Crusoe v. Dormire

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM re: 1 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Eli Crusoe. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 1/7/14. (KKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ELI CRUSOE,

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Petitioner,
vs.
DAVE DORMIRE,
Respondent.

Case No. 4:11-CV-1501 (CEJ)

MEMORANDUM
This matter is before the Court on the petition of Eli Crusoe for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
I.

Procedural Background

Petitioner Eli Crusoe is presently incarcerated at the Jefferson City Correctional
Center pursuant to the sentence and judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis. On April 13, 2007, a jury found petitioner guilty of second-degree assault, in
violation of § 565.050, Mo.Rev.Stat., and armed criminal action, in violation of §
571.015.

Resp. Ex. B at 52-55.

The trial court sentenced petitioner as a prior

offender to concurrent three-year and twenty-year terms of imprisonment,
respectively. On June 17, 2008, the Missouri Court of Appeals summarily affirmed
petitioner’s convictions and sentences. State v. Crusoe, 261 S.W.3d 620 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008).
Petitioner filed a timely motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 29.15, which the post-conviction court denied without an
evidentiary hearing. On October 19, 2010, the Missouri Court of Appeals summarily
affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Crusoe v. State, 328 S.W.3d 321 (Mo.

Ct. App. 2010). On August 30, 2011, petitioner timely filed this petition for relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
II.

Factual Background

On February 4, 2005, Jimmie Stevenson, Jr., (Jimmie) and his girlfriend Ashley
Britt went to petitioner’s home in St. Louis City to finalize a deal for a used car that
Jimmie sold to petitioner. Jimmie’s father, Jimmie Stevenson, Sr. (Mr. Stevenson),
drove the couple to petitioner’s home and waited outside in his truck. Resp. Ex. A, Tr.
180. Petitioner’s brother and a man named Arnett Bowers were in the home when
Jimmie and Ashley arrived.
Ms. Britt testified that Jimmie and petitioner went into another room to talk.
She did not hear any raised voices or sounds of disagreement. Tr. 217. When Jimmie
returned to the living room, he and Ms. Britt left the house through the front door.
Jimmie testified that someone in the house called his name. He turned and went back
in while Ms. Britt remained on the porch. Jimmie testified that he has no memory of
anything that happened in the house once he stepped through the door. Tr. 233-34.
Ms. Britt and Mr. Stevenson testified that they saw petitioner strike Jimmie on the head
with a pistol. Tr. 199, 179. Jimmie fell down and petitioner continued to strike Jimmie
on the head with the pistol. Ms. Britt testified that she tried to get back into the house
but the front door was locked so she used a shovel to break a window. The front door
was opened from inside and petitioner and his brother dragged Jimmie out to the front
lawn.
Petitioner testified that he told Jimmie and Ms. Britt to leave his house because
tempers were flaring.

Tr. 314.

According to petitioner, they left but almost

immediately a window was broken and Jimmie was back in the house, swinging a

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steering wheel lock at petitioner. Petitioner stated that he feared for his life. Tr. 315.
He testified that blocked one blow with his hand and sustained a fracture. Petitioner’s
brother joined the fight and they punched Jimmie multiple times; at one point,
petitioner used a 2 by 4 to hit Jimmie. Tr. 320. He testified that Jimmie kept getting
back up and petitioner was frightened by the younger man’s aggression. According to
petitioner, Jimmie left the house under his own power. Petitioner called the police to
report a burglary. Tr. 321. No steering wheel lock was recovered from the scene.
Mr. Bowers testified that Jimmie demanded money from petitioner and refused
to leave. Jimmie and petitioner started “tussling” and petitioner “picked him on up and
threw him out of the house.” Tr. 278-79. Mr. Bowers did not see Jimmie with a
weapon in his hands. Tr. 283. He did see petitioner hitting Jimmie with a board. Tr.
286.
Jimmie sustained serious injuries to his skull and required hospitalization. He
testified that he continued to experience blurred vision in one eye, persistent pain, and
short-term memory problems.

Tr. 236-37.

Petitioner testified that he sustained

damage to both hands. There was expert testimony that the injuries to petitioner’s
right hand were consistent with holding a pistol and striking someone in the manner
Ms. Britt described. Tr. 357-58.
Additional facts will be included as necessary to address the merits of petitioner’s
claims for relief.
III.

Legal Standard

When a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings,
habeas relief is permissible under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), only if the state court’s determination:

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(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)-(2).
A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established law if “it applies a rule
that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or if it
confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the
Supreme Court] but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141
(2005). “The state court need not cite or even be aware of the governing Supreme
Court cases, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision
contradicts them.’” Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Early
v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). “In the ‘contrary to’ analysis of the state court’s
decision, [the federal court’s] focus is on the result and any reasoning that the court
may have given; the absence of reasoning is not a barrier to a denial of relief.” Id.
A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established law if
“the state court applies [the Supreme Court’s] precedents to the facts in an objectively
unreasonable manner,” Payton, 125 S. Ct. at 1439; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
405 (2000), or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from
[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or
unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.”
Id. at 406. “Federal habeas relief is warranted only when the refusal was ‘objectively
unreasonable,’ not when it was merely erroneous or incorrect.” Carter v. Kemna, 255
F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11).
IV.

Discussion
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Ground 1: Presence of Rifle/Failure to Declare Mistrial
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred “in allowing the State to use the
SKS semi-automatic rifle that had been excluded from evidence in a pre-trial hearing.”
Defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude two pistols and an assault
rifle seized from petitioner’s home. The trial court granted the motion with respect to
the assault rifle. Resp. Ex. B at 22-24. Despite the court’s ruling, however, the assault
rifle remained on a table that the jurors passed as they entered the court room.
During Ms. Britt’s testimony, the prosecutor retrieved one of the pistols from the table
and defense counsel noticed the assault rifle there as well. Counsel moved for a
mistrial, arguing that the jurors would know the rifle was associated with petitioner’s
case because the prosecutor had just retrieved another weapon from the same table.
The trial court disagreed, noting that the evidence table was very far away from the
bench and jury box. Tr. 200. During the next recess, the court had the rifle removed
from the court room, had other evidence bags placed on the table, and told the
prosecutor to move the State’s evidence to counsel table.
On direct appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred in denying his
request for a mistrial, while here he asserts that the trial court erred in “allowing” the
State to “use” the rifle. The claim as presented in the petition is refuted by the record
in that, far from allowing use of the rifle, the court excluded it. To the extent that
petitioner intends to assert that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
mistrial, the claim fares no better. As the Missouri Court of Appeals noted, “a mistrial
is a drastic remedy and is to be exercised only in those extraordinary circumstances
in which the prejudice to the defendant cannot otherwise be removed.” Resp. Ex. E
at 2.

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[T]he trial court was in the best position to determine the prejudicial effects, if
any, of the rifle remaining in the courtroom during the first part of the trial.
When brought to the court’s attention, the rifle . . . was removed during a jury
recess. In addition, the court took corrective measures [to reduce prejudice].
Id. at 3.
The trial court’s decision to deny the request for a mistrial did not deny
petitioner due process and a fair trial. See LaFrank v. Rowley, 340 F.3d 685, 690 (8th
Cir. 2003) (no prejudice in denying mistrial after two bomb threats disrupted trial
proceedings). Petitioner has failed to show that the state courts’ decision was contrary
to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Petitioner’s first claim for relief will
be denied.
Ground 2: Admission of two handguns
Petitioner claims the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to admit two
handguns into evidence.
Three handguns were seized from petitioner’s home: Exhibit 14 was identified
by Ms. Britt as the weapon petitioner used to strike Jimmie Stevenson; exhibit 16 was
taken from petitioner’s brother; and exhibit 15 was found elsewhere in the house. Tr.
252-53. A police officer showed all three handguns to Ms. Britt in a “gun lineup.” Tr.
255, 258. The court permitted the admission of exhibits 15 and 16 for the limited
purpose of allowing the jury to see which guns were displayed to Ms. Britt. Tr. 257.
The Court of Appeals held that, while the “weapons line up” had marginal relevance,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the guns. Resp. Ex. E at 3.
Questions concerning the admission of evidence are matters of state law and
thus are not cognizable in federal habeas review. Wood v. Lockhart, 809 F.2d 457,
459 (8th Cir. 1987). A state court’s evidentiary ruling will warrant the issuance of a
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habeas writ only where the asserted error resulted in a denial of due process. Id. To
establish a right to relief, the petitioner must show that the evidentiary ruling was “so
gross,” “conspicuously prejudicial,” or “otherwise of such magnitude that it fatally
infected the trial and failed to afford petitioner the fundamental fairness which is the
essence of due process.” Id. (citations omitted).
Petitioner argued on appeal that the jury rejected his self-defense claim because
they saw him as a bad person who possessed an arsenal of weapons. Resp. Ex. C at
12. In order to prevail on his self-defense claim, petitioner needed to establish that
he was not the initial aggressor and that he reasonably believed he was in imminent
danger of death or serious physical injury from Jimmie.

Resp. Ex. B at 38-39.

Considering the evidence as a whole, the jury could have reasonably rejected
petitioner’s self-defense claim without drawing an improper inference from the
handguns. The admission of the handguns was not so prejudicial as to fatally infect
the trial or violate petitioner’s due process rights. Petitioner’s second claim for relief
will be denied.
Ground 3: Failure to instruct the jury
Petitioner claims the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on “defense
of premises.”
Jury instructions involve questions of state law, and petitioner has the burden
of showing that the instructions used constituted a fundamental defect that resulted
in a miscarriage of justice. Robinson v. LaFleur, 225 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Louisell v. Director of Iowa Dept. of Corrections, 178 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th
Cir. 1999) (“Habeas corpus relief may be granted only when an erroneous jury
instruction constituted a fundamental defect that resulted in a complete miscarriage

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of justice, or an omission inconsistent with rudimentary demands of a fair trial.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
Defense counsel proposed a “defense of premises” instruction which stated that
a “person can lawfully use force against another person in defense of premises . . . if
he reasonably believes the other person is committing or attempting to commit the
crime of trespass.” Resp. Ex. B at 45-46. The instruction further provided that, in
defense of premises, “a person is not entitled to use deadly force . . . unless the entry
was made in a violent and tumultuous manner.” Id. Defense counsel argued that the
fact that the window was broken was evidence that Jimmie Stevenson entered in a
violent and tumultuous manner. Tr. 381. The trial court rejected the instruction
because there was no evidence that the window was used for entry. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. “Once the person enters the premises without resistance, . . . the
principles of self-defense apply and the defendant is no longer entitled to a defense of
premises.” Resp. Ex. E at 4.
The state courts determined that there was no evidence that Jimmie Stevenson
trespassed and that petitioner was therefore not entitled to the defense of premises
instruction. This determination is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law; neither is it based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
Accordingly, petitioner’s third claim for relief will be denied.
Ground 4: Sentencing error

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Petitioner claims that the trial court considered improper factors when it
sentenced him to twenty years for armed criminal action.1
The presentence investigation report recommended that petitioner serve two
concurrent three-year terms of imprisonment. Tr. 431. The trial court expressed
concern that the investigation did not take into account the degree of impact on the
victim. The court also noted that petitioner continued to strike Jimmie Stevenson once
he “went down” and did not “seize the opportunity” to back off. Tr. 433-34. Petitioner
contends that these factors were relevant only to the assault conviction and were
improperly considered to determine his sentence for the armed criminal action. He
argues that trial court’s consideration of these factors was improper because the jury
acquitted him of first-degree assault.
Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal but asserted it in his Rule
29.15 motion for post-conviction relief.

On appeal from the denial of relief, the

Missouri Court of Appeals determined that the claim was waived. Resp. Ex. I at 4.
Alternatively, the court noted that the claim was refuted by the record: proper
sentencing considerations include the impact of the crime on the victim, the nature of
the offense, and the history and character of the defendant.
557.036.3, Mo.Rev. Stat.)

Id. at 5 (citing §

Furthermore, the sentence was within the permissible

range of punishment and was consistent with the State’s recommendation.
Under Missouri law, appellate review of sentencing errors is a matter to be
raised on direct appeal. Hufft v. State, 759 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
Missouri law does not allow a movant to challenge trial court errors in a post-conviction

1

The range of punishment for second-degree assault is a term not to exceed
seven years and for armed criminal action a term of not less than three years. Resp.
Ex. I at 2 n.1.
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motion, absent rare and exceptional circumstances. Fenton v. Dormire, 4:07CV1595DJS, 2010 WL 3733923 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2010) (citing Phillips v. State, 214 S.W.3d
361, 364 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)).

Thus, petitioner failed to properly present his

sentencing claim to the state courts.
It is well established that “[t]o be eligible for federal habeas corpus relief, a state
prisoner must first exhaust his state law remedies and fairly present the facts and
substance of his habeas claim to the state court.” Herndon v. Norman, 4:09CV1889
TCM, 2013 WL 1282250 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2013) (quoting Carney v. Fabian, 487 F.3d
1094, 1096 (8th Cir.2007)).

Absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a federal

habeas court may not reach the merits of “procedurally defaulted claims in which the
petitioner failed to follow applicable state procedural rules in raising the claims.”
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338 (1992). Petitioner procedurally defaulted this
claim and cannot satisfy the cause and prejudice requirements. Furthermore, even if
the claim were properly before the Court, petitioner has failed to show that the state
courts’ decision with respect to his sentence was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence.
V.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that petitioner has failed
to establish that he is entitled to relief based on state court proceedings that were
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or based
upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner has also failed to make
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Therefore, the Court will

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not issue a certificate of appealability. See Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir.
1997).
___________________________
CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 7th day of January, 2014.

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