Mayfield v. Dormire

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum will be entered this same date.. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 6/19/13. (KKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RICHARD MAYFIELD,

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Petitioner,
vs.
DAVE DORMIRE,
Respondent.

No. 4:10-CV-1838 (CEJ)

MEMORANDUM
This matter is before the Court on the petition of Richard Mayfield for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has filed a response in
opposition, and the issues are fully briefed.
I.

Procedural History

Petitioner Richard Mayfield is currently incarcerated in the Jefferson City
Correctional Center, pursuant to the sentence and judgment of the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County, Missouri. On May 10, 2005, petitioner was found guilty of eight
counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree, in violation of Mo.Rev.Stat. § 566.062.
Resp. Ex. B at 133-134. On the same date, petitioner was sentenced to eight terms
of life imprisonment, some of which were to be served consecutively. Id. at 134-137.
On June 13, 2006, the Missouri Court of Appeals of the Eastern District affirmed
petitioner’s conviction and sentence in a per curiam order. State v. Mayfield, 193
S.W.3d 792 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006) (Resp. Ex. E). Along with its opinion, the appeals
court issued to the parties a non-precedential addendum explaining the basis for its
decision. Id.
On August 29, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief under
Missouri Rule 29.15. Resp. Ex. F at 4-9. On June 25, 2008, the trial court denied

petitioner’s post-conviction motion. Id. at 26-27. On November 17, 2009, the Missouri
Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief in a per curiam
opinion. Mayfield v. State, 297 S.W.3d 638 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (Resp. Ex. J). The
appeals court issued to the parties a non-precedential addendum explaining the basis
for its decision. Id.
In the instant § 2254 petition, petitioner asserts three grounds for relief: (1)
illegal search and seizure; (2) insufficient evidence of anal sodomy; and (3)
prosecutorial misconduct.
II.

Legal Standard

Federal courts may not grant habeas relief on a claim that has been decided on
the merits in state court unless that adjudication:
(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)-(2).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established law if "it applies a rule
that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it
confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the
Supreme Court] but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141
(2005). "The state court need not cite or even be aware of the governing Supreme
Court cases, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision
contradicts them.'" Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Early
v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). "In the ‘contrary to' analysis of the state court's

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decision, [the federal court's] focus is on the result and any reasoning that the court
may have given; the absence of reasoning is not a barrier to a denial of relief." Id.
A decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established law if
"the state court applies [the Supreme Court's] precedents to the facts in an objectively
unreasonable manner," Payton, 125 S. Ct. at 1439; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
405 (2000), or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from
[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or
unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply."
Id. at 406. "Federal habeas relief is warranted only when the refusal was ‘objectively
unreasonable,' not when it was merely erroneous or incorrect." Carter v. Kemna, 255
F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11).
A state court decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings only if it is shown that
the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the
record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir.2004).
“[T]he prisoner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear
and convincing evidence.” Barnett v. Roper, 541 F.3d 804, 811 (8th Cir. 2008).
III. Discussion
Ground One: Illegal Search and Seizure
Petitioner argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the trial
court allowed the contents of his laptop computer to be admitted into evidence.
Petitioner alleges that the computer was searched and seized without a warrant and
without proper consent.
“The Supreme Court has held that ‘[w]here the State has provided an

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opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner
may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.’” Mims v. Smith,
No. 4:07-CV-1445 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2010) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494
(1976)). A search and seizure claim is cognizable in a habeas action only if “the state
provided no procedure by which the prisoner could raise his Fourth Amendment claim,
or the prisoner was foreclosed from using that procedure because of an
unconscionable breakdown in the system.” Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1149 (8th
Cir. 1997).
In the instant case, petitioner was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
Fourth Amendment claim. Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress the
seized computer and contents, which the trial court denied. Resp. Ex. B at 52-54; see
Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 (filing a motion to suppress qualifies as a full and fair
opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim.). Petitioner then appealed the trial
court’s decision and the appeals court affirmed on the merits. Rep. Ex. E at 2-4. As
a result, petitioner’s first claim is not appropriate for federal review and is denied.
Ground Two: Insufficient Evidence
Petitioner argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
petitioner committed sodomy during the period charged in the eighth count. Petitioner
further argues that the victim’s testimony was contradictory and inconsistent.
The due process clause prohibits the conviction of an accused “except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A federal habeas court
must consider “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

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prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see
also Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 2004).
On direct appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals wrote:
Section 566.062 provides that “[a] person commits the crime of
statutory sodomy in the first degree if he has deviate sexual intercourse
with another person who is less than fourteen years old.” As pertinent,
the eighth count required the jury to find that between September 1,
2000, and December 5, 2000, Defendant put his penis in J.M.’s anus and
that J.M. was less than fourteen years of age.
Resp. Ex. E, p. 4.
The evidence established that the victim, J.M., was less than fourteen years of
age during the time period alleged in the charge. The victim testified that petitioner
anally penetrated him, and he described the sexual acts, the location of the acts, and
the period of time during which the abuse occurred. Resp. Ex. A at 748, 755, 758,
762-768, 831. During cross-examination, counsel for petitioner attempted to impeach
the victim based on prior inconsistent statements made at a deposition. Id. at 790798. Counsel also questioned the victim about his earlier admission that he
“sometimes tells lies.” Id. at 823. Notwithstanding the efforts to cast doubt on the
victim’s veracity, the Court concludes that when the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that petitioner committed the essential elements of statutory
sodomy in the first degree as charged in the eighth count. Petitioner’s second claim is
denied.
Ground Three: Prosecutorial Misconduct
Petitioner’s third claim is based on the allegation that the State did not inform
him that the prosecutor had been previously fired after being found guilty of
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misconduct in an unrelated case.
Petitioner did not raise this argument on direct appeal or in his post-conviction
relief motion and has not shown cause, prejudice, or actual innocence to excuse his
failure to exhaust state-court remedies. Thus, this claim is procedurally barred from
review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See

Murphy, 652 F.3d at 848-50; Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547, 1552 (8th Cir.
1994); U.S. v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001).
However, even if this claim was not procedurally barred, it would still fail.
“Prosecutorial misconduct involves serious unfairness which results in a deprivation of
a defendant’s fundamental due process right to a fair trial.” Morrison v. USA, No. 4:11CV-437 (E.D. Mo. August 20, 2012) (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)).
“To prove prosecutorial misconduct, [petitioner] must show that (1) the prosecutor’s
conduct was improper and (2) that conduct ‘prejudicially affected the defendant’s
substantial rights.’” Id. (citing Graves v. Ault, 614 F.3d 501, 507 (8th Cir. 2010)). The
prosecutor’s prior misconduct is completely irrelevant to the instant case and the
record does not reflect any improper conduct on behalf of the State. Petitioner’s third
claim is denied.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to
establish that he is entitled to relief based on state court proceedings that were
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based
upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because petitioner has failed to make
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, the Court will not issue a

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certificate of appealability.

See Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997).

A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum will be entered this
same date.

____________________________
CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 19th day of June, 2013.

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