Hunter v. Salem, Missouri, City of et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 20 MOTION to Strike 16 Answer to Complaint, 17 Answer to Complaint (to strike jury demands) filed by Plaintiff Anaka Hunter. (Rothert, Anthony)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ANAKA HUNTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF SALEM, MISSOURI, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:12-CV-4 ERW

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE JURY DEMANDS
In support of her motion to strike Defendants’ jury demands, Plaintiff submits the
following:
I.

Background

On January 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants seeking declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and nominal damages. (Doc. # 1).
Defendant City of Salem, Missouri, has filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 18). Defendants
Board of Trustees of the Salem, Missouri, Public Library and Glenda Wofford have filed
separate answers. (Doc. # 16, 17). In their respective answers, Board of Trustees and Wofford
demand a trial by jury. Id.
II.

Argument

Because Plaintiff seeks only equitable relief, Defendants are not entitled to a jury trial on
any issue in this case. There is no right to a jury trial on equitable claims under § 1983. In
addition, a claim for nominal damages is insufficient to trigger the Seventh Amendment right to
a trial by jury.
There is no statutory right to a jury trial under section 1983. City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). In the absence of a statutory right to trial
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by jury, the question is whether or not the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to trial by jury
on the § 1983 claim at issue. Id. at 708. “It is settled law that the Seventh Amendment does not
apply” in some contexts, including “suits seeking only injunctive relief” and “suits seeking only
equitable relief.” Id. at 719. Because Plaintiff seeks only equitable relief against Defendants,
they have no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII.
The Supreme Court adopted a two-prong inquiry to determine whether the Seventh Amendment
requires a jury trial. First, a court must determine whether the cause of action was tried at law at
the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted or is analogous to a cause of action that was so
tried. City of Monterrey, 526 U.S. at 719. If it was not, then there is no right to a jury trial. If it
was, then the court must next determine “whether the particular trial decision must fall to the
jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
The Monterrey Court concluded that the Seventh Amendment applies not only to
common-law causes of action, but also to statutory causes of action “‘analogous to common-law
causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to
those customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty.” Id. at 708-9 (emphasis added, internal
citations omitted). Thus, the Court held “that a § 1983 suit seeking legal relief is an action at law
within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment.” Id. at 709. The holding was premised on the
settled proposition that “the Seventh Amendment jury guarantee extends to statutory claims
unknown to the common law, so long as the claims can be said to ‘soun[d] basically in tort,’ and
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seek legal relief.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In Monterrey, the Court found a right to a jury
trial because the plaintiff sought damages. “Damages for a constitutional violation are a legal
remedy.” Id.
This case does not pass the first prong’s inquiry. The question is whether Plaintiff's
claims against Defendants not only “sound in tort” but also constitute a “suit for legal relief.” Id.
at 709-10. Plaintiff is aware of no precedent that would support a proposition that her equitable
claims are, or are analogous to, “common-law cause[s] of action ordinarily decided by English
law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or
admiralty.” Id. at 708-9 (internal citations omitted). To the contrary, this is a classic example of
an equity case.
In addition, Monterrey makes clear that challenges like this are not within the province of
a jury. The Court noted that its holding concerning the right to jury trial “does not extend” to a
case raising “a broad challenge to the constitutionality of [laws].” Id. at 722. In such cases, the
determination of whether the purposes of the challenged law were legitimate or whether the
purposes, though legitimate, were furthered by the ordinances, “might well fall within the
province of the judge.” See id. Plaintiff’s claims assert just the type of broad challenge that the
Supreme Court recognized to be within the province of the judge.
Even were the first prong on the inquiry satisfied, the second prong would not be. The
constitutional issues Plaintiff has raised in this case are not “particular trial decision[s] [that]
must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in
1791.” Id. at 708. Accordingly the issues are within the province of the court, not a jury.
The conclusion does not change because of Plaintiff’s request for nominal damages. The
issue of whether a defendant has a right to a jury trial in a § 1983 case alleging violation of the
First Amendment and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages is
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thoroughly discussed in Doe v. Barrow County, Georgia, No. 2:03-cv-156-WCO, 2005 WL
6033020 (N.D. Ga.). Based on the reasoning of the Barrow County Court, the cases upon which
that Court relied, and applicable precedent from the Eighth Circuit, there is no right to a jury trial
on any claim in this case.
As discussed, supra., any right to a jury trial in a § 1983 case comes from the Seventh
Amendment, which preserves the right of trial by jury in suits where the value in controversy
exceeds twenty dollars. Barrow County, at *2. (quoting U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII). “Where
both damages and equitable relief are involved, moreover, the court will try any equitable issues
while the jury will try the damage issue.” Id. (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198
(1974)). Barrow County is similar to this case. There the Plaintiff sough declaratory judgment,
an injunction, and a judgment for nominal damages. Id. at *3. The Court observed,
An action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief is equitable in
nature and not entitled to a jury trial. See Wilson v. Bailey, 934
F.2d 301, 305 n. 4 (11th Cir.1991). As a result, plaintiff's first two
requests for relief arise in equity and are issues solely for the
court’s determination. Plaintiff’s request for an award of nominal
damages, however, requires further consideration[.]
Id.; see also Black v. Boyd, 248 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1957)(an action that is equitable by nature is
not triable by a jury). The issue then becomes whether a claim for nominal damages is a claim in
excess of twenty dollars because a smaller claim is insufficient to make the Seventh Amendment
right to trial by jury applicable. Barrow County, at *3 (citing Burt v. Abel, 583 F.2d 613, 619 n.7
(4th Cir. 1978)).
Regardless of whether Plaintiff’s request for nominal damages is in law or in equity, it is
not a claim in excess of twenty dollars. One dollar is recognized as an appropriate value for
nominal damages. Corpus v. Bennett, 430 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 2005). “’Nominal damages are
damages in name only, trivial sums such as six cents or $1.’” Utah Animal Rights Coalition v.
Salt Lake City, 371 F.3d 1248, 1264 (10th Cir. 2004)(McConnell, J., concurring)(quoting 1 Dan
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B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 3.3(2), at 294 (2d ed. 1993)). They are “‘a trivial sum—
usually one cent or one dollar—awarded to a plaintiff whose legal right has been technically
violated but who has proven no damage.’” Borrow County, at *5 (quoting Howard v.
International Molders & Allied Workers Union, 779 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986)). “They
do not purport to compensate for past wrongs. They are symbolic only.” Utah Animal Rights
Coalition, 371 F.3d at 1263 (McConnell, J., concurring.).
Nominal damages arise from a violation of a constitutional right where there are no
actual damages alleged. Plaintiff has expressly limited her potential relief to nominal damages.
She has made no demand for actual damages nor made any attempt to allege that any actual
damages exist. See Barrow County, at *5. Instead she has asserted a claim only to nominal
damages, which courts presume to follow from a constitutional violation even where no actual
damages have been alleged. Id. at *4; see Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540
F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2008).
To the extent there is any concern that the nominal damages claimed in this case could
exceed the trivial, symbolic amount that is generally presumed, Plaintiff expressly represents to
this Court that she does not seek nominal damages of more than one dollar in this case. This is
consistent not only with the common law understanding of nominal damages but also with
Plaintiff’s allegations in this case and the Eighth Circuit model jury instruction on nominal
damages.
Because the amount in dispute is less than twenty dollars, there is no Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial for any party in this case. In addition, there is also no statutory
right to a jury trial in this case.

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III.

Conclusion

Because Defendants are not entitled to a jury trial on any issue raised in Plaintiff’s
Complaint, their jury demands should be stricken.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Anthony E. Rothert
Anthony E. Rothert, #44827MO
Grant R. Doty, #60788MO
454 Whittier Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63108
[phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 12, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of the Court using the CM/ECF system and a copy was made available electronically to counsel
for defendants, who are an electronic filing participant.
/s/ Anthony E. Rothert

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