Trendle v. Campbell et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(h)(3) (Doc. #9) is granted to the extent it requests the Court to decline jurisdiction over the instant cause of action. In all other respects, the motion is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court abstains from determining the claim raised in Count I of plaintiff's Complaint, and plaintiff's due process claim against de fendant Alyson Campbell is dismissed without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 USC § 1367(c)(3), this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claim raised in Count II of th e plaintiff's Complaint, and plaintiff's claims against defendant Missouri Department of Social Services-Family Support Division is dismissed without prejudice. granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to Dismiss Case Signed by Magistrate Judge Frederick R. Buckles on 7/19/2011. (MRC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES TRENDLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALYSON CAMPBELL, et al.,
Defendants.

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No.

4:10CV2210 FRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently pending before the Court is defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
and 12(h)(3) (Doc. #9).

All matters are pending before the

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with consent of the
parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Plaintiff James Trendle brings this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendant Alyson Campbell, Director of
the Missouri Department of Social Services—Family Support Division,
wrongfully deprived him of his property, to wit, his wages, without
due process of law.

Plaintiff also brings a supplemental state law

claim against the Missouri Department of Social Services—Family
Support

Division

(hereinafter

“FSD”)

alleging

that

it

denied

plaintiff access to public records in violation of Missouri’s
Sunshine Law.

Defendants now move to dismiss this cause of action,

arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
cause and/or that plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.

Plaintiff has responded to the motion to

which defendants have replied.
I.

Background

A review of plaintiff’s Complaint and the attachments
thereto shows the following:
In July 2009, plaintiff received a letter from defendant
FSD informing him that he owed back child support to his ex-wife,
Sharon

Trendle,

in

the

amount

of

approximately

$30,000.00.

Plaintiff requested a hearing on the matter, after which a hearing
date was set in March 2010.
In the meanwhile, on August 21, 2009, FSD entered an
Administrative

Income

Withholding

Order

directing

plaintiff’s

employer to deduct a certain amount from plaintiff’s wages and to
forward such monies to the Family Support Payment Center for
purposes of satisfying plaintiff’s obligation for past-due child
support.

Plaintiff’s employer was advised that it could not stop

such deductions unless it received a termination order.

On that

same date, August 21, 2009, FSD mailed to plaintiff a Notice of the
Administrative Income Withholding Order and informed plaintiff that
he could contest the Order by submitting a written request for a
hearing within thirty days.

Beginning September 2009, plaintiff’s

wages were reduced in accordance with the Order.
In

October

2009,

plaintiff

filed

a

Motion

for

Modification of the Dissolution of Marriage in the Circuit Court of

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the City of St. Louis, Missouri.

A hearing was conducted on the

motion on January 28, 2010, upon which a Judgment Terminating Child
Support was entered terminating plaintiff’s obligation to pay child
support, effective December 8, 2007, inasmuch as the child was
determined to be emancipated.

Within the Judgment, it was also

ordered that the Notice of Wage Withholding directed to plaintiff’s
employer was terminated, effective January 28, 2010.

Finally, it

was ordered that plaintiff’s obligation for child support was
abated from January 1, 1997, through December 8, 2007, inasmuch as
the child had lived with the plaintiff and because plaintiff was
solely or jointly responsible for the care and custody of the
child.1
In

a

letter

dated

February

2,

2010,

FSD

informed

plaintiff, through counsel, that, in accordance with the Judgment
Terminating Child Support, it had terminated all actions and would
refund to plaintiff “any future money” that FSD would receive. The
letter also stated that “all monies collected in past has [sic]
already been disbursed to Ms. Sharon Trendle & therefore would need
to be collected from her.”

(Pltf.’s Compl., Exh. 5.)

From September 2009 to January 2010, FSD collected over
$2,000.00 from plaintiff’s wages pursuant to the August 2009
Administrative Income Withholding Order.

1

Although the copy of this Judgment submitted with plaintiff’s
Complaint is not signed by a judge or other authority (see Pltf.’s
Compl., Exh. 6), defendants do not contest its validity.
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II.
In
defendant

Discussion

Count I of his Complaint, plaintiff claims that

Campbell’s

withholding

of

his

wages

violated

his

Fourteenth Amendment procedural right to due process inasmuch as he
was

not

provided

an

opportunity

to

be

heard

prior

to

such

withholding. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as
well as attorney’s fees.

In the instant Motion to Dismiss,

defendant Campbell argues that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim inasmuch as matters involving child
support fall within the “domestic relations exception” to federal
jurisdiction.

In addition, defendant Campbell argues that she is

entitled to qualified immunity on the claim inasmuch as her conduct
in withholding plaintiff’s wages pursuant to an Administrative
Order did not violate plaintiff’s clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.

Defendant Campbell also argues that plaintiff fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted inasmuch as the
facts as alleged by plaintiff demonstrate that he received all of
the process he was due in accordance with Missouri law and,
further, that plaintiff cannot recover under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory of liability.
For the following reasons, the circumstances of this case
require the Court to abstain from determining the dispute, and
plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed.

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A.

Domestic Relations Exception
The domestic relations exception grew out of Barber v.

Barber,

21

How.

582

584

(1859),

in

which

the

Supreme

Court

announced that federal courts have no jurisdiction over suits for
divorce

or

the

allowance

of

alimony.

Although

the

domestic

relations exception “divests the federal courts of power to issue
divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees,” it “did not intend to
strip the federal courts of authority to hear cases arising from
the domestic relations of persons unless they seek the granting or
modification of a divorce or alimony decree.”
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701-02 (1992).
exception

“[T]he domestic relations

encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a

divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.”
added).

Ankenbrandt v.

Id. at 704 (emphasis

The exception does not extend to other related issues

merely because domestic relations considerations are implicated.
Id. at 703-04.
Here,

plaintiff

does

not

seek

the

issuance

or

modification of a decree involving divorce, child custody or child
support.

Instead,

plaintiff

alleges

that

defendant

Campbell

deprived him of due process through her actions in a Missouri state
child support proceeding.

Plaintiff is asking this Court to

examine whether defendant’s actions, which happen to involve child
support, comported with the federal constitutional guarantees of
due process.

Because plaintiff’s claim does not involve the

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issuance or modification of a domestic relations decree, the claim
falls

outside

the

domestic

relations

exception

to

federal

jurisdiction.
As such, to the extent defendant Campbell argues that
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s due
process claim, defendant’s argument fails.
B.

Abstention
Nevertheless, even where federal jurisdiction exists, a

federal court should abstain from deciding domestic relations cases
under certain circumstances.

See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 705

(citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)).

See also

Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen a cause of
action closely relates to but does not precisely fit into the
contours of an action for divorce, alimony or child custody,
federal

courts

will

generally

abstain

from

exercising

jurisdiction.”). “This would be so when a case presents ‘difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial
public import whose importance transcends the result in the case
then at bar.’”

Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 705 (quoting Colorado

River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976)).

For the following reasons, this is such a case.
As

set

out

above,

plaintiff

claims

that

defendant

Campbell denied him due process by failing to provide him an
opportunity to be heard on the Income Withholding Order prior to

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the actual withholding of his wages.

A review of Missouri’s

comprehensive statutory scheme governing domestic relations shows
Missouri’s legislature to have enacted various and numerous laws in
this domestic arena, including, inter alia, judgments respecting
child support, property subject to garnishment/ attachment for
child support, administrative actions on judgments, duties of state
administrative agencies in such actions, duties of the parties in
such actions, and liability and recovery of overpayments.

See Mo.

Rev. Stat. §§ 452.140, et seq.; §§ 454.400, et seq.

Indeed, a

cursory

following

review

of

this

statutory

scheme

shows

the

sampling of statutes to have potential relevance to the instant
claim raised in this litigation:
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.340, governing abatement and termination
of child support obligations;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.345, governing obligations of circuit
clerk to remit support payments to person entitled to receive
payments within three working days of clerk’s receipt of
payment;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.350, governing the withholding of income,
timing of hearing and decision, time frame within which
employer to transmit withheld amounts, court’s termination of
withholding, and director’s authority to issue administrative
withholding order;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.370, governing the duty of parent
receiving child support to inform obligated parent of child’s
emancipation with notice that failure to do so results in
receiving-parent’s liability to obligated parent to pay amount
of child support which was paid following emancipation, plus
interest;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 454.400, governing the establishment of the
Division of Child Support Enforcement to administer state
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plan, and setting out
thereto;

the duties and powers promulgated

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 454.475, governing administrative hearings
and agency’s authority to enforce and collect upon administraive order during hearing process and appeal unless enjoined by
court order;
Mo.
Rev.
Stat.
§
454.476,
governing
the
entry
of
administrative orders, including orders directing employer to
withhold and pay over money due, requests for hearing, and
directive that withholding be implemented unless obligor posts
bond or other security to insure payment of support;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 454.496, governing the modification of
support orders, effect of motion to modify upon director’s
authority to enforce and collect upon previous order, support
payments affected by modification, and effective date of
modification orders;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 454.500, governing the modification of and/or
amendments to administrative orders;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 454.501, governing courts’ authority;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 454.505, governing administrative garnishment
orders issued to employers, the time within which to request
a hearing, and the time within which employer is to transmit
payments; and
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 454.531, governing the recipient-parent’s
indebtedness to the division for the receipt of erroneous
payments of child support, and potential criminal liability.
This

extensive

statutory

scheme

demonstrates

the

substantial public importance of domestic relations in the State of
Missouri and the difficult multi-faceted questions of state law
bearing on policy problems relating thereto. Indeed, the statutory
backdrop sampled above provides support for the Supreme Court’s
recognition that “domestic relations are preeminently matters of
state law,” Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989), and that
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state courts traditionally have authority over issues of child
support given their unparalleled familiarity and experience in
applying detailed state statutes, Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 628
(1987).

State

authority

Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587.

is

rarely

displaced

in

this

area.

Any decision by this Court on the

question raised by plaintiff’s claim here, when viewed against the
public importance of significant policy-driven state law, would
transcend the result in this case and could potentially interfere
with Missouri’s statutory scheme in the area of domestic relations.
As such, the undersigned determines

it

inappropriate for the
See Ankenbrandt, 504

federal court to decide this controversy.

U.S. at 705; cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
1,

12

(2004)

(“[W]hile

rare

instances

arise

in

which

it

is

necessary to answer a substantial federal question that transcends
or exists apart from the family law issue, in general it is
appropriate for the federal courts to leave delicate issues of
domestic relations to the state courts.”).
Accordingly,

because

the

State

of

Missouri

has

a

substantial interest in managing its citizens’ domestic relations,
has

developed

a

comprehensive

scheme

for

the

enforcement

of

domestic orders and collections relating thereto, and has courts
with expertise and experience in applying that scheme, this Court
will abstain from determining plaintiff’s instant due process claim
which is inextricably intertwined with issues that were subject to

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prior state adjudications.

See Khan, 21 F.3d at 861.

Plaintiff’s due process claim raised against defendant
Campbell in Count I of the Complaint should therefore be dismissed.
C.

Supplemental Jurisdiction
Inasmuch

as

the

Court

will

dismiss

plaintiff’s

due

process claim, the undersigned declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law claim raised in
Count II of his Complaint.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(h)(3)
(Doc. #9) is granted to the extent it requests the Court to decline
jurisdiction over the instant cause of action.

In all other

respects, the motion is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court abstains from
determining the claim raised in Count I of plaintiff’s Complaint,
and plaintiff’s due process claim against defendant Alyson Campbell
is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3),

this

Court

declines

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claim raised in Count II of
plaintiff’s Complaint, and plaintiff’s claim against defendant
Missouri Department of Social Services—Family Support Division is

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dismissed without prejudice.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this

19th

day of July, 2011.

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