Perry v. State of Missouri

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 21 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendant Jerome Stubblefield motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff's cause of action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to defendant Stubblefield only.. Signed by Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 7/5/11. (LGK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

MARK R. PERRY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEROME STUBBLEFIELD, ET. AL.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:10CV2436SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se prisoner plaintiff has filed this §1983 action alleging that while incarcerated at the
St. Louis Medium Security Institution, he was assaulted by two correctional officers (defendants
Martin and Darden). This matter is before the Court on defendant Stubblefield’s motion to
dismiss [21], filed May 3, 2011. Responsive pleadings have been filed by both the plaintiff and
defendant Stubblefield.
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of a
complaint so as to eliminate those actions “which are fatally flawed in their legal premises and
designed to fail, thereby sparing litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity.”
Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d. 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001) quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989). A complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)(abrogating
the prior “no set of facts” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Courts “do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., 127 U.S. at 1974. A complaint must set forth factual

allegations which are enough to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id., 127 U.S.
at 1974.
In passing on a motion to dismiss, a court must view the allegations of the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Kottschade v. City
of Rochester, 319 F.3d. 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2003). While a complaint challenged by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must still provide the
grounds for relief, and neither “labels and conclusions” nor “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action” will suffice. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1265 (internal
citations omitted). “Although the pleading standard is liberal, the plaintiff must allege facts – not
mere legal conclusions – that, if true, would support the existence of the claimed torts.”
Moses.com Securities v. Comprehensive Software Systems, Inc., 406 F.3d. 1052, 1062 (8th Cir.
2005) citing Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Systems, 298 F.3d. 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2002). In
viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court should not dismiss it
merely because the court doubts that the plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary
allegations. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d. 1053, 1058 (8th Cir. 1982). The primary issue for a court
to consider is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail in the lawsuit, but whether the
complaint adequately states a claim; and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in
support of that claim. A complaint may not be dismissed based upon a district court’s assessment
that the plaintiff will fail to present evidentiary support for the complaint’s allegations or will
ultimately fail to prove one or more claims to the satisfaction of the factfinder. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1969, n.8; Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327 (“What Rule
12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based upon a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s

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factual allegations.”). With this plausibility standard in mind, this Court turns to an examination
of the plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff fails to make any allegations that defendant Stubblefield was personally involved
in the alleged assault. He fails to allege that defendant Stubblefield was aware of any problems
that plaintiff had with the two correctional officers alleged to have assaulted him or that defendant
Stubblefield was aware of any past complaints of assault by the two named correctional officers.
Plaintiff consistently asserts that defendant Stubblefield should be held accountable because he is
the Warden and that by virtue of his authority he is “acting in concert” with defendants Martin
and Darden. He further attests that defendant Stubblefield should be held accountable because
plaintiff speculates that no disciplinary action was taken against defendants Martin and Darden for
the alleged assault.
Plaintiff is clearly attempting to hold defendant Stubblefield liable under respondeat
superior; a fact conceded by the plaintiff. It is well-settled that respondeat superior cannot be the
basis for liability under §1983. The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in §1983
actions. Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d. 1229, 1233 (8th Cir. 1990); Wilson v. City of Little Rock,
801 F.2d. 316, 322 (8th Cir. 1986); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d. 1334. 1338 (8th Cir. 1985).
A Section 1983 action against police supervisory officers cannot be based upon the theory of
respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Moreover, "[A] section 1983 action will not lie against police supervisory officers for failure to
prevent police misconduct, absent a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action."
Harris v. Pirch, 677 F.2d. 681m 685 (8th Cir. 1982) citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975);
Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d. 37 (1st Cir. 1977); see also, Wilson v. City of North Little Rock, 801
F.2d. 316, 322 (8th Cir. 1986). "Liability may only be found if there is personal involvement of

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the officer being sued." Wilson v. City of Little Rock, at 322 quoting Watson v. Interstate Fire &
Casualty Co., 611 F.2d. 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980). "What is required is a causal connection
between the misconduct complained of and the official sued." Harris v. Pirch, at 685. To meet
this burden the plaintiff must establish an "affirmative link" between the defendant's action and the
alleged deprivation of constitutional rights. See, Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377. Plaintiff has failed to
meet this burden, thus he fails to state a viable §1983 claim against defendant Stubblefield.
Plaintiff has failed to allege personal involvement by Stubblefield in the alleged wrongful conduct
or to allege any knowledge by Stubblefield of any prior complaints of assault by Martin and
Darden. As for his “failure-to-discipline”, all plaintiff has done is speculate and has failed to state
how any failure to discipline the correctional officers (after the alleged assault) rises to the level of
a constitutional violation for the alleged assault in the first place.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Stubblefield’s motion to dismiss [21] be and
is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s cause of action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to
defendant Stubblefield only.
Dated this 5th

day of July, 2011.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE