scene, Joseph was standing in the hallway, in front of his
apartment.1 (PSUMF, ¶9). Allen heard loud arguing. (DSUMF, ¶8; PSUMF, ¶¶14-15). Allen
observed Jones in a ripped t-shirt; she was yelling and upset. (DSUMF, ¶10). During his
investigation of the scene, Jones told Allen that Joseph cut her on her arm during the altercation in
the bedroom. (DSUMF, ¶12; PSUMF, ¶60; ECF No. 64-3, pp. 68-69).2 Allen saw a knife (DSUMF,
¶9), which Jones identified as the knife that cut her. (ECF No. 64-3, p. 69). Allen seized the knife.
(Id.; PSUMF, ¶52). Allen saw the cut on Jones’s arm. (DSUMF, ¶13; ECF No. 64-3, pp. 77, 106).
Allen also saw a scratch on Jones’s neck and abrasions on her fingers. (DSUMF, ¶11; ECF No. 643, pp. 107-08).3
A neighbor, Jon Jordan, lived across the hall from Joseph’s apartment. (PSUMF, ¶18).
Shortly before 5:00 p.m., Jordan heard yelling from inside Joseph’s apartment. (PSUMF, ¶¶19, 23).
Jordan went into the hallway, but Joseph’s door was closed. (PSUMF, ¶21). Jordan heard banging
and a woman yelling coming from inside Joseph’s apartment. (PSUMF, ¶22). Jordan returned to
his apartment and continued to look through the peephole. (PSUMF, ¶¶28-29). Jordan observed
the door to Joseph’s apartment open, and he saw Joseph and Jones for about ten (10) minutes.
(PSUMF, ¶¶30, 32). Jordan claimed that he saw Jones throw a pot of water, but never saw Joseph
1
The parties dispute whether Joseph was holding a knife. Joseph claims he was not (PSUMF,
¶12); Allen claims that Joseph was (PSUMF, ¶61; ECF No. 64-3, pp. 53-55). While this is an issue
of fact, the Court finds that it is not material for purposes of summary judgment.
2
At her deposition, Jones testified that she believes that Joseph cut her because she does not
know how else she received that cut on her left arm. (ECF No. 64-1, pp. 88-89).
3
Allen did not observe that Joseph was injured in any way. (ECF No. 64-3, p. 112). Joseph
testified that he had a few scratches. (ECF No. 64-2, p. 58).
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with a knife. (PSUMF, ¶¶35, 39). Jordan stated that he continued to hear Jones yelling when he was
inside his apartment. (PSUMF, ¶41).
Allen arrested Joseph at the scene. (DSUMF, ¶14).4 Neither Allen nor Harper obtained
Joseph’s side of the story.5 (PSUMF, ¶59). Initially, Joseph was charged with assault, first degree.
(PSUMF, ¶55). The charge was later amended to domestic assault, second. (ECF No. 64-3, p. 116).
Allen prepared a police report regarding the incident and Joseph’s arrest. (PSUMF, ¶¶6066). In the police report, Allen stated that Joseph cut Jones with a knife; that he observed a knife in
Joseph’s left hand; and that he seized a knife. (PSUMF, ¶¶60-62). Allen did not provide Joseph’s
version of the events or identify Jordan as a witness in the police report. (PSUMF, ¶¶64, 65; ECF
No. 64-3, p. 105).6 Harper approved the police report drafted by Allen. (PSUMF, ¶68).
Joseph was tried on the charge of domestic assault, second. Jones testified on behalf of the
prosecution at trial. (ECF No. 77, ¶81). Joseph was acquitted. (First Amended Complaint for
Damages (hereinafter “Complaint” or “Compl.”, ECF No. 20, ¶¶15, 40, 49).
On August 17, 2010, Joseph filed this lawsuit and, on April 25, 2011, he filed a First
Amended Complaint for Damages. Therein, Joseph alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“§1983”)
4
Allen contends that he arrested Joseph at Harper’s direction. (ECF No. 64-3, p. 87). Harper
claims that Joseph already was under arrest when he arrived on the scene. (ECF No. 64-10, pp. 3133). Again, this issue of fact is not material for purposes of summary judgment.
5
Allen maintains that Joseph refused to speak to him or provide any statements regarding the
incident with Jones. (ECF No. 64-3, pp. 81-82, 90). Joseph claims that Allen did not attempt to
obtain his side of the story, and told him to “shut up.” (PSUMF, ¶46). Again, this is an issue of fact,
but it is not material to this Court’s analysis.
6
Allen claims that he spoke with Jordan, who said that he heard Jones and Allen arguing but
did not see anything. (ECF No. 64-3, p. 101-03). Jordan testified that he told the officer that he had
seen Joseph and Jones “interact” from the peephole of his apartment. (ECF No. 64-4, p. 25). Jordan
stated that the officer responded, “That will be all.” (Id.). Joseph contends that Allen never
obtained a statement from Jordan. (PSUMF, ¶48).
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for Deprivation of Civil Rights against Allen and Harper (Counts I and V),7 for False Arrest against
Allen and Harper (Counts II and VI), and for Malicious Prosecution against Allen, Jones and Harper
(Counts III, IV and VII).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Citrate, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Torgerson v. City
of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). The substantive law determines which facts are
critical and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Id.
Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. Id.
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party
must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material
fact, not the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 258.
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331. The Court’s function is not to weigh the evidence but to determine
7
Joseph’s §1983 claim is based upon an alleged deprivation of his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights under the Constitution. (Compl., ¶¶11, 45).
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whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “‘Credibility determinations,
the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge.’” Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000)).
DISCUSSION
I.
DEFENDANTS ALLEN AND HARPER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.
Section 1983 Claims Against Allen and Harper
Joseph alleges claims against Allen and Harper under §1983 “to remedy deprivation of rights
secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments fo the United States Constitution.” (Compl.,
¶¶11, 45). Joseph alleges that he was arrested and charged with assault, even though the officers
had no probable cause for such charge. (Id., ¶¶12-13, 46-47). In addition, Joseph claims that
baseless criminal charges were instigated against him based upon the foregoing, which ultimately
resulted in his acquittal. (Id., ¶¶15, 49). The Court construes Joseph’s allegations as a §1983 action
for false arrest.8
1.
Qualified Immunity Standard
Qualified immunity shields public officials “from liability in a § 1983 action unless the
official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable
8
In his briefing, Joseph argues that the Court also should construe his allegations as asserting
a §1983 claim for malicious prosecution. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Response”), ECF No. 64, pp. 23-25). The Eighth Circuit, however, has refused to
recognize such a cause of action. See Response, p. 24 (admitting that the Eighth Circuit in Kurtz
v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001) rejected the notion that the constitution
provides a substantive right for a person to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable
cause). This Court finds no basis to disturb the Eighth Circuit’s finding and, therefore, will not
address Joseph’s purported §1983 claim for malicious prosecution. See also (I')sla Ballard v. City
of St. Louis, No. 4:11CV1553, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107994, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2011);
Miller v. Albright, No. 4:07-CV-1086, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112838, at *18-19 (E.D. Mo. Dec.
3, 2009)(granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claims brought pursuant to §1983
based upon Kurtz).
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person would have known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir.
2009)(citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002)); Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982); Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663
F.3d 952, 960 (8th Cir. 2011)). To overcome a defendant’s qualified immunity claim, the plaintiff
must show that: “‘(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the
deprivation of a constitutional . . . right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the
deprivation.’” Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010)(quoting Howard
v. Kansas City Police Dep’t, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009)); Stepnes, 663 F.3d at 960. “The law
is clearly established if it gives the defendant officials ‘fair warning’ that their conduct violated an
individual’s rights when the officials acted.” Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2005)
(citing Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-40 (2002)); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)
(A right is “clearly established” if “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.”). If a state official violates a clearly established constitutional right, he is not
entitled to qualified immunity. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
Qualified immunity allows “officers to make reasonable errors,” Habiger v. City of Fargo,
80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1996), and provides “ample room for mistaken judgments.” Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986). “The defense protects public
officials unless they are ‘plainly incompetent’ or ‘knowingly violate the law.’” Borgman v. Kedley,
646 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 2011)(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S. Ct. 534, 116
L. Ed. 2d 589 (1991)) (citation omitted).
2.
Joseph’s §1983 Claim For False Arrest is Barred by Qualified Immunity
“‘It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an
individual’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.’” Marksmeier v.
Davie, 622 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2010)(quoting Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo., 795 F.2d 1385,
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1389 (8th Cir. 1986)). An officer, however, is entitled to qualified immunity for a warrantless arrest
if there was at least “arguable probable cause.” Borgman, 646 F.3d at 522-23 (citing Walker v. City
of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2005)); Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816
(8th Cir. 2010)(citing Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th Cir. 2008))(a warrantless arrest is
consistent with the constitution if it is supported by probable cause). “An officer has probable cause
to make a warrantless arrest when the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest ‘are
sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant has committed or is committing
an offense.’” Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523 (quoting Fisher, 619 F.3d at 816 ). “Arguable probable
cause exists even where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based in probable
cause if the mistake is ‘objectively reasonable.’” Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523 (quoting Amrine, 522
F.3d at 832). Whether the police had probable cause at the time of an arrest is a question of law for
a court to decide. Fisher, 619 F.3d at 816; Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475 (8th Cir.
1995).
Because Joseph was arrested for assault, the relevant inquiry is whether Allen and/or Harper
had “probable cause, or at least arguable probable cause, to believe that” Joseph had assaulted Jones
on February 3, 2008. Stepnes, 663 F.3d at 960. Under Missouri law, the criminal offense of first
degree assault exists if a person “attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious
physical injury to another person.” Mo.Rev.Stat. §565.050 (2012). In turn, a person acts
“knowingly” when “he is aware of his conduct or that those circumstances exist” or when “he is
aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause that result.” Mo.Rev.Stat. §565.016.3 (2012).
“Serious physical injury” is defined as “physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that
causes serious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part of the
body[.]” Mo.Rev.Stat. §556.061(28)(2012).
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The record here indicates that Allen and/or Harper had at least arguable probable cause to
arrest Joseph for assault. Allen arrived on the scene and found Jones visibly upset, with her clothing
torn. Jones told Allen that Joseph had attacked and cut her in the bedroom of Joseph’s apartment.
Allen relied on Jones’s statements to determine that he had probable cause to arrest Joseph. (ECF
No. 64-3, pp. 77-78). In addition, Allen saw a laceration on Jones that corroborated her claim and
found a knife at the scene, in addition to abrasions on her hands. Thus, Allen and/or Harper had
probable cause to arrest Joseph based upon Jones’s accusation, her verified injury and other physical
evidence. See Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523 (quoting Fisher, 619 F.3d at 817)(“Officers may ‘rely on
the veracity of information supplied by the victim of a crime. . . .’”); see also Granito v. Tiska et al.,
120 F. App'x 847, 849 (2d Cir. 2005)).
Joseph claims that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest him because he
and a potential witness, Jordan, were not interviewed.9 Jordan, however, admittedly witnessed only
events that occurred in the hallway and that were within sight of his apartment’s peephole. Jordan’s
account does not exonerate Joseph or negate a finding of probable cause. According to Joseph,
Jordan
heard Jones angrily yell for at least five minutes before the door to Joseph’s
apartment was opened. Jordan testified that he sensed anger and that Jones never
sounded frightened or scared. After the door opened, Jordan watched the apartment
for at least 10 minutes before Allen arrived. Throughout the period, Joseph remained
within Jordan’s sight, looking exasperated and frustrated and Jordan heard Joseph
continuously plead to Jones to stop tearing up the apartment and just leave. In the
meantime, Jones continued to angrily yell at Joseph and Jordan heard the sound of
banging coming from the apartment.
9
Joseph makes much of the fact that Allen was disciplined for failing to identify Jordan as
a witness in the police report. (PSUMF, ¶67). The fact that Allen may not have followed police
procedures by failing to interview and/or identify Jordan is not the proper inquiry to determine
whether Allen had probable cause to arrest Joseph.
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Response, p. 22. Even if this Court adopted Joseph’s version of Jordan’s account in its entirety, it
still would be insufficient to demonstrate lack of probable cause. Jordan’s testimony is not
incongruous with a finding that Joseph assaulted Jones in the bedroom; Jordan did not witness the
entire dispute between Joseph and Jones, particularly none of the altercation in the bedroom. Allen
could have determined that Joseph cut Jones during the altercation in the bedroom, as stated by
Jones, and also believed Jordan’s testimony. Allen’s alleged failure to speak to Jordan and omission
of Jordan’s information in the police report is not sufficient to prove that Allen lacked probable
cause to arrest Joseph or to deprive Allen of qualified immunity. See Stepnes, 663 F.3d at 961
(citing Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th Cir. 2008))(Police officers are not required to
conduct a “mini-trial” before arrest, although probable cause “does not exist when a minimal further
investigation would have exonerated the suspect.”).
Joseph cites Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 1999) to support his claim that the
officers lacked probable cause to arrest him based upon their failure to interview Jordan. There, the
Eighth Circuit found that there was no arguable probable cause because the officer had spoken with
the suspect for only twenty seconds, ignored exculpatory evidence, disregarded an eyewitness
account, and did not mention the witness’s account in his police report. Id. at 650-51. Accordingly,
the Eighth Circuit found that an arresting officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court finds that Kuehl is not on point for several reasons. First, the Court cannot
identify any “plainly exculpatory evidence” as was present in Kuehl. Id., at 651. At most, Joseph
can identify conflicting evidence. Allen relied upon the testimony of Jones, which is sufficient for
finding probable cause. (ECF No. 64-3, pp. 77-78); see Baptiste v. J. C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252,
1259 (10th Cir. 1998) (officers may weigh the credibility of witnesses in making a probable cause
determination); Jamison v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 411 (Mo.
2007)(“A probable cause standard does not require a fact finder to balance conflicting evidence.”).
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Allen merely evaluated the conflicting versions of the events in making his probable cause
determination. In addition, in Kuehl, the arresting officer refused to interview a witness to the
“entire altercation.” Kuehl, 173 F.3d at 651. As discussed, Jordan was not a witness to all of the
events that occurred on February 3, 2008. Jordan did not witness Jones and Joseph in their bedroom
and, therefore, his testimony does not preclude the assault. As this is not a case where “minimal
further investigation” would have exonerated the subject, Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1219
(5th Cir. 1988); Kuehl, 173 F.3d at 650, the Court finds that Allen and Harper had probable cause
to arrest Joseph. Given the totality of the circumstances, even if Allen had been aware of Jordan’s
witness account and included that information in his report, Allen still would have had probable
cause to arrest Joseph.
Accordingly, because Joseph fails to demonstrate that any of Allen’s and/or Harper’s actions
violated a constitutional right, they are entitled to qualified immunity, and thus summary judgment
in favor of Allen and Harper is appropriate on Joseph’s §1983 claim. Stepnes, 663 F.3d at 963
(citing Lykken v. Brady, 622 F.3d 925, 929-30 (8th Cir. 2010)).
B.
State Law Claims of False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution against Allen and
Harper
1.
State Law Claims in this case fail Because Allen and Harper had probable
cause. Joseph alleges that Allen and Harper committed the torts of false arrest and malicious
prosecution because they arrested and prosecuted him for assaulting Jones without probable cause.
False arrest only has two elements: restraint of the plaintiff against his will, and the unlawfulness
of that restraint. Blue v. Harrah's North Kansas City, LLC, 170 S.W.3d 466, 475 (Mo. Ct. App.
2005)(citing Bramon v. U–Haul, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Mo.Ct. App. 1997)); Kurtz, 245 F.3d
at 757 (“A false arrest occurs when there is a confinement without legal justification.”); Day v.
Wells Fargo Guard Service Co., 711 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Mo. 1986)). An officer is empowered to
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make an arrest if he or she has reasonable grounds, or “probable cause,” to believe that the person
is guilty of the offense. Kurtz, 245 F.3d at 757 (citing Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 769
(Mo. 1984)). A police officer who has probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a
crime is not liable for the state law tort of false arrest simply because the suspect is later proven
innocent or the charges are dismissed. Kurtz, 245 F.3d at 757 (citing Hannah, 795 F.2d at 1389);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, 87 S. Ct. 1213 (1967)). Similarly, a person
suing on a theory of malicious prosecution must plead and prove the following elements: (1) the
commencement of a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) the instigation by the defendant; (3) the
termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (4) the want of probable cause for the
prosecution; (5) the defendant’s conduct was actuated by malice; and (6) the plaintiff was damaged.
Sanders v. Daniel International Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo. 1984)(citing S. Greenleaf, II
Greenleaf on Evidence §§ 449-59 (2nd ed. 1844)). Thus, the existence of probable cause negates
actions for both false arrest and malicious prosecution in Missouri. Kurtz, 245 F.3d at 757.
As discussed previously, Allen and Harper had ample evidence to support a finding of
probable cause to arrest Joseph. Jones stated that Joseph had attacked her with a knife; Jones had
a cut on her arm consistent with her claim; and police found a knife that Jones identified as Joseph’s
weapon. Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Missouri law claims for false arrest
and malicious prosecution fail because Allen and Harper had probable cause to arrest and prosecute
Joseph for assault. See Kurtz, 245 F.3d at 757; Edwards v. McNeill, 894 S.W.2d 678, 683 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995)(reasonable belief that individual committed offense complete defense to false arrest
claim); Baker v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 744 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (absence of
probable cause for prosecution is essential element of malicious prosecution claim).
2.
State Law Claims Also Fail Because Allen and Harper Have Official
Immunity
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As an additional basis for granting summary judgment, Allen and Harper argue that they are
entitled to summary judgment on Joseph’s state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution
under the doctrine of official immunity. “Under Missouri law, the doctrine of official immunity
protects public officials from civil liability for injuries arising out of their discretionary acts or
omissions performed in the exercise of their official duties.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 617
(8th Cir. 2008). Discretionary acts require “the exercise of reason in the adaption of means to an
end and discretion in determining how or whether an act should be done or pursued.” Rustici v.
Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 769 (Mo. 1984)(quoting Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979)). Conversely, a ministerial act is one “of a clerical nature which a public officer is
required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the
act to be performed.” Id. The analysis of the act in question “must be determined by the facts of
each particular case after weighing such factors as the nature of the official’s duties, the extent to
which the acts involve policymaking or the exercise of professional expertise and judgment, and the
likely consequences of withholding immunity.” Kanagawa v. State, 685 S.W.2d 831, 836 (Mo.
1985). “[P]olice officers exercising judgment or discretion are entitled to official immunity unless
they commit a ‘willful or malicious wrong.’” Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 482 (quoting State ex rel.
Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. 1994)). The “willful and malicious
wrong” standard contemplates “whether the official has intentionally committed an act that he or
she had reason to believe is prohibited.” Beaulieu, 518 N.W.2d at 571. “This is a subjective
standard, in contrast to the objective qualified immunity standard.” Nelson v. County of Wright, 162
F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 676-79 (Minn.
1988)).
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Defendants Allen and Harper argue that they are entitled to official immunity for Joseph’s
state law claims. They assert that their actions were “discretionary and required the exercise of
professional judgment that would be protected by the doctrine of official immunity.” (ECF No. 46,
p. 14).
In response, Joseph, without citation, asserts that “Missouri law is clear that an official
charged with making a false arrest is not entitled to official immunity.” (Response, p. 26). Joseph
argues that arrests are “a ministerial act for the basis of applying official immunity.” (Id., p. 27).
Likewise, Joseph argues that Allen and Harper are not entitled to official immunity because they
acted “in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the rights of Joseph through their failure to
account for and record the observations and statement of Jordan in the police report, ignorance of
physical evidence at the scene and Joseph’s report of the incident and Allen’s mischaracterization
to Harper of Joseph’s action at the scene following his arrival.” (Id., p. 27). Finally, Joseph claims,
again without citation, that Allen and Harper are not entitled to official immunity protection because
they are accused of intentional torts, not mere negligent acts. (Id., pp. 26, 28).
Joseph’s reasons for this Court to deny defendants official immunity are not supported in law
or in the record. First, the investigation of a crime and arrest of a subject are discretionary acts, not
ministerial ones. Reasonover v. St. Louis County, 447 F.3d 569, 585 (8th Cir. 2006); Blue, 170
S.W.3d at 479 (“Deciding whether or not to arrest someone is a matter of discretion - the officer
must decide what course should be pursued based on the circumstances at hand.”); see also Highfill
v. Hale, 186 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Mo. 2006)(noting that the officer has discretion to determine whether
to make an arrest). With respect to the second point and putting aside Joseph’s numerous
unsupported contentions, the Court finds no specific evidence of bad faith on the part of either Allen
or Harper. Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585; see also Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir.
2006)(granting summary judgment based upon official immunity where the plaintiff “presented no
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evidence of subjective malice, such as ill will toward [plaintiff] or an intent to act unlawfully”).
Finally, the Court does not find the negligence/intentional tort dichotomy proffered by Joseph to be
either persuasive or supported by Missouri law. Missouri law clearly applies official immunity to
cases involving intentional tort. See Richardson v. Sherwood, 337 S.W.3d 58, 63 (Mo. Ct. App.
2011)(noting cases applying official immunity applies to intentional tort claims of false
imprisonment, assault and malicious prosecution). Allen and Harper are entitled to official
immunity with respect to Joseph’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
In summary, the Court grants Allen and Harper’s motion for summary judgment on Joseph’s
state law claims. Joseph’s claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution fail either because Allen
and Harper had probable cause to arrest Joseph for assault or because they are protected by official
immunity.10
II.
JONES’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Having granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court lacks federal subject
matter jurisdiction over Joseph’s malicious prosecution claim against Jones. The Court denies
Jones’s motion for summary judgment as moot.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Allen and Harper’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and will deny, without prejudice, Jones’s motion for summary judgment. The Court also
dismisses Joseph’s malicious prosecution claim against Jones and Jones’s Counterclaim for Tort
Damages Against Plaintiff Stanley Joseph (ECF No. 15), without prejudice, for lack of federal
subject matter jurisdiction.
10
Having determined that Allen and Harper are entitled to summary judgment based upon
the absence of probable cause and their entitlement to official immunity, the Court need not address
Defendants’ public duty defense.
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Kenneth L. Allen’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 45) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Latavia Jones’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No.75) is DENIED, without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Joseph’s claim for malicious prosecution against Latavia
Jones and Defendant Latavia Jones’s Counterclaim for Tort Damages Against Plaintiff Stanley
Joseph (ECF No. 15) are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
An appropriate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 15th day of May, 2012.
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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