Mason v. Invision LLC et al

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -......IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Invision LLC's and Defendant S. Eric Westacott's Motion To Dismiss (Docket No. 22) is denied without prejudice. denying 22 Motion to Dismiss Case Signed by Magistrate Judge Frederick R. Buckles on 3/9/2012. (MRC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
HAROLD B. MASON,

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)
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)
)
)
)
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Plaintiff,
v.
INVISION LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 4:11CV575 FRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendant Invision LLC’s
and Defendant S. Eric Westacott’s Motion To Dismiss.
22).

(Docket No.

All matters are pending before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge, with consent of the parties, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
In the complaint filed in the case at bar, plaintiff
Harold Mason alleges that defendant Invision LLC (plaintiff’s
former

employer)

and

S.

Eric

Westacott

(plaintiff’s

former

supervisor) (collectively “defendants”) discriminated against him
on the basis of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1

In

support, plaintiff alleges that defendants harassed him, failed to
promote him, retaliated against him and terminated him based upon
his race.

1

Plaintiff’s complaint also alleged age and gender discrimination pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981; violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and violations of the
Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. St. § 213.010. In its Memorandum and Order
dated May 24, 2011, this Court dismissed those claims. In addition, on February
23, 2012, plaintiff’s claims against defendants Timothy McMahon and JaNet Morgan
were dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to effectuate service on those
defendants. (Docket No. 35).

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Defendants now move for dismissal on the grounds that
plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be
granted.

In support, defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint

in this case alleges the same claims against the same parties as
plaintiff alleged in a previous lawsuit titled Mason v. Invision
LLC, et al., Cause Number 4:07CV1575 (hereafter referred to as
“Mason I”), which was dismissed pursuant to a Judgment entered on
September 9, 2008.

Defendants argue that the Judgment entered in

Mason I was a final judgment disposing of all claims against all
parties, and was a judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction.

Citing Mills v. Des Arc Convalescent Home, 872 F.2d

823, 826 (8th Cir. 1989), defendants argue that they are therefore
entitled to an order dismissing plaintiff’s § 1981 claim in his
complaint on the basis of res judicata, inasmuch as (1) a prior
judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the
prior judgment was a judgment on the merits; and (3) the same cause
of action and the same parties are involved in both cases.

Stating

that plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous, defendants note that the
purpose

of

res

judicata

is

to

avoid

serial

and

frivolous

litigation, and argue entitlement to an award of their costs and
attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff has responded to the instant motion.

As defendants correctly note, “[r]es judicata bars claims
if three requirements are met: (1) the prior judgment was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) the decision was a final
judgment on the merits, and (3) the same cause of action and the
same parties or their privies were involved in both cases.”
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Mills,

872 F.2d at 826 (citing Headley v. Bacon, 828 F.2d 1272, 1274 (8th
Cir. 1987)).

The issue in the instant case centers on the second

requirement: that the decision in the prior case was a final
judgment on the merits.

Having carefully reviewed the record, the

undersigned determines that the Court’s decision in Mason I was not
a final decision on the merits as is required for the operation of
res judicata.
In Mason I, plaintiff Harold Mason filed a complaint
alleging that defendants Invision LLC, Timothy McMahon, S. Eric
Westacott and Ja’Net Morgan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 200e et seq. by, inter alia,
terminating his employment with Invision on the basis of his race
and gender.

(Mason I, Docket No. 1).

On October 29, 2007,

Defendant Invision, LLC filed “Defendant Invision, LLC’s Motion To
Dismiss.”

(Mason I, Docket No. 11).

Therein, Invision, LLC noted

that it was not an “employer” for purposes of Title VII because it
never employed fifteen or more employees.

(Id. at 1.)

Invision

LLC further stated that, because it was not an “employer” for
purposes

of

Title

VII,

“this

Court

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.”

lacks
(Id.)

subject

matter

In its motion to

dismiss and accompanying memorandum, Invision, LLC argued only that
the Court should dismiss plaintiff’s complaint because the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
12).

(Mason I, Docket Nos. 11 and

Invision, LLC wrote, “. . . Invision is not an “employer”

within the meaning of Title VII.

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot

establish that this Court has jurisdiction over his Title VII
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claims, and his Complaint must be dismissed.” (Mason I, Docket No.
12, at 3).

In their separate motion to dismiss, the individual

defendants argued that there was no individual liability under
Title VII.
grounds

(Mason I, Docket No. 13).

asserted

by

Invision,

LLC

in

In accordance with the
its

motion

to

dismiss,

plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed in a Judgment dated September
9, 2008.

(Mason I, Docket No. 30).

That Judgment specified that

“plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. #1] is dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.”

Id.

The Judgment did not specify an

alternative basis for the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.
In an Order filed on that same date, the Court noted the
following: the parties involved and the basis of plaintiff’s
complaint; the basis of the motions to dismiss; the fact that Title
VII

does

not

apply

to

employers

that

employ

fewer

than

15

employees; defendant Invision’s evidence attesting to the fact that
it employed fewer than 15 employees and the absence of adequate
rebuttal; and the fact that the individually-named supervisors
could not be held liable under Title VII.
pages 1-3).

(Mason I, Docket No. 29,

Having so noted, the Order then stated that the

motions to dismiss filed by defendant Invision and by defendants
McMahon, Westacott and Morgan were granted, and that all other
pending motions were denied as moot.

(Id. at page 3).

A Court’s determination that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits.

The Rules of

Civil Procedure state that any dismissal under the Rules, “except
one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a
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party under Rule 19" is an adjudication on the merits.

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(b); see also Johnson v. Boyd-Richardson Co., 650 F.2d
147, 148 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an
adjudication on the merits and thus such a dismissal should be
without prejudice”).
The dismissal in Mason I was not a judgment on the
merits,

but

rather

jurisdiction.

a

dismissal

for

lack

of

subject

matter

Jurisdiction is a threshold question, and must be

answered in the affirmative before a court may proceed to determine
the merits of a claim.
Cir. 2010).

Ginters v. Frazier, 614 F.3d 822, 826 (8th

As stated by the Supreme Court, jurisdiction is power

to declare the law, and when it does not exist, the only function
the court has is to announce that fact and dismiss the cause.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94
(1998).

This, in fact, is exactly what the Court did in Mason I.

Therefore, because the Court in Mason I determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, it lacked the power to determine the
merits of plaintiff’s complaint, and the Mason I decision therefore
has no res judicata effect upon the case at bar.
Defendants cite Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)
for the proposition that the numerical threshold of Title VII is
not a jurisdictional issue, but rather a substantive element of a
plaintiff’s case. Defendants argue that, in light of that holding,
the Court’s dismissal in Mason I was actually a judgment on the
merits.

Defendants argument is unavailing.
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While the undersigned

does not quarrel with defendant’s interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Arbaugh, the characterization of the numerical
threshold in Title VII cases described in Arbaugh does not change
the fact that the judgment in Mason I specified that plaintiff’s
complaint was dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Arbaugh was decided in 2006.

In Mason I, Invision, LLC

was free to present an Arbaugh-based argument to the Court in
support of its motion to dismiss.
in

Mason

I,

that

the

Invision, LLC could have argued,

employee

numerosity

requirement

for

establishing its “employer” status under Title VII was an element
of plaintiff’s claim for relief rather than a jurisdictional
requirement.

Instead, and contrary to the then applicable holding

in

Invision,

Arbaugh,

LLC

asserted,

as

its

sole

grounds

for

dismissal, that because it did not meet the employee numerosity
requirement for Title VII purposes, the Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.

Based upon the argument

Invision, LLC presented in support of its Mason I motion to
dismiss, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint on the basis
of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction without consideration of
the merits.
Arbaugh provides no authority to return to Mason I and
change either the arguments Invision, LLC presented to the Court,
or the substantive basis for the Mason I Court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s complaint. Arbaugh also fails to provide authority for
the undersigned to construe the dismissal in Mason I as a decision
on

a

substantive

element

of

plaintiff’s
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Title

VII

case,

and

therefore a judgment on the merits.

The Judgment entered in Mason

I clearly and exclusively stated that the basis for the dismissal
was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and it is that
disposition which controls the disposition of the instant motion to
dismiss.
Defendants also cite Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco
Chemicals

Corp.,

657

F.2d

939,

943

(7th

Cir.

1981)

for

the

proposition that, where the court in the prior action is required
to address the substance of plaintiff’s allegations “and not merely
whether the court has authority to decide a particular controversy,
that court’s judgment is on the merits.”
5).

(Docket No. 23 at page

However, the Mason I Court did not address the substance of

the plaintiff’s allegations; the Mason I Court noted the numerical
threshold of Title VII and the fact that suit could not lie
thereunder

against

individual

supervisors,

and

dismissed

the

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Harper Plastics
provides no support for the proposition that the Court’s dismissal
in Mason I was actually a judgment on the merits.
cases

defendants

cite

are

equally

inapposite

The remaining

and

provide

no

authority to give preclusive effect to the Court’s decision in
Mason I.

Thus, because of the Court’s jurisdictional holding in

Mason I, plaintiff’s claims in the case at bar are not precluded on
res judicata grounds.
Although the instant motion to dismiss must be denied at
this

time,

defendants

are

not

precluded

from

pursuing

an

appropriate remedy, through means available as set forth in the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon their argument that
plaintiff will be unable to prevail on the merits of his claims.
Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Invision LLC’s and
Defendant S. Eric Westacott’s Motion To Dismiss (Docket No. 22) is
denied without prejudice.

_______________________________
Frederick R. Buckles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 9th day of March, 2012.

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