Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Baker et al

Filing 65

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCLUSION Based on evidence presented at trial, this Court finds and concludes that Troy Baker, Sr. possessed testamentary capacity on March 7, 1991 when he executed a beneficiary designation in favor of Mary Baker and, further, that Mary Baker did not exercise undue influence over Mr. Baker causing him to make the designation. The March 7, 1991 beneficiary designation was therefore valid and lawful and will be upheld. For these reasons, the Court will dismiss the Crossclaim, enter judgment in favor of cross-defendant Mary Baker and against cross-plaintiffs Deborah A. Baker and Troy L. Baker, Jr., and order the Clerk of the Court to disburse the interpleaded funds in the Court registry to Mary Baker. An appropriate order and judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Charles A. Shaw on 8/1/2013. (NCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARY BAKER, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:11-CV-1789 CAS

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This matter is before the Court following a one-day bench trial held on April 8, 2013. This
is a dispute over the proceeds of a Metropolitan Life Insurance Company policy issued to decedent
Troy L. Baker, Sr. The main issue for determination is whether Mr. Baker was mentally competent
to execute a change of beneficiary designation in March 1991 that changed the sole beneficiary of
the Policy from his daughter, defendant and cross-plaintiff Deborah A. Baker, to his former spouse,
defendant and cross-defendant Mary Baker, and whether Mary Baker unduly influenced Mr. Baker’s
actions. Having considered the pleadings, trial testimony and exhibits, the Court hereby makes and
enters the following findings of fact ands conclusions of law, in accordance with Rule 52 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) filed a Complaint in Interpleader
(“Complaint”) in this Court on October 13, 2011, naming as defendants Mary Baker, Deborah A.
Baker, and Troy L. Baker, Jr. (Complaint in Interpleader, Doc. 1).

2. At issue are the proceeds of a MetLife life insurance policy issued to Troy L. Baker, Sr.
(sometimes referred to as “Mr. Baker”) in the principal amount of $13,988.00. (Doc. 1-1, Ex. A,
Part 1 to MetLife’s Complaint in Interpleader).
3. The MetLife policy (the “Policy”) was issued to Mr. Baker in connection with his
employment with General Motors Corporation, and pursuant to an employee welfare benefit plan
established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”)
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.
4. The MetLife Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) establishes the right of a Plan
participant such as Mr. Baker to name his or her beneficiary, and states that benefits will be paid to
the beneficiary. (Doc. 1-2 at 42, Ex. A Part 2 to Complaint in Interpleader).
5. The most recent Beneficiary Designation form on file with MetLife is dated March 7,
1991 and designates defendant Mary Baker as the sole primary beneficiary of the life insurance
benefits at issue. (Trial Ex. B).
6. The prior beneficiary designation form on file with MetLife is dated July 22, 1990 and
designates defendant Deborah Baker as the sole primary beneficiary of the life insurance benefits
at issue. (Trial Ex. C).
7. The next prior beneficiary designation form on file with MetLife was signed on June 28,
1988 and designates defendants Deborah Baker and Mary Baker as coequal primary beneficiaries
of the life insurance benefits at issue. (Trial Ex. D).
8. Mr. Baker died on December 26, 2009 when the Policy was in full force and effect.
Shortly thereafter, Mary Baker submitted a statement of claim to MetLife for the insurance proceeds
pursuant to the most recent beneficiary designation which Mr. Baker executed on March 7, 1991.
(Complaint at ¶¶ 14-16).
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9. Mr. Baker’s adult children, Deborah Baker and Troy Baker, Jr., sent a letter to MetLife
accusing Mary Baker of fraud and requesting that MetLife withhold payment of the Policy proceeds
to Mary on that basis. (Doc. 1-8, Ex. G to Complaint).
10. After receiving the letter, MetLife filed its Complaint in Interpleader and deposited the
Policy proceeds and accrued interest into the Court registry, and has been dismissed from the case.
(See Order of Feb. 15, 2012 (Doc. 17) and Preliminary Order in Interpleader and for Dismissal and
Discharge of Apr. 24, 2012) (Doc. 26)).
11. Deborah Baker and Troy Baker, Jr. filed a Cross Claim against Mary Baker alleging that
Mr. Baker was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease when he made Mary Baker his beneficiary on
March 7, 1991, that Mary unduly influenced him and, accordingly, the beneficiary designation to
Mary is void. (Cross Claim, Doc. 9, ¶ 15).
12. Mr. Baker and Mary Baker were married from June 1983 until April 1990 when they
divorced. (Tr. Transcript at 3, ll. 1-12).
13. Mary Baker testified that the divorce was caused because Mr. Baker wanted to move to
Moberly, Missouri, where some of his family lived, and she was unable to do that. (Trial Tr. at 33,
ll. 10-17). Mary testified that she had begun seeing differences in Mr. Baker after five or six years
of marriage, including that he was forgetful and she thought he might have a nervous breakdown
after serving as executor of his father’s estate. (Id. at 32, ll. 17-25 to 33, ll. 1-6). Mary testified that
she “told him I would give him a divorce, but I wanted him to first go the doctor and find out what
was going on with him.” (Id., ll. 18-23).
14. In January 1990, Mr. Baker underwent a psychiatric evaluation at Barnes Jewish
Hospital. The evaluation report states that his chief complaint was “trouble remembering things.”
(Tr. Ex. 1 at 3). The report states that Mary Baker reported that beginning four years prior, Mr.
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Baker began having “slowly progressive difficulties with memory and thinking.” (Id.) The report
provides these details concerning the history of Mr. Baker’s condition:
These problems have continued to the point now that Mr. Baker gets mixed up
writing checks, while working with machinery in the house (he doesn’t remember
where the switch is to turn it off), he doesn’t remember where the phones are, he
needs to figure out how to turn off the hose, he forgets where he left his car, he may
forget where he was driving if it is out of the neighborhood. His remote memory is
also not as good as it used to be, although we do not have good confirmation since
his wife has only been married to him for 6 years. The patient saw Dr. Richard Sohn
approximately one and one-half to two years ago who reported that a CT Scan and
EEG was normal.
In addition to the memory problems, his wife reports that his judgement [sic] is not
as good as it used to be in terms of problem solving. She reports that he is not aware
of the date and not as good with remembering dates of events. He also gets confused
over the ages of his children. Mr. Baker still is able to take care of his own bodily
functions and does dress himself though it takes him a long time. He is still
interested in his hobbies of tinkering, reading the newspaper and watching TV,
although he is not as good at fixing things as he had been in the past.
(Tr. Ex. 1 at 3; Tr. at 25, ll. 5-25 to 26, ll. 1-18).
15. Mr. Baker’s psychiatric evaluation report of January 1990 stated the following under the
heading of “Mental Status Examination”:
The patient is a mildly upset, nervous appearing man who appears slightly older than
his stated age of 56. His flow of speech reveals a normal rate, normal rhythm, no
loose associations of flight of ideas. He does have word-finding difficulties. His
affect is mildly upset, but not depressed. No suicidal or homicidal ideation. He did
get upset when his wife and I talked outside the room while he was clock drawing
(because he didn’t want us talking behind his back). Thought content without
delusions, hallucinations or any Schneiderian symptoms. Oriented x 2. Memory and
orientation: Short Blessed Test, 17 errors out of possible 28 (missed month,
backward numbers, month backwards and only remembered John brown of the John
Brown phrase).
(Tr. Ex. 1 at 4).

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16.

Mr. Baker’s psychiatric evaluation report of January 1990 concluded with the

“Impression” of “History consistent with DAT” [Dementia of the Alzheimer’s Type]. (Tr. Ex. 1 at
4).
17. Mary Baker testified that the evaluating doctor did not say Mr. Baker needed to be
treated for Alzheimer’s related issues (Tr. at 25, ll. 2-4), and in January 1990, Mr. Baker did not
show any signs of confusion about who his family members were, the names of his children and
grandchildren, how many children or grandchildren he had, or the nature and extent of the property
he owned. (Trial Tr. at 26, ll. 19-25 to 27 at ll. 1-14).
18. Mary Baker testified that following the divorce, Mr. Baker continued to live with her in
her home in Festus, Missouri until June 1990, including a ten-day period while Mary was out of
town, during which he took care of the house, including mowing the grass, and helped a neighbor
build rabbit hutches. (Tr. at 34, ll. 4-10). Mary testified that she and Mr. Baker “liked each other,
you know, we had no animosity toward each other,” even after the divorce. (Tr. at 34, ll. 22-25).
19. In June 1990, Mr. Baker told his daughter, Deborah Baker, that he wanted to come live
with her in her home in North Carolina. Deborah Baker traveled to Missouri and moved Mr. Baker
to North Carolina. (Tr. at 60, ll 1-25 to 61, ll. 1-14). Mr. Baker lived with Deborah for almost three
months and then moved into a rental town home next door where he lived alone. (Tr. at 61, ll. 1522). Deborah Baker’s teenage sons would often, but not always, spend the night with him. (Tr. at
65, ll. 5-14).
20. Mr. Baker had a bank account while he lived in North Carolina, and Deborah Baker was
on the account with him. (Tr. at 63, ll. 13-23). Mr. Baker went to adult day care four days a week
while he was in North Carolina. (Tr. at 64, ll. 1-8). On weekends, Mr. Baker often went fishing with
a neighbor, sometimes on the beach and sometimes in a boat. (Tr. at 67, ll. 4-19).
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21. On July 22, 1990, Mr. Baker executed a MetLife Designation of Beneficiary form that
made Deborah Baker the sole beneficiary of the Policy. (Tr. Ex. C). Previously, Mary Baker and
Deborah Baker were coequal primary beneficiaries of the Policy under a June 28, 1988 Designation
of Beneficiary form. (Complaint, Ex. D). Deborah Baker testified it was Mr. Baker’s decision to
name her as beneficiary, that she did not tell him to name her as his beneficiary, and she believed
that he had the mental capacity to make a decision like that “because of all his specifics he wanted
done with it.” (Tr. at 87, ll. 7-17).
22. Deborah Baker testified that in March of 1991, Mr. Baker’s long-term memory was good
as to things in the past, but his short term memory was bad. (Tr. at 67, ll. 20-25 to 68, ll. 1-16).
23. Deborah Baker testified that from January 1991 through March 5, 1991, she talked with
Mr. Baker about his finances, and believed that he “pretty much” understood what she was talking
about. (Tr. at 75, ll. 15-21). During this time period, Deborah believes that Mr. Baker signed “a
couple of checks,” although he was “shaky” and “trembling.” (Tr. at 79, ll. 24-25 to 80, ll. 1-17).
When asked if Mr. Baker had the mental ability to know what he was doing in terms of writing a
check, Deborah responded, “Maybe at that moment,” if she told him what to do. (Tr. at 80, ll. 2125). Deborah did not believe Mr. Baker would know how to write a rent check unless she told him
to, and this was true with all of his financial matters. (Tr. at 81, ll. 1-5).
24. Deborah Baker never applied for a guardianship or conservatorship for Mr. Baker in
North Carolina. (Tr. at 81, ll. 6-9). Mr. Baker’s doctors “pulled his driver’s license” in North
Carolina. (Tr. at 64, ll. 21-22).
25. While he lived in North Carolina, Mr. Baker called Mary Baker every two or three weeks
to talk. (Tr. at 8, ll. 2-8). They would talk about what he’d done and going to the beach, and she
would tell him what was going on in the family. (Tr. at 35, ll. 18-25 to 36, l. 1). Mary testified that
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Mr. Baker didn’t seem happy living in North Carolina, that he was depressed, and said the “kids was
getting on his nerves.” (Tr. at 36, ll. 2-5).
26. Mr. Baker had a step-daughter, Cheryl Schwartz, from a prior marriage. Mr. Baker had
married Cheryl’s mother, Virginia Baker, when Cheryl was five years old. (Tr. at 89, ll. 1-11).
Cheryl had a close relationship with Mr. Baker, who she considered “more a father to me than my
own.” Cheryl continued to have a close relationship with Mr. Baker after her mother died, saw him
regularly after her mother’s death, and continued to stay in touch with both Mr. Baker and Mary
Baker after they married. (Tr. at 89, ll. 16-25, to 90, ll. 1-9).
27. Cheryl Schwartz testified that around the time Mr. Baker and Mary Baker divorced, Mr.
Baker was able to make change, buy things at stores and drive a car. Mr. Baker never said anything
that made Cheryl think he did not understand who his family members were, or that he was confused
about the names or relationships of his family members, or what property he owned. Cheryl never
observed any signs of hallucinations. (Tr. at 91, ll. 2-18).
28. Not long after Mr. Baker moved to North Carolina, he called Cheryl Schwartz and told
her that he was unhappy there. Cheryl testified that Mr. Baker “mentioned the children a lot, about
how they bothered his things, and the food he ate.” (Tr. at 92, ll. 2-13).
29. In late November 1990, Cheryl Schwartz went to visit Mr. Baker in his town home in
North Carolina. Cheryl stayed with Mr. Baker for a week. (Tr. at 95, ll. 1-5). Cheryl testified that
Mr. Baker’s mental state then was about the same as at the time of the divorce. (Id., ll. 18-22).
30. While she was visiting him in November 1990, Mr. Baker told Cheryl that he wanted
to leave North Carolina and “come home.” (Tr. at 96, ll. 1-5). Mary Baker testified that Mr. Baker
also called his sister, Ruth Johnson, and told her he was unhappy and depressed. (Tr. at 36, ll. 2325).
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31. Mr. Baker later called Mary Baker and told her he didn’t like being in North Carolina,
that “they wasn’t treating him good,” (Tr. at 8, ll. 14-15), he didn’t have much food and they “was
spending all of his money and he didn’t have any money.” (Tr. at 10, ll. 2-6). Mary never suggested
to Mr. Baker that he move back to Missouri. (Tr. at 36, ll. 6-8). In late December 1990, Mr. Baker
asked Mary Baker to come down to North Carolina and “get him out of there because he was very
unhappy.” (Tr. at 9, ll. 7-8, 22-25). Mary Baker agreed to do that. (Tr. at 96, ll. 18-21).
32. On March 3, 1991, Mary Baker, Cheryl Schwartz and a woman named Mary Blume
arrived in North Carolina to bring Mr. Baker back to Missouri. (Tr. at 8, ll. 12-25; at 10; ll. 13-19;
at 96, ll. 22-24). Cheryl testified that Mr. Baker was very glad to see them and couldn’t wait to
leave. (Tr. at 97, ll. 9-13). Cheryl Schwartz and Mary Baker testified that Mr. Baker was concerned
that Deborah Baker might try to stop him from leaving. (Id. at 97, ll. 14-17; at 38, ll. 2-21).
33. On March 5, 1991, while they were still in North Carolina, Mary Baker and Mr. Baker
went to an attorney obtained through a United Auto Workers (“UAW”) Legal Services referral, Mr.
Baker consulted with the attorney, and then executed a durable power of attorney naming Mary
Baker as his attorney in fact. (Joint Statement of Facts, ¶ 5; Tr. at 11, ll. 17-25, to 12, ll. 1-12; Tr.
at 38, ll. 22-25, to 39, ll. 1-11; Tr. Ex. 4). They also stopped at Mr. Baker’s bank, where he closed
his account. (Tr. at 12, ll. 17-25).
34. Cheryl Schwartz testified that when they traveled to North Carolina and back to Missouri
with Mr. Baker, his mental state was the same as it had been in November 1990. (Tr. at 96, ll 22-25
to 97, ll. 1-8). Cheryl testified Mr. Baker was not confused about who his family members were,
or the names or ages of his children or grandchildren, and did not express any confusion about what
sort of assets he owned, or what accounts or vehicles he had. (Tr. at 98, ll. 21-25 to 99, ll. 1-7).

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35. On March 7, 1991, after they returned to St. Louis, Mr. Baker asked Mary Baker to take
him to make a change of beneficiary designation on the MetLife Policy. (Tr. at 40, ll. 1-18). Mary
Baker testified that on that date, Mr. Baker was able to take care of himself and dress himself, (id.,
ll. 19-23), and did not appear confused about who his family members were, what sort of property
he owned, or seem hesitant or confused about making the beneficiary designation. (Tr. at 41, ll. 415).
36. Mary Baker testified that Mr. Baker also changed the beneficiaries of his Certificates of
Deposit and Individual Retirement Accounts, and that he said he “wanted to change everything.”
(Tr. at 13, ll. 7-12). There is no indication in the record that Mary Baker was made the beneficiary
of any of Mr. Baker’s other assets.
37. Mary Baker testified that Mr. Baker’s mental state on March 7, 1991, was about the same
as it was in January 1990, and “[m]ight actually have been a little better because he understood what
was happening to him. He wasn’t as confused about what was going on.” (Tr. at 41, ll. 16-22).
38. When Mary Baker went to get Mr. Baker from North Carolina, she did not know whether
he would come back and live with her. She thought he wanted to go to Moberly, Missouri where
his brothers and sisters were. (Tr. at 39, ll. 15-25). After they arrived in Missouri, Mr. Baker told
Mary he knew that as time went on, he would get worse, and asked if she would take care of him.
Mary agreed to do so, and that is how he ended up living with her. (Tr. at 42, ll. 10-14).
39. Mary Baker testified that Mr. Baker was still very concerned that Deborah Baker might
take some action to try and make him return to North Carolina. (Tr. at 42, ll. 15-20). Mr. Baker and
Mary talked with a UAW attorney who suggested that Mary establish a guardianship over Mr.
Baker. (Id. at 42, ll. 11-22). Mary Baker testified that it was Mr. Baker’s wish that she become his
guardian. (Id. at 14, ll. 2-12; at 18, ll. 21-25; at 43, ll. 23-25 to 44, ll. 1-5). Mary Baker filed a
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Petition for Appointment of Guardian and Conservator in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County,
Missouri on March 15, 1991. (Tr. Ex. 5).
40. Prior to the guardianship hearing, Mary Baker took Mr. Baker to Paul F. Hintze, M.D.,
an internist, to be evaluated. (Tr. at 28, ll. 12-25). Dr. Hintze signed a written Deposition of
Medical Professional which stated a diagnosis of “Dementia, Alzheimer’s type,” and listed the
following symptoms or actions of Mr. Baker that Dr. Hintze observed that caused him to make this
diagnosis:
Inability to state correct date, or month
Inability to drive a car without getting lost (by history)
Cannot subtract 7 from 100
Cannot recall 3 objects for 5 minutes
Cannot find his way in and out of unfamiliar building without help
(Tr. Ex. 6 at 5, ¶¶ 9-10). Dr. Hintze opined that Mr. Baker was partially incapacitated and partially
disabled, (id., ¶ 11), but was not an incapacitated person. (Id., ¶ 11). The Deposition defined the
term “partially incapacitated person” as: “One who is unable by reason of any physical or mental
condition to receive or evaluate information or to communicate decisions to the extent that he lacks
capacity to meet, in part, essential requirements for food, clothing, shelter, safety or other care
without court ordered assistance.” (Id. at 1-2, ¶ c).
41. Later in the Deposition, Dr. Hintze opined that Mr. Baker was disabled, rather than
partially disabled. (Tr. Ex. 6 at 6, ¶ 17). The Deposition defined the term “disabled person” as:
“One who is unable by reason of any physical or mental condition to receive and evaluate
information or to communicate decision to such an extent that the person lacks ability to manage his
financial resources.” (Id. at 1, ¶ a.) Dr. Hintze opined that Mr. Baker was “unable to manage money
– cannot add or subtract.” (Id. at 7, ¶ 19).

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42. Mary Baker testified that Mr. Baker testified at his guardianship hearing that he wanted
Mary to be appointed as his guardian, and she was appointed as guardian on August 1, 1991. (Tr.
at 43, ll. 23-25 to 44, ll. 1-8). Mary also testified that it was Mr. Baker’s idea to change the
beneficiary designation on his life insurance policy, because he “was mad at” Deborah Baker and
Troy Baker, Jr., and “didn’t want them to have anything.” (Tr. at 40, ll. 1-9). Mary testified that she
did not suggest that he change the beneficiary to her, and that, “You didn’t tell [Mr Baker] much
what to do.” (Id., ll. 1-6). Mary testified that Mr. Baker testified at the guardianship hearing that
he “did not want either of his children to profit from his death.” (Id., ll. 9-13).
43. The county Public Administrator was appointed as the conservator of Mr. Baker’s estate
because Deborah Baker and Troy Baker, Jr. opposed Mary’s appointment as conservator. (Tr. at 44,
ll. 9-17; at 52, ll. 8-13).
44. Mr. Baker lived with Mary Baker in her home from 1991 until 1997, when he went into
a nursing home. (Tr. at 44, ll. 18-22). They never remarried. (Joint Statement of Facts, ¶ 10).
45. Mary Baker continued to serve as Mr. Baker’s guardian until the time of his death in
2009. (Joint Statement of Facts, ¶ 11).
46. Mr. Baker passed away on December 26, 2009. (Tr. Ex. E).
47. The Court finds that Cheryl Schwartz was the most credible of the witnesses, and that
Mary Baker’s testimony was more credible than that of Deborah Baker and Troy L. Baker, Jr. In
particular, the Court credits Cheryl Schwartz and Mary Baker’s testimony about Mr. Baker’s mental
condition in early March 1991, his desire to leave North Carolina and return to Missouri, and his
wish to change the Policy beneficiary to Mary Baker because he was angry at his children and was
grateful to Mary for agreeing to bring him back to Missouri and to take care of him as his condition
worsened.
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48. The Court finds that although Mr. Baker had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease
in 1990 and had some dementia, he was mentally competent to change the beneficiary of his life
insurance policy on March 7, 1991. The testimony of Cheryl Schwartz and Mary Baker was that Mr.
Baker’s mental state was largely unchanged from January 1990 through March 1991, and that in
March 1991 he was able to dress and care for himself, he knew who his family members were, the
names and ages of his children and grandchildren, and was not confused about what sort of assets
he owned. This finding of mental competence is also supported by the testimony of Deborah Baker
that Mr. Baker had the mental capacity to live alone in North Carolina from late 1990 until March
5, 1991, that she was certain he understood what he was doing when he designated Deborah as sole
beneficiary of the Policy on July 22, 1990, and that he “pretty much” understood from January 1991
through March 5, 1991, when she talked with him about his financial matters.
49. The Court further finds that while Mr. Baker had some dementia on March 7, 1991 as
a result of Alzheimer’s disease, all the evidence shows that he had the mental capacity to choose to
change the beneficiary of the Policy, and made a knowing and conscious decision of his own free
will to change the Policy beneficiary to Mary Baker.
50. There is no credible evidence of undue influence by Mary Baker to override and destroy
Mr. Baker’s free will, such that the action of changing the Policy beneficiary was his own, and not
Mary’s. The fact that close in time to Mr. Baker’s execution of the change of beneficiary form on
March 7, 1991 he consulted a UAW attorney in North Carolina prior to giving Mary Baker a durable
power of attorney, and consulted another UAW attorney when he returned to Missouri and sought
to have Mary Baker appointed as his guardian, is further evidence that he was not unduly influenced
by Mary Baker, and voluntarily took the action of changing the Policy’s beneficiary.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, because this action arises under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq., a law of the United States. Further, this is an
interpleader action pursuant to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court also has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 because two or more adverse claimants of diverse
citizenship are claiming entitlement to life insurance benefits interpleaded into the Court registry,
the value of which exceeds $500.
Venue is proper pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1397, and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b), because a defendant resides in this district and a substantial part of the events giving rise
to this action occurred in this district. The parties agree that Missouri law applies to the crossclaim
at issue.
Under Missouri law, the test used for determining whether Mr. Baker as grantor had
sufficient mental capacity at the time he executed the beneficiary designation on March 7, 1991 is
the same test used for determining if a testator had the capacity to execute a will. See Rapp v. Rapp,
238 S.W.2d 80, 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951). “A [testator] is shown to have testamentary capacity when
the evidence reveals that, at the time of the execution of the will or codicil, the [testator] understood
the ordinary affairs of life, the value and extent of [his] property, the persons who are the natural
objects of [his] bounty, and that [he] is giving [his] property to the persons mentioned in the will or
codicil in the manner stated.” Dorsey v. Dorsey, 156 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (cited
cases omitted). If a testator’s testamentary capacity is established, then he “has the right to dispose
of [his] property according to [his] own way of thinking, and it is not for courts or juries to make a

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will or codicil for [him].” Id. (brackets, quotation marks and internal citations omitted). The
Missouri Supreme Court has stated,
[M]ere proof of illnesses, or imperfect memory, or forgetfulness of names and
persons, or old age with its attendant physical and intellectual weaknesses, or mental
confusion, or arteriosclerosis, either [singly] or in combination, unless it further
appears that grantor did not understand the nature of the instant transactions, and did
not with such understanding voluntarily enter into and consummate the transactions,
are insufficient to invalidate [legal documents].
Vineyard v. Vineyard, 409 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Mo. 1966) (quoted case omitted).
“When a [beneficiary designation] is challenged on the grounds the person executing the
instrument lacked testamentary capacity, the proponents of the challenged instrument have the
burden to establish a prima facie case of due execution of the [beneficiary designation] and of the
sound mind of the [grantor] at the time of the instrument’s execution.” Dorsey, 156 S.W.3d at 446.
Mary Baker therefore has the initial burden of proof.
Based on the facts discussed above, the Court concludes that Mary Baker met her initial
burden to establish due execution by Mr. Baker of the Policy beneficiary designation on March 7,
1991, and that Mr. Baker had the mental capacity to execute the beneficiary designation on that date.
Mr. Baker was forgetful and had an imperfect memory, but he knew the nature and extent of his
property, the names of his relations, and the disposition that he wished to make of his property.
To overcome this showing and establish Mr. Baker’s lack of mental capacity or undue
influence by Mary Baker, the burden of proof is on crossclaim plaintiffs Deborah Baker and Troy
L. Baker Jr. to show evidence of mental incapacity or undue influence that is “clear, cogent and
convincing.” See Ulrich v. Zimmerman, 349 Mo. 772, 781 (Mo. 1942). Missouri courts have
defined undue influence as “force, coercion, [or] overpersuasion . . . which destroys the will power
or free agency of a grantor to act. To be effectual to invalidate this change of beneficiary undue

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influence must have been in active exercise at the time of the change, and with such potency that the
change was not the action of [Mr. Baker], but was the act of [Mary].” Rapp, 238 S.W.2d at 91
(internal citation omitted). In other words, Deborah and Troy, Jr. must establish that Mr. Baker was
“unable to act freely in the designation of a beneficiary.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 721
F. Supp. 227, 229 (E.D. Mo. 1989). Evidence of undue influence may be inferred from facts and
circumstances in the case, but the facts and circumstances must be convincing and mere suspicion
of or opportunity for undue influence are insufficient. Rapp, 238 S.W.2d at 91.
Proof of the existence of certain factors may raise a rebuttable presumption of undue
influence. A presumption of undue influence arises if the contesting parties shows that: 1) a
confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between the decedent and the beneficiary; 2) the
beneficiary has been given a substantial benefit by the beneficiary designation; and 3) the beneficiary
was active in procuring the execution of the beneficiary designation. Simmons v. Inman, 471
S.W.2d 203, 206 (Mo. 1971). When supported by probative evidence, the presumption makes a
prima facie case which does not disappear upon the introduction of rebutting evidence and raises an
issue for the fact finder. Id.
Assuming without deciding that such a presumption arose in this case, the Court finds that
Deborah Baker and Troy L. Baker, Jr. have not shown by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that
Mary Baker unduly influenced Mr. Baker to change the beneficiary designation, or that he lacked
the mental capacity to make the designation change on March 7, 1991. The substantial weight of
the evidence presented was that Mr. Baker had the mental capacity to change the beneficiary
designation, and that he did so because he was angry with his children and was grateful to Mary
Baker that she was willing to return him to Missouri as he desired, and that she agreed to care for

15

him as his condition worsened; which she did, allowing Mr. Baker to live in her home for six years
and then continuing to act as his guardian until he passed away another twelve years later.
CONCLUSION
Based on evidence presented at trial, this Court finds and concludes that Troy Baker, Sr.
possessed testamentary capacity on March 7, 1991 when he executed a beneficiary designation in
favor of Mary Baker and, further, that Mary Baker did not exercise undue influence over Mr. Baker
causing him to make the designation. The March 7, 1991 beneficiary designation was therefore valid
and lawful and will be upheld. For these reasons, the Court will dismiss the Crossclaim, enter
judgment in favor of cross-defendant Mary Baker and against cross-plaintiffs Deborah A. Baker and
Troy L. Baker, Jr., and order the Clerk of the Court to disburse the interpleaded funds in the Court
registry to Mary Baker.
An appropriate order and judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

CHARLES A. SHAW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 1st day of August, 2013.

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