Jackson v. Astrue

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the relief sought by plaintiff in his brief in support of complaint [#14] is denied. A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 8/6/2012. (KMS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RICHARD R. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 4:11-CV-1061 (CEJ)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for review of an adverse ruling by the Social
Security Administration.
I. Procedural History
On May 29, 2008, plaintiff Richard Jackson filed an application1 for disability
insurance benefits, Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., with an
alleged onset date of November 1, 2006. (Tr. 78-84).2 After plaintiff’s application was
denied on initial consideration (Tr. 47-52), he requested a hearing from an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) (Tr. 53-54).
Plaintiff appeared for a hearing on November 30, 2009. (Tr. 16-36). The ALJ
issued a decision denying plaintiff’s claims on December 22, 2009 (Tr. 5-15), and the
Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on April 8, 2011.

(Tr. 1-4).

Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision stands as the Commissioner’s final decision.

1

Plaintiff was awarded disability benefits in 1993. (Tr. 41). He subsequently
returned to work and his disability was terminated. The Social Security Administration
determined that plaintiff had received an overpayment for the period of May 2000
through May 2004. (Tr. 41-44). An ALJ determined that plaintiff was without fault
with regard to this period of overpayment and waived recovery. (Tr. 43-44).
2

104).

Plaintiff subsequently amended the alleged date of onset to April 8, 2009. (Tr.

II. Evidence Before the ALJ
A. Disability Application Documents
In his Disability Report (Tr. 191-99), plaintiff listed his disabling conditions as
a learning disorder and hyperactivity. He stated that his conditions limited his ability
to work in that he had poor communication skills and was unable to focus. In addition,
he had “listening problems” and did not carry out orders. He was impulsive, talked
incessantly and interrupted others. He dropped things and had illegible handwriting.
(Tr. 192). His longest held job was as a stocker in a retail setting from January 1997
to February 2006. (Tr. 193). He had last worked on March 13, 2008. An agency
interviewer met with plaintiff and his mother and noted that plaintiff had difficulty with
concentration, understanding, and answering. (Tr. 189). In addition, plaintiff “seemed
easily frustrated and [did] not fully understand the nature of some of the questions
being asked” and displayed “somewhat aggressive” behavior toward his mother. Id.
Plaintiff and his mother completed a Function Report (Tr. 209-20).

They

described his symptoms as a lack of coordination, short attention span, and constant
verbalizing “(mostly negative uncalled-for comments).” In addition, he had a poor
driving record with the result that he did not have a car. His socially-inappropriate
behaviors included swearing and unspecified antisocial conduct. His symptoms were
made worse by large assignments, crowds, paper work, and having to follow a lot of
commands at one time. He had been prescribed Effexor on a trial basis but was unable
to tolerate the side effects. He lived alone in an apartment and received his mother’s
assistance in paying bills, using a checkbook, and counting change. He was able to
complete household chores, shop, and prepare simple meals. He listed swimming as
a hobby and stated that he was able to watch television without difficulty. He read the

-2-

newspaper, although he had difficulty with comprehension. Plaintiff’s mother indicated
that he did not get along well with other employees, bosses or anyone in authority, and
that he “thinks he is perfect.”
B. Hearing on November 30, 2009
At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 43 years old. He lived alone in an
apartment in a complex. (Tr. 20, 31). He had attended one year of college during
which he received special accommodations such as extra time to take tests and
complete assignments. He had a current driver’s license. (Tr. 30). He had previously
held a commercial driver’s license and had once driven an armored car but his
employer felt that he was not suitable for the position. (Tr. 32-33).
Plaintiff testified that he last worked the night shift at a Wal-Mart store stocking
shelves. He was terminated after about six months because he was too slow and did
not concentrate. (Tr. 22-23). Before that he had worked for about a month at a
transmission shop filling parts orders and making deliveries.

He was terminated

because he did not fill orders correctly and drove erratically. (Tr. 24). Plaintiff worked
for six years unloading trailers and stocking shelves at a Target store. He testified that
he received special accommodations – for instance, he stocked goods that did not
require him to look up bar codes. Eventually, however, his managers decided that he
was too slow and he was terminated. (Tr. 25-26). Plaintiff described a number of
other short-term positions he had held with the U.S. Census Bureau, a consumer
research company, a pool company, and others. He opined that employers did not
keep him on because he did not always get along with fellow employees and he had
a “smart mouth.” Plaintiff testified that he went to a movie or out to eat with a friend
about once a week and went to church services. Plaintiff testified that he did not have

-3-

any physical problems that prevented him from working. (Tr. 30). He is able to cook
and clean, go grocery shopping, and do laundry.
Plaintiff’s mother, Jacqueline Jackson, testified that plaintiff had job coaches
from Vocational Rehabilitation when he worked at Target. (Tr. 34). Initially, he had
a supervisor who was very willing to work with people with disabilities. Plaintiff was
assigned to a night shift so that he did not have to interact with customers and could
work somewhat independently. His subsequent supervisor was not willing to provide
the same accommodations and plaintiff lost his job because he did not follow
directions. Ms. Jackson stated that the termination paperwork described plaintiff as
argumentative, uncoordinated, and immature. Ms. Jackson heard reports that plaintiff
had similar problems when he worked at Wal-Mart. (Tr. 35).
C. Records
Plaintiff was evaluated by the Special School District Evaluation Clinic in October
1976 when he was in the fifth grade. (Tr. 110-17). His scores on the Weschler
Intelligence Scale for Children (Revised) (WISC-R) were as follows: Verbal IQ of 98,
a Performance IQ of 114, and a Full Scale IQ of 105.3 It was noted that his short-term
visual memory abilities were adequate at only a very basic level and the integration of
auditory and visual perception and memory were “very depressed.” (Tr. 113). He was
reading below grade level and could be disruptive in the classroom. He was described
as having little self-confidence in peer relationships and academics. He was enrolled
in a resource program for the learning disabled.

See Tr. 106 (background

information).

3

This represented a decline from 1972 when he scored a Verbal IQ of 111,
Performance IQ of 124, and Full Scale IQ of 119. (Tr. 111).
-4-

The Special School District completed a re-evaluation in 1983 when plaintiff was
in the eleventh grade. (Tr. 106-09). It was determined that he had processing deficits
in the areas of auditory memory and motor integration with academic weaknesses in
reading and written language. Nonetheless, his speech and language development
were found to be within age expectancy and his motor coordination was not “an area
of concern” with the exception of poor handwriting. He was functioning adequately in
all academic areas and interacted well with teachers and other authority figures.
Plaintiff was described as conscientious in the extreme, and he was noted for taking
personal initiative and demonstrating adequate time management skills. His good
performance was attributed to “persistent and responsible work habits” and the
resource support he received. (Tr. 109).
Plaintiff was evaluated on June 6, 1985, by Herbert R. Berger, a licensed
psychologist.

(Tr. 133-37).

Mr. Berger administered several tests, including the

Weschler Adult Intelligence Scare – Revised (WAIS-R). Plaintiff’s scores on this test
indicated he was functioning in the “lower reaches of the ‘dull’ normal intellectual
range.”

However, plaintiff missed a number of “easy items” while successfully

completing a number of more difficult ones.

If credited with the missed items,

plaintiff’s IQ rose closer to the middle of the normal intellectual range. Plaintiff had
short-term auditory memory problems that interfered with his ability to organize ideas
and remember lists of items in a series. His ability to concentrate was impaired due
to both internal and external distractions and he had trouble controlling his impulses.
Mr. Berger diagnosed plaintiff with attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity and
developmental reading disorder. The “eroding effects of attention deficits [were] quite
noticeable [and] encroach[ed] upon cognitive functioning.” (Tr. 136). Mr. Berger

-5-

opined that plaintiff “need[ed] a work environment which has a very high action
component to it and a very low attending and concentrating component, [for example
d]igging ditches . . . Even in digging ditches he would have to be in a structured
environment with fairly close supervision.” (Tr. 137).
Plaintiff attended the University of Missouri-Columbia for one year and took a full
course load.

See Vocational Analysis Report (Tr. 120-25).

He reported that he

managed his basic math class without difficulty but felt overwhelmed by a political
science class that required extensive reading. He was placed on academic probation
in his second semester. (Tr. 121). It was thought that his poor academic performance
was due to his taking a heavy course load without accommodation for his learning
disabilities; he also worked while attending school. (Tr. 120).
Plaintiff underwent a two-week assessment at the Metropolitan Employment and
Rehabilitation Service in August 1986. (Tr. 120-25). He expressed interest in a career
in computer programming. Plaintiff displayed auditory perceptual problems and had
difficulty with auditory and visual memory. He also had difficulty with concentration,
although it was noted that he performed well on many activities that required attention
to detail. His fine motor speed was poor. Plaintiff’s scores on intelligence tests were
within the average range of intellectual ability. Tests of specific areas of cognitive
functioning indicated that plaintiff had deficits in several areas, including writing,
reading, and aspects of auditory perception and oral motor skills.

(Tr. 123).

Psychological inventories did not indicate any serious psychopathology.

His

performance on tests of mechanical comprehension fell within the fifth percentile of
industrial employees and the sixtieth percentile of 12th graders at a technical high
school. Plaintiff was described as “pleasant and cooperative” and was punctual and

-6-

well-groomed. He worked in a persistent manner and became more open and talkative
in the course of the two-week evaluation.
Plaintiff graduated from a one-year computer studies program at the Bryan
Institute in April 1987. He received “A’s” in several courses, including accounting and
basic and COBOL programming. (Tr. 119).
The record contains a letter of reference dated April 28, 1987, written by Franke
Arcand, a counselor with Vocational Rehabilitation. (Tr. 169). Ms. Arcand described
plaintiff as a “first-rate worker” and “an excellent and reliable employee.” She noted
that plaintiff participated in a class on interpersonal skills in addition to completing the
Bryan Institute program. Ms. Arcand stated that,, with “true grit” and encouragement
from his family, plaintiff had successfully attained his vocation and training goal.
Jean Jose, Ph.D., completed a psychological evaluation in January 15, 1991, to
determine plaintiff’s eligibility to participate in programs offered by Vocational
Rehabilitation. (Tr. 146-49). His scores on the WAIS-R fell within the low average
range of intelligence, although Dr. Jose opined that his score was adversely affected
by learning disabilities and that his actual functioning was within the normal range. As
in earlier evaluations, plaintiff’s high level of distractibility interfered with his
performance and he continued to display difficulty controlling his impulses. He had
deficits in language and numerical facility and had problems involving his short-term
auditory memory. Plaintiff’s scores on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI) indicated that he had an excess of energy, and could be talkative, distractible,
and restless. Dr. Jose gave plaintiff diagnoses of developmental language disorder and
developmental expressive writing disorder.

-7-

Plaintiff participated in a career placement program offered by Missouri Goodwill
Industries in August 1991.

(Tr. 142-43).

He expressed interest in computer

programming or operation and was assigned to work with various specialists in these
fields. He was provided one-on-one assistance and participated in mock interviews.
The specialists all expressed concern about his skill level and his inability to answer
questions in an interview setting.
Plaintiff participated in the “Work Station in Industry” program from January 6th
through February 28th, 1992. (Tr. 140-41). According to the final report, plaintiff
entered the program with the goal of being a dietary aide. Plaintiff was punctual and
courteous and kept all appointments throughout the program.

The employment

specialist completed applications for plaintiff because his handwriting was illegible. He
interviewed well and was hired at a nursing home. He completed his first week without
any employer complaints. During the second week, however, the employer expressed
concerns regarding plaintiff’s grooming, production and attitude. The employment
specialist provided plaintiff with a list of specific duties and educated the employer
regarding his learning disabilities. In addition, plaintiff worked with a job coach for two
weeks, after which the employer reported improvement in his grooming and
production. The employer requested the chance to work with plaintiff without a job
coach.

Despite extraordinary efforts by the employer over the next two weeks,

plaintiff was terminated. It was agreed that he “tried his best” but that his disability
prevented him from meeting the employer’s expectations.
Joseph Shuman, M.D., completed a psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff on
September 2, 1993. (Tr. 156-58). Plaintiff, who was 26 at the time, was driven to the
interview by his girlfriend. He reported that he lived in an apartment and spent his

-8-

time seeking work. He stated that he is shy in interviews and does not get hired. Dr.
Shuman noted that plaintiff spoke in a low voice but made good eye contact. He was
coherent and logical but there was “no spontaneity.” Plaintiff displayed no evidence
of a thought disorder and he was well oriented in all spheres. He was “surprisingly”
slow in completing simple counting calculation problems. Plaintiff reported that he got
along well with others. Dr. Shuman opined that plaintiff could maintain the attention
required to do simple repetitive tasks and could withstand the stress and pressures of
an ordinary job.
Donald T. Cross, Ph.D., administered the WAIS-R to plaintiff on September 2,
1993. (Tr. 159-61). Plaintiff appeared reserved and uncomfortable and showed little
spontaneous speech. He understood instructions readily and had a methodical and
orderly approach to the assessment tasks. The scores were thought to be an accurate
estimate of his current functioning. Plaintiff demonstrated significant weaknesses in
auditory memory, computational skills, judgment and common sense, analysis and
synthesis of visually presented material, long-term visual memory, and nonverbal
concept formation and spatial visualization. Overall, plaintiff’s intellectual functioning
was within the borderline range. Dr. Cross noted that across repeated testing his IQ
scores progressively declined.

Individuals with similar scores functioned best in

unskilled or semiskilled work with a focus on concrete and repetitive tasks.
Supervision was usually necessary except for tasks that were well-practiced.
Michael Gottfried, Ph.D., completed a consultative evaluation of plaintiff on
August 11, 2008. (Tr. 279-84). Plaintiff stated that he had been diagnosed with
learning disabilities in kindergarten and had difficulty with reading and writing. Plaintiff
reported that he had had two long-term girlfriends, each lasting for about 10 years,

-9-

with the latter relationship ongoing. He lived alone in an apartment and received
financial support from his family and girlfriend. He stated that he arose around 8:00
in the morning, and went online to search for jobs. He then spent several hours
watching television and swimming. He spent time with a high-school friend in addition
to his girlfriend. He completed all his own household tasks. Dr. Gottfried observed
that plaintiff was very reserved but pleasant during the interview and demonstrated
“a great deal of cooperation.” His concentration remained consistent throughout the
evaluation and his attention was well-focused. He did not appear distracted and did
not need items repeated.

He made three errors in completing twelve simple

calculations and could not subtract serial 7s from 100. Based on the interview and a
record review, Dr. Gottfried opined that plaintiff was functioning in the low average to
borderline range of intellectual functioning. His ability to work was affected by his
history of reading and writing disabilities.

In addition, his difficulty with social

communicating affected his abilities to search for a job, interview, and handle conflict
in the work setting. Dr. Gottfried opined that, “with ongoing support and assistance,
he may be able to function well in a low or unskilled job that does not require reading
or writing.” Dr. Gottfried assigned plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF)4
score of 49.5

4

The GAF is determined on a scale of 1 to 100 and reflects the clinician’s
judgment of an individual’s overall level of functioning, taking into consideration
psychological, social, and occupational functioning. Impairment in functioning due to
physical or environmental limitations are not considered. American Psychiatric
Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - Fourth Edition, Text
Revision 32-33 (4th ed. 2000).
5

A GAF of 41-50 corresponds with “serious symptoms OR any serious
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.” American Psychiatric
Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - Fourth Edition, Text
Revision 34 (4th ed. 2000).
-10-

Kenneth Burstin, Ph.D., completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form on
August 15, 2008. (Tr. 286-301). Among the materials Dr. Burstin reviewed were
letters submitted to the Employment Security Office. These letters indicated that
plaintiff worked well when left alone but had problems with being disrespectful to
supervisors.

Dr. Burstin noted that he gave significant weight to Dr. Gottfried’s

assessment because he was a specialist, his evaluation was recent, and it was based
on historical evidence and objective observations. Based on his review, Dr. Burstin
found that plaintiff had the medically determinable organic mental disorder of learning
disabilities in the areas of reading and written expression. Dr. Burstin opined that
plaintiff had moderate limitations in the domains of daily living activities and social
functioning and mild limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. In
addition, plaintiff had moderate limitations in the ability to understand, remember and
carry out detailed instructions, interact appropriately with the public, and maintain
appropriate grooming.
III. The ALJ’s Decision
In the decision issued on December 22, 2009, the ALJ made the following
findings:
1.

Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through September 30, 2013.

2.

Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 8, 2009,
the alleged date of onset.

3.

Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: reading disorder and
disorder of written expression.

4.

Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or substantially equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

-11-

5.

Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of
work at all exertional levels, with the following nonexertional limitations:
he retains the capacity to acquire and retain at least simple instructions
and to sustain concentration and persistence with at least simple,
repetitive tasks. He can relate adequately to others in settings that do
not require frequent public contact or unusually close interaction. He can
adapt to changes in noncomplex work environments.

6.

Plaintiff is able to perform his past relevant work as a store laborer
stocking shelves.

7.

Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from April 8, 2009, through the date of the decision.

(Tr. 10-15).
IV. Discussion
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must prove that he is
disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001). The Social
Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382(a)(3)(A) (2000). An
individual will be declared disabled “only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”

42 U.S.C. §§

423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner employs a fivestep evaluation process, “under which the ALJ must make specific findings.” Nimick
v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 887 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1989). The ALJ
first determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. If the

-12-

claimant is so engaged, he is not disabled. Second, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment,” meaning one which significantly limits his ability
to do basic work activities. If the claimant’s impairment is not severe, he is not
disabled. Third, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment meets or is
equal to one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, he is
disabled under the Act. Fourth, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform
his past relevant work. If the claimant can, he is not disabled. Fifth, if the claimant
cannot perform his past relevant work, the ALJ determines whether he is capable of
performing any other work in the national economy. If the claimant is not, he is
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2002); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137, 140-42 (1987).
A.

Standard of Review

The Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision “if the decision is not based
on legal error and if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support
the conclusion that the claimant was not disabled.” Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187
(8th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough so
that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion.” Estes v.
Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145,
1147 (8th Cir. 2001)). If, after reviewing the record, the Court finds it possible to
draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions
represents the Commissioner’s findings, the Court must affirm the decision of the
Commissioner. Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotations and
citation omitted).

-13-

B.

Plaintiff’s Allegations of Error

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ: (1) improperly determined his residual functional
capacity (RFC); and (2) failed to complete a function-by-function analysis of his past
relevant work.
1.

The ALJ’s RFC Determination

The ALJ determined that plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform
the full range of work at all exertional levels with nonexertional limitations: he retains
the capacity to acquire and retain at least simple instructions and to sustain
concentration and persistence with at least simple, repetitive tasks. He can relate
adequately to others in settings that do not require frequent public contact or unusually
close interaction. He can adapt to changes in noncomplex work environments.
The Social Security Administration has stated that “RFC is an administrative
assessment of the extent to which an individual’s medically determinable
impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical or
mental limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to do work-related
physical and mental activities.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184,
*2. A claimant’s RFC is “the most a claimant can still do despite his or her physical or
mental limitations.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotations, alteration and citations omitted). “The ALJ bears the primary responsibility
for determining a claimant’s RFC and because RFC is a medical question, some medical
evidence must support the determination of the claimant’s RFC.”

Id. (citation

omitted). “However, the burden of persuasion to prove disability and demonstrate RFC
remains on the claimant.” Id. Even though the RFC assessment draws from medical
sources for support, it is ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the

-14-

Commissioner. Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
416.927(e)(2), 416.946 (2006)).
The ALJ’s Credibility Determination
In reaching his RFC determination, the ALJ stated that plaintiff’s allegation
regarding the degree of limitation caused by his impairments was not entirely credible.
“The credibility of a claimant’s subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide,
not the courts.” Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2001). “In
order to assess a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ must make a credibility
determination by considering the claimant’s daily activities; duration, frequency, and
intensity of the pain; precipitating and aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness and
side effects of medication; and functional restrictions.” Mouser v. Astrue, 545 F.3d
634, 638 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.
1984)). The claimant’s work history and the absence of objective medical evidence to
support the claimant’s complaints are also relevant. Wheeler v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 891,
895 (8th Cir. 2000). The courts will defer to an ALJ’s credibility finding if the ALJ
“explicitly discredits a claimant’s testimony and gives a good reason for doing so.”
Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 558 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
The ALJ noted that plaintiff does not take any medication or receive treatment
for his impairments. In addition, he noted that plaintiff spends a part of each day
looking for a job and submitting resumes online; these are activities that are
inconsistent with an inability to work. Furthermore, plaintiff is able to complete the
ordinary activities of daily living, including cooking, cleaning, doing laundry, grocery
shopping, banking, paying bills, keeping a checkbook, reading the newspaper, watching
television, and playing video games. He maintains social relationships with a long-term

-15-

girlfriend and a high school friend. It is significant that plaintiff worked for a number
of years, and there is no allegation or evidence that his condition deteriorated since he
stopped working. The fact that he was able to work in the past with the same allegedly
disabling impairments is inconsistent with a finding of disability in the present. Van
Vickle v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that plaintiff worked for
four years with symptoms she now claimed were disabling); Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d
785, 792 (8th Cir. 2005) (conditions not disabling in the present where plaintiff worked
for three years after stroke and there was no evidence of deterioration in her
condition). The ALJ’s credibility determination was adequately supported by citations
to evidence in the record. See Dukes v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2006)
(finding no error in ALJ’s credibility determination where ALJ noted lack of treatment,
ability to perform household chores, and engage in recreation).
“Some” Medical Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by “some”
medical evidence as required by the Eighth Circuit’s opinions in Singh v. Apfel, 222
F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2000), and Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s
reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Lauer, the ALJ substituted his own lay opinion
for that of medical experts. Id. at 703-04. There is no allegation that the ALJ in this
case committed this error. Singh involved a challenge to the weight the ALJ gave to
a treating physician’s opinion. Singh, 245 F.3d at 452. The record in this case does
not include the opinion of a treating physician.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Gottfried’s assessment
that his GAF is 49, which indicates a severe limitation in functioning.

The ALJ

determined that this GAF score was inconsistent with the record as a whole and with

-16-

Dr. Gottfried’s own findings. As the ALJ correctly noted, no physician opined that
plaintiff was disabled or incapable of work; indeed, Dr. Gottfried stated that plaintiff
would be capable of working in a semiskilled or unskilled setting with support.
Furthermore, a GAF score of 49 is inconsistent with plaintiff’s description of his own
daily activities. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to give Dr. Gottfried’s opinion
proper weight is meritless. See SSR 96-2P, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996) (even a
well-supported medical opinion will not be given controlling weight if it is inconsistent
with other substantial evidence in the record.).

The ALJ’s RFC determination is

supported by substantial evidence in the record.
2.

Past Relevant Work

The ALJ determined that plaintiff could return to his past relevant work as a
store laborer stocking shelves, both as he performed it and as it is generally performed
in the national economy. (Tr. 14).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination is

improper because he failed to complete a function-by-function analysis as required by
Pfitzner v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 1999). Under Pfitzner, the ALJ must make
specific findings as to the claimant’s limitations and the effect of those limitations on
the claimant’s residual functional capacity. Id. at 568. The ALJ should then “make
explicit findings regarding the actual physical and mental demands of the claimant’s
past work.” Id. at 569 (quoting Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
1991)). The ALJ may discharge this duty by referring to the specific job descriptions
in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles that are associated with the claimant’s past
work. Id.
In this instance, an agency examiner determined that plaintiff’s past work as a
store laborer stocking shelves was within the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)

-17-

classification 922.687-058.

(Tr. 46).

According to the DOT, this work is simple,

repetitive, and has little or no public interaction. Id. Thus, the shelf stocker job as
previously performed by plaintiff falls within his RFC. The ALJ adopted the examiner’s
findings as expert opinion. (Tr. 14). Although the ALJ did not make explicit findings
regarding the demands of plaintiff’s past relevant work and compare those demands
with his RFC, the Court finds that the error did not prejudice plaintiff. See Samons v.
Astrue, 497 F.3d 813, 821-22 (8th Cir. 2007) (declining to remand matter for further
proceedings on past relevant work where DOT classification made clear that past
relevant work met plaintiff’s RFC).
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the relief sought by plaintiff in his brief in
support of complaint [#14] is denied.
A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be
entered this same date.
___________________________
CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 6th day of August, 2012.

-18-