Robbins et al v. Becker, Sr. et al

Filing 42

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No 22], is GRANTED. The federal counts are dismissed with prejudice and the remaining state counts are dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment in accordance with the Opinion, Memorandum and Order is entered this same date.. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Autrey on 1/21/14. (CEL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARK ROBBINS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

RANDY BECKER, SR., et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:10CV1552 HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking damages for alleged federal
constitutional and statutory violations. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants
interfered with their business operations of towing services in and around the I-44
corridor. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
federal claims against them are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
On August 31, 2012 , the Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. On May 22, 2013, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued its Opinion that this Court remanded the
matter for further consideration of Defendants’ qualified immunity arguments.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court now concludes that Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s federal claims. Additionally, the

Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.
Facts and Background1
Plaintiffs Mark Robbins and Gail Robbins operate I-44 Truck Center and
Wrecker Service, LLC, and I-44 Wrecker Service, LLC (I-44 and, collectively,
Robbins). I-44 provides towing and wrecker services to semi tractor-trailers and
other private and commercial vehicles along the Interstate 44 corridor in the St.
Louis, Missouri, area. From approximately 1996 to 2006, the officers maintained
a “rotation list” for selecting wrecker and towing companies to respond to
highway accidents. The Robbins allege I-44 was excluded from the list after Mark
Robbins had a confrontation with some of the officers in 1999. The Robbins
further allege that, following this 1999 incident, the officers maliciously conspired
with each other and third parties to prevent I-44 from providing towing services to
I-44’s clients.
The Robbins brought suit against fourteen individually named officers and
at least three “John Doe” officers, alleging (1) violations of their due process and
equal protection rights under § 1983; (2) conspiracy to violate Robbins’
constitutional rights; (3) violations of the Sherman Act; and (4) Missouri state law

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The summary of facts was set forth by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in its May
22, 2013 Opinion. It was taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint.
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claims. After discovery, the officers moved for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity.
Discussion
Government officials, who are performing discretionary functions, are
generally shielded from liability for civil damages, unless their conduct violates
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. See, Wallingford v. Olson, 592 F.3d 888, 891 (8th Cir.2010);
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 866
(8th Cir.2002); Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 766 (8th Cir.2001).
“[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the
‘objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in the light of the legal
rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.” Wilson, at 614. The
contours of the constitutional right at issue “must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right,” but
“[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless
the very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that
in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). As a consequence, "[t]he doctrine 'gives
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ample room for mistaken judgments but does not protect the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Bagby v. Brondhaver, 98 F.3d 1096,
1098 (8th Cir.1996).
In determining whether a public official has violated a clearly established
constitutional right, the reviewing Court has discretion to determine which prong
of the two-part test to address first. See, Heartland Academy Community Church
v. Waddle, 595 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2010), citing Pearson v. Callahan, --- U.S. ----,
129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
The party asserting immunity always has the burden to establish the relevant
predicate facts, and at the summary judgment stage, the nonmoving party is given
the benefit of all reasonable inferences. In determining whether an officer is
entitled to qualified immunity, the Court asks: (1) whether, taking the facts in the
light most favorable to the injured party, the alleged facts demonstrate that the
official's conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the asserted
constitutional right is clearly established. The Court may address either question
first. If either question is answered in the negative, the public official is entitled to
qualified immunity. To determine whether a right is clearly established the Court
asks whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted. Wallingford v. Olson, 592 F.3d at 892
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(internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has articulated the standard for
determining the question of qualified immunity. The question
involves the following two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown
by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory
right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of
the defendant's alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part by
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d
565 (2009) (holding that Saucier's two-step sequence is not
mandatory). “Under the rule established in Pearson, we have the
discretion to decide ‘which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.’ ” Fields v. Abbott, 652
F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129
S.Ct. 808).
Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 989-90 (8th Cir. 2013).
Due Process
The matter of whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity has
recently been addressed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals:
To have a constitutionally cognizable property interest in a right or a
benefit, a person must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” See Bd. of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d
548 (1972). The Due Process Clause does not create any property interest; it
merely protects property rights arising “from an independent source such as state
law.” Id. A property interest arises when state law creates “expectations that are
‘justifiable.’ ” O'Bannon v. Town Ct. Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 796, 100 S.Ct.
2467, 65 L.Ed.2d 506 (1980) (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489, 100 S.Ct.
1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980)). No property interest arises where the statutory
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claim to a benefit is “too ephemeral and insubstantial.” Id. (quoting Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Austell v. Springer, 690 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 2012).
“Before official conduct or inaction rises to the level of a substantive due
process violation, it must be so egregious or outrageous that it is
conscience-shocking.” Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (citation, internal
quotation marks and alteration in the original omitted). Nothing in the record
supports an allegation the state troopers' conduct was egregious or rose to the
“conscience-shocking” level. Habhab v. Hon, 536 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2008).
Whether the conscience-shocking standard is violated is an issue of law. Sitzes v.
City of West Memphis, AR, 606 f.3d 461, 467 (8th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs’ claims do not give rise to a claim for a violation of substantive
due process. “‘The Constitution only protects [the] liberty [to follow a chosen
profession free from unreasonable governmental interference] from state actions
that threaten to deprive persons of the right to pursue their chosen occupation.
State actions that exclude a person from one particular job are not actionable in
suits.... It is the liberty to pursue a particular calling or occupation, and not the
right to a specific job, that is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Habhab,
536 F.3d at 968, quoting, Piecknick v. Com. of Pa., 36 F.3d 1250, 1259–60 (3d
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Cir.1994).
Equal Protection
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause by
stating a valid class-of-one claim. A class-of-one claim is stated when a plaintiff
alleges that a defendant intentionally treated Plaintiff differently from others who
are similarly situated and that no rational basis existed for the difference in
treatment. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) Costello v.
Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916 (8th Cir.2001). More recently, in
Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008), “the
Supreme Court delineated the outer limits of this cause of action when it
concluded that class-of-one claims are not cognizable in the context of public
employment. It reasoned that this categorical exclusion was appropriate in light of
the nature of employment decisions:
There are some forms of state action, however, which by their nature
involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of
subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases the rule that
people should be “treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions” is not violated when one person is treated differently
from others, because treating like individuals differently is an
accepted consequence of the discretion granted. In such situations,
allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a particular
person would undermine the very discretion that such state officials
are entrusted to exercise. Id. at 603, 128 S.Ct. 2146.

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Mathers v. Wright, 636 F.3d 396, 399-400 (8th Cir. 2011).
The record herein establishes that Defendants were clearly exercising their
discretionary decision making duties. Defendants’ actions were not motivated by
animus, rather, the decision of which towing company to call was based on several
factors, including the nature of the accident, the location of the accident in relation
to towing services, the need to clear blocked roadways, the need for quick
response from the towing company.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to present to the Court any other towing
company that was treated differently from Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cannot establish a
violation of their constitutional Equal Protection rights, and therefore, Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity on the Equal Protection claim.
Sherman Act
Plaintiff I-44 claims a violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 .S.C.
§ 1, et seq. Section 1 prohibits “every contract, combination in the form
of a trust or otherwise or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.” Section 2
of the Act bars efforts to conspire with any person to monopolize trade or
commerce.
To establish a claim under §1, Plaintiff must show: 1) the existence of a
contract, combination, or conspiracy; 2) that the agreement unreasonably
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restrained trade under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis,
and; 3) that the restraint affected interstate commerce. Insignia Sys. Inc. v. News
Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., 661 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1062 (D.Minn. 2011).
The Sherman Act does not impose liability for an alleged conspiracy where
the alleged agreement was among officers or employees within the same entity.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984). Here,
all Defendants are members of the Highway Patrol. They cannot conspire among
themselves. Richmond v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Minn, 957 F.2d 595, 598
(8th Cir. 1992).
Regarding Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Plaintiff must establish: 1) each
Defendant acted with the intent to control prices or destroy competition in some
part of commerce; 2) predatory or anti-competitive conduct was directed toward
accomplishing the unlawful purpose, and; 3) a dangerous probability of success
existed. Trace X Chemical, Inc. v. Canadian Indus., Ltd., 738 F.2d 261, 265 (8th
Cir. 1984). Anti-competitive conduct must lack a legitimate business purpose.
Becker v. Egypt News Co. , 713 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1983). It does not extend
to the exercise of business judgment. Id.
Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants acted with the requisite
intent required under Section 2. Defendants have presented admissible evidence
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that the decision to call a certain tow company was based on numerous legitimate
purposes, as detailed above.
Conspiracy
Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The elements
of a conspiracy claim are: 1) one or more persons conspiring with the intent to
either directly indirectly deprive Plaintiff with one or more federal constitutional
or statutory rights; 2) that at least one of the alleged conspirators engaged in an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and; 3) that the overt act injured
Plaintiff. White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2008). Again,
Defendants, all members of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, could not have
conspired amongst themselves. Richmond, 957 F.2d at 598.
Failing to establish a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights tolls the death knoll of
Plaintiffs’ claims because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
State Claims
Because the Court has granted summary judgment on the federal claims, it
need not decide the state claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), federal courts may
assert supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when a federal claim is properly
before the court. However, when all federal claims have been dismissed, the court
has discretion to dismiss the state claims as well. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)
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(providing that the Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim ... if the [Court] has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.”). The Court’s discretion should be informed by consideration of the
principles of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. E.g., Grain
Land Coop v. Kar Kim Farms. Inc., 199 F.3d 983, 993 (8th Cir.1999). These
factors will generally weigh in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction. United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (dismissal of state claims
strongly encouraged when federal claims are dismissed prior to trial); Grain Land
Coop, 199 F.3d at 993; American Civil Liberties Union v. Florissant, 186 F.3d
1095, 1098-99 (8th Cir.1999). In this case, each of the factors support the Court’s
decision to decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs have presented no constitutional or statutory claims which gives
rise to Defendant’s qualified immunity. Therefore, the doctrine of qualified
immunity protects Defendants’ actions.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, and upon all of the files, records,
and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, [Doc. No 22], is GRANTED. The federal counts are dismissed with
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prejudice and the remaining state counts are dismissed without prejudice.
A separate judgment in accordance with the Opinion, Memorandum and
Order is entered this same date.
Dated this 21st day of January, 2014.

_______________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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