Mangold et al v. Lincoln County

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for class certification [#25] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there will be an amended scheduling conference on Friday, September 9, 2011 at 12:00 p.m. in my Chambers. Parties shall file a proposed schedule for class notification and discovery for the remainder of this case no later than Thursday, September 8, 2011. Signed by Honorable Rodney W. Sippel on 8/31/2011. (RAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LISA MANGOLD, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
LINCOLN COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 4:10 CV 1991 RWS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before me on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Defendants do not
oppose class certification. Following a hearing held on August 30, 2011, I will grant class
certification for the reasons that follow.
I.

Introduction
Plaintiffs Lisa Mangold and Christopher Shive bring this putative class action against

Defendants Lincoln County, Missouri; Michael Brigbaum, Lincoln County Sheriff; County
Commission of Lincoln County, Missouri; Sean O’Brien, Presiding Commissioner; James Mayes,
Associate Commissioner; and Matt Bass, Associate Commissioner.
Plaintiffs allege Defendants wrongfully withheld part or all of the cash bond they posted
while incarcerated in the Lincoln County Adult Detention Facility for “Board Bill” incurred during
their incarceration. In Count I of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated
their rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In
Count II, Plaintiffs allege Defendants committed the tort of conversion. In Count III, Plaintiffs allege
Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights under Article I, § 26 of the Missouri Constitution. In Count IV,

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Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, Plaintiffs allege in
Count V that Defendants committed the common law tort of money had and received.
II.

Proposed Class Definition
Plaintiffs propose the following class definition:
All persons who posted a cash bond to secure their release from the
Lincoln County Jail, and, at the disposition of their criminal case,
Lincoln County seized a portion of their entire cash bond for the
purposes of recouping the “Board Bill” which was incurred during the
individual’s incarceration. Said seizure was done by Lincoln County
under state authority and in violation of the Plaintiffs and Class’ [sic]
Constitutionally protected rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as protection
from common law conversion and money had and received occurring
from January 5, 2001 until March 7, 2011.
“The class definition must enable the Court to determine objectively who is in the class, and

thus, who is bound by the ruling.” Walls v. Sagamore Ins. Co., 2009 WL 890528, *4 (E.D. Ark.
March 31, 2009); see also Dumas v. Albers Medical, Inc., 2005 WL 2172030, *5 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 7,
2005). “Identifying the class insures that those actually harmed by the defendant’s conduct will be
the recipients of the relief eventually provided.” Id. (quoting In re PPA Products Liability Litig., 214
F.R.D. 614, 617 (W.D. Wash. 2003)). “[T]o accomplish this, the Court should not have to engage in
lengthy, individualized inquiries in order to identify members of the class.” Walls, 2009 WL 890528
at *4 (internal citation omitted). Here, Defendants do not contest the proposed definition of the class
and all putative members in the proposed class definition are harmed by Defendants’ conduct under
Plaintiffs’ theory of the case. On this record, Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition is sufficient.
III.

Class Action Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class certification. “Rule 23(a) ensures that the

named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate.”
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550. “The Rule’s four requirements – numerosity,

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commonality, typicality, and adequate representation– effectively limit the class claims to those
fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “In
determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have
stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23
are met.” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). Although “it may be necessary
for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,” a
court has no “authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine
whether it may be maintained as a class action.” General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
A. Requirements of Rule 23(a)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) allows one or more individuals to sue as representative
parties on behalf of a class “only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law and fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a); see also Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1539 (8th Cir. 1996); Morgan v.
United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 354 (E.D. Mo. 1996). Plaintiffs have the
burden to establish each of the four prerequisites: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy
of representation. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156. Additionally, a plaintiff must fulfill the requirements of
a Rule 23(b) category in order to obtain certification for the proposed class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b);
Wal-Mart,131 S. Ct. at 2548. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving both the threshold requirements
of Rule 23(a) and fulfillment of one of the three subsections set forth in Rule 23(b). Coleman v.
Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1994).

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a. Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity
A class may not be certified unless the proposed class is so large that joinder of all class
members would be “impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). At the hearing, Plaintiffs stated that
the number of potential class members has been difficult to estimate due to Defendants failure to
provide records of all class members and the amount of any board bill seized by Defendants for the
time period in question. Defendants do not dispute that the plaintiffs meet the numerosity
requirement, and, given the nature of the class, I find that Plaintiffs have met the numerosity
requirement of Rule 23(a).
b. Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires the presence of questions of law or fact common to the class.
“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have ‘suffered the same
injury.’” Wal-Mart, 131S.Ct at 2551 (quoting Falcon, 457 US at 157). Plaintiffs contend that a
common question of law is presented in this case: whether Defendants practice of withholding cash
bond to satisfy “Board Bill” is unconstitutional and constitutes the torts of conversion and money
had and received. Plaintiffs also assert that class members have suffered the same injury because
their claims arise from the same conduct of Defendants withholding part or all of their cash bond for
Board Bill. The determination of whether that same conduct was legal or illegal will resolve the
claims of the putative class. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs meet the commonality
requirement, and I find that Plaintiffs have met the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a).
c. Rule 23(a)(3)-(4): Typicality and Adequacy
Rule 23 (a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class . . . .” Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the named plaintiff must fairly
and adequately protect the interests of class members. To meet this requirement, the named plaintiff

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must be a member of the class she seeks to represent. East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc v.
Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977); Roby, 775 F.2d at 961; Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 581
F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (8th Cir. 1978). In addition, the class representative must possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury as the class members. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. at 403. The adequacy
rule also applies to lawyers seeking to represent the class. See Bradford v. AGCO Corp., 187 F.R.D.
600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
Here, Plaintiffs contend that their claims are identical to members of the putative class and
that they and their counsel will adequately represent and vigorously defend the interests of the class.
Plaintiffs assert this requirement is satisfied because the claims of the Plaintiffs and the class
members arise from the same conduct by the Defendants. Plaintiffs also assert they will adequately
protect the interests of all class members because they share the same injury and seek the same legal
remedy. Plaintiffs seek a refund of cash bond withheld for Board Bill, which is the same relief
sought on behalf of the Class. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs meet this requirement, and I
find that Plaintiffs have met the Typicality and Adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) and 23(a)(4).
For these reasons, I find that plaintiffs meet the requirements for bringing a class action
under Rule 23(a).
B. Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)
In addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), to be certified as a class action
Plaintiffs must also fulfill the requirements of one of the Rule 23(b) categories. Here, Plaintiffs
allege that they meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), which permits class certification where “the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” This requirement “tests whether

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proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). The nature of the evidence that will suffice to
resolve a question determines whether the question is common or individual. See In re Visa, 280
F.3d at 136-40. If, to make a prima facie showing on a given question, the members of a proposed
class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member, then it is an individual
question. If the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing, then it
becomes a common question. See id. In other words, “just because the legal issues or underlying
theories of recovery involved may be common to all class members does not mean that the proof
required to establish these same issues is sufficiently similar to warrant certification.” Dumas v.
Albers Med., Inc., 2005 WL 2172030, *3 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2005). “The standard for certification
imposed by Rule 23(b)(3) is more demanding than the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), and
mandates caution, particularly where individual stakes are high and disparities among class members
are great.” In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. 392, 397 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
“To determine whether common questions predominate, a court must conduct a limited
preliminary inquiry, looking behind the pleadings.” Blades v. Monsanto Co.,400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th
Cir. 2005). “In conducting this preliminary inquiry, however, the court must look only so far as to
determine whether, given the factual setting of the case, if the plaintiffs’ general allegations are true,
common evidence could suffice to make out a prima facie case for the class.” Id. at 566-67.
Plaintiffs allege that a class action is a superior to other available methods to adjudicate this
controversy because “members will have no interest in individually pursuing the seizure of the cash
bonds because the litigation expenses would far outweigh the recover of this cash bond.” Plaintiffs
argue that, as a result, individual litigation by the purported class members is not a viable alternative
to proceeding with a class action. Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have identified litigation that has

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already begun by the class members.1 Further, the evidence required to determine whether the
purported class members are entitled to recover is the same as is necessary to determine if Plaintiffs
are entitled to recovery. Finally, Plaintiffs argue managing this class action is unlikely to present
difficulties. Defendants do not contest that Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3). Accordingly, I find that Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements for bringing a class
action under Rule 23(b)(3).
Based on the foregoing, I will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [#25] is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there will be an amended scheduling conference on
Friday, September 9, 2011 at 12:00 p.m. in my Chambers. Parties shall file a proposed schedule
for class notification and discovery for the remainder of this case no later than Thursday,
September 8, 2011.
________________________________
RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 31st day of August, 2011.

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During the hearing, Plaintiffs referred to litigation pending before a different court
challenging a similar practice used by a different county in Missouri.
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