Compion v. Astrue

Filing 21

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge is SUSTAINED, ADOPTED, and INCORPORATED herein. (Doc. No. 19.) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/13/2013. (NCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT COMPION,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:12CV003 AGF-TIA

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Currently before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge Adelman to whom this matter was referred for recommended disposition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b). On February 4, 2013, Magistrate Judge Adelman filed his
recommendation that the Court deny Plaintiff=s request to reverse the decision of the
Commissioner. Plaintiff has filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation.
Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate’s determination that the ALJ
properly assessed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). The ALJ determined
the RFC as follows:
[Plaintiff] has the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). [Plaintiff] will be limited in terms of his
reading and writing skills [Plaintiff] will be able to understand, remember
and carry out at least simple instructions and non-detailed tasks. [Plaintiff]
will be able to respond appropriately to supervisors and co-workers in a task
oriented setting where contact with others is casual and infrequent.
[Plaintiff] should not work in a setting which includes constant and/or
regular contact with the general public. [Plaintiff] should not perform work

which includes more than infrequent handling of customer complaints. (Tr.
16-17).
Upon review of the record before it, the Court is satisfied that the Magistrate Judge
applied the proper legal standard in assessing the ALJ’s RFC determination and that the
ALJ included those additional limitations that he found supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole.
With respect to Plaintiff’s asserted limitation arising from “intermittent explosive
disorder and anger outbursts,” the Court concludes that the ALJ properly analyzed the
medical records and opinions and accounted for this limitation by restricting the work
setting described in the RFC and in his hypothetical to the Vocational Expert. In addition,
the record supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not leave work due to the
alleged “intermittent explosive disorder and anger outbursts.” Further, although Plaintiff
correctly asserts that the diagnosis of mental conditions such as “intermittent explosive
disorder” necessarily relies on reports from the patient, the record supports the ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff’s testimony and reports with respect to this disorder were not
credible and conflicted with the reports of his fiancé.
In addition, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s objections to the greater weight given to the
findings and opinions of Dr. Thomas Spencer, an examining consultative expert, than to
the findings and opinions of Dr. Patrick Ourwari, Plaintiff’s a treating physician. The
Court concludes that the ALJ properly accounted for his decision to discount some of Dr.
Ourwari’s opinions and to credit Dr. Spencer’s opinions. See Anderson v. Astrue, 696
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F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that “ALJ may discount or even disregard the
opinion of a treating physician where other medical assessments are supported by better or
more thorough medical evidence, or where a treating physician renders inconsistent
opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions”) (internal quotation omitted); 20
C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(2).
Similarly, the Court is satisfied that the record supports the ALJ’s credibility
determinations and that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the ALJ properly
assessed Plaintiff’s credibility with respect to subjective complaints. See McCoy v.
Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320,
1321-22 (8th Cir. 1984)). For example, Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ failed to give
proper consideration to Plaintiff’s work record is without merit. Although a consistent
work record weighs in favor of a claimant’s credibility, Aubuchon v. Astrue No. 4:09 CV
465HEA/ DDN, 2010 WL 2870566, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Jul. 19, 2010) (citing Burnside v.
Apfel, 223 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2000)), here the ALJ explicitly found that Plaintiff had a
“poor” prior work record. (Tr. 17.)
Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ failed to carry out his duty to develop the record
because he discounted the IQ test results in the record but did not order an additional IQ
test. In fact, the ALJ noted that Dr. Spencer, the consultative examiner who performed the
test, opined that the IQ score of 62 should be considered in light of his observations of and
interactions with Plaintiff. Given the non-adversarial nature of Social Security disability
proceedings, an ALJ has a well-established duty to develop a full and fair record. Byes v.
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Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2012). Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s reliance on Scott ex
rel. Scott v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2008), in support of his position is
misplaced. Unlike the situation in Scott, there is no indication on this record that the IQ
test results were outdated. Compare Scott, 529 F.3d at 824 (explaining that the ALJ has a
duty to supplement the record with an additional IQ test and may not rely upon a test result
not “sufficiently current” to comply with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P.,
App. 1 § 112.00D.10) with Hall v. Astrue, 460 Fed. Appx. 609, 610 (8th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that the ALJ is required to order medical examinations only if the medical

records before him do not provide sufficient evidence to determine whether the claimant is
disabled). In this case, there is no indication that the IQ test was not current, and the ALJ
merely took into account the consultative examiner’s opinion that the test results should be
considered in light of the other relevant factors and findings in the medical record.
Therefore, the Court concludes that this objection also lacks merit.
Finally, with respect to the ALJ’s assessment of the alleged limitations arising from
Plaintiff’s complaints of back pain as related to sitting and standing restrictions, the Court
is satisfied that the ALJ’s conclusions are fully supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. As the Magistrate Judge noted, no treating physician or other medical
professional recommended that Plaintiff restrict the time he spent sitting or standing or that
he lie down intermittently throughout the day. Moreover, the medical records do not
indicate that Plaintiff ever reported to his physicians his asserted need to lie down
throughout the day or that he had difficulty sitting and standing. Therefore, the ALJ’s
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decision to discount this alleged limitation is supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, careful consideration of the record in this
case, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and Plaintiff’s objections
thereto, the Court concurs with the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that the
Commissioner=s decision in this matter should be affirmed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the United
States Magistrate Judge is SUSTAINED, ADOPTED, and INCORPORATED herein.
(Doc. No. 19.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED.
A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

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AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 13th day of March, 2013.

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