Wills v. Dodson et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's claims that he was denied his First Amendment right to possession of religious materials and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process are dismissed without prejudice. With re spect to plaintiff's claims that he was denied his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #38) is GRANTED as to plaintiff's c laims against defendant Cindy Griffith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #38) is GRANTED to the extent plaintiff seeks monetary relief against defendants in their official capacities. IT IS FURTH ER ORDERED that, in all other respects, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #38) is DENIED. Granting in part and Denying in part 38 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Frederick R. Buckles on 3/25/2013. (NCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
WILLIAM JOHN WILLS, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTINA DODSON, et al.,
Defendants.

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No.

4:11CV1152 FRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently

pending

before

the

Court

is

defendants

Christina Dodson, Scott Storz, Carl Brawley, Jesse Maxey, and Cindy
Griffith’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #38). All matters are
pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with
consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Plaintiff William John Wills, III, an inmate incarcerated
at

the

Eastern

Reception,

Diagnostic

and

Correctional

Center

(ERDCC) at all times relevant to this lawsuit, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the conduct of the
defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel

and

unusual

punishment,

his

First

Amendment

right

to

possession of religious materials, and his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process.

Named as defendants to the cause are

Christina Dodson, Scott Storz, Carl Brawley, and Jessie Maxey,
correctional

officers

employed

by

the

Missouri

Department

of

Corrections at ERDCC; and Cindy Griffith, an assistant warden

employed by the Missouri Department of the Corrections at ERDCC.1
Plaintiff brings his claims against these defendants in both their
individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff seeks monetary and

injunctive relief.
Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled
to judgment on plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law.
has

responded

to

the

motion,

arguing

that

genuine

Plaintiff
issues

of

material fact exist with respect to his Eighth Amendment claims.
Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his First and Fourteenth Amendment
claims without prejudice, with such dismissal acknowledged by
defendants in their reply brief and not opposed.

This Court thus

proceeds on defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains
to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), a court may grant
summary judgment if the information before the court shows that
there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

Anderson v.

The burden of proof

is on the moving party to set forth the basis of its motion,
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), and the court
must view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to

1

In his Complaint, plaintiff also named Andrea Lindquest and
John Doe as defendants to the cause. Upon motion of the plaintiff,
all claims against these defendants were subsequently dismissed
without prejudice. (See Order, Doc. #22.)
-2-

the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Once the moving party shows there are no
material issues of fact in dispute, the burden shifts to the
adverse party to set forth facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial.
pleadings,

Id.
but

The non-moving party may not rest upon his
must

come

forward

with

affidavits

or

other

admissible evidence to rebut the motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Summary judgment is a harsh remedy and should not be granted unless
the movant "has established [its] right to judgment with such
clarity as to leave no room for controversy."

New England Mutual

Life Ins. Co. v. Null, 554 F.2d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 1977).
I.
In

his

The Verified Complaint2

Verified

Complaint,

plaintiff

contends

that

defendant correctional officers subjected him to excessive force
and were deliberately indifferent to his safety on February 13,
2011, in relation to an incident whereby, without provocation, he
was sprayed with pepper spray while he was handcuffed in his cell
and was forced to remain in his contaminated cell thereafter.
Specifically, plaintiff claims that, while handcuffed behind his
back, he was escorted into his cell by defendant Dodson subsequent
to receiving a haircut during which time Dodson made derogatory and
insulting comments toward plaintiff.

2

Plaintiff contends that

A verified complaint is equivalent to an affidavit for
summary judgment purposes. Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774, 775
(8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
-3-

defendant Dodson then exited the cell, closed the cell door, opened
the food slot, and ordered plaintiff to relinquish his handcuffs.
Plaintiff refused Dodson’s order because of Dodson’s agitated state
and

requested

handcuffs.

that

another

correctional

officer

remove

the

After repeated orders by Dodson to relinquish his

handcuffs, plaintiff ultimately determined to comply and began
backing up to the food port

to permit Dodson to remove the

handcuffs. Plaintiff contends that while he was backing up, Dodson
sprayed pepper spray on his neck, back and arms, causing him to
fall to the ground.

Plaintiff contends that when he sat up and

looked at the food port, defendant Dodson again sprayed pepper
spray,

striking

plaintiff

in

the

face.

Plaintiff

handcuffed behind the back during this incident.

remained

Plaintiff claims

that defendants Maxey and Storz were present and did nothing to
prevent defendant Dodson from engaging in this unprovoked assault
despite

Dodson

making

them

aware

that

she

intended

to

spray

plaintiff.
Subsequent to the incident, defendant Brawley came to
plaintiff’s cell and removed plaintiff’s handcuffs.

Plaintiff

claims that defendant Brawley refused to remove him from the
contaminated cell despite breathing difficulties and injuries to
his face and ear from the pepper spray.

Plaintiff claims that

defendant Maxey likewise refused plaintiff’s request to be removed
from his cell so that it could be cleaned and instead instructed
plaintiff to use his sheets to clean the cell.
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Plaintiff claims he

attempted to do so, but that such method was ineffective inasmuch
as it smeared the pepper spray around the cell.

Plaintiff claims

that he was not allowed out of his cell until almost fifteen hours
later, at which time he was allowed to take a shower.
Plaintiff claims that he has experienced hearing loss in
his right ear due to the pepper spray.
II.
In

Other Evidence Before the Court on the Motion
her

affidavit

submitted

in

support

of

summary

judgment, defendant Dodson attests that during her encounter with
plaintiff on February 13, 2011, she repeatedly ordered plaintiff to
relinquish his handcuffs and he continually refused.

Dodson

attests that at some point during this conflict, plaintiff picked
up his mattress and attempted to block the cell door.

Dodson

attests that she sprayed pepper spray as plaintiff approached the
cell door with the mattress, striking the mattress with the spray.
Defendant Dodson attests that the mattress then struck the door,
striking her hand in the food port at which time she again sprayed
pepper spray, striking plaintiff.

(Defts.’ Exh. E, Dodson Affid.)

In a Report of Incident completed by defendant Dodson on February
13, 2011, Dodson reported that she applied two short bursts of
pepper spray to plaintiff’s facial area when he failed to comply
with her directives to return the restraints to her.

Dodson

reported that she sustained an injury to her right hand due to
plaintiff striking her hand against the food port with a mattress.
(Pltf.’s Resp., Doc. #47, Attch-1.)
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In their respective affidavits, defendants Maxey and
Storz each attest that they could not see into the cell during the
incident but observed defendant Dodson to struggle at the food
port.

(Defts.’ Exh. F—Storz Affid., Exh. G—Maxey Affid.)

In a

Report of Incident completed by defendant Storz on February 13,
2011, Storz reported that he witnessed defendant Dodson apply two
short bursts of pepper spray to plaintiff’s facial area upon
plaintiff’s refusal to return his wrist restraints.

(Pltf.’s

Resp., Doc. #47, Attch-1.)
Subsequent to the pepper spray incident, plaintiff felt
a burning sensation about his face, had watering eyes, and felt a
throbbing and burning sensation in his right ear.

A nurse came to

plaintiff’s cell to perform a medical evaluation.

At no time were

defendants

advised

by

medical

recommended for plaintiff.
running water.

that

a

shower

was

A sink in plaintiff’s cell provided

Plaintiff did not use the sink because of the

presence of pepper spray on it.
in pepper spray.

personnel

Everything in the cell was covered

Plaintiff was given fresh clothes, towels and

linens and was instructed to clean his cell.

Plaintiff attempted

to clean his cell but then abandoned his efforts.

(Pltf.’s Depo.

at pp. 157, 160, 162, 168, 170, 174, 194-97.)
After 11:00 p.m. on that same date, plaintiff showered
during the regular shower shift.
his

cell

door

remained

open

While plaintiff was showering,

allowing

the

cell

Plaintiff received clean clothes after the shower.
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to

air

out.

(Pltf.’s Depo.

at pp. 198, 203.)
Plaintiff received a conduct violation for failing to
return his handcuffs and for using his mattress to strike defendant
Dodson’s hand against the food port.

Plaintiff filed an Informal

Resolution Request against defendant Dodson regarding her use of
force.

(Deft.’s Exh. J—Grievance Docs.; Pltf.’s Resp., Doc. #47,

Attch-1.)
III.
A.

Discussion

Defendant Griffith
Plaintiff raises no claim that defendant Cindy Griffith

was personally involved in the pepper spray incident.

Instead,

plaintiff’s claims against defendant Griffith are based only on her
supervisory capacity as assistant warden in relation to his now
dismissed Fourteenth Amendment due process claims.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of respondeat superior does
not apply in cases brought pursuant to § 1983.
Sargent, 696 F.2d 413, 414–15 (8th Cir. 1983).
“direct

responsibility

for

the

improper

See Glick v.

Absent a showing of

action”

or

“personal

involvement of the officer being sued,” supervisory personnel
cannot be found liable under § 1983.

Harris v. Pirch, 677 F.2d

681, 685 (8th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

In his Complaint here, plaintiff does not allege that

Griffith was directly responsible for or personally involved in any
conduct giving rise to the alleged Eighth Amendment violations.
“Section 1983 liability cannot attach to a supervisor merely
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because a subordinate violated someone's constitutional rights.”
Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997).
Therefore,

to

the

extent

plaintiff’s

pending

Eighth

Amendment claims can be construed as brought against defendant
Griffith, Griffith is entitled to summary judgment thereon.
B.

Official Capacity
To

the

extent

plaintiff

seeks

monetary

relief

from

defendants in their official capacities, such relief is barred. It
is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars a § 1983 suit for
damages

from being asserted against State officials in their

official capacities because such a suit is no different from a suit
against the State itself.

Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 64, 70-71 (1989); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184
F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999).

As such, defendants are entitled

to summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims to the extent
plaintiff

seeks

monetary

relief

against

defendants

in

their

official capacities.
C.

Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff claims that defendant Dodson’s use of pepper

spray against him constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff also contends that

defendants Maxey’s and Storz’s failure to prevent Dodson’s use of
force likewise constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

Finally,

plaintiff claims that defendants Maxey, Storz and Brawley violated
his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
-8-

punishment

by

not

allowing

him

to

properly

clean

his

cell

subsequent to the pepper spray incident, thereby causing him to
remain in the affected cell for nearly fifteen hours resulting in
pain and suffering.
The

Eighth

Amendment

protects

inmates

from

the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by correctional officers,
regardless of whether an inmate suffers serious injury as a result.
Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2002).
Officers are permitted to use force reasonably
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, but force is not to be used
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.
Factors to be considered in deciding whether a
particular use of force was reasonable are
whether there was an objective need for force,
the relationship between any such need and the
amount of force used, the threat reasonably
perceived by the correctional officers, any
efforts by the officers to temper the severity
of their forceful response, and the extent of
the inmate's injury.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The core judicial inquiry is whether the force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.

Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491,

495 (8th Cir. 2000).
A.

Initial Use of Force
When viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff,

plaintiff’s Verified Complaint, defendants’ affidavits, and the
records of ERDCC show there to be genuine issues of material fact
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as to whether

plaintiff posed an objective threat reasonably

perceived to justify Dodson’s use of pepper spray without warning.
A factual dispute exists as to whether, after initially refusing
Dodson’s orders to relinquish his handcuffs, plaintiff attempted to
comply with Dodson’s order and approached the food port to have his
restraints removed at which time Dodson pepper sprayed plaintiff
without warning——or whether, after refusing Dodson’s order to
relinquish his handcuffs, plaintiff picked up his mattress and
attempted to block the cell door, striking Dodson’s hand in the
food port at which time Dodson sprayed plaintiff with pepper spray.
It is well established that “[a] basis for an Eighth Amendment
claim exists when, as alleged here, an officer uses pepper spray
without warning on an inmate who may have questioned [her] actions
but who otherwise poses no threat.”
cases cited).
Cir.

1993)

Treats, 308 F.3d at 873 (and

Compare Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 758-59 (8th

(summary

application

of

force

is

constitutionally

reasonable when safety of officer has been placed in jeopardy).
“[U]se of pepper spray will not be justified every time an inmate
questions orders[.]”

Treats, 308 F.3d at 873.

Defendants claim that an inmate’s possession of handcuffs
is itself a security risk given that they can be used as a weapon
(Defts.’ Memo. in Supp., Doc. #39 at p. 6), and thus that Dodson
was justified in her use of force in response to plaintiff’s
failure to relinquish the restraints. In the circumstances of this
case, however, while plaintiff may have remained in possession of
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his handcuffs, he was in such possession because he himself was
handcuffed.

Indeed, he was handcuffed behind his back and was

alone in a locked cell.
whether

plaintiff’s

As such, a genuine issue exists as to

possession

of

his

handcuffs

in

the

circumstances here constituted such an objective threat that Dodson
Cf. Walker v.

was reasonably justified in her use of force.

Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 2008) (recalcitrant inmate
no longer a threat when handcuffed, thereby removing any need for
force).
Finally, defendants claim that plaintiff’s failure to
show serious injury resulting from the pepper spray
demonstrates that the use of force was reasonable.
lasting

injury

is

necessary

to

make

out

an

incident

However, “[n]o

Eighth

Amendment

violation, for the infliction of pain is sufficient if it was
Treats, 308 F.3d at

inflicted for the purpose of causing harm.”
874.

Nor are the defendants entitled to qualified immunity on
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.
sprayed,

“the

law

was

clearly

At the time plaintiff was

established

that

correctional

officers do not have a blank check to use force whenever a prisoner
is being difficult.”

Treats, 308 F.3d at 875 (citing Hickey, 12

F.3d at 759).
B.

Failure to Protect
Plaintiff claims that defendants Storz and Maxey stood by

and did nothing to prevent Dodson from
- 11 -

unlawfully assaulting

plaintiff with pepper spray despite their knowledge that Dodson
intended to so act.
material

fact

as

As noted above, there exist genuine issues of
to

whether

Dodson’s

act

of

pepper

spraying

plaintiff constituted an unlawful use of force and thus violated
plaintiff’s right to be free from cruel and usual punishment.
Officers who are present during an unlawful use of force, are in a
position to observe the unlawful actions, and do nothing to protect
an inmate therefrom may be liable to the inmate for their failure
to intervene.

Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388,

1395-96 (8th Cir. 1997).
Because genuine issues of material fact exist as to the
extent defendants Storz and Maxey witnessed the pepper spraying
incident and/or knew of Dodson’s alleged intention to pepper spray
plaintiff without legal justification, defendants are not entitled
to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that they failed to
protect him from unlawful use of force.
C.

Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff claims that he was forced to remain in his

contaminated cell for fifteen hours before he was permitted to
shower and that, during this time, defendants Brawley and Maxey
refused plaintiff’s requests to be removed from the cell so that it
could be cleaned.

Because genuine issues of material fact exist as

to the extent to which plaintiff’s cell was doused with pepper
spray, the extent to which plaintiff was effected by such continued
exposure to pepper spray, and the extent to which the cell could
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have been and was cleaned during this time, summary judgment should
Cf. Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir.

be denied.
2002)

(affirmed

denial

of

summary

judgment

on

deliberate

indifference claim to those defendants who required inmates, after
having been removed from cell to shower ten minutes after pepper
spray incident, to return to their cell without first cleaning out
the chemicals).
Accordingly, on the information before the Court, and
viewing all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, it
cannot be said that defendants Christina Dodson, Scott Storz, Carl
Brawley, and Jesse Maxey have established their right to judgment
with such clarity as to leave room for no controversy and that
plaintiff is not entitled to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claims
under any discernable circumstances.
Sur.

Co.,

612

F.2d

1076,

1077

Vette Co. v. Aetna Cas. &

(8th

Cir.

1980).

Therefore,

defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied as to
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims to the extent such claims are
brought against said defendants.

Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s claims that he was
denied

his

First

Amendment

right

to

possession

of

religious

materials and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process are
dismissed without prejudice.
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With respect to plaintiff’s claims that he was denied his
Eighth

Amendment

right

to

be

free

from

cruel

and

unusual

punishment,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. #38) is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s claims against
defendant Cindy Griffith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. #38) is GRANTED to the extent plaintiff seeks
monetary relief against defendants in their official capacities.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in all other

respects,

defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #38) is DENIED.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this

25th

day of March, 2013.

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