Snelling v. Pawloski et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Dated this 20th day of July, 2011. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/20/11. (JWJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LONNIE SNELLING,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN J. PAWLOSKI, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 4:11CV1079 AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on its own motion. After providing notice to
Plaintiff and an opportunity to be heard, the Court has determined that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the complaint.
The Complaint
Plaintiff is well known to the Court, having filed several frivolous or otherwise
non-meritorious actions here over the years.
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985(2)-(3), and § 1986,
and also asserts several state law claims pursuant to the Court’s supplemental
jurisdiction. Named as Defendants are John Pawloski, a private attorney; Richard
Lecinski, a private attorney; Lawrence Wilson; Shawna Gibson-Wilson; Averyia
Gibson, several John and Jane Does; Pamela Snipes; David Mason, a Circuit Court
Judge; David Dowd, a Circuit Court Judge; and Mark Neill, a Circuit Court Judge.

Judges Mason, Dowd, and Neill are the only state actors named in the complaint, and
Plaintiff is suing these Defendants in their official capacities.
The majority of the complaint is comprised of allegations that Defendants
Lawrence Wilson, Shawna Gipson-Wilson, and Averyia Gibson let a dog onto
Plaintiff’s property so that it could defecate. Plaintiff also alleges that Lawrence
Wilson threw empty dog food cans onto his property, which caused damage to two
lawn mowers. Plaintiff further alleges that Lawrence Wilson and the John Doe
Defendants vandalized and lit fire to his property in 2005 and 2006.
In 2007 Plaintiff filed suit against Lawrence Wilson and Shawna Gibson-Wilson
in state court for property damages. Snelling v. Wilson, 0722-CC07105-01 (22nd
Judicial Circuit, City of St. Louis). Defendants filed a counterclaim, which Plaintiff
says is a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On May 4, 2010, the
state court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Wilson and Gibson-Wilson. Wilson and
Gibson-Wilson’s counterclaims are still pending. Defendant Pawloski is representing
Wilson and Gibson-Wilson in the matter.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Judge Mason presided over a motion hearing in
his case on November 2, 2007, during which Judge Mason allegedly disparaged his
case in open court. Plaintiff says that on March 10, 2008, Defendant Judge Dowd
presided over a hearing, during which Judge Dowd allegedly “made various comments
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directed towards Plaintiff’s heritage as a Negro-American, reference to now president
Barack Obama.” Plaintiff alleges, in a conclusory manner, that Judges Mason and
Dowd conspired with Pawloski to deprive him of his right to fair proceedings.
Plaintiff alleges that the counterclaim pending against him has been filed for
illegitimate reasons, including to punish him for filing the case in the first place.
Plaintiff’s federal causes of action arise from either the filing of the counterclaim or
from adverse rulings from the named judges.
Discussion
Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: “If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action.”
1.

Review of State Court Decision

This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction “over challenges to state
court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those
challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Review of those
decisions may be had only in [the United States Supreme Court].” District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). In the complaint, Plaintiff
seeks review of the state court’s adverse ruling. As a result, the Court does not have
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint.
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2.

Plaintiff’s Federal Claims are Patently Meritless

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
A court does not obtain subject-matter jurisdiction just because a Plaintiff
raises a federal question in his or her complaint. If the asserted basis of
federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction is appropriate. Because this is a facial rather than a factual
challenge to jurisdiction, [the court] determine[s] whether the asserted
jurisdictional basis is patently meritless by looking to the face of the
complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff.
Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).
Plaintiff’s § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986 claims against Judges Mason, Dowd, and
Neill as Defendants are legally frivolous. Plaintiff sues these Defendants in their
official capacities. Naming a government official in his or her official capacity is the
equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the official, in this case the
State of Missouri. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
The State of Missouri, however, is absolutely immune from liability under the federal
civil rights statutes. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63
(1989).
Even if Plaintiff were to have sued these Defendants in their individual
capacities, Plaintiff’s allegations against them would still be meritless. Judges are
“entitled to absolute immunity for all judicial actions that are not ‘taken in a complete
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absence of all jurisdiction.’” Penn v. United States, 335 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)). Plaintiff is suing the Defendant
judges for official actions taken in the courtroom, which were within Defendants’
jurisdiction.
Absolute immunity bars not only Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for damages but also
his claims for injunctive relief. The 1996 amendments to § 1983 provide that “in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1996, § 309(c), Pub.L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). Plaintiff, however, alleges neither the violation of a declaratory decree, nor
the unavailability of declaratory relief. Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is therefore
barred under § 1983.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Pawloski, Lecinski, Lawrence
Wilson, Shawna Gibson-Wilson, Averyia Gibson, Snipes, and the various John Does
are legally frivolous because those Defendants are not state actors. “Private actors may
incur section 1983 liability only if they are willing participants in a joint action with
public servants acting under color of state law.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
172 F.3d 531, 536 (8th Cir.1999) “[A] plaintiff seeking to hold a private party liable
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under § 1983 must allege, at the very least, that there was a mutual understanding, or
a meeting of the minds, between the private party and the state actor.” Mershon v.
Beasley, 994 F.2d 449, 451 (8th Cir. 1993). The facts alleged with respect to a
conspiracy must be specific and may not be merely conclusory. See White v. Walsh,
649 F.2d 560, 561 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (conclusory allegations not entitled to the assumption of truth). Here, Plaintiff
fails to allege facts sufficient to give rise to the inference that any private party
Defendants came to a mutual understanding with any state actors to violate his
constitutional rights.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) provides a private cause of action for the following
conspiracies to deter or obstruct access to the court process or equal protection:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United
States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending
therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his
person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to
influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror
in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on
account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by
him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons
conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating,
in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with
intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure
him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the
right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.

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Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Pawloski, Lawrence Wilson, and Shawna
Gibson-Wilson’s participation in the state court proceedings and the filing of a
counterclaim do not constitute threats or intimidation under § 1985(2).
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the existence of a conspiracy are
wholly conclusory and are not entitled to an assumption of truth.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides a private cause of action for the
following conspiracies:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons
conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who
is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in
a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully
qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as
a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen
in person or property on account of such support or advocacy.
To state a claim under § 1985(3), a Plaintiff must establish that (1) he is
a member of a class suffering from invidious discrimination, and (2) Defendants’
actions were motivated by racial animus or some other type of class-based
discrimination. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,

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834-39 (1983). Nothing in the complaint indicates that Defendants Lawrence
Wilson, Shawna Gibson-Wilson, or Averyia Gibson were motivated by racial
animus when they allegedly entered his property and did damage to it. As a
result, Plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claims against these Defendants are frivolous.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s federal claims are legally frivolous. As a
result, these claims are so patently meritless as to fail to confer jurisdiction on this
Court, and Plaintiff’s federal claims must be dismissed.
3.

State Law Claims

Because Plaintiff's federal claims will be dismissed, all remaining pendent
state claims should be dismissed as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (if federal claims are
dismissed before trial, remaining state claims should also be dismissed); Hassett
v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co.,851 F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1988) (where federal
claims have been dismissed, district courts may decline jurisdiction over pendent
state claims as a “matter of discretion”).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.

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An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 20th day of July, 2011.

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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