Mangold et al v. Lincoln County

Filing 63

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion of for summary judgment # 52 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any additional motions for summary judgment may be filed by January 15, 2013. Any opposition briefs shall be filed by Febr uary 14, 2013, and any reply briefs shall be filed by February 26, 2013. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the January 7, 2013 trial setting is vacated, and this case will be reset for trial, if necessary, following the Courts ruling on summary judgment. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 12/13/2012. (RAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LISA MANGOLD and CHRISTOPHER
SHIVE,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.
LINCOLN COUNTY, MISSOURI, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:10CV01991 RWS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Lisa Mangold and Christopher Shive filed a class action against Lincoln County, the
Lincoln Sheriff, the Lincoln County Commission, the Lincoln County Commissioners, and Judges
of the 45th Judicial Circuit of Missouri1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, claiming their rights
were violated when Defendants deducted the costs of their incarceration from their posted bond
without their consent. Plaintiffs now seek summary judgment on their § 1983 and conversion
claims. The motion will be denied for the reasons discussed below.
Standards Governing Summary Judgment
“Summary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d

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On July 5, 2011, I granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims against Defendants
Judge Dan Dildine, Judge Ben Burkemper, Judge Amy Kinker, and Judge David Ash on the
ground of judicial immunity [#32].
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1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2)). The movant “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and must identify “those
portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “If the movant does so, the
nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000), (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). The nonmovant “must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” and must come forward with
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) .
Background
Mangold was incarcerated in the Lincoln County Adult Detention Facility from November
25, 2009 through February 9, 2010. Mangold’s mother, Dawn Hawn, posted a $1,500.00 cash
bond with the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Department to secure Mangold’s release. The bond was
posted in Mangold’s name alone. Mangold alleges that Lincoln County Sheriff’s Department did
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not return her bond after the disposition of her case, but instead applied the entire bond as payment
for the costs of her incarceration. Mangold alleges that she was not notified that cost of room and
board for jail time would be deducted from her bond, that she did not consent to the deduction,
and that she was not provided an opportunity to contest the deduction.
Shive has been incarcerated in Lincoln County Adult Detention Facility on several different
occasions, including on March 12, 2004, on May 4, 2004 to May 19, 2004, and June 1, 2004
through June 10, 2004. Shive posted a $2,500.00 cash bond with the Lincoln County Sheriff’s
Department to secure his release. Shive alleges that after the disposition of his case, $320.00 of his
cash bond was deducted as payment for the costs of his incarceration. Shive also alleges that he
was not notified that cost of room and board for jail time would be deducted from his bond, that he
did not consent to the deduction, and that he was not provided an opportunity to contest the
deduction.
Plaintiffs sued Defendants for allegedly violating the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 26 of the Missouri Constitution.
They also brought claims under state law for conversion and money had and received. On August,
31, 2011, I certified a plaintiff class of all persons who posted a cash bond to secure their release
from the Lincoln County Jail from January 5, 2001 until March 7, 2011 and had a portion of their
cash bond deducted for the purposes of recouping the costs of the individual’s incarceration. On
June 22, 2012, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a putative defendant class that included ninety
counties in the State of Missouri and their respective court administrators. Currently before me is
Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgement.

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Discussion
At the outset, I find it necessary to resolve some apparent confusion regarding the proper
parties in this matter. Public servants may be sued under § 1983 in both their official and
individual capacities. Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999).
However, “in order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must
expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the
defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
specifically states that the Lincoln County Commissioners are not being sued in their individual
capacities, but the complaint is silent as to whether the Lincoln County Sheriff, Michael Krigbaum,
is being sued in his individual or official capacity. The caption of Plaintiffs’ complaint makes no
reference to either individual or official capacity, and the body of the complaint refers to Michael
Krigbaum as “the duly elected Sheriff of Lincoln County, Missouri, serving as authorized pursuant
to Chapter 57 of the Missouri Revised Statues.” Because the complaint contains no specific
pleading of individual capacity, it is assumed that the Sheriff is sued only in his official capacity.
Id. A suit against a defendant in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the public
employer, in this case Lincoln County. Elder–Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir.
2006).
The defenses of absolute and qualified immunity, including quasi-judicial immunity, are not
available to individuals sued in their official capacities. VanHorn v. Oelschlager, 502 F.3d 775,
778 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court’s precedent, Supreme Court precedent, and case law from our
sister circuits make clear that absolute, quasi-judicial immunity is not available for defendants sued
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in their official capacities.”). Because this is essentially a suit against Lincoln County, “the only
immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that
the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 167 (1985). However, sovereign immunity does not extend to counties, so Lincoln
County cannot claim such protection. Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham County, Ga.,
547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly refused to extend sovereign immunity to
counties.”).
Lincoln County cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts
of its employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); McGautha v.
Jackson County, 36 F.3d 53, 56 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Respondeat superior does not apply under
section § 1983 because municipal liability is limited to conduct for which the municipality is itself
actually responsible.”). Instead, Plaintiffs must prove that Lincoln County“itself caused the
constitutional violation at issue.” Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 604 (8th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis in original). To do so, Plaintiffs must identify a policy or custom of Lincoln County that
caused the alleged violation. Mettier v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999). A
county will only be liable under § 1983 where a county official “responsible for establishing final
policy with respect to the subject matter in question” makes a deliberate choice among competing
alternatives that results in the violation of constitutional rights. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 483–84 (1986). Designation of the official or body responsible for the challenged policy
is a matter of state law determined by the court. Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S.
701, 737 (1989).
Even if I construe Plaintiffs’ pleadings liberally to allege that it is Lincoln County’s policy
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of deducting the costs of incarceration from a posted bond that violated their rights under the
Constitution, Plaintiffs would not be entitled to summary judgement because they have not
demonstrated that Lincoln County is responsible for the challenged policy. Instead, the 45th
Judicial Circuit--the state judicial district in which Lincoln County sits--adopted Local Court Rule
12, which declares that “room and board for jail time and court ordered restitution shall be
deducted from the cash bond before any money is refunded to the defendant.” When Plaintiffs
posted bond, they signed a “Bond Form” bearing a Circuit Court heading, which advised that
“fines, court costs, restitution, and various other fees will be deducted from the cash bond before
any money will be refunded to the defendant”. The “Case Party Fee Report,” a document
provided to Plaintiffs to account for the charges for the costs of their incarceration and deductions
from their bond, also included a Circuit Court heading. In light of this undisputed evidence in the
record, it is unclear whether Lincoln County is responsible for the policy in question. See Granada
v. City of St. Louis, 472 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding a judicial order was not a final policy
capable of creating municipal liability under § 1983). However, it certainly demonstrates that
Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law at this time.2
It appears that Defendants may actually be entitled summary judgment, but further briefing
is required from the parties before the Court may decide whether Lincoln County can be held liable
for the challenged policy. Therefore, in the interests of justice, the Court will grant the parties an
opportunity to properly address the issues raised in this Memorandum and Order, through
additional summary judgment briefing.

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I also find that Plaintiffs are not entitled summary judgment as a matter of law on their
state law claim of conversion at this time.
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion of for summary judgment [#52] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any additional motions for summary judgment may be
filed by January 15, 2013. Any opposition briefs shall be filed by February 14, 2013, and any
reply briefs shall be filed by February 26, 2013.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the January 7, 2013 trial setting is vacated, and
this case will be reset for trial, if necessary, following the Court’s ruling on summary
judgment.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 13th day of December, 2012.

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