Ballard v. City of St. Louis et al

Filing 87

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that each party may file a supplemental brief on the issue of qualified immunity relating to Ballard's excessive force claim no later than September 27, 2013. Each party may file a response no later th an October 7, 2013. Parties shall properly support any facts asserted in their briefing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the September 9, 2013 trial setting is vacated, and this case will be reset for trial, if necessary, following the Court's ruling on summary judgment. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 8/19/13. (LAH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
(I’)SLA BALLARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:11 CV 1553 RWS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In a 17 count complaint, Plaintiff (I’)sla Ballard has sued Defendants for violations of his
constitutional rights and Missouri law. All claims arise out of Ballard’s arrest on June 12, 2009,
and his subsequent prosecution. Defendants move for summary judgment on several grounds.
Ballard, who is proceeding pro se, opposes summary judgment.
After reviewing the record, it appears that Defendants may be entitled to summary
judgment on Ballard’s excessive force claim on the grounds of qualified immunity.1 In § 1983
actions, qualified immunity protects a government official from liability “unless the official’s
conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 501 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The standard “gives ample room for mistaken
judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

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In their motion for summary judgment Defendants cite Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F. 3d 868 (5th Cir. 1996), for the
argument that Ballard’s excessive force claim is barred because he pled guilty to resisting arrest and assaulting
police officers during the incident at issue. Here, however, Defendants have not provided sufficient evidence
regarding the extent and necessity of the force they applied during the incident. The affidavits of Defendants
Vaughn, Ogilvie, Lovelady-Armstrong, and Henderson simply conclude that they “were able to subdue Plaintiff
after a physical altercation.” Therefore, on this record, it is not clear whether Ballard’s excessive force claim would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his arrest or conviction. See Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996).

Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court asks the
following two-part question: (1) whether the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether
the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the offending conduct. Brown v. City of
Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001)). The Court may decide which determination to make first, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 235–36 (2009), and “the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless the answer to
both of these questions is yes.” McCaster v. Clausen, 684 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 2012).
At the time of Ballard’s arrest in 2009 it was clearly established that an arrestee enjoyed
the right to be free from excessive force during an arrest. Henderson, 439 F.3d at 503. In 2011,
the Eight Circuit made it clear that an excessive force inquiry must focus on the force applied
rather than the resulting injury. Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 931, 936 (8th Cir. 2005).
However, at the time of Ballard’s arrest, it was unclear whether an officer violated the rights of
an arrestee by applying force that caused only de minimis injury. Id. at 908. If Ballard only
suffered de minimis injuries during his arrest, then Defendants may be entitled to qualified
immunity on the excessive force claim. See Id.; see also McClennon v. Kipke, 821 F. Supp. 2d
1101 (D. Minn. 2011).
Because Defendants did not raise the issue of qualified immunity in their motion for
summary judgment, I cannot grant summary judgment at this time. However, under Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2), the a court can “grant the motion on grounds not raised by a
party,” but only after “first giving notice and a reasonable time to respond.”
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that each party may file a supplemental brief on the issue
of qualified immunity relating to Ballard’s excessive force claim no later than September 27,
2013. Each party may file a response no later than October 7, 2013. Parties shall properly
support any facts asserted in their briefing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the September 9, 2013 trial setting is vacated, and
this case will be reset for trial, if necessary, following the Court’s ruling on summary
judgment.

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RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 19th day of August, 2013.

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