Suter v. The Carpenter Health and Welfare Trust Fund of St. Louis

Filing 54

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Michael Suter's Motion For Summary Judgment On Defendant's Counterclaim (Docket No. 33) is denied. Denying 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Frederick R. Buckles on 11/3/2011. (NCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL SUTER, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

v.
THE CARPENTER HEALTH AND
WELFARE TRUST FUND OF
ST. LOUIS,
Defendant/Counter-Claimant.

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Case No. 4:10CV1855 FRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Suter’s
Motion For Summary Judgment On Defendant’s Counterclaim (Docket No.
33).

All matters are pending before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge, with consent of the parties, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
I.

Procedural Background and Evidence Before the Court
Plaintiffs Michael Suter and Candice Suter brought this

action in the Associate Division of the 21st Judicial Circuit
Court, St. Louis County, Missouri.

On October 1, 2010, defendant

removed the matter to this Court, alleging that this Court has
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims inasmuch as they arise under
the civil enforcement provision of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).

The parties do not

dispute that The Carpenters Health and Welfare Trust Fund of St.
Louis (also “Fund”) is an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA.
Defendant subsequently filed an Answer and a two-count
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Counterclaim,

acknowledging

that

the

plaintiffs

are

covered

individuals under the employee benefit plan (also “Plan”).

Count

II of the Counterclaim was dismissed by this Court on June 17,
2011, and Plaintiff Michael Suter now moves for summary judgment on
Count I.
In Count I, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff Michael
Suter was injured in a motor vehicle accident on or about April 27,
2004 (also “the accident”), for which a third party is or may be
responsible. The Counterclaim alleges that the Plan provides that:
“The covered person, and anyone acting on his or her behalf, shall
hold the third-party recovery In Trust, as Trustee, for the benefit
of

the

Plan,

to

be

applied

first

in

satisfaction

reimbursement obligation of the covered person.”
page 5).

of

the

(Docket No. 7 at

Defendant alleges that the plaintiffs have received, or

will receive, “the settlement sum as the trustees of an express
trust, referred to herein as the “Settlement Trust,” with the
fiduciary duty to apply the Settlement Trust assets to satisfy
their reimbursement obligations under the Plan.”

(Id. at page 6).

In Count I, Defendant seeks a declaration that, if the plaintiffs
receive money from a third party based on an act or omission that
caused

injuries

for

which

the

Fund

paid

benefits,

that

the

plaintiffs will hold such money as trustees of the Settlement Trust
for the benefit of the Fund.
II.

Discussion
Under

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

56(c),

summary

judgment

is

appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
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and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 246 (1986). A
dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonAnderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

moving party’s favor.

In determining

whether the dispute is genuine, this Court should believe the
evidence of the non-moving party, and draw justifiable inferences
in that party’s favor.

Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 967

F.2d 270, 272 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
A trial court should exercise great caution, and may
properly deny a motion for summary judgment when it believes that
the better course is to proceed to trial.

Id. (citing Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255). Summary judgment is an extreme remedy, and is
“not to be entered unless the movant has established its right to
a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy
and unless the other party is not entitled to recover under any
discernible circumstances.”

Vette Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,

612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).
Relevant

to

the

instant

motion

is

ERISA’s

civil

enforcement provision which permits, inter alia, a plan fiduciary
to bring a civil action “(A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan,
or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such

violations

or

(ii)

to

enforce

subchapter or the terms of the plan.”
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any

provisions

of

this

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).

Defendant’s status as a fiduciary, and its right to assert the
claim it asserts in Count I, has been fully discussed in prior
orders entered by this Court in this matter, and will not be
repeated here.
In support of the instant Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff Michael Suter states, inter alia, “Defendant has not
produced, in response to discovery requests, that it has any
information that Michael Suter received any funds from a third
party,” and that “Plaintiff has no documents showing that Michael
Suter has received payment from a third party relating to the
automobile accident on April 27, 2004 involving Michael Suter.”
(Docket No. 33 at page 3).

Plaintiff Michael Suter does not aver

that he has not or will not receive money from a third party as a
result of the accident; he avers only that Defendant has not so
proven.

Indeed, whether Plaintiff Michael Suter has received or

will receive money from a third party relating to the accident is
the threshold issue for Defendant’s claim in Count I.
In response, Defendant argues that the allegation in
Count I that Plaintiff Michael Suter has received or will receive
money from a third party as a result of the accident is strongly
supported by evidence indicating that Plaintiff Michael Suter
filed, and subsequently voluntarily dismissed, a civil action in
the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis on August 26, 2005
against T and M Corporation and also against Jack Leon Priest, the
individual identified in the Subrogation Questionnaire as the third
party involved in the accident.

See (Docket No. 37, Attachment 1,
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page 1).

In support, Defendant attached a copy of the docket sheet

from cause number 22052-10282, Suter v. T and M Corporation, from
Case.net,

the

state

of

Missouri’s

online

docketing

system.

Defendant requests that this Court take judicial notice of this
fact pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
has

noted

that

courts

“may

take

judicial

The Eighth Circuit
notice

of

judicial

opinions and public records.” Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757,
760 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of an unpublished
bankruptcy order of default judgment).

Having examined the docket

sheet Defendant attaches, and having also independently accessed
the docket sheet on Case.net and examined it, the undersigned takes
judicial notice of Plaintiff Michael Suter’s civil case against T
and

M

Corporation

and

Jack

Leon

Priest

for

the

purpose

of

confirming its existence.
With this evidence, Defendant has met its burden of
demonstrating the presence of a genuine issue of material fact:
that

being

whether

Plaintiff

Michael

Suter

has

received

settlement from a third party related to the accident.
judgment is therefore inappropriate.

a

Summary

Having so determined, the

undersigned declines to address at this time the other arguments
raised by Plaintiff Michael Suter and responded to by Defendant,
with

the

exception

of

noting

that

Plaintiff

Michael

Suter’s

assertion that this matter is not ripe for adjudication is not well
taken,

inasmuch

as

he

has

taken

action

which

Defendant

has

interpreted as challenging the terms of the Plan, a Plan which
Defendant, as a fiduciary, has the right to seek to enforce.
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29

U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).

Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Michael Suter’s
Motion For Summary Judgment On Defendant’s Counterclaim (Docket No.
33) is denied.

_______________________________
Frederick R. Buckles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 3rd day of November, 2011.

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