Ruppel v. Astrue
Filing
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OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. A separate judgment in accordance with this Opinion, Memorandum and Order is entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Autrey on 2/21/14. (CLA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
THELMA JEAN RUPPEL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:12CV2222 HEA
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s request for judicial review
under 28 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of Defendant denying Plaintiff’s
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
affirms the Commissioner's denial of Plaintiff's application.
Facts and Background
Plaintiff was 52 years old at the time of the hearing on July 26, 2011. She
was born in 1959. Plaintiff is married and lives with her husband and adult
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Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin should be substituted
for Michael J. Astrue as the Defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be taken to continue this
suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
daughter. Plaintiff completed high school. She does not have any other vocational
training. Plaintiff was employed as an institutional cook for 16 years.
Plaintiff suffers from a hereditary disease known as Fuch’s dystrophy which
is related to vision loss. She also has congestive heart failure. Plaintiff testified
that she is able to do light housework but has to take short breaks of about 20
minutes in order to accomplish all chores because she becomes tired and short of
breath. Her daughter helps her with heavy lifting, vacuuming, and drives for her.
The ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: Fuch’s dystrophy
status post cornea transplant, congestive heart failure, and chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (20 CFR 404.1520 (c) ).
A vocational expert also testified. In response to the hypothetical question
posed by the ALJ, the VE testified that there were jobs in the national economy
that Plaintiff could perform.
Standard For Determining Disability
The Social Security Act defines as disabled a person who is “unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738
(8th Cir.2010). The impairment must be “of such severity that [the claimant] is not
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only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
A five-step regulatory framework is used to determine whether an individual
claimant qualifies for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see
also McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir.2011) (discussing the five-step
process). At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is currently
engaging in “substantial gainful activity”; if so, then he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Two, the
ALJ determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment, which is “any
impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the
claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities”; if the claimant
does not have a severe impairment, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)
(4)(ii), 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At
Step Three, the ALJ evaluates whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals
one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the
“listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant has
such an impairment, the Commissioner will find the claimant disabled; if not, the
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ALJ proceeds with the rest of the five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
416.920(d); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Prior to Step Four, the ALJ must assess the claimant's “residual functional
capacity” (“RFC”), which is “the most a claimant can do despite [his] limitations.”
Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir.2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (a)
(1)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). At Step Four, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant can return to his past relevant work, by comparing
the claimant's RFC with the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4) (iv), 404.1520(f), 416.920(a) (4) (iv),
416.920(f); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the claimant can perform his past relevant
work, he is not disabled; if the claimant cannot, the analysis proceeds to the next
step. Id... At Step Five, the ALJ considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and
work experience to determine whether the claimant can make an adjustment to
other work in the national economy; if the claimant cannot make an adjustment to
other work, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Through Step Four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove that he is
disabled. Moore, 572 F.3d at 523. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to establish that the claimant maintains the RFC to perform a
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significant number of jobs within the national economy. Id.; Brock v. Astrue, 674
F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir.2012).
ALJ’S DECISION
Applying the foregoing five-step analysis, the ALJ in this case determined at
Step One that Plaintiff had met the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2014 and that Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since May 5, 2009, the alleged onset date. At Step
Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: Fuch’s
dystrophy status post cornea transplant, congestive heart failure, and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease. At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled in
severity of any impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 and
416.929.
Prior to Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity to perform light work except she needs a clean environment.
At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not able to perform her
past relevant work through the date last insured.
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At Step Five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, pursuant to
20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a).
Standard For Judicial Review
The Court’s role in reviewing the Commissioner’s decision is to determine
whether the decision “‘complies with the relevant legal requirements and is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.’” Pate–Fires v. Astrue,
564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th
Cir.2008)). “Substantial evidence is ‘less than preponderance, but enough that a
reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Renstrom
v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d
520, 522 (8th Cir.2009)). In determining whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision, the Court considers both evidence that supports that
decision and evidence that detracts from that decision. Id. However, the court
“‘do[es] not reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ, and [it] defer[s] to the
ALJ’s determinations regarding the credibility of testimony, as long as those
determinations are supported by good reasons and substantial evidence.’” Id.
(quoting Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir.2006)). “If, after
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reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s
findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.’” Partee v. Astrue, 638 F.3d
860, 863 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th
Cir.2005)). The Court should disturb the administrative decision only if it falls
outside the available “zone of choice” of conclusions that a reasonable fact finder
could have reached. Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir.2006).
Discussion
In her appeal of the Commissioner's decision, Plaintiff makes the following
arguments: (1) The ALJ failed to consider the combined effects of all the
Plaintiff’s impairments; (2) The ALJ posed an incomplete/improper hypothetical
question to the vocational expert; (3) The ALJ improperly found that Plaintiff
could perform light work.
RFC
A claimant's RFC is the most an individual can do despite the combined
effects of all of his or her credible limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. An
ALJ's RFC finding is based on all of the record evidence, including the claimant's
testimony regarding symptoms and limitations, the claimant's medical treatment
records, and the medical opinion evidence. See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959,
969 (8th Cir.2010); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545; Social Security Ruling (SSR)
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96–8p. An ALJ may discredit a claimant's subjective allegations of disabling
symptoms to the extent they are inconsistent with the overall record as a whole,
including: the objective medical evidence and medical opinion evidence; the
claimant's daily activities; the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of medications and medical treatment; and the
claimant's self-imposed restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322
(8th Cir.1984); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 96–7p.
A claimant's subjective complaints may not be disregarded solely because
the objective medical evidence does not fully support them. The absence of
objective medical evidence is just one factor to be considered in evaluating the
claimant's credibility and complaints. The ALJ must fully consider all of the
evidence presented relating to subjective complaints, including the claimant's prior
work record, and observations by third parties and treating and examining
physicians relating to such matters as:
(1) the claimant's daily activities;
(2) the subjective evidence of the duration, frequency, and intensity of the
claimant's pain;
(3) any precipitating or aggravating factors;
(4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication; and
(5) the claimant's functional restrictions.
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The ALJ must make express credibility determinations and set forth the
inconsistencies in the record which cause him to reject the claimant's complaints.
Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir.2005). “It is not enough that the
record contains inconsistencies; the ALJ must specifically demonstrate that he
considered all of the evidence.” Id. The ALJ, however, “need not explicitly
discuss each Polaski factor.” Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1072 (8th
Cir.2004). The ALJ need only acknowledge and consider those factors. Id.
Although credibility determinations are primarily for the ALJ and not the court, the
ALJ's credibility assessment must be based on substantial evidence. Rautio v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 176, 179 (8th Cir.1988).
The ALJ failed to consider the combined effects of all the Plaintiff’s
impairments
The record belies this point set forth by Plaintiff. The RFC was determined
considering all of Plaintiff’s impairments including non-severe impairments (Tr.
16). Here the ALJ discussed each impairment, including the non-severe
impairments. An ALJ has sufficiently considered impairments in combination
when he has separately discussed each impairment, the complaints of pain, and
made a finding that Plaintiff’s impairments did not prevent her from performing
other work (Tr. 17-21). See Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821
(8th Cir. 1992).
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The ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s treating physician to determine her RFC (Tr.
21) and in so doing considered the medical opinion evidence of record. The
opinion of Dr. Feeler, her treating physician and Dr. Deligonul were consistent
with each other regarding limitations on the Plaintiff. The ALJ properly accorded
little weight to Dr. Feeler’s opinion as it was the duty of the ALJ to determine the
incapacity or disability of the Plaintiff.
The substantial evidence of record also demonstrated that Plaintiff’s
impairments improved with treatment. This was clearly indicated through the
medical records reviewed by the ALJ. Plaintiff ‘s alleged disability, in part, was
based on vision problems. The ALJ properly reviewed the medical records and
found that Plaintiff’s cornea transplant improved her vision. Her congestive heart
failure symptoms improved considerably with treatment. Plaintiff was initially
diagnosed with a Class IV congestive heart failure, but with treatment her
congestive heart failure improved to a Class I to II1. With the assistance of
inhalers, Plaintiff’s COPD was considered mild to moderate (Tr. 18, 350). She had
a normal spirometry in July 2011 (Tr. 348-49, 353). Plaintiff’s improvement with
1
Class I is indicative of no limitation of physical activity and ordinary physical activity does not cause
undue fatigue, palpitation, or dyspnea. Class II is indicative of a slight limitation of physical activity. The
patient is comfortable at rest, but ordinary physical activity results in fatigue, palpitation, or dyspnea. See
Heart Failure Society of America, NYHA Classification available at
http://www.abouthf.org/questions_stages.htm (last visited October 12,
2012).
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treatment did not support her subjective allegations of disabling impairments . This
was all properly noted by the ALJ.
Consistent with Polaski, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations of
disabling impairments were not supported by the medical evidence. The medical
records did not support the extent of Plaintiff’s alleged limitations.
The ALJ posed an incomplete/improper hypothetical question to the
vocational expert
The essence of Plaintiff’s argument is that the ALJ improperly determined
the RFC applicable to her. The Eighth Circuit has noted that the “point of the
hypothetical question is to clearly present to the VE a set of limitations that mirror
those of the claimant.” Rose v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 1996), citing
Hogg v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1995). A hypothetical question “must
precisely describe a claimant’s impairments so that the VE may accurately assess
whether jobs exist for the claimant.” Newton v. Chater, 92 F3d 688, 694-95 (8th
Cir. 1996). Here the ALJ referenced the medical records available, the opinions of
physicians, as well as the credible testimony of the Plaintiff in developing the
hypothetical question for the vocational expert.
The ALJ Referenced the past relevant work of the Plaintiff, her current
medical condition from the records of her surgery, assessments and treatments of
her heart condition (Tr.p 21-24) and set forth credible limitations from the
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testimony of Plaintiff that were consistent with the with the other credible evidence
of record. This was based upon the substantial evidence of the record.
The ALJ improperly found that Plaintiff could perform light work
The court, consistent with its duty has reviewed the entirety of the record
and has found that the ALJ incorporated into Plaintiff’s RFC those credible
impairments and restrictions, and found Plaintiff capable of a range of light
work (Tr. 20). “It is the claimant’s burden, and not the Social Security
Commissioner’s burden, to prove the claimant’s RFC.” Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217
(citing Anderson, 51 F.3d at 779). The vocational expert testified in response to a
hypothetical question that incorporated the same limitations as the RFC, that such
an individual could perform work as a house keeping cleaner, a cashier II, and a
cafeteria attendant. The vocational expert also testified that an individual with
20/60 left eye vision and 20/80 right eye vision could still perform the same jobs.
The ALJ was justified in relying on the vocational expert’s testimony in finding
Plaintiff not disabled . See Nelson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 1314, 1317 (8th Cir. 1991).
Conclusion
After careful review, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The decision will be affirmed.
Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security is affirmed.
A separate judgment in accordance with this Opinion, Memorandum and
Order is entered this same date.
Dated this 21st day of February, 2014.
______________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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