Evantigroup, LLC v. Mangia Mobile, LLC

Filing 182

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant C.A.T. I, LLC to dismiss the third amended complaint [Doc. # 109 ] is denied. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 3/4/13. (KJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
EVANTIGROUP, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MANGIA MOBILE, LLC et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:11-CV-1328 (CEJ)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant C.A.T. I, LLC’s (C.A.T.) motion to
dismiss the third amended complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in
opposition, and the issues have been fully briefed.
I.

Background

Plaintiff brings this action asserting claims of trademark infringement under Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 417.056 (Count I); trademark infringement under Missouri common law
(Count II); unfair competition under Missouri common law (Count III); injunctive relief
under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 417.061 (Count IV); and unfair competition under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count V). Plaintiff further seeks to pierce the corporate veil
of C.A.T. in order to hold the individual defendants personally liable (Count VI). The
lawsuit stems from the defendants’ operation of a food truck under a name that
plaintiff claims to be confusingly similar to the name of plaintiff’s restaurant.
II.
1

Legal Standard

The motion to dismiss was filed in response to the second amended complaint.
Plaintiff has now filed a third amended complaint containing the same allegations
against C.A.T. as in the second amended complaint. Therefore, the motion to dismiss
will be considered as being directed to the third amended complaint.

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. The factual allegations
of a complaint are assumed true and construed in favor of the plaintiff, “even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (“Rule
12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a
complaint’s factual allegations”); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears “that a recovery is very remote
and unlikely”).

The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but

whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of his claim. Id. A
viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. See also id. at 563 (“no set of facts”
language in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), “has earned its retirement.”)
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Id. at 555.
III.

Discussion

In support of its motion to dismiss, C.A.T. contends that plaintiff has not pled
any facts demonstrating that C.A.T. used any terms confusingly similar to plaintiff’s
trademark, engaged in unfair competition under Missouri law or the Lanham Act, or
engaged in any acts causing injury to plaintiff’s business reputation or dilution of
plaintiff’s trademark. C.A.T. further argues that plaintiff has not pled any facts that
would support piercing the corporate veil.

Having considered the elements of each of plaintiff’s claims and the allegations
of the third amended complaint, the Court finds that the defendant has been provided
fair notice of what the claims are and the facts upon which they rest. See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Reading the complaint liberally, and taken in context with plaintiff’s
other allegations, plaintiff has done more than merely recite the elements of each its
claims. Instead, plaintiff has stated plausible claims for relief. Plaintiff alleges that
C.A.T. purchased the food truck, truck cover and insurance for the truck. Plaintiff
further alleges that C.A.T. entered into an agreement to lease the food truck to
defendant Mangia Mobile while the alleged infringement was occurring and that C.A.T.
funds were used for the general operation of the food truck business. Plaintiff also
alleges sufficient facts to support the allegation that C.A.T. was an alter ego of the
individual defendants. Therefore, the facts, as alleged, are sufficient to state claims for
infringement, unfair competition, and veil-piercing.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant C.A.T. I, LLC to
dismiss the third amended complaint [Doc. # 109] is denied.

____________________________
CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 4th day of March, 2013.