Nine v. Wentzville R-IV School District et al

Filing 132

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs renewed motion for leave to file a third amended complaint [Doc. # 124 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants motions for partial summary judgment [Doc. # 80 ] and for summary judgment [Doc. # 121 ] are denied as moot. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to strike defendants motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 122 ] is denied as moot. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 9/4/12. (KJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARY DOE NINE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL D. WILLIAMS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:11-CV-353 (CEJ)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint. Defendant Michael D. Williams has filed a response in opposition
to the motion. Also pending is Williams’s motion for summary judgment and plaintiff’s
motion to strike his summary judgment motion. The issue before the Court is whether
plaintiff should be granted leave to correct her allegations regarding the school year
during which defendant Williams allegedly assaulted her.
I.

Background

Plaintiff Mary Doe Nine alleges that former music teacher Michael Williams
sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions when she was an elementary school
student in the Wentzvile R-IV school district.1 She asserts claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, negligent infliction of emotional distress, battery, and statutory
childhood sex abuse, pursuant to § 537.046, Mo.Rev.Stat.
In her original complaint, filed on February 24, 2011, plaintiff alleged that the
abuse occurred in 1993 when she was a fifth-grade student at Wentzville East

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Defendant Williams is presently serving a term of imprisonment pursuant to
guilty pleas to eighteen counts of statutory sodomy and rape.

Elementary School.2 Plaintiff filed amended complaints on July 27, 2011, and August
31, 2011, but did not alter allegations regarding when the alleged abuse occurred. On
January 24, 2012, plaintiff sought leave to file a third amended complaint in order to
allege that the assaults occurred in the 1990-1991 school year when she was in third
grade. Because the deadline for amending pleadings elapsed on September 1, 2011,
plaintiff was required to satisfy the “good cause” standard of Rule 16(b)(4) by showing
that she had been diligent in attempting to meet that deadline.3 See Sherman v.
Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716-17 (8th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff did not address
the good cause standard and the Court found that she failed to establish diligence. The
Court also noted that defendant Wentzville had argued that it was entitled to sovereign
immunity based upon the terms of the liability insurance in place in 1993; the proposed
amendment would require Wentzville to repeat the analysis under a different insurance
policy. Based on these considerations, the Court denied plaintiff leave to amend her
complaint. [Doc. #85].
Wentzville then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing in part that the
discrepancy between plaintiff’s allegations and her deposition testimony regarding
when the alleged assaults occurred precluded her claims.

In her opposition to

summary judgment, plaintiff reasserted her argument that she should be allowed to
amend her allegations to conform to the evidence, asserting that defendant Wentzville
contributed to her delay in discovering the proper dates by failing to timely produce

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Plaintiff also named as defendants principal Richard Beauchamp, teacher Mrs.
Null, and the Wentzville R-IV school district. The Court granted defendants Beauchamp
and Null’s motion for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. #27], and defendant
Wentzville’s motions for summary judgment [Docs. #99 and #117]. Williams is the
sole remaining defendant.
3

Plaintiff sought leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15 and did not discuss Rule 16.
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school records. The Court did not reconsider this issue because the date of the alleged
assaults was immaterial to defendant Wentsville’s summary judgment motion.
Defendant Williams has filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting, as did
Wentzville, that plaintiff’s mistaken allegations are fatal to her claims. Plaintiff again
seeks leave to amend her complaint to conform her allegations to her corrected
recollection that the assaults occurred at an earlier time than what she pleaded in her
initial complaint. She does not seek to add new claims or allegations.
II.

Discussion

In deciding whether to grant plaintiff leave to amend her complaint, the Court
has considered Rule 15(a)(2) and Rule 16.
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that the courts “should freely give leave [to amend
pleadings] when justice so requires.” Under this liberal amendment policy, denial of
leave to amend pleadings is appropriate “only in those limited circumstances in which
undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving partly, futility of the amendment, or
unfair prejudice to the non-moving party can be demonstrated.”

Roberson v. Hayti

Police Dept., 241 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962)); Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987)). Delay
alone is not a reason in and of itself to deny leave to amend; the delay must have
resulted in unfair prejudice to the party opposing amendment. Sanders, 823 F.2d at
217. “The burden of proof of prejudice is on the party opposing the amendment.” Id.
However, where, as here, a party seeks leave to amend a pleading outside the
deadline established by the court’s scheduling order, the party must satisfy the goodcause standard of Rule 16(b)(4) rather than the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a).
Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2008). “The primary

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measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence in attempting to meet the order's
requirements.”

Id. (citing Rahn v. Hawkins, 464 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir. 2006)).

“While the prejudice to the nonmovant resulting from modification of the scheduling
order may also be a relevant factor, generally, [the court] will not consider prejudice
if the movant has not been diligent in meeting the scheduling order’s deadlines.” Id.
(citing Bradford v. DANA Corp., 249 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2001)).
Plaintiff again does not cite Rule 16 in her renewed motion to amend her
complaint and has not argued that she satisfies the good-cause standard. However,
in her response in opposition to defendant Wentzville’s summary judgment motion
(filed after the Court denied her last motion for leave to amend), plaintiff set forth the
following facts relevant to her late discovery of dates relevant to her claims: the
deadline for amending pleadings as set forth in the Case Management Order was
September 1, 2011; the school district provided its Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures on
November 22, 2011; the school district produced the employment file for defendant
Williams on December 14, 2011; and plaintiff filed her motion to amend on January 24,
2012. The Court finds that plaintiff’s failure to meet the deadline established by the
Case Management Order was not due to a lack of diligence on her part. The Court also
finds that defendant Williams is not unduly prejudiced by an amendment that merely
corrects the year in which the alleged assaults occur. See Buder v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1981) (no undue prejudice
in allowing plaintiffs to amend complaint where facts are substantially similar). Unlike
the school district, defendant Williams does not have a defense that depends upon the
terms of a liability insurance policy for a particular year. The Court recognizes that
defendant Williams has consistently asserted in summary judgment motions that he

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could not have been plaintiff’s teacher during the 1993 school year. However, the
prejudice to him must be balanced against the hardship to plaintiff if leave to amend
is denied. Id. Here, there would be significant hardship to plaintiff because denying
her leave to amend would foreclose her claims altogether on the basis of a mistake in
fact that has no impact on the substance of her allegation that defendant sexually
assaulted her when she was a child. Id. at 694-95.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s renewed motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint [Doc. #124] is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motions for partial summary
judgment [Doc. #80] and for summary judgment [Doc. #121] are denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s motion
for summary judgment [Doc. #122] is denied as moot.

___________________________
CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 4th day of September, 2012.

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