Saint Louis University v. Duncan et al

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the relief which Plaintiff St. Louis University seeks in its Complaint and in its Memorandum in Support of its Request for Relief is DENIED. (Doc. Nos. 1 & 41 .) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the final decision of the U.S. Secretary of Education is AFFIRMED. A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/17/2015. (NEB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY a/k/a
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARNE DUNCAN, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:11-CV-01367-AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In an administrative proceeding, the U.S. Secretary of Education (“Secretary”)
determined that St. Louis University (“SLU”) improperly disbursed more than $2.8
million in federal student aid money during the 1994 to 1996 school years, in violation of
Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (“Title IV”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070 et seq. The
Secretary demanded that SLU pay the U.S. Department of Education (“Department”)
back the $2.8 million, and SLU now asks the Court to set aside the Secretary’s decision
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. This Court’s
review is limited to the administrative record. After careful review of the extensive
record, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the Secretary’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and reflects application of the proper legal standards.
Therefore, the Court will deny SLU’s request for relief.
BACKGROUND
This case turns on the statutory requirements that condition when a postsecondary

institution may award federal financial aid under Title IV to a student who, absent special
circumstances, would be ineligible for such an award. The Title IV program at issue is
the Federal Pell Grant program.
I.

The Federal Pell Grant Program
The Federal Pell Grant program provides need-based grants to low-income

students at participating postsecondary institutions. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070a. Unlike
loans, these grants do not have to be repaid. The Pell Grant program is one of several
Title IV programs which Congress has authorized the Secretary to administer. Id. §
1070(b). The Secretary reviews and certifies postsecondary institutions for Title IV
eligibility. Id. § 1099c. An eligible postsecondary institution must then enter into a
program participation agreement with the Secretary, in which the institution, as a
fiduciary with direct access to and authority to disburse federal funds, agrees to comply
with all statutory and regulatory requirements under Title IV. Id. § 1094.
The Secretary is also authorized to monitor and enforce participating institutions’
Title IV compliance through final audit determinations and final program reviews. 20
U.S.C. § 1094(c); see also Trs. of Calif. State Univ. v. Riley, 74 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir.
1996) (“Under the authority of 20 U.S.C. § 1094, the Secretary has promulgated
regulations governing the institutions participating in the various federal programs for
financial assistance for students, including the Pell Grant Program.”).
An institution may challenge a final audit determination or final program review in
an administrative hearing, but the institution has the burden to prove, as applicable, that
the “expenditures questioned or disallowed were proper” and that “the institution or
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servicer complied with program requirements.” 34 C.F.R. § 668.116(d). On review, the
hearing official must issue a written decision explaining whether the final audit
determination “was supportable, in whole or in part.” Id. § 668.118(b). The hearing
official may base any findings of fact “only on evidence properly presented before him,
on matters given official notice, or on facts stipulated to by the parties.” Id. § 668.118(c).
Either party may appeal the hearing official’s decision to the Secretary. Id. § 668.119.
The decision of the Secretary is the final decision of the Department. Id. § 668.121.
II.

Title IV’s Need Analysis Provisions
The amount of a student’s financial aid award is determined by Title IV’s “need

analysis” provisions. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087kk-1087vv. These provisions set forth a
statutory formula that calculates a family’s expected contribution to a student’s
educational expenses based on the family’s net income and net assets. Expected family
contribution (“EFC”) is the linchpin of Title IV’s need analysis. To qualify for needbased assistance, a student’s education costs must exceed his EFC. See id. §§ 1070a(b)
(Pell Grants), 1087kk (other Title IV programs). The size of a student’s Pell Grant is
then determined by subtracting the student’s EFC from the statutory maximum Pell Grant
amount for that award year. Id. § 1070a(b)(2)(A).
The statutory formula for calculating EFC is uniform, comprehensive, and
extremely detailed. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087ll-1087vv. In general, the formula takes into
account the family’s available income and then provides for a series of deductions against
that income, such as federal income taxes paid, allowances for social security taxes, an
employment expense allowance, and an income protection allowance. See, e.g., id. §
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1087oo. The income protection allowance constitutes the maximum deduction for
general living expenses that may be taken into account in calculating EFC. Id. § 1087oo
(c)(4). The amount of income protection allowance is prescribed by the Secretary and
updated annually based on increases in the Consumer Price Index. Id. § 1087rr(b). The
amount differs depending on a family’s size and the number of persons in the family
attending college. Id. § 1087oo (c)(4).
Notwithstanding the comprehensive need analysis formula, Title IV grants
participating institutions some amount of discretion to adjust the statutory formula to
account for an individual student’s special circumstances. This discretion is governed by
section 1087tt(a), which, during the years at issue in this case, provided:
Nothing in this part shall be interpreted as limiting the authority of the
financial aid administrator, on the basis of adequate documentation, to
make adjustments on a case-by-case basis to the cost of attendance or the
values of the data items required to calculate the expected student or parent
contribution (or both) to allow for treatment of an individual eligible
applicant with special circumstances. However, this authority shall not be
construed to permit aid administrators to deviate from the contributions
expected in the absence of special circumstances. Special circumstances
shall be conditions that differentiate an individual student from a class of
students rather than conditions that exist across a class of students.
Adequate documentation for such adjustments shall substantiate such
special circumstances of individual students.
20 U.S.C. § 1087tt(a) (1994).
Although the Secretary has authority to enforce Title IV compliance generally, the
Secretary is prohibited from prescribing regulations to carry out Title IV’s need analysis
provisions, including section 1087tt(a), except to update the amount of the income
protection and other allowances, and to propose modifications in the need analysis
methodology. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087rr(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
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the Secretary shall not have the authority to prescribe regulations to carry out this part
except (A) to prescribe updated tables in accordance with subsections (b) through (h) of
this section; or (B) to propose modifications in the need analysis methodology required
by this part.”).
III.

SLU’s Implementation of Section 1087tt(a)
In its briefs, SLU describes itself as a private Catholic, Jesuit university that

participates in Title IV programs, including the Pell Grant program. Pursuant to section
1087tt(a), SLU implemented a policy allowing students to request adjustments to their
EFC based on special circumstances. Students requested adjustments using a form
entitled “Application for Consideration of Financial Aid Special Circumstances.” The
form asked students to list, among other things, medical and dental expenses; elementary
and high school education expenses, including private or parochial school tuition; and
average annual living expenses, including, for example, housing, food, insurance,
utilities, debts, clothing, and transportation.
According to a declaration submitted by SLU’s financial aid director, Harold
Deuser, SLU’s financial aid administrators “only made Professional Judgment
adjustments for individual students and/or families who completed an individual
‘Application for Consideration of Financial Aid Special Circumstances’ form.”
(Administrative Record (“R.”) at 262.) Deuser contended that financial aid
administrators would engage in discussions with students about their circumstances prior
to making adjustments, if needed, and that administrators documented adjustments by
making a notation in the student’s file. Id.
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In making these adjustments, Deuser stated that it was “extremely important” to
SLU that its institutional policies implementing section 1087tt(a) ensured that students
“who are similarly situated are similarly treated.” (R. at 260.) Thus, after reviewing the
statutory requirements and various guidance documents from the Department, SLU made
the policy decision to treat certain categories of expenses reported by a student as
“automatic” special circumstances. Id. at 266.
IV.

The Department’s Audit of SLU
In January of 1997, the Department’s Office of Inspector General (“OIG”)

initiated an audit of SLU’s Pell Grants during the 1994 to 1996 award years. The OIG
found that SLU used section 1087tt(a) to make adjustments for 46% of its Pell Grant
recipients during these award years, whereas financial aid administrators nationally did so
for only 4% of their Pell Grant recipients. (R. at 309.)
In its audit, the OIG extracted a sample of 139 students’ files from a universe of
the 2,200 students for whom SLU used a section 1087tt(a) adjustment to award Pell
Grants in excess of the amount normally awardable under the statutory formula. The
sample consisted of 50 students who received an adjusted Pell Grant during the 19941995 award year and 89 students who received an adjusted Pell Grant during the 19951996 award year.
Through interviews with SLU’s financial aid administrators, including Deuser,
and a review of SLU’s records, the OIG found that SLU’s practice was to make acrossthe-board adjustments for the following categories of expenses: medical and dental
expenses, elementary and secondary school tuition, and annual living expenses in excess
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of those already accounted for in the statutory formula. (R. at 3167-68.) The OIG
accepted some of SLU’s adjustments, including those based on elementary and secondary
school tuition and medical and dental expenses exceeding 5% of a family’s income. Id.
at 312-13. Ultimately, the OIG determined that SLU improperly adjusted the financial
aid awards of 126 of the 139 students, or 90% of the sample. Id. at 309. The OIG
concluded that the amount of improperly disbursed funds for the 139 student sample was
$167,347. Id. The OIG then extrapolated that amount to the universe of 2,200 students
to estimate that the total amount of improperly disbursed funds for the 1994 to 1996
award years was $2,599,709. Id.
In July of 1997, the OIG cited its audits of SLU and other postsecondary
institutions in a legislative proposal to Congress to amend section 1087tt(a). The
proposal stated that financial aid administrators were “unreasonabl[y]” using professional
judgment to deduct expenses that were “nonessential.” (R. at 320.) The OIG
recommended that section 1087tt(a) be amended to state that “[a]ny adjustments for
additional expenses allowed because of special circumstances should be limited to
instances where the student demonstrates the expenses were . . . incurred out of
necessity.” Id. Additionally, the OIG recommended that Congress grant the Secretary
authority to regulate section 1087tt(a). Id. Congress did not adopt any of the OIG’s
recommendations.
The OIG audit was ultimately submitted to the Department’s Federal Student Aid
office (“FSA”)1 for review prior to a final audit determination. The FSA not only agreed

1

The FSA was formerly known as the Office of Student Financial Assistance Programs.
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that SLU improperly exercised its authority under section 1087tt(a) to adjust students’
financial aid awards in the 1994 to 1996 award years, but went further to find that SLU’s
liability was greater than that stated in the OIG’s audit.
The FSA found that the OIG should not have accepted SLU’s adjustments to
students’ awards based on medical and dental expenses because SLU “made no
individual determination as to why deductions of medical expenses was appropriate,”
instead “allow[ing] across the board deductions for all medical and dental expenses.” (R.
at 228.) Likewise, the FSA found that the OIG should not have accepted SLU’s
adjustments based on all reported elementary and secondary school tuition because
“[t]uition may not be used to reduce a student’s family income in the absence of
documentation of special circumstances justifying the reduction.” Id. at 229.
The FSA concluded that the amount of improperly disbursed funds for the 139
student sample was $175,797, which, extrapolated to the universe of 2,200 students for
the 1994 to 1996 award years, amounted to “a total liability of $2,816,029 for an
estimated 2,016 improperly awarded students.” (R. at 231-32.) Thus, the FSA issued a
final audit determination holding SLU liable for $2,816,029 and attaching its findings
with respect to each student in the sample.
V.

Administrative Proceedings
SLU sought administrative review of the final audit determination under 34 C.F.R.

§ 668, Subpart H. SLU challenged both the FSA’s finding of liability and the
methodology used to calculate the amount of liability.
During the first administrative proceeding before Chief Administrative Judge
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Ernest Canellos (“Canellos I”), SLU stated that it had indeed defined certain medical and
dental, elementary and secondary school tuition, and living expenses as “per se” special
circumstances under section 1087tt(a). (R. at 3274-77.) In other words, SLU made an
“advance judgment” that expenses falling within these categories would be treated as
special circumstances warranting an adjustment for all students who reported them. Id. at
3272-73. But SLU argued that section 1087tt(a) gave financial aid administrators
discretion to determine, in their professional judgment, that these categories of expenses
constituted special circumstances. SLU emphasized that although the OIG sought to
limit financial aid administrators’ discretion under section 1087tt(a) in its July 1997
legislative proposal, Congress rejected the OIG’s proposal.
After reviewing the record, Judge Canellos determined that SLU should be
relieved of liability. Judge Canellos reasoned that the FSA’s arguments in this case
“parallel[ed]” the OIG’s legislative proposal to Congress in July of 1997. (R. at 3446.)
The “marked difference,” however, was that the OIG’s proposal presumed that section
1087tt(a) permitted SLU’s actions. Id. Judge Canellos concluded that the Department
could not argue “that the law proscribes the actions taken by [SLU] and, at the same time,
argue to Congress that it needs to change the law to make such actions illegal.” Id.
Given his finding that SLU was not liable, Judge Canellos did not need to reach
SLU’s methodology challenges. However, he noted that SLU “could have, if it wished,
performed a full-file review to potentially establish lesser damages.” (R. at 3446.)
The FSA appealed the Canellos I decision to the Secretary. The Secretary

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remanded the matter for further review.2 The Secretary held that the record reflected that
SLU’s financial aid administrators considered medical and dental expenses, elementary
and secondary school tuition, and living expenses that exceeded statutory income
protection allowances as “per se special circumstances.” (R. at 3547.) The Secretary
held that the mandatory language of section 1087tt(a) did not permit SLU to define
certain categories of expenses as “per se special circumstances” but required it to
determine “on a case-by-case basis” that “special circumstances” exist and were
supported by “adequate documentation.” Id. The Secretary instructed the hearing
official to determine, on remand, whether SLU had shown it satisfied these prerequisites
in each case. Id.
On remand (“Canellos II”), Judge Canellos ordered SLU to identify any case-bycase analysis it had used in determining whether special circumstances existed for each
student, to identify where in the record documentation of special circumstances could be
found, and to explain why the documentation was adequate for this purpose. (R. at 403536.) Judge Canellos also ordered the FSA to file a response brief. Id.
SLU argued that its case-by-case analysis consisted of reviewing each Application
for Consideration of Financial Aid Special Circumstances, one by one, before making
adjustments. SLU also offered a document entitled “Student-by-Student Analysis” in
which it attempted to demonstrate, retrospectively, that the students at issue qualified for
the award SLU gave them. In this document, SLU performed post-hoc individualized

2

There was a nearly seven year delay between Canellos I and the Secretary’s remand.
However, no interest accrued on the $2,816,029 liability during the pendency of the
administrative proceedings. (Doc. No. 45 at 20 n.13.)
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analysis to demonstrate that some students did have “special circumstances” as that term
is defined in section 1087tt(a). SLU also argued for hindsight application of other Title
IV provisions to justify the awards granted. See id. at 4037.
After reviewing the submissions and the preexisting record, Judge Canellos
reinstated SLU’s liability. (R. at 4034-45.) Judge Canellos found that the record before
him indicated that SLU “1) created per se categories of special circumstances for all
medical and dental expenses, elementary and secondary tuition, and normal living
expenses, and 2) found special circumstances for any student who completed [SLU’s]
supplemental form and reported expenses within any of these per se categories.” Id. at
4038.
Judge Canellos found that, even if SLU reviewed the applications one by one in a
“pro forma manner,” there was no indication that SLU performed any analysis of
individual situations or made any effort to consider whether a condition differentiated an
individual student. (R. at 4038-39.) Thus, although it was “certainly possible that within
[SLU’s] student files, some students’ reported circumstances may have constituted
special circumstances,” SLU’s practice of considering “any and all instances where a
student’s family incurred expenses within a designated category as special
circumstances” demonstrated that the university “neither conducted a case-by-case
analysis nor considered only ‘special’ circumstances,” as that term was defined in the
statute. Id. at 4039.
Likewise, with respect to the statute’s “adequate documentation” requirement,
Judge Canellos found that “from the paucity of documents collected by [SLU], there
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exists a significant lack of context from which to make determinations that special
circumstances were present, even if the school had conducted an appropriate case-by-case
analysis.” (R. at 4041.)
Judge Canellos held that SLU could not cure these statutory violations by
submitting post-hoc analysis, as it attempted to do in its Student-by-Student Analysis,
because the record contained nothing to demonstrate that SLU conducted this analysis at
the outset, before making the adjustments. (R. at 4039-40.)
Judge Canellos also rejected SLU’s challenges to the methodology that the FSA
used to calculate SLU’s liability. SLU argued that the methodology was flawed because
the FSA failed to meet its own guideline of a 95% confidence level, instead reaching only
a 90% confidence level.3 SLU also argued that even if a 90% confidence level were
sufficient, the sample size for the 1994-1995 award year was too small to achieve a 90%
confidence level. SLU argued that, according to a formula applied by the OIG in its audit
of a different university, the sample size required to achieve a 90% confidence level for
the 1994-1995 award year would have been 51 students, and the FSA’s sample for that
year was only 50 students.
Judge Canellos rejected each of SLU’s arguments. Judge Canellos held that
“[a]bsent demonstrated error, the use of sampling and extrapolation to assess liability will
be upheld so long as a statistically reliable method of data analysis is employed and the
institution . . . is afforded an opportunity to rebut the findings and technique of an audit.”

3

As Judge Canellos explained, “[i]n audits conducted using a sampling methodology,
a confidence level represents the level of precision or reliability for a statistical projection
of liability from a sample of reviewed files.” (R. at 4042 n.18.)
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(R. at 4044.) In this case, Judge Canellos concluded that the FSA and OIG’s
methodology was shown to be statistically reliable and valid because there was no
judicially-mandated minimum confidence level or sample size. Relying on a declaration
by the OIG’s statistical expert, Judge Canellos found that the OIG’s protocol was to use a
90% confidence level for its audits, and the OIG was not bound by the particular sample
size it used in an audit of a different university. (R. at 3863, 4044.) Judge Canellos held
that although the FSA guidelines called for a 95% confidence level for audits performed
solely by the FSA, this non-binding guideline was not dispositive in determining the
statistical validity of an audit conducted initially by the OIG. Finally, Judge Canellos
noted that SLU could have performed a full-file review and requested an alternate
method of calculating liability, but SLU chose not to do so.
SLU appealed the Canellos II decision to the Secretary, who affirmed. The
Secretary’s affirmance constitutes the final agency action in this case. The Secretary
agreed with SLU that in exercising professional judgment under section 1087tt(a),
“financial aid administrators are not required to act as judges of whether prudent financial
choices have been adopted by parents and/or students.” (R. at 4220 n.7.) But he held
that financial aid administrators are required to comply with the statute’s two “key
requirements”: “[1] that professional judgment be exercised on the basis of adequate
documentation and [2] that the professional judgment be exercised only under special
circumstances followed by the financial aid administrator on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at
4220.
The Secretary held that SLU failed to comply with these requirements. Rather
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than determining whether special circumstances exist on a case-by-case and adequately
documented basis, the Secretary found that SLU “executed a systematic practice of using
professional judgment to override the statutory formula in any case in which a student
requested a determination of special circumstances.” Id. at 4221. Thus, SLU “departed
from the statutory formula regardless of special circumstances, not because of special
circumstances.” Id.
The Secretary also affirmed the amount of SLU’s liability. The Secretary held that
the FSA’s calculation of liability was reasonable, and SLU could not merely assert that
the FSA’s calculation was unfair or unacceptable without offering an appropriate
alternative calculation. In any event, the Secretary held that the “extrapolation
calculation [did] not hinge on the statistical validity of the student sample.” (R. at 4223.)
Rather, the Secretary found that the sample was used solely to determine whether SLU’s
“use of professional judgment systematically lacked statutory compliance.” Id. Once
systematic non-compliance was found, the “calculation of liability . . . was derived from a
projection of the improper Pell Grant Awards” to the entire universe of 2,220 students.
Id. The Secretary found that this method was apparently used “because of the audit
finding that in all cases for whom professional judgment was performed during the award
years at issue, [SLU’s] professional judgment determinations were improper.” Id. Thus,
the Secretary found that the amount of SLU’s liability was “based on the sum of the
actual number of students awarded Federal Pell Grant funds by the exercise of
professional judgment during the 1994-95 and 1995-96 award years multiplied by the
average Pell Grant awarded: 779 x $1,003 plus 1441 x $1,412, respectively, which
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yields, $2,816,029.” Id. The Secretary ordered SLU to repay the Department the sum of
$2,816,029.
SLU now seeks judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision under the APA, 5
U.S.C. §§ 701-706. (Doc. No. 1 at 8.)
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
As an initial matter, SLU argues that it did not grant a section 1087tt(a) adjustment
every time a student requested it, as the Secretary found. Rather, SLU argues that it
rejected some requests for adjustments during the 1994 to 1996 award years, but the
auditors simply never reviewed those files. In support of this allegation, SLU cites the
supplemental declaration of its financial aid director, Deuser, submitted during the
administrative proceedings. In his supplemental declaration, Deuser states that SLU
“rejected Professional Judgment application information in the 1994-95 and 1995-96
award years of this audit, and still does to this day.” (R. at 3216.) However, Deuser does
not identify the category of expenses to which these rejections related.
In any event, SLU argues that its policy decision to treat certain medical and
dental, elementary and secondary school tuition, and living expenses as special
circumstances was permitted by section 1087tt(a). SLU argues that, as Canellos I held,
the OIG admitted SLU’s conduct was permissible under section 1087tt(a) when it
unsuccessfully sought to amend the statute. SLU reasons that by rejecting the OIG’s
legislative proposal and prohibiting the Department from regulating section 1087tt(a),
Congress granted financial aid administrators the authority to interpret the statute.
Thus, SLU contends that its financial aid administrators had discretion to interpret
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“ambiguous” statutory terms such as “special circumstances” and “adequate
documentation,” and SLU argues that “neither the Secretary nor a reviewing court can
reject [the administrators’] interpretation . . . in favor of his or its own opinion as to what
the statute means.” (Doc. No. 41 at 36.) SLU asserts that its financial aid administrators’
interpretation of section 1087tt(a) was reasonable because, for example, “it is selfevident, especially for a private Catholic, Jesuit University such as SLU, that whether to
exercise Professional Judgment for the parents of children who attend a private or
parochial school rather than a public primary or secondary school is one of the core
elements of Professional Judgment.” (Doc. No. 41 at 48.)
Moreover, SLU argues that the use of per se categories of special circumstances
was contemplated by the Department in its own advisory documents, and was ultimately
adopted by Congress in later amendments to section 1087tt(a). Specifically, SLU points
to a 1999 “Dear Colleague Letter” sent by the Department to universities participating in
Title IV programs, which stated that “[p]rofessional judgment authority may be used in
other ways to assist students with special circumstances such as for elementary or
secondary school tuition expenses, unusual medical or dental expenses, or unusual
changes in income or assets.” (R. at 369.) And SLU notes that Congress later amended
section 1087tt(a) to explicitly state that “[s]pecial circumstances may include tuition
expenses at an elementary or secondary school, medical, dental or nursing home expenses
not covered by insurance,” and other categories of expenses. 20 U.S.C. § 1087tt(a)
(2008). SLU argues that this amendment “makes it clear that each per se category of
expense could be considered a special circumstance.” (Doc. No. 41 at 50.)
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SLU also argues that the Secretary’s finding that all of SLU’s award adjustments
violated section 1087tt(a) improperly ignored the OIG’s finding that some of SLU’s
adjustments were appropriate exercises of professional judgment, and were adequately
documented.
Next, SLU challenges the methodology used to calculate its liability. SLU argues
that the Secretary misconstrued the methodology employed by the FSA, and erred in
holding that the $2,816,029 liability was calculated by first finding that all of SLU’s
section 1087tt(a) adjustments were improper and then multiplying the total number of
awards benefitting from a section 1087tt(a) adjustment by the average award amount.
Rather, SLU argues, the FSA calculated liability by determining some, but not all, of
SLU’s section 1087tt(a) adjustments were improper, and then extrapolating the amount of
improperly disbursed funds found in the sample files to the total number of awards
benefitting from a section 1087tt(a) adjustment. SLU argues that “because the basis upon
which the Secretary affirmed the extrapolated liability is not the basis upon which that
figure was actually calculated, the Secretary’s Decision must be vacated as a matter of
law.” (Doc. No. 41 at 56.)
SLU also argues that the Secretary erred in rejecting its challenges to the audit’s
confidence level and sample size. SLU does not dispute that extrapolation is an
acceptable method of quantifying liability. But SLU maintains that the FSA must be held
to its self-imposed guideline of a 95% confidence level. In support of this argument,
SLU cites the FSA’s 1994 Program Review Guide, published by the FSA’s Institutional
Review Branch, which includes as “recommended language” for reports, that student
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files should be “selected randomly from a statistical sample . . . valid to a 95 percent
confidence level with a plus or minus five percent confidence interval.” (R. at 3683-84.)
SLU also argues that even if a 90% confidence level is appropriate, the sample size of 50
for the 1994-95 award year was too small to achieve a 90% confidence level. As it did in
the administrative proceedings, SLU points to a formula applied by the OIG in an audit of
a different university to argue that a sample size of 51 was necessary.
Finally, SLU argues that there are other, unspecified errors in the calculation of
liability with respect to particular students. As one example, SLU argues that the FSA
improperly included in its extrapolation part of one student’s Pell Grant that was not the
result of a section 1087tt(a) adjustment. This student was designated as Student GR-2043 in the final audit determination. SLU has not provided any other examples of errors
but argues that the Court must remand the case to the Secretary to review each student’s
file and determine the correct amount of liability. SLU states that its Student-by-Student
Analysis submitted during the administrative proceedings, which was created post-hoc,
sets out SLU’s view as to the correct disbursement for each student.
The Department responds that the Secretary’s decision is supported by the plain
language of section 1087tt(a). The Department argues that SLU’s use of per se special
circumstances violates the statute’s case-by-case and adequate documentation
requirements, and is contrary to the statutory definition of special circumstances. The
Department contends that, regardless of any agency guidance documents or statutory
amendments listing examples of expenses that “may” warrant a section 1087tt(a)
adjustment, SLU cannot make any adjustment without first fulfilling the statutory
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requirement to conduct an individualized and adequately documented review.
Regarding SLU’s contention that it did not automatically award adjustments to
every student who requested one, the Department argues that it was incumbent upon SLU
to demonstrate this fact in developing the administrative record, and it failed to do so.
The Department notes that Deuser did not substantiate the statement in his supplemental
declaration that SLU rejected some requests for adjustments, and this statement was
contradicted by other evidence in the record.
Regarding SLU’s emphasis on the OIG’s unsuccessful legislative proposal, which
was the focus of Canellos I, the Department argues that the Secretary properly ignored
the proposal. According to the Department, the OIG’s legislative proposal is irrelevant
because the final audit determination “did not assess liability using the standards OIG
proposed to Congress, nor did the Secretaries affirm on that basis.” (Doc. No. 45 at 30.)
Likewise, the Department argues that the Secretary properly disregarded the
OIG’s findings that SLU appropriately exercised and adequately documented
professional judgment in at least some cases. The Department acknowledges that “there
are a handful of students, out of the 139 sampled, as to whom the OIG concluded SLU
had at least in part correctly exercised professional judgment,” and that the final audit
determination did not assess liability with respect to at least some of these awards. (Doc.
No. 45 at 27.) However, the Department argues that the OIG’s decision to accept these
adjustments was “improper” because it was made after auditors determined whether
students “would have warranted an exercise of professional judgment had SLU ever
engaged in the requisite individualized analysis professional judgment required.” Id. at
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28. Because SLU did not engage in such analysis, the Department argues that “[n]either
SLU, nor the Department, could effect a valid exercise of professional judgment authority
post hoc, or based on documents in SLU’s student files concerning students as to whom
no such inquiry had been made when the funds were awarded.” Id. at n.18. In short, the
Department argues that the Secretary properly held that, because SLU systematically
failed to comply with section 1087tt(a), all of SLU’s award adjustments in the years at
issue were improper.
Regarding SLU’s methodology challenges, the Department acknowledges that the
FSA’s calculation of liability was not based on the assumption that all of SLU’s section
1087tt(a) adjustments were improper, as the Secretary held. This is because, as explained
above, the final audit determination (erroneously, according to the Department) accepted
some of SLU’s section 1087tt(a) adjustments as appropriate when calculating the total
amount of improperly disbursed funds found in the sample files. Nevertheless, the
Department argues that this fact does not undermine the Secretary’s decision because
“[t]he Secretary’s decision did not turn on whether or not the [final audit determination]
assessed liability for every penny it should have.” Id. at 28. The Department argues that,
although there may be some conflict between the Secretary’s finding that all of SLU’s
section 1087tt(a) adjustments were improper and the final audit determination’s
allowance of certain section 1087tt(a) adjustments, any error in this regard actually
benefitted SLU. The Department notes that had Secretary’s finding of across-the-board
liability been applied, all of SLU’s section 1087tt(a) adjustments would have been
disallowed, and the amount of SLU’s liability would have been even greater than
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$2,816,029.
The Department also argues that the Secretary properly rejected SLU’s challenges
based on confidence level and sample size. The Department argues that Title IV does not
mandate a minimum confidence level or sample size for final audit determinations, and
the methodology employed in this case was shown to be statistically reliable and valid by
the OIG’s statistical expert. The Department also notes that, as Judge Canellos found in
Canellos II, SLU could have performed a full-file review and proposed an alternative
calculation of liability, or rebutted the FSA’s evidence of reliability and validity with its
own statistical expert, but SLU chose not to do either.
Finally, the Department argues that the Court should reject SLU’s alternative
request to remand the matter for correction of other particular errors because SLU failed
to make any showing to the Secretary regarding what the correct amount of liability
should have been and why. With respect to Student GR-2-043, the single example of
error cited by SLU, the Department argues that it correctly included the student’s entire
Pell Grant in its calculation of liability because, absent SLU’s improper section 1087tt(a)
adjustment, the student’s EFC would have made him ineligible for any Pell Grant. In its
reply brief, SLU does not respond to the Department’s explanation with respect to
Student GR-2-043.
DISCUSSION
The parties state, and the Court agrees, that the Secretary’s final decision is a final
agency action subject to this Court’s review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. See
also Sistema Universitario Ana G. Mendez v. Riley, 234 F.3d 772, 777 (1st Cir. 2000)
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(reviewing Secretary of Education’s decision regarding Title IV final audit determination
under the APA).
“It is well-established that judicial review under the APA is limited to the
administrative record that was before the agency when it made its decision.” Rochling v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 725 F.3d 927, 936 (8th Cir. 2013). Neither party in this case
has asked the Court to review any evidence outside the administrative record.
Under the APA, a reviewing court must affirm the agency action unless it was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,”
or was “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C). Reviewing courts must also “accept the agency’s
factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.” Maverick Transp., LLC v.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Admin. Review Bd., 739 F.3d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir. 2014); 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(E). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support the agency’s conclusion.” Maverick, 739 F.3d at 1153
(citation omitted).
SLU asserts errors with respect to both the Secretary’s finding of liability and the
Secretary’s calculation of the amount of liability. The Court will address each of these
issues in turn.

I.

Secretary’s Finding of Liability Under Section 1087tt(a)
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A. Secretary’s Interpretation of Section 1087tt(a)
The first question before the Court is whether the Secretary properly construed
section 1087tt(a) to prohibit SLU’s financial aid administrators from treating any and all
instances where a student’s family incurred expenses within a designated category as
special circumstances warranting an adjustment to the statutory need analysis formula.
In reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers, courts must ask
two questions. First “is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984). “If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect.” Id. at 843 n.9.
If, on the other hand, the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, courts must reach a second question: whether Congress has explicitly or implicitly
“left a gap for the agency to fill” by regulation. Id. at 843-44. “[W]hen it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority,” the agency interpretation controls unless it is “procedurally
defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). But when there has been no
such delegation of authority, the agency interpretation is “entitled to respect only to the
extent it has the power to persuade.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006)
(citation omitted).
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As an initial matter, the Court rejects SLU’s novel argument that its financial aid
administrators are entitled to the deference that would normally be afforded agencies
under Chevron and its progeny. SLU is correct that, although Congress has delegated
authority to the Secretary to administer and enforce Title IV, Congress has expressly
restricted that authority in the area of need analysis, including section 1087tt(a).
Therefore, to the extent the Court finds any ambiguity in section 1087tt(a), it need not
defer to the Secretary’s interpretation.
But this does not mean that the Court must defer to SLU’s interpretation. The
principle of deference to administrative interpretations under Chevron and its progeny is
based on a recognition that “[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,” and the
formulation of that policy might require “more than ordinary knowledge respecting the
matters subjected to agency regulations.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (citation omitted).
Congress has not delegated participating institutions like SLU any such broad,
gap-filling authority to administer Title IV. Rather, Congress has required participating
institutions to submit to agency oversight for compliance with Title IV’s provisions.
Section 1087tt(a) may afford financial aid administrators some amount of discretion to
make adjustments to the need analysis formula, but this discretion is limited by certain
express conditions, and the statute does not afford administrators any discretion to define
or interpret those conditions. Therefore, the Court rejects SLU’s call for deference.
In any event, the Court need not reach the question of deference, to any party,
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because Congress’ intent may be ascertained from the plain language of section 1087tt(a)
and traditional tools of statutory construction.
Section 1087tt(a) expresses the unambiguous congressional intent that financial
aid administrators must satisfy certain conditions precedent before adjusting the statutory
need analysis formula for an individual student. Specifically, financial aid administrators
are not permitted to deviate from the statutory formula in the absence of “special
circumstances.” 20 U.S.C. § 1087tt(a) (1994). The definition of “special circumstances”
is not left to the unbridled discretion of administrators but is limited to “conditions that
differentiate an individual student from a class of students rather than conditions that
exist across a class of students.” Id. And these special circumstances must be
determined on a “case-by-case basis” and substantiated by “adequate documentation.”
Id.
To automatically treat any and all instances in which a student’s family incurred
expenses within a designated category as special circumstances is, by definition, to fail to
conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the condition differentiates an
individual student.
Moreover, section 1087tt(a) does not exist in a vacuum. It must be read in the
context of the extremely detailed statutory scheme Congress created to control the
amount of and circumstances under which federal funds may be disbursed to assist
students with financial need. See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (“[A]
fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) [is] that
the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the
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context in which it is used.”); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The
plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.”). Title IV’s need analysis provisions, including its strict parameters
for the calculation of EFC and its annually updated maximum deductions for family
living expenses, further signal that section 1087tt(a) was not intended to serve as an
avenue for financial aid administrators to create, according to their own policy
preferences, entire categories of expenses to be automatically deducted from EFC.
Therefore, applying the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the Court finds
that SLU’s policy of treating certain categories of expenses as per se special
circumstances violates the plain language of section 1087tt(a).
SLU points to the legislative history and subsequent amendments of section
1087tt(a) to argue that the statute permits its conduct. Although the Court need not resort
to this extrinsic evidence in light of the unambiguous language of the statute, a diversion
into legislative history only supports the plain meaning of the statute’s text.
First, SLU notes that a House Committee Report accompanying the 1992
amendments to section 1087tt(a) stated that “the Committee recognize[d] that although
adjustments must be made on an individual case-by-case basis, students may have similar
circumstances which make similar adjustments appropriate.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-447, at
72 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 334, 405. But this statement merely
recognizes that nothing in the statute prohibits the result—after financial aid
administrators have made adjustments on an individualized, case-by-case basis—that
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some students receive similar adjustments. What is prohibited is for financial
administrators to assume this result without first conducting the individualized, case-bycase analysis required to get there.
Indeed, as the Department correctly notes, the conference report accompanying the
originally enacted section 1087tt(a)4 reveals that Congress considered, but rejected, the
idea of permitting financial aid administrators to make adjustments on a group basis. See
H.R. Rep. No. 99-861, at 416-17 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2718, 2773 (“The House amendment and the Senate bill permit financial aid
administrators to exercise discretion to make adjustments to [the statutory formula],
however, the Senate bill limits the exercise of such discretion to individual students,
while the House amendment permits it to be exercised for groups of students. The House
recedes.”). And to clarify that special circumstances must be determined on an
individualized basis, the 1992 amendments to section 1087tt(a) added the “case-by-case”
requirement and explicitly defined special circumstances as “conditions that differentiate
an individual student from a class of students rather than conditions that exist across a
class of students.” Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1087tt(a) (1986), with 20 U.S.C. § 1087tt(a)
(1992). Therefore, the legislative history of section 1087tt(a) supports the plain meaning

4

As originally enacted in 1986, section 1087tt(a) stated, in relevant part:
Nothing in this title shall be interpreted as limiting the authority of the
student financial aid administrator, on the basis of adequate documentation,
to make necessary adjustments to the cost of attendance and expected
student or parent contribution (or both) to allow for treatment of individual
students with special circumstances.

20 U.S.C. § 1087tt(a) (1986).
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of the statutory text, which prohibits treating certain categories of expenses as per se
special circumstances.
The subsequent amendments to section 1087tt(a) do not alter this conclusion.
SLU correctly notes that the 1998 and later amendments to section 1087tt(a), as well as
the Department’s own guidance documents, state that certain categories of expenses, such
as elementary and secondary school tuition and medical and dental expenses, “may”
constitute special circumstances. See R. at 369; 20 U.S.C. § 1087tt(a) (1998); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087tt(a) (2008).
But listing examples of conditions that “may” qualify as special circumstances
does not equate to creating per se categories of circumstances in which adjustments are
automatically made, regardless of whether it has been determined, on a case-by-case and
adequately documented basis, that the individual circumstances of that student, as
compared to a class of students, warrant a departure from the statutory formula. The
latter is prohibited under all versions of the statute.
The Court concludes that the plain language of section 1087tt(a), as well as its
legislative history, supports the Secretary’s interpretation that the statute prohibited
SLU’s financial aid administrators from treating certain categories of expenses as per se
special circumstances.
B. Secretary’s Factual Finding that SLU’s Financial Aid Administrators
Systematically Made Adjustments Based on Per Se Categories of Special
Circumstances
The Secretary’s factual finding that SLU’s financial aid administrators
systematically treated all expenses reported in certain designated categories as special
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circumstances warranting an adjustment is supported by substantial evidence. This
evidence includes SLU’s own statements during the Canellos I hearing, Deuser’s
declaration, and the OIG’s audit work papers.
Although Deuser later submitted a supplemental declaration stating that SLU did
not grant every request for a finding of special circumstances that it received, Deuser did
not cite or attach any evidence in support of this statement. Nor did Deuser state whether
any of these purported rejections were for medical and dental, elementary and secondary
school tuition, or living expenses, such that they would undermine the Secretary’s finding
that SLU treated these expenses as per se special circumstances.
Indeed, despite Judge Canellos’s explicit order for SLU to submit any evidence
that it conducted a case-by-case, individualized review before granting section 1087tt(a)
adjustments in the award years at issue, the administrative record does not include any
such evidence.5 Therefore, the Court is bound by the Secretary’s factual finding that
SLU systematically made section 1087tt(a) adjustments on the basis of per se categories
of special circumstances.
5

In its Student-by-Student Analysis in the administrative proceedings and in its brief
before this Court, SLU attempts to demonstrate, retrospectively, that the students at issue
had “special circumstances” as that term is defined in section 1087tt(a). See, e.g., Doc.
No. 41 at 20 (explaining circumstances of a student whose parent lost his job and whose
sister was disabled). But this post-hoc analysis is irrelevant to the Court’s review. The
Secretary found that SLU failed to conduct this individualized analysis before making the
adjustments, and the Court need only determine whether this finding is supported by
substantial evidence. See Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 646 (1985) (“The role of
a court in reviewing a determination by the Secretary that funds have been misused is to
judge whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and reflect application
of the proper legal standards.”). “Where the Secretary has properly concluded that funds
were misused under the legal standards in effect when the grants were made,” as here, “a
reviewing court has no independent authority to excuse repayment based on its view of
what would be the most equitable outcome.” Id.
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C. Effect of the OIG’s Legislative Proposal and Initial Audit Findings
Because this Court’s review is limited to the Secretary’s final decision, and the
findings therein, the findings of lower level agency officials such as the OIG and FSA are
irrelevant except to the extent they are incorporated in the Secretary’s decision. See
Morris v. Sullivan, 897 F.2d 553, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Courts do not normally review
the interim actions of . . . lower level agency officials. Rather, they review final agency
decisions.”).
Nor is the OIG’s legislative proposal, on which SLU places much emphasis,
pertinent to the Secretary’s finding of liability. As the Department correctly notes, the
Secretary did not assess liability using the “necessity” standards that OIG proposed to
Congress. The Secretary agreed with SLU that, in rejecting the OIG’s legislative
proposal, Congress ensured that nothing in section 1087tt(a) would require financial aid
administrators to make judgment calls regarding whether the adjusted expenses were
incurred out of necessity.6 See R. at 4219-20 n.7.
Rather, the Secretary found that section 1087tt(a) requires only that financial aid
administrators conduct a case-by-case determination and obtain adequate documentation
of the “special circumstances—whatever those circumstances may be—that form the
basis of the judgment to depart from the statutory need analysis formula.” Id. at 4220
6

For this reason, just as SLU’s post-hoc analysis regarding some students with
particularly adverse circumstances is irrelevant to the Court’s review, so are the
Department’s examples of particularly wealthy students for whom SLU more drastically
adjusted the statutory formula. See, e.g., Doc. No. 45 at 18 n.12 (noting that SLU
reduced the EFC of one student “from $24,102 to $384” after “deducting an additional
$82,100 of living expenses” on top of the statutory income protection allowances, “even
though the student’s family income was $100,996, and the family indicated that it could
pay $8000 towards the daughter’s educational costs”).
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n.7. The OIG’s legislative proposal did not address whether SLU complied with these
statutory prerequisites, and there is substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s finding
that it did not.
Likewise, the OIG’s findings in its initial audit, in which it accepted some of
SLU’s award adjustments as proper and/or adequately documented exercises of
professional judgment, are irrelevant to the Court’s review. The basis for the Secretary’s
decision was not whether the award adjustments were warranted by facts in each case,
but whether SLU’s financial aid administrators complied with the statutory prerequisites
prior to making the adjustments. The Secretary found that they did not, and as discussed
above, this finding is supported by substantial evidence and reflects application of the
proper legal standards. Therefore, the Court will affirm the Secretary’s finding that SLU
violated section 1087tt(a).
II.

Secretary’s Calculation of Amount of Liability
A. Errors Arising from Conflict Between Secretary’s Reasoning and Final
Audit Determination’s Calculation of Liability
As SLU correctly notes, the final audit determination only assessed liability for an

estimated 2,016 of the 2,200 section 1087tt(a) adjustments in the award years at issue,
whereas the Secretary found that SLU’s systematic noncompliance with section 1087tt(a)
meant that all 2,220 of the adjustments were improper. Under the Secretary’s reasoning,
which this Court has upheld, SLU arguably could have been ordered to repay more than
$2,816,029. But the fact that the Secretary did not assess liability to the full extent
permitted by Title IV only benefitted SLU. If this is an error, it is not one warranting
reversal of the Secretary’s decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (noting that courts reviewing
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agency action under the APA must take “due account . . . of the rule of prejudicial
error”); Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1121 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (“[I]f the agency’s mistake . . . did not prejudice the petitioner, it would be
senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration”.). The Secretary’s finding that SLU
is liable for at least $2,816,029 is supported by substantial evidence.
B. Errors Based on Confidence Level and Sample Size
In reviewing the Secretary’s calculation of liability as stated in the final audit
determination, “the task of the reviewing court is not to determine whether the accounting
method employed by the Secretary is better or more accurate than the method proposed
by [the petitioner], but rather, whether it is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.” Trs.
of Calif. State Univ, 74 F.3d at 966.
Nothing in Title IV or the Department’s regulations mandates a particular
computing method for final audit determinations. Nor is there any binding authority
prescribing a minimum sample size or confidence level. The most SLU offers to
contradict the Secretary’s calculation of liability is “recommended” language referencing
a higher confidence level in non-binding Department guidance documents, and a nonmandatory formula applied by the OIG in its audit of a different university. But these
documents did not require the Secretary to overturn the FSA’s otherwise statistically
reliable and valid calculation of liability.
The assumptions underlying the final audit determination’s statistical analysis and
the calculations upon which it depended were explained in detail in the evidence before
the Secretary, including in an appendix to the final audit determination and a declaration
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from a statistical expert employed by the OIG. See R. at 240-48; 3863-64. SLU did not
rebut this evidence or offer any other affirmative evidence to demonstrate that the
statistical methodology employed in the final audit determination was invalid or
unreliable. Nor did SLU offer an alternative calculation of its liability, despite having the
opportunity to perform a full-file review.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the Secretary’s calculation of liability was
neither arbitrary nor capricious. See GoJet Airlines, LLC v. F.A.A., 743 F.3d 1168, 117071 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that agency action is not arbitrary or capricious unless the
agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that runs contrary to the evidence
before it, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or a
product of agency expertise); see also Chauffeur’s Training School, Inc. v. Spellings, 478
F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming the Department of Education’s assessment of
liability where its statistical calculation and analysis was explained in record and “[t]he
School was free to offer competing statistical evidence (which it did not do) and to argue
any claimed defects in the Department’s analysis”).
C. Alternative Request to Remand
The Court likewise rejects SLU’s alternative request to remand the matter to
correct purported errors in the calculation of liability with regard to particular students.
The Court agrees with the Department that it was SLU’s burden to demonstrate any
errors in the calculation of its liability during the administrative proceedings. 34 C.F.R. §

- 33 -

668.116(d) (placing burden on petitioner to show each expenditure questioned or
disallowed was proper).
SLU claims it met this burden by submitting its Student-by-Student Analysis. But
as discussed above, the Student-by-Student Analysis merely argued that each of SLU’s
award adjustments could be retrospectively justified under section 1087tt(a) or other
provisions of Title IV. Because these post-hoc justifications did not demonstrate that
SLU complied with Title IV before disbursing federal funds, the Student-by-Student
Analysis did not satisfy SLU’s burden to demonstrate any expenditure was proper.
And SLU has not identified any other specific error in the Secretary’s calculation
that would warrant a reduction in liability. With respect to the sole error initially
identified by SLU, regarding Student GR-2-043, SLU has not contested the Department’s
explanation that liability was correctly assessed because, without the benefit of a section
1087tt(a) adjustment, this student’s EFC disqualified him for a Pell Grant. Therefore,
there is no basis for remand.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Secretary’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and reflects application of the proper legal standards.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the relief which Plaintiff St. Louis University
seeks in its Complaint and in its Memorandum in Support of its Request for Relief is
DENIED. (Doc. Nos. 1 & 41.)

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the final decision of the U.S. Secretary of
Education is AFFIRMED.
A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

_______________________________
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 17th day of March, 2015.

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